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This thesis seeks to redress the inconsistent and inadequate treatment of gender-based 
claims for refugee status by decision-makers, focusing exclusively on the controversial 
cultural practice of Female Genital Mutilation (FGM). Drawing upon the experiences of 
the UK, Canada and the US, argument is made that if FGM-based refugee claims were 
subjected to the protective processes implemented within specialised domestic violence 
courts, the refugee determination process (RDP) would be more inclusive and 
accommodating of the needs of claimants in a similar fashion to the approach taken in 
respects of domestic violence. To this end, the thesis argues that culturally recognized 
practices do not lose their criminal label just because some people demand that they be 
labelled as such. Secondly, it allows us to examine the protective functions of specialised 
domestic violence courts and programme for victims and how that shift in attitudes and 
practices might be replicated or mirrored in some shape or form within the RDP. The 
examined jurisprudence has revealed that the task of defining a just, humanitarian 
standard for a grant of refugee status in FGM cases is complex. Coupled with procedural 
and evidential barriers, in an era where States have tightened border controls, FGM 
claimants face great challenges in obtaining refugee status. The thesis reveals that the 
RDP is failing to meet the challenging claims brought by women, and that claimants are 
let down, both by an extremely poor standard of decision-making and by a non-gendered 
RDP. It contributes to the literature on FGM, particularly in respect of its categorization 
as a gender-based form of violence within the RDP. The thesis proposes several 
recommendations to potentially make the RDP gender-sensitive and accommodating for 
FGM claimants. Whilst the therapeutic objectives underpinning the specialised domestic 
violence courts cannot be directly transposed into the refugee determination context, 
lessons and best practices from these courts can help to inform a realistic and reasoned 









Affirmance without Opinion (AWO) 
Asylum and Immigration Tribunal (AIT) 
Board of Immigration Appeal (BIA) 
Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) 
Centre for Gender and Refugee Studies (CGRS) 
Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (Torture Convention) 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW) 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) 
Country of Origin Information (COI) 
Country of Origin Service (COIS) 
Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) 
Derbyshire Criminal Justice Board (DCJB) 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women (DEVAW) 
Derby Dedicated Domestic Violence Court (DDDVC) 
Domestic Violence Justice Strategy (DVJS) 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(ECHR) 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
European Union (EU) 
Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) 
Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) 
House of Lords (UKHL) 
Immigration Appeals Tribunal (IAT) 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) 
XI 
 
Immigration Refugee Board (IRB) 
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 1991 (IRPA) 
Independent Domestic Violence Advocates (IDVA) 
Information Technology (IT) 
Ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) 
Internal Flight Alternative (IFA) 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 
International Criminal Court (ICC) 
International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda (ICTR) 
International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
International Refugee Organisation (IRO) 
Leeds Domestic Violence Cluster Court (LDVCC) 
National Organization for Women (NOW) 
New Asylum Model (NAM) 
Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) 
Particular Social Group (PSG) 
Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) 
Reasons for Refusal Letter (RFRL) 
Refugee Determination Process (RDP) 
Refugee Women’s Resource Project (RWRP) 
The Dade County Domestic Violence Court (DCDVC) 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) 
United Kingdom (UK) 
United Kingdom Border Agency (UKBA) 
United Kingdom Immigration Appeal Authority (IAA) 
United Nations (UN) 
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugee Status (UNHCR) 
United States (US) 
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) 
XII 
 
United States Department of Justice (DOJ) 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) 
Victim/witness assistance programme (VWAP) 
West London Specialised Domestic Violence Court (WLSDVC) 
Witness Services (WS) 






























“I hereby declare that for 2 years following the date on which the thesis is deposited in 
Research Student Administration of Ulster University, the thesis shall remain confidential 
with access or copying prohibited. Following expiry of this period I permit 
 
1. the Librarian of the University to allow the thesis to be copied in whole or in 
part without reference to me on the understanding that such authority applies to 
the provision of single copies made for study purposes or for inclusion within the 
stock of another library. 
 
2. the thesis to be made available through the Ulster Institutional Repository and/or 
EThOS under the terms of the Ulster eTheses Deposit Agreement which I have 
signed.* 
 
IT IS A CONDITION OF USE OF THIS THESIS THAT ANYONE WHO CONSULTS 
IT MUST RECOGNISE THAT THE COPYRIGHT RESTS WITH THE UNIVERSITY 
AND THEN SUBSEQUENTLY TO THE AUTHOR ON THE EXPIRY OF THIS 
PERIOD AND THAT NO QUOTATION FROM THE THESIS AND NO 
INFORMATION DERIVED FROM IT MAY BE PUBLISHED UNLESS THE 






I. Background and Summary of Thesis 
 
Domestic refugee status determination procedures have often been criticised for 
producing inconsistent decisions; according to the literature it has become almost 
common for the phrases ‘refugee roulette’ or ‘asylum lottery’ to be employed by those 
who perceive that the outcomes of decisions on refugee claims differ widely irrespective 
of their essential similarities.1 In fact, Corien Jonker, Chair of the Council of Europe 
Parliamentary Assembly Migration and Refugee Committee in 2009 stated that “poor 
quality decision-making and inconsistency of asylum decisions result in unfairness and 
suffering for asylum seekers. It creates an “asylum lottery” and is an affront to the rule of 
law”.2 Such inconsistency may itself be bad enough because it undermines an inherent 
aspect of our sense of justice – that like cases be treated alike. It can also generate further 
concerns: if a decision-making process produces disparate outcomes, then surely some of 
its decisions must also be substantively incorrect, either because genuine claims have been 
rejected and/or non-genuine claims accepted. Various reasons may be proffered as to why 
such inconsistencies arise: the inherent difficulties of the asylum decision problem; 
difficulties in determining credibility; the number of decision-makers required; the 
inherent personal bias of decision-makers; the quality or lack of training and expertise 
among decisions-makers; the different accounts and quality of evidence relied upon: and 
the scope for differential assessments as to whether or not such evidential material 
establishes risk on return to a county of origin. Given the potential scope for inconsistency 
                                                 
1 See, Prasad R, “The Asylum Lottery”, The Guardian, 25 January 2002. For a detailed empirical study of 
inconsistent decision-making see, Ramji-Nogales J, et al, “Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum 
Adjudication”, 60 Stanford Law Review 457, (2007); Immigration Advisory Service, “The Refugee 
Roulette: The Role of Country Information in Refugee Status Determination”, (2010), available online via 
the UNHCR Ref World website at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4b62a6182.html, (last accessed 
29/12/16). 
2 Council of Europe, Press Release 493, (2009) (noting the comments of Corien Jonker). This release is 
available online via the Council of Europe website at 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1462649&Site=DC (last accessed 1/2/17). 
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in refugee determination, debate has tended to focus on what, if anything can be done to 
reduce, or at least, ameliorate the risk of it.3 
 
II. Purpose, Aim and Significance 
 
The aim of this thesis is therefore to redress the inconsistent and inadequate treatment of 
gender-based claims for refugee status by decision-makers, focusing exclusively on the 
controversial cultural practice of Female Genital Mutilation (FGM). 4 As a recognised 
human rights violation,5 the nature and incidence of FGM is overwhelming.6 The practice 
involves the partial or complete removal of the external female genitalia for non-medical 
                                                 
3 Thomas R, “Consistency in Asylum Adjudication: Country Guidance and the Asylum Process in the United 
Kingdom”,  20 International Journal of Refugee Law 489, (2008), at 489; Ramji-Nogales, supra note 1, at 
378-89; Legomsky S, “Learning to Live with Unequal Justice: Asylum and the Limits to Consistency”, 60 
Stanford Law Review 413, (2007), at 413-74; Taylor M, “Refugee Roulette in an Administrative Law 
Context: The Déjà vu of Decisional Disparities in Agency Adjudication”, 60 Stanford Law Review 475, 
(2007), at 475-501. 
4 Hereafter referred to as FGM. For a comprehensive overview of FGM please refer to, UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), “Too Much Pain: Female Genital Mutilation & Asylum in the 
European Union - A Statistical Overview”, (2013), available online 
at http://www.refworld.org/docid/512c72ec2.html  (last accessed 10/2/16).  
5 FGM is a form of violence committed against women and girls which is in itself both a cause and 
consequence of gender inequality. FGM has been documented as discrimination based on sex because it is 
rooted in gender inequalities and power imbalances between men and women and inhibits women’s full and 
equal enjoyment of their human rights. It is a form of violence against girls and women, with physical and 
psychological consequences. It deprives girls and women from making an independent decision about an 
intervention that has a lasting effect on their bodies and infringes on their autonomy and control over their 
lives. See, WHO, “Violence Prevention: Promoting Gender Equality to Prevent Violence against Women”, 
(2009). This document is available online at 
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/44098/1/9789241597883_eng.pdf (last accessed 10/7/17) and 
WHO, “Eliminating Female Genital Mutilation: An Interagency Statement”, (2008), at 10. This document 
is available online at 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/csw/csw52/statements_missions/Interagency_Statement_on_Elimin
ating_FGM.pdf (last accessed 11/7/17). 
6 Conroy M, “Refugees Themselves: The Asylum Case for Parents of Children at Risk of Female Genital 
Mutilation”, 22 Harvard Human Rights Journal 109, (2009), at 110. For further information on the origins 
of FGM see, Daly C, “The Psychobiological Origins of Circumcision” 31 International Journal of 
Psychoanalysis 217, (1950), at 217-36; Lockhat H, “Female Genital Mutilation: Treating the Tears”, 
Middlesex University Press: Hampshire, (2004); Bilotti E, “The Practice of FGM”, USA: Lexington, MA, 
(2000); Shandall A, “Female Circumcision and Infibulation of Females” 5 Sudan Medical Journal 178, 




reasons.7 The age at which FGM is carried out varies.8 The procedure may be carried out 
shortly after birth, during childhood or adolescence, just before marriage or during a 
woman’s first pregnancy.9 The practice often results in lifelong health problems,10 
increased risks during childbirth, psychological trauma,11 and even death.12 Often 
rationalised as a rite of passage into womanhood, FGM is an extreme form of violence 
used to control female sexuality.13 It involves a mixture of religious,14 cultural and social 
                                                 
7 Female Genital Mutilation: WHO/UNICEF/UNFPA Statement. Geneva, World Health Organization, 
1997. See also, WHO, “Eliminating Female Genital Mutilation: An Interagency Statement”, supra note 5 
at 1. 
8 See, Razors Edge, “The Controversy of Female Genital Mutilation: When culture harms the girls - the 
globalisation of female genital mutilation” (March 2005), available online via the IRIN website at 
http://www.irinnews.org/InDepthMain.aspx?InDepthId=15&ReportId=62462 (last accessed 
21/11/16). See also, Cardenas A, “Female Circumcision: The Road to Change” 26 Syracuse Journal of 
International Law and Commerce 291, (1999), at 295. 
9 HM Government, “Multi-agency Practice Guidelines: Female Genital Mutilation”, (2016), at 8. This 
document is available online at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/512906/Multi_Agency_Sta
tutory_Guidance_on_FGM__-_FINAL.pdf (last accessed 10/7/17). See also, See, Razors Edge, supra note 
8; Toubia N, “Female Circumcision as a Public Health Issue” 331 New England Journal of Medicine 712, 
(1994), at 712-16; Dorkenoo E, “Cutting the Rose: Female Genital Mutilation- The Practice and its 
Prevention” Minority Rights Publications: London, (1994), at 10-13; Trueblood L, “Female Genital 
Mutilation: A Discussion of International Human Rights Instruments, Cultural Sovereignty and Dominance 
Theory” 28 Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 437, (2000), at 442. 
10 Lewis H, “Between Irua and Female Genital Mutilation: Feminist Human Rights Discourse and the 
Cultural Divide” 8 Harvard Human Rights Journal 1, (1995), at 13. See also, HM Government, “Multi-
agency Practice Guidelines: Female Genital Mutilation”, supra note 9, at 8-11; Dorkenoo, supra note 9, at 
14; Chalmers B & Hashi KO, “Somali Women’s Birth Experiences in Canada after Earlier Female Genital 
Mutilation”, 27 Birth 227, (2000), at 227-234 & Talle A, “Transforming women into ‘pure’ agnates: aspects 
of female infibulation in Somalia”, in BrochDue V, Rudie I, Bleie T, eds, “Carved Flesh, Cast Selves: 
Gender Symbols and Social Practices”, Berg: Oxford, (1993), at 83-106. 
11 Obermeyer CM, “The Consequences of Female Circumcision for Health and Sexuality: An Update on 
the Evidence”, 7 Culture, Health and Sexuality 443, (2005), at 443-461. See also, Wellerstein J, “In the 
Name of Tradition: Eradicating the Harmful Practice of Female Genital Mutilation” 22 Loyola of Los 
Angeles International and Comparative Law Review 99, (2000), at 108; Cardenas, supra note 8, at 297; 
Dorkenoo, supra note 9, at 24-27; Rahman A & Toubia N, “Female Genital Mutilation: A Guide to Laws 
and Policies Worldwide” Zed Books Ltd: New York, (2000), at 9; Trueblood, supra note 9, at 443. 
12 It is impossible to estimate the number of deaths resulting from female circumcision largely due to the 
fact that the majority of these procedures take place in rural areas where death records are not kept, and 
since the nature of the procedures requires that unsuccessful attempts be concealed from strangers and health 
authorities, only a very small proportion of cases reach hospital. Nevertheless, hospital staff in all the areas 
concerned are very familiar with last-minute and often hopeless attempts to save bleeding, terrified little 
girls. Those who perform the procedures are protected by the community. Invariably when death or infection 
results they are attributed to witchcraft and, not to the operator or the fact that their instruments were non-
sterile. See also, Razors Edge, supra note 8. 
13 Crawley H, “Refugees and Gender: Law and Process” Jordan Publishing Limited: Bristol, (2001), at 176. 
14 The majority of communities, which practice FGM, believe that the procedure is an approved religious 
practice of Islam. In reality, the procedure is a cultural, not a religious practice, which actually predates the 
arrival of both Christianity and Islam in Africa. In Africa, the procedure is performed by Christians 
(Catholics, Protestants, and Copts), Jews, Muslims, Animists, and atheists, although the practice does not 
exist in the teachings of any formal religions. For further information on the religious underpinning and 
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traditions15 associated with preparing for adulthood and marriage,16 and ideal of 
community, modesty and fidelity.17  
     It is estimated that more than 200 million women and girls alive today have undergone 
FGM in countries where the practice is concentrated.18 Furthermore, there are an 
estimated 3 million girls at risk of undergoing FGM every year. Most instances of FGM 
occur in Africa, Asia and the Middle East,19 but FGM is also practiced in Australia, 
Europe, Latin America, New Zealand and North America.20 
                                                 
justification of FGM see, Gruenbaum E, “Sexuality issues in the movement to abolish female genital cutting 
in Sudan”, 20 Medical Anthropology Quarterly, 121, (2006); Dellenborg L, “A Reflection on the Cultural 
Meanings of Female Circumcision: Experiences from Fieldwork in Casamance, Southern Senegal”, in 
Arnfred, S, ed., “Re-thinking sexualities in Africa” Uppsala, Nordic Africa Institute, (2004), at 79-98; WHO, 
“Eliminating Female Genital Mutilation: An Interagency Statement”, supra note 5, at 6; Cutner L, “Female 
Genital Mutilation” 40 (7) Obstetrical and Gynaecological Survey, 437, (1985), at 438; Walker A &Parmar 
P, “Warrior Marks: Female Genital Mutilation and the Sexual Binding of Women” Harcourt: San Diego, 
(1996), at 325 & Abdalla R, “Sisters in Affliction: Circumcision and Infibulation of Women in Africa” 
Lawrence Hill & Co: Connecticut, (1982), at 84. 
15 Beliefs surrounding FGM often run very deep and may appear illogical to outsiders. For example, African 
animist beliefs surrounding the practice have been dismissed simplistically as mere superstitions, whereas 
deeper analysis points to a complex set of ideas which underpin a social system. Some cultures, such as the 
Bambara and the Doga in Mali and the Mossi of Burkina Fasco believe that FGM is necessary, firstly, 
because it will enhance fertility, and secondly because they believe that if a baby’s head touches the clitoris 
during childbirth, the baby will die. See, Dorkenoo, supra note 9, at 34. In other areas, most notably 
Ethiopia, tribes believe that if the clitoris is not removed, it will grow and dangle between the legs, like the 
male genetalia. Coello I, “Female Genital Mutilation: Marked by Tradition” 7 Cardozo Journal of 
International and Comparative Law 213, (1999), at 215. In the Sudan, it is also believed that women are 
naturally polluted, and can only be cleansed, and suited for marriage and childbirth, by being excised. For 
further information on the myths surrounding FGM, see, Assaad M, “Female Circumcision in Egypt: Social 
Implications, Current Research, and Prospects for Change” 11 Studies in Family Planning 1, (1980); Slack 
A, “Female Circumcision: A Critical Appraisal” 10 Human Rights Quarterly 437, (1988), at 447 & 
Dorkenoo E & Elworthy S, “Female Genital Mutilation: Proposals for Change” (3rd ED), Minority Rights 
Group International: London, (1992), at 9. 
16 See, Dellenborg, supra note 14, at 79-98 & Gruenbaum, supra note 14. 
17 For further commentary on the justifications for FGM see, Johnson M, “Making mandinga or making 
Muslims? Debating female circumcision, ethnicity, and Islam in Guinea-Bissau and Portugal”, in Hernlund 
Y, Shell Duncan B, eds, “Transcultural Bodies: Female Genital Cutting in Global Context”, Rutgers 
University Press: New Brunswick, (2007), at 202-223. See also, Talle, supra note 10, at 83-106. See also, 
Almroth L, Almroth-Berggren V, Hassanein OM, Al Said SS, Hasan SS & Lithell UB, “Male Complications 
of Female Genital Mutilation”, 53 Social Science and Medicine1455, (2001), at 1455–1460; Johnson, supra 
note 17; Hernlund Y, “Winnowing Culture: Negotiating Female ‘Circumcision’ in the Gambia”, (2003), 
PhD thesis. University of Washington, Seattle; Ahmadu F, “Rites and wrongs: an insider/outsider reflects 
on power and excision”, in Shell-Duncan B, & Hernlund Y, eds. “Female ‘circumcision’ in Africa: culture, 
controversy and change”, Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Rienner, (2000), at 283-312. 
18 WHO, “Female Genital Mutilation: Prevalence”, (2017), available online via the WHO website at 
http://who.int/reproductivehealth/topics/fgm/prevalence/en/ (last accessed 10/7/17). See also, UNICEF, 
“Female Genital Mutilation/ Cutting: a Global Concern”, (2016). This document is available online at 
http://data.unicef.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/FGMC-2016-brochure_250.pdf (last accessed 10/7/17). 
19 See, UNICEF, “Female Genital Mutilation/ Cutting: a Global Concern, supra note 18. 
20 Ibid. See also, HM Government, “Multi-agency Practice Guidelines: Female Genital Mutilation”, supra 
note 9, at 10. 
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     From the outset it should be noted that the issue of gender persecution will not be 
examined in its totality as that is beyond the scope of the thesis. The focus is on one aspect, 
FGM, but where further consideration of the issue of gender persecution arises it will be 
given due consideration. Thus, whilst this thesis focuses on the practice of FGM, it 
recognises that there is a tendency to assume a gendered approach to refugee 
determination means exclusively addressing the experiences of women. As women and 
girls are disproportionately affected by gender inequality, on account of their unequal 
access to rights, resources, and political power, as well as other gendered power 
imbalances, a focus on women and girls is often necessary. 21  However, the gendered 
experiences of men and the roles of masculinities are increasingly being recognized and 
understood.22 Importantly, this thesis advocates that a gendered approach focuses not on 
individual women and men but on the system which determines gender roles and 
responsibilities, access to and control over resources, and decision-making potentials. 
Thus, this thesis seeks to break down the social and cultural ideas surrounding gender, 
which have conditioned the structures of refugee law. It will examine how FGM as an 
example of gender violence is treated within the Refugee Determination Process.23 In so 
doing it aims to identify areas which require reform, to ensure that victims of FGM and 
resultantly other claimants of gender-based violence have access to a fair and 
accommodating decision-making process, one well-removed from the current ‘lottery’ 
system.  
      The central argument therefore offered is that, if gender-based forms of violence were 
subject to the protective processes implemented within specialised domestic violence 
                                                 
21 For scholar articles on this subject see, Edwards A, “It’s a Man’s World: The Effect of Traditional 
Masculinity on Gender Equality”, (2015), available online at http://www.e-ir.info/2015/03/29/its-a-mans-
world-the-effect-of-traditional-masculinity-on-gender-equality/ (last accessed 1/6/17); Hughes M & and 
Paxton P, “Women, Politics, and Power: A Global Perspective”, (2nd ed), London: SAGE Publications, Inc., 
(2014); Zimmerman D & West C, “Doing Gender”, in Aronson A and Kimmel M (eds.), “The Gendered 
Society Reader”, (5th ed), New York: Oxford University Press, (2014); International Labour Organization, 
“Men and Masculanities -Promoting Gender Equality in the World of Work”, (2013), available online at  
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/-gender/documents/publication/wcms_232755.pdf 
(last accessed 1/8/17); Carpenter C, “Recognizing Gender-Based Violence Against Civilian Men and Boys 
in Conflict Situation”, (2006), available online via the Security Dialogue website at  
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0967010606064139 (last accessed 2/6/17); Alden A, “A 
Continuum of Violence: A Gendered Analysis of Post-Conflict Transformation”, 3 Polis Journal 1, (2010). 
22 Ibid. 
23 Hereafter referred to as the RDP. 
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courts, the RDP could be more inclusive and accommodating of the needs of claimants. 
This proposition firstly reinforces the argument that culturally recognized practices do not 
lose their criminal label just because some people demand that they be labelled as cultural 
practices. Secondly, it allows us to examine the protective functions of specialised 
domestic violence courts and programme for victims and how that shift in attitudes and 
practices might be replicated or mirrored in some shape or form within the RDP, in 
respects of FGM and other gender-based claims. Thus, this thesis posits that like the 
criminal response to domestic violence, existing refugee determination procedures and 
processes need to be reformed to adequately address the complexity of FGM and in 
tandem correct the legal, historical and moral disparities in the protection afforded to 
female refugee claimants. Drawing upon the experiences of three jurisdictions, Canada, 
the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US), this thesis develops and explores 
the framework underpinning the innovative specialised domestic violence courts and aims 
to examine how the shift in attitudes and practices towards domestic violence within the 
domestic criminal justice systems of these case-studies may be transposed within the 
RDP. 
    Context is also important. Criminal law and refugee law at first glance do not appear to 
have a great deal in common since they regulate different realms of interest.24 Criminal 
law, both internationally and domestically is concerned with the punishment of 
perpetrators. Refugee law, on the other hand, is an aspect of human rights law which is 
designed to set out in which circumstances States will extend protection to those 
individuals in fear of persecution.25 However, these two distinct areas of law intersect in 
a number of small and important ways.26 Firstly, it can be argued that within the 
international context, they are inextricably linked, insofar as the same harms form many 
international crimes and fundamental human rights violations, i.e., torture, slavery, and 
                                                 
24 Rikhof J, “Complicity in International Criminal Law and Canadian Refugee Law”, 4 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 702, (2006), at 702. 
25 Ibid. See also, Judgment, Kupreski6 (IT-95-16), Trial Chamber, 14 January 2000, at 586-598 which was 
of the view that the interpretation of persecution in refugee law or human rights law was of little assistance 
to provide parameters for the crime against humanity of persecution.  
26 Unfortunately, due to the vast arguments surrounding the linkages between refugee and criminal law, the 
researcher can only make a small reference to this issue here. However, for more coherent arguments and 
commentary please refer to the sources referred to below.  
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unlawful killings.27 Secondly, they both make use of the exclusion clause contained in the 
1951 Refugee Convention so as to ensure that serious criminals would not obtain the 
benefits of the Refugee Convention.28 Both areas of law are relatively new. Following the 
development of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia29 and 
Rwanda,30 and the International Criminal Court31 issues surrounding gendered aspects of 
persecution32 have become more firmly established and defined. Indeed, it has been 
suggested that the ICC would benefit from guidance outside of the sphere of criminal law 
in terms of defining and addressing the crime against humanity of gender-based violence. 
International refugee law since 1985 has acknowledged gender-based forms of violence. 
This recognition influenced the drafters of the Rome Statute to include gender within the 
list of persecutory grounds in the crimes against humanity provision.33 The cooperative 
linkages between these two spheres of law are irrefutable. International and domestic 
refugee law has explored certain elements of gender-related persecution that until 
recently, were for the most part unexplored in international criminal law.34  Thus, just as 
it has been suggested that judges of the ICC when determining the content of the elements 
                                                 
27 De Than C & Shorts E, “International Criminal Law and Human Rights”, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 
(2009), at 346. 
28 See, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Handbook on Procedures and 
Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the 
Status of Refugees (UN Doc. HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1 (1992)), at 148-150; See also Henkaerts J and Doswald-
Becks L (eds), “Customary International Humanitarian Law”, Volume 1: Rules (Cambridge University 
Press: Cambridge, 2005), at 610-611. For further information on the use of the exclusion clause contained 
in the 1951 Refugee Convention 189 UNTS 137, see, Rikhof, supra note 24. Work by the  UNHCR  includes  
'The  Exclusion  Clauses:  Guidelines  on  their  Application' (December  1996);  'Note  on  Exclusion  
Clauses'  by  the  Executive  Committee  of  the  High Commissioner's  Programme  (30  May  1997,  
Document  EC/47/SC/CRP29);  the  Summary Conclusions  of  the  Lisbon  Expert Roundtable  on 
Exclusion  as  part of the Global  Consultations Rome Statute on  International  Protection  (20 May  2001, 
Document  EC/GC/012Track/1);  the 'Guidelines  on International  Protection:  Application  of  the  
Exclusion  Clauses:  Article  IF  of  the  1951 Convention  relating  to  the  Status  of Refugees'  and  its 
accompanying  'Background  Note  to  the Guidelines'  (4  September  2003,  Document  HCR/GIP/03/05);  
the  'Resettlement  Handbook', 1  November  2004.  Chapter 3.7; and 'Procedural Standards for Refugee 
Status Determination under UNHCR's Mandate', 1 September 2005, chapter 4.8. 
29 Hereafter referred to as the ICTY. 
30 Hereafter referred to as the ICTR. 
31 Hereafter referred to as the ICC. 
32 See, Oosterveld V, “Gender, Persecution, and the International Criminal Court: Refugee Law’s 
Relevance to the Crime Against Humanity of Gender-Based Persecution”, 17, Duke Journal of International 
and Comparative Law 49, (2006). 
33 Oosterveld V, “The Definition of ‘Gender’ in the Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court: A 
Step Forward or Back for International Criminal Justice?”, 18 Harvard Human Rights Journal 55, (2005), 
at 59. 
34 Oosterveld, “Gender, Persecution, and the International Criminal Court”, supra note 32, at 51. 
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of the crime against humanity of gender-based persecution should examine principles or 
rules found within refugee law,35 it is arguable that such an approach has opened the door 
to allow an innovative concept to be examined, such as that proposed in this thesis. 
International refugee law has informed international criminal law, and a clear overlap can 
be found between the two. It is therefore also reasonable and logical to examine how at 
the domestic level, ‘gendered’ criminal processes and procedures can inform the RDP. In 
other words, this concept can shed light on the strengths and weaknesses of the RDP and 
the specialised domestic violence courts inform responses and allow for recommendations 
to be made at all levels. Thus, this is essentially one of the original contributions which 
this thesis will make to the existing literature in this area. Ultimately, without this 
examination and response, root causes underpinning the ‘refugee roulette’ in gender-
based claims for refugee status will not be addressed and State remedies, such as the use 
of gender-guidelines will remain partially effective, at best. Ultimately, whilst this thesis 
postulates that this innovative concept presents challenges, it is nevertheless an 
appropriate concept. Firstly, it represents the changing nature and discourse of the law 
and about violence against women and, secondly the rights of women to be afforded 
equality of access and treated in a gender-sensitive manner within all legal/quasi-judicial 
processes. 
   The examination of whether the RDP would benefit from the protective processes 
implemented within the specialised domestic violence courts must necessarily involve a 
consideration of the wider discussions on the treatment of gender-based violence and the 
procedural and evidential barriers inhibiting women’s access to the RDP. In line with such 
gender scholarship, O’Rourke has argued that the important entry-point for gender 
analysis begins with the visible exclusion of women and experiences disproportionately 
associated with women.36 This is particularly evident within the refugee context. 
                                                 
35 When faced with a question that the Rome Statute, the ICC’s Rules of Procedure and  Evidence, and the 
Elements of Crimes do not answer, the ICC shall first apply “applicable  treaties and principles and rules of 
international law,” and failing that, “general principles of law  derived by the Court from national laws of 
legal systems of the world including, as appropriate,  the national laws of States that would normally 
exercise jurisdiction over the crime, provided  that those principles are not inconsistent with this Statute and 
with international law and internationally recognized norms and standards.” See, Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court art. 7(1)(h), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, 37 I.L.M. 999, 1004 (1998), art. 
21(1)(b)-(c). 
36 O’Rourke C, “Transitional Justice and Gender”, in Lawther C, Moffett L & Jacobs D (eds), “Research 
Handbook on Transitional Justice”, Ewdard Elgar: Cheltenham, (2017), at 117-141. 
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Consequently, the following section aims to contextualize those barriers through an 
examination of the concept and treatment of gender within the sphere of international 
refugee law and its significance.   
 
III. Normative Theoretical Framework 
 
A. Gender Bias in International Refugee Law 
 
In pursuit of its ideal that “human beings shall enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms 
without discrimination”,37 international refugee law has developed to protect those 
individuals who are unjustly persecuted in their homelands. However, the current 
standards for granting refugee status are overly narrow and are consequently insufficient 
to protect those who live in fear of such persecution. The rights of women are often 
overlooked due to a definition of “refugee” that fails to enumerate gender as a persecution 
ground and encompass the type of persecution that women often suffer. The 1951 Refugee 
Convention, the document which established this definition, grants protection to those 
who suffer political persecution in the public sphere. If a woman can establish that she 
has a well-founded fear of being persecuted because of her race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a social group or political opinion as the Convention specifies, she will of 
course be granted protection. However, because women are often restricted by their 
societies to the private sphere and suffer persecution for different reasons than men, they 
are often found ineligible for the Convention's protection.38 
                                                 
37 1951 Refugee Convention or the Refugee Convention, supra note 28. 
38 See Dorlinf K, et al, “Refused: The Experience of Women Denied Asylum in the UK”, (2012), available 
online at 
http://www.scottishrefugeecouncil.org.uk/news_and_events/blogs/1711_refused_the_experiences_of_wo
men_denied_asylum_in_the_uk (last accessed 27/4/16). Some commentators contend that such a 
formulation of persecution denies women's experiences outside the private sphere and erects an 
impenetrable wall between the social and private realms. See, Greatbach J, “The Gender Difference: 
Feminist Critiques of Refugee Discourse”, 1 International Journal of Refugee Law 520, (1989). However, 
a conception of persecution which includes social persecution does not necessarily preclude women's claims 
based on political persecution. The other categories of the Refugee Convention would still apply to women 
who suffer persecution for those reasons. Expanding the definition merely extends protection to those 
women whose persecution is outside the scope of the convention. 
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     Since women are often relegated and restricted to the domestic, private sphere and men 
largely operate within the public, political sphere of life, international law is unable to 
effectively evaluate the gender-related refugee claims of women. This restriction of 
women’s ability to participate in the public sphere of life is most prevalent in traditional 
societies, but it also exists in more developed countries, including the case-studies. 
Arguably, whilst persecution because of gender is widely recognised by human rights 
advocates, the ability to seek refugee status from persecution on account of gender has 
failed to develop accordingly. While part of this lack of development reflects a more 
general failure within the human rights discourse to adequately reflect the persecution of 
women, it also in part results from archaic ideas of who a refugee is39 and political 
motivations.  
     Undoubtedly the relationship between gender and violence is complex. Evidence 
suggests, however, that gender inequalities increase the risk of violence by men against 
women and inhibit the ability of those affected to seek protection.40  As will be discussed 
in greater detail in Chapter One, a key factor inhibiting the protection of women under 
international human rights law is that existing laws identify sexual equality with equal 
treatment.41 Differences in gender roles and behaviours often create inequalities, whereby 
one gender becomes empowered to the disadvantage of the other.42 Thus, in many 
societies, women are viewed as subordinate and have a lower social status, allowing men 
control over, and greater decision-making power than, women.  Such inequalities have a 
large and wide-ranging impact on society. For instance, they can contribute to gender 
inequities in health and access to health care, opportunities for employment and 
promotion, levels of income, political participation and representation and education. 
Often inequalities in gender increase the risk of acts of violence by men against women.  
                                                 
39 Thiele B, “Persecution on Account of Gender: A Need for Refugee Law Reform”, 11 Hastings’s Women’s 
Law Journal 221, (2000), at 222. 
40 World Health Organisation, “Violence Prevention – The Evidence: Promoting Gender Equality to Prevent 
Violence Against Women”, (2009), at 1. This document is available online at 
http://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/violence/gender.pdf (last accessed 3/6/17). 
41 For a comprehensive discussion on issues pertaining to equality within the context of international, 
national and domestic laws please see, McColgan A, “About Discrimination, Equality and the Law”, Hart 
Publishing: London, (2016); Freedman S, “Engendering socio-economic rights”, in Hellum A & Sinding 
Aasen H, “Women’s Human Rights”, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, (2013) at 217-42. 
42 See, World Health Organisation, “Violence Prevention – The Evidence: Promoting Gender Equality to 
Prevent Violence Against Women”, supra note 40 at 3.  
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Thus, it is argued that the promotion of gender equality is a critical part not only of 
violence prevention43 but also of ensuring that women are protected within the RDP.  
     The gender inequity of the current system is further demonstrated by its unjust and 
inconsistent results. Recent figures from the UNHCR reveal that women and young girls 
comprise about fifty percent of any refugee, internally displaced or stateless population.44 
Coupled with the fact that the United Nations45 estimates allege that between seventy and 
eighty percent of the world's refugees are female,46 most of those who are actually granted 
refugee status are male.47 Such disparity is no longer an abstract problem which can be 
ignored, reform is needed. The RDP deals with vulnerable individuals and in the words 
of Mawson, we should remember that, first and foremost, this process is about people's 
lives.48 Consequently, to sufficiently protect the rights of female refugees, this thesis will 
argue that the RDP needs to be reformed, to include the private persecution which women 
suffer on account of their gender. Such procedural reforms, which include a reshaping of 
the very structures and mechanisms currently in use within the case-studies, will ensure 
equitable treatment for female victims of gender-based violence within a gender-sensitive 
and accommodating process. In adding to the discourse in this area, this thesis argues that 
the process by which refugee determination is made is almost as important as the actual 
interpretation of the 1951 Refugee Convention definition. The Refugee Convention 
definition must be a living instrument, where the meaning is constant but the application 
may change over time.49 This thesis will argue (to the extent permissible within the 
                                                 
43 Ibid. 
44 UNHCR, “Women”, (2017), available online via the UNHCR website at 
http://www.unhcr.org/uk/women.html (last accessed 9/4/17). 
45 Hereafter referred to as the UN. 
46 UN, “The World’s Women 1970-1990: Trends and Statistics”, (1991), at 74. 
47 Aeckert A, “Gender in International Refugee Law”, (2008), available online via the Race and Ethnicity 
website at http://race.eserver.org/refugee-law.html (last accessed 4/4/17). See also, UNHCR, “Women”, 
supra note 44.  
48 Mawson A, “Women Fast-Track to Asylum Denial”, (2010), available online at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/feb/26/asylum-fast-tracked-women-refugees (last 
accessed 10/2/17). 
49 See, Sigmarsdottir D, “Refugee Status and Gender-Related Persecution”, B.A Thesis, University of 
Akureyri: Faculty of Law and Social Sciences, (2008), at 13. This thesis is available online at 
https://skemman.is/bitstream/1946/1618/1/Refugee_Status_&_Gender-Related_Persecution.pdf (last 
accessed 10/3/17); Sepet and Bulbul v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, (2003) UKHL 15, at 
section 11 per Lord Bingham. The reasoning of Bingham was adopted from Sedley J in R v. Immigration 
Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Shah, (1997) Imm AR 145, at 152. Bingham also approved of the observation of 
Laws LJ in R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Adan and Aitseguer, (1999) 3 WLR 
1274, that “it is clear that the signatory states intended that the Convention should affront continuing 
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constraints of the thesis) that content and meaning must be widely known and owned by 
the ‘public’50 if it is to have an impact on those who need it most and is to be regarded as 
a legitimate, accommodating and gender-inclusive text. Furthermore, it will be argued 
that a reformed RDP based on the inclusively of ‘gender’, creating a space for the ‘public’ 
to have a say, can also help influence the interpretation of the wording of the Refugee 
Convention definition. Although a full discussion of the legal, political, psychological and 
cultural aspects of the RDP are beyond this thesis and deserve ongoing research; this 
thesis hopes to develop a constructive narrative which challenges the current refugee 
evaluative system, while also highlighting the difficulties that FGM victims face within 
the RDP.  
     The primary area of concern for female refugees is protection. Protection falls into 
three broad categories. The first, which my thesis focuses on, is at the level of refugee 
status determination and the insufficiency afforded to women by the current refugee 
definition under international law. The second issue is that of physical insecurity 
surrounding women refugees not enjoying permanent settlement and the third is at the 
level of programming, where the basic insensitivity of officials during operations inhibits 
fair distribution of food distribution, access to healthcare, education, and employment.51  
Of the three, the easiest to rectify, appears to be the third and some aspects of the second 
category of protection, which is the main thrust of UNHCR Guidelines.
 
 The issues of 
legal protection and durable physical protection, which directly ties in with the former, 
are not easily resolved or tackled. These are deeply rooted in legal discourse; functioning 
and response capacity of the state/administrative machinery; and actions of private actors 
that are either dismissed or implicitly accepted by various states.  Despite the recognition 
and attempts made by UNHCR in this regard, there continues to be a neglect of any such 
formalized approach and acceptance of existing discriminatory policies by the 
                                                 
protection for refugees in the changing circumstances of the present and future world. In our view, the 
Convention has to be regarded as a living instrument.” 
50 In using the term ‘public’, this thesis is referring to all those individuals who play a part in or who will 
utilise the RDP as a means of obtaining protection. 
51 Kelley H, “Report on the International Consultation on Refugee Women” Geneva, 15-19 November 
1988, with particular reference to protection problems”, International Journal of Refugee Law, 
vol.1 (1989), at 237. 
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international community of states in dealing with women refugees.  The following section 
examines how this neglect continues.  
 
B. Gender Issues in the Development of International Refugee Law 
 
The international community’s obligation to asylum seekers is based on the 1951 Refugee 
Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees and the principle of 
non-refoulement. The Refugee Convention defines a refugee as a person who:   
 
owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside 
(her) country of origin and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail 
(herself) of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and 
being outside the country of (her) former habitual residence as a result of such 
events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.52 
 
Although persecution is not defined by the Refugee Convention, the grounds of such 
persecution are listed as race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion. This definition of what constitutes a ‘refugee’ has been highly 
debated given its perception of being a cold war instrument, narrowly defined to contain 
future refugee flows and its failure to address and recognise present day refugee 
movements that may be a result of economic disasters, war, and persecution on account 
of gender.53 The 1951 Convention in its narrowly defined approach, covers civil and 
political rights, and ignores economic, social and cultural rights, which are largely the 
root causes of women seeking protection. Women may be the victims of rape, torture, and 
sexual abuse committed by private and public actors alike that may have social sanction 
in certain situations (FGM being an example of social acceptance in many countries), who 
may also be subjected to such torture by state agencies on account of their gender.54 
                                                 
52 See, 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 28.  
53 See, Crawley, supra note 13, at 4 citing, Goodwin-Gill G, “The Refugee in International Law”, Clarendon 
Press: Oxford, (1983); Hathaway J, “The Law of Refugee Status”, Butterworths: Toronto, (1991) & 
Macdonald A & Blake NJ, “Macdonald’s Immigration Law and Practise in the United Kingdom”, (4th Ed), 
Butterworths: London, (1995). 
54 Raj S, “The Gender Element in International Refugee Law: Its Impact on Agency Programming and the 
North South Debate”, 1 Yearbook of International Humanitarian and Refugee Law 164, (2001), at 166-67.  
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Furthermore, women may flee a country when they are kept from engaging in basic life-
sustaining economic activities primarily on account of their gender and not only on 
account of the recognized grounds of persecution. Consequently, the non-recognition of 
gender as grounds for persecution then specifically leads to an interpretive problem, 
coupled with procedural barriers which results in the denial of refugee status or asylum to 
those genuinely deserving such status.  Clearly then a deficiency exists within the existing 
international legal framework concerning the status of refugees, since it fails to address 
these issues.  
Thus, as the following section will discuss, it is paradoxical that at one level, under a 
general human rights framework international law is expansionary and women’s rights 
are increasingly being addressed. Yet at another, under a male orientated refugee-specific 
framework, women’s claims are often formulated in ways which reflect the decision-
makers understanding of the law rather than the reality of the applicant’s experiences.  
 
C. The Concepts of ‘Gender’ and ‘Gender-Related Persecution’ 
 
Violence against women is a technical term used to collectively refer to violent acts that 
are primarily or exclusively committed against women. Similar to a hate crime, this type 
of violence targets a specific group with the victim's gender as a primary motive. The 
United Nations General Assembly defines ‘violence against women as:  
 
any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, 
sexual or mental harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, 
coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in 
private life.55 
 
As such, gender-based violence both reflects and reinforces inequities between men and 
women and compromises the health, dignity, security and autonomy of its victims. It 
encompasses a wide range of human rights violations, including sexual abuse of children, 
rape, domestic violence, sexual assault and harassment, trafficking of women and girls 
                                                 
55 See U.N. Fourth World Conference on Women, Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women, U.N. 




and several harmful traditional practices, including FGM.56 FGM, as discussed above, is 
inherently gendered and an extreme example of the general subjugation of women. Its 
contrast with male circumcision is obvious: where performed for ritualistic rather than 
health reasons, male circumcision may be seen as symbolising the dominance of the male. 
Thus, whilst FGM may ensure a young woman’s acceptance within the family and society, 
she is only accepted on the basis of institutionalised inferiority.57 In examining this 
controversial practice, this thesis contributes to the literature on FGM, particularly in 
respect of its categorisation as a gender-based form of violence against women. Firstly, it 
reinforces the fact that it a form of violence committed against women which can be 
utilised as a basis for claiming refugee status. Secondly, by examining comparatively how 
such complex forms of violence are accommodated for within the RDP’s of my case-
studies. Thirdly it contributes to the existing literature by comparatively examining how 
decision-makers specifically apply and interpret the Refugee Convention definition and 
gender-guidelines when addressing FGM as a basis for refugee status. 
     Whilst, the existing literature and commentaries on the experiences of refugee women 
has been important in highlighting the marginalization of women within current 
interpretations of international refugee law, it is also problematic. This quandary stems 
from its tendency to be grounded in an analysis of ‘sex’ as the key factor accounting for 
the differential experiences of refugee women rather than the construction of gender 
identity in particular historical, geographical, political and socio-cultural contexts.58 
‘Gender’ refers to the “relationship between women and men based on socially or 
culturally construed and defined identities, status, roles and responsibilities that are 
assigned to one sex or another”, whereas ‘sex’ is a biological determination.59 Thus, 
                                                 
56 UNFPA, “Gender Equality”, (2016), available online via the UNFPA website at 
http://www.unfpa.org/gender/violence.htm (last accessed 1/5/16). Whilst FGM and domestic violence both 
fall under this category, it is important to note from the outset that whilst their distinctive similarity is that 
both these practices reinforce the subordinate position of women, they are also inherently different. Notably, 
as will be discussed more fully in Chapter Three, domestic violence is predominately carried out by men 
against women, whereas women, in order to ensure their survival within patriarchal societies carry out FGM 
on other women. 
57 K & Fornah (2006) UKHL 46 (reasoning of Lord Bingham). 
58 Crawley, supra note 13, at 6. 
59 See, Guidelines on international protection: Gender-related persecution within the context of Article 1A 
(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, HRC/GIP/02/01, 7 
May 2002 (hereafter UNHCR Gender Guidelines), Para 3. 
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gender is not static or innate but acquires culturally and socially constructed meaning 
because it is a primary way of signifying relations of power.60 This thesis posits that any 
analysis or process which provides for the analysis of the way in which gender shapes the 
experiences of female claimants, must therefore contextualise those experiences.61 
Although not exclusive to women and girls, gender-based violence principally affects 
them across all cultures.62 Thus, it has to be recognised that the forms of violence suffered 
by women may be gender specific. The reasons why they are tortured may relate to gender 
specific inequalities or roles, and women and girls’ access to a remedy and reparation for 
the harm they suffered may hold challenges. Thus, understanding the ways in which 
women are violated as women is vital to naming as persecution those forms of harm which 
only/mostly affect women63 and establishing a process which accommodates and 
contributes to this understanding.  
       According to Crawley, gender-specific persecution is therefore a term used to explain 
‘serious harm’ within the meaning of persecution. Gender-related persecution is used to 
explain the basis of the refugee claim.64 A woman may be persecuted as a woman (i.e. 
raped) for non-gender reasons (i.e. because of her political opinion or nationality), not 
persecuted as a woman but still because of gender (i.e. because of her failure to comply 
with societal norms, like covering her face), and persecuted as and because she is a woman 
(i.e. FGM).65 Gender-specific violations do not necessarily constitute persecution because 
of gender and this thesis acknowledges this fact. For example, if a man’s genitals are 
subjected to electric shocks, he is certainly being tortured in a gender-specific manner, 
but it does not follow that he is being persecuted because of his gender. 
                                                 
60 Crawley, supra note 13, at 7. 
61 See, Benjamin A & Murchison L, “Gender-Based Violence: Care and Protection of Children in 
Emergencies”, (2004), at 3-4, available online via the GSDRC Applied Knowledge Services at 
http://www.gsdrc.org/document-library/gender-based-violence-care-protection-of-children-in-
emergencies/ (last accessed 10/3/17). 
62 Ibid, at 4. See also generally, Ward J, “If Not Now, When? Addressing Gender-Based Violence in Refugee, 
Internally Displaced, and Post-Conflict Settings”, (2002), New York: The Reproductive Health for 
Refugees Consortium. 
63 Crawley, supra note 13, at 7. 
64 Ibid, at 7-8. 
65 Ibid, at 8. See also, REDRESS, “Sexual and Other Forms of Gender-Based Violence”, (2016), available 
online at http://www.redress.org/post-conflict-justice/sexual-and-other-forms-of-gender-based-violence 
(last accessed 15/12/16).  
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    Whilst the primary objective of this thesis is to redress the inconsistent and arguably 
inadequate treatment of FGM within the RDP, this thesis also examines the ways in which 
gender shapes women’s experiences as ‘women’ which negate critical aspects of 
oppression and resistance. Thus, the thesis postulates that the current framework and 
procedures for refugee determination need to be reformed to accommodate “an inclusion 
of women not as a special case deviating from the norm, but as one of many different 
groups in an open and heterogeneous universe”.66 The theoretical focus will therefore 
examine the ways in which socially and culturally construed ideas on ‘gender’ have inured 
the normative frameworks and processes of international refugee law.67 This approach to 
the politics of protection used by other academics, suggests that the problem is not so 
much the invisibility of women but rather how their experiences have been ‘represented 
and analytically characterised’68 within the RDP. The use and development of this 
approach is imperative to ensure that FGM related refugee claims are consistently and 
properly considered by decision-makers. According to Heaven Crawley, who has also 
used this approach within her research, “looking at gender as opposed to sex, enables an 
approach which can accommodate specificity, diversity and heterogeneity”.69 More 
importantly, it also ensures that such claims are not dismissed as culturally relative and 
outside the scope of protection offered under the 1951 Refugee Convention.70 
 
D. Cultural Relativism  
 
Another theme/issue which emerges throughout the academic commentary and the case-
law analysis relating to FGM and warrants consideration, concerns the relationship 
between women’s human rights and the issue of cultural relativism.  
    The debate concerning cultural relativism and women’s human rights has resulted in 
the adoption of two directly opposite opinions. On the one hand, there are those who argue 
that women’s human rights are continually violated by oppressive patriarchal societies, 
                                                 
66 Crawley, supra note 13, at 9. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Indra DM, “Ethnic Human Rights and Gender Differences: Gender Implications for Refugee Studies and 
Practice”, 2 Journal of Refugee Studies 221, (1989), at 221-42. 




which espouse restrictive traditions and cultures.71 On the other hand, there exist those 
who campaign for the maintenance of practices such as FGM on grounds of cultural 
relativism and the right for centuries-old customs and traditions to exist.72 Many countries 
have in recent times, acknowledged the human rights stance over and above cultural 
maintenance arguments and have ratified international conventions, declarations73 and 
regional instruments, which make provision for the promotion and protection of the rights 
and health of women and young girls. In fact, many countries have even outlawed the 
practice of FGM.74 
    Perhaps one of the most controversial issues pertaining to cultural relativism concerns 
approaches which argue that human rights are not universal but should instead be viewed 
in relation to the cultures to which they apply.75 According to Niamh Reilly, debates about 
                                                 
71 Afkhami M, “Women, Gender, and Human Rights: A Global Perspective” in Agosin S, (ed), “Gender 
Apartheid, Cultural Relativism, and Women’s Human Rights in Muslim Societies”, New Jersey: Rutgers 
University Press, (2001), at 234-245. See also, United Nations Human Rights Office of the High 
Commissioner, “Women’s Rights are Human Rights”, New York and Geneva, (2014), at 27-29. The PDF 
of this document is also available online at  
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Events/WHRD/WomenRightsAreHR.pdf (last accessed 15/5/17). For 
further discussions on the complexity of the arguments surrounding human rights and cultural relativism 
see generally, Downes C, “Women’s Rights in a Muslim Context: From Theory to Advocacy”, 1 Brussels 
Journal of International Studies 17, (2004). 
72 Ibid. See also, Buncombe A, “New Jersey Govoner Refuses to Ban Child Marriage because it would 
Conflict With Religious Customs”, (15/5/17), available online via the INDEPENDENT website at 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/new-jersey-chris-christie-child-marriage-ban-fails-
religious-custom-a7735616.html?cmpid=facebook-post (last accessed 16/5/17). See also, Desai S, 
“Hearing Afghan Women’s Voices: Feminist Theory’s Reconceptulization of Women’s Human Rights”, 16 
Arizona, Journal of International and Comparative Law 805, (1999). See also, Uyo D, “Why Communities 
Continue Female Circumcision despite the 2015 Ban”, (2017), available online at 
https://www.pressreader.com/nigeria/daily-trust/20170314/281865823277408 (last accessed 13/5/17). See 
also more generally, Mutua M, “Politics and Human Rights: An Essential Symbiosis”, in Byers M (ed.), 
“The Role of Law in International Politics – Essays in International Relations and International Law”, 
Oxford: OUP, (2000) and Tibi B, “Islamic Law/Shari’s, Human Rights, Universal Morality and 
International Relations”, 16 Human Rights Quarterly 277, (1994), at 290 (arguing that the human rights 
stance has little resonance in societies where duties to family and society predominate). 
73 See, “Women’s Rights are Human Rights”, supra note 71. For a more detailed list of International and 
Regional Instruments which can be  referenced for the elimination of FGM, please see, UNFPA, “Female 
Genital Mutilation Frequently Asked Questions”, (2016), available online via the United Nations Population 
Fund website at http://www.unfpa.org/resources/female-genital-mutilation-fgm-frequently-asked-
questions#banned_by_law (last accessed 28/12/16).  
74 For a complete list of countries which have outlawed the practice of FGM please refer to, UNFPA, 
“Female Genital Mutilation Frequently Asked Questions”, (2016), supra note 73.  
75 Downes, supra note 71 at 20 stating that, “cultural relativists argue that all rights are contingent on the 
understanding of the culture in which those rights are expressed. They fundamentally reject the implicit 
moral superiority associated with universal rights doctrine 22 and point to real diversity in cultural practices 
even within relatively culturally homogenous regions”. See also, Renteln A.D., “International Human 
Rights: Universalism Versus Relativism”, Sage: Newbury Park, (1990), at 72 and Cerna C.M., “Universality 
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the meaning of the universality of human rights and whether human rights simply express 
Western hegemony and, therefore, are fundamentally at odds with respect for cultural 
diversity and integrity are a major feature of contemporary human rights discourse.76 In 
light of these arguments, this thesis posits that the association between human rights and 
culture is specific to women, and has been used by decision-makers (in some instances to 
mask their gender and racial biases) to argue against granting refugee status to FGM 
claimants.  Thus, decision-makers should not be able to consider or use this association 
of culture and human rights when determining a women’s gender-based refugee claim. 
FGM is an internationally recognised human rights violation77 and like the recognition of 
domestic violence at the domestic level as a criminal and human rights matter, this thesis 
advocates for the same recognition of FGM, not as a cultural practice but as a human 
rights violation. Such an approach would effectively eliminate refugee denials on the basis 
that FGM is a cultural and personal ritual, whilst politicizing the experiences of such 
claimants and including them within a human right’s, rather than a masculine 
interpretation of international refugee law. To deny refugee status based on cultural 
relativism is a denial of human rights. Whilst, human rights arguments are intended to 
“‘trump’ sovereign States’ justifications for oppressive or restrictive behaviour and the 
international refugee system is supposed to be a mechanism for translating this theory into 
practice”78 this is not always reflected in reality. Within the RDP, where foreign policy 
considerations, state priorities and restrictionist immigration pressures have a clear 
bearing on the decision-making process, “the content of protected rights has often been 
relativised in line with practices prevailing in different States”.79 This process is reflected 
                                                 
of Human Rights and Cultural Diversity: Implementation of Human Rights in Different Socio-Cultural 
Contexts”, 16 Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 16 (1994), 740, at 750. 
76 See, Reilly N, “Women’s Human Rights – Seeking Gender Justice in a Globalizing Age”, Cambridge: 
Polity Press, (2009), Chapter One. 
77Strong support for the protection of the rights of women and girls to abandon FGM is found in international 
and regional human rights treaties and consensus documents. See, World Health Organisation, “Eliminating 
Female Genital Mutilation – An Interagency Statement”, WHO: Geneva, (2008), at 8-11. This document is 
also available online at 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/csw/csw52/statements_missions/Interagency_Statement_on_Elimin
ating_FGM.pdf (last accessed 17/11/16).  




in the use of ‘culture’ to exclude women from protection under the 1951 Refugee 
Convention.80  
      The concept of culture81 is a dynamic notion, not a static one, and may be appropriated 
by decision-makers to justify an otherwise untenable decision or position. This thesis 
attempts to bridge the two diverging views; the view that human rights are universal, and 
the view that human rights are either non-existent or can vary among different cultures. 
Logic dictates that societies, cultures and customs are not static; they all evolve as time 
progresses. Similarly, respect for international human rights law does not require that 
every culture use a similar or even identical approach, what it does require, however, is 
that human rights be defined and protected in a manner consistent with international 
principles.82 Thus, regardless of the conflicting ideologies and cultural values to which 
nations adhere, the U.N. promulgated norms represent agreements by these participating 
nations to work toward a common goal.83 
     Violence against women in all its forms is no longer a private issue; it has been 
recognized as a human rights violation.84 Yet recognition and the legal measures discussed 
in the next section are not enough. Contributing to the literature in this area, violence 
prevention is a priority at the domestic level and effective mechanisms and processes for 
violence prevention and gender mainstreaming have been put into effect, an inspirational 
                                                 
80 Ibid. In fact, Bhabha has stated that, “Decisions upholding an asylum applicant’s claim of persecution 
may contain culturally arrogant, even racist descriptions of the state of origin’s policies. Conversely 
judgments that dismiss the asylum application may adopt the language of cultural sensitivity or respect for 
state sovereignty as a device for limiting refugee admission numbers”. See, Bhabha J, “Embodied Rights: 
gender persecution, state sovereignty and refugees” 9 Public Culture 3, (1996), at 11. See also, Islam v 
SSHD; R v IAT ex parte Shah (1999) INLR 144, Imm AR 283 (HL) (Hereafter referred to as Shah and 
Islam). 
81 For the purposes of this thesis, the term ‘culture’ refers to the customs, ideas and behaviours of a particular 
society or people. 
82 Crawley, supra note 13, at 12. 
83 In fact, it has been said that, “To argue that human rights are universal is not equivalent to saying that 
their understanding or interpretation is self-evident or immutable, or to deny the various cultural contexts 
in which human rights must be embedded. Rejecting radical cultural relativism does not preclude flexibility 
in the conceptualization, interpretation and application of human rights within and between different 
cultures. Human rights are universal but not absolute (in the sense of pure, unalloyed, completely uniform) 
in their application to various cultures. In this way, the relativist ‘truth’ about enculturation can be 
accommodated within a human rights framework”. See, James SA, “Reconciling international human rights 
and cultural relativism: the case of female circumcision” 8 Bioethics 1, (1994), at 4. 
84 See, Ohana Y, et al, “Gender Matters: Manual on Gender Based Violence Affecting Young People”, 
Council of Europe: Budapest, (2007), at 60. This manual is available online at 
http://www.eycb.coe.int/gendermatters/pdf/Gender_matters_EN.pdf (last accessed 30/7/17). 
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example being the specialised domestic violence courts. This thesis advocates that similar 
procedural reforms would remedy the gender-bias inherent within refugee law, and the 
plethora of other problems, including the use of cultural relativism to deny protection to 
victims of FGM. 
 
E. National and International Initiatives 
 
A new awareness and willingness to take gender into account in policy development and 
implementation has emerged and there have been many encouraging recent developments 
legitimizing the factual basis for women’s refugee claims. Concurring, Niamh Reilly has 
argued that traditionally accepted human rights abuses are specifically affected by gender, 
and violations against women have remained invisible within prevailing approaches to 
human rights.85 For example, she has stated that, violations of women's human rights 
committed in the "private sphere" of the home, or in the context of familial or intimate 
relationships, have not been considered within the purview of a government's human 
rights obligations.86 She posits that a renewed recognition of the moral authority that 
human rights afford, and of the potential of human rights practice to transform conditions 
of oppression have prompted women to ask why, to date, human rights thinking and policy 
have failed women.87 Consequently, in light of this renewed recognition, individuals, 
advocates and human rights groups have focused their attention on highlighting awareness 
of gender-based violence and gender-specific forms of violence. International bodies, 
including the UNHCR and other U.N. bodies have attempted to address the intersection 
of gender-based violence and forced displacement. The Executive Committee of the 
UNHCR first issued formal recommendations regarding expansion of the Refugee 
Convention definition to include individuals who had experienced sexual violence or 
                                                 
85 Bunch C & Reilly N, “Demanding Accountability – The Global Campaign and Vienna Tribunal for 
Women’s Human Rights”, (1999), available online at 
http://www.cwgl.rutgers.edu/docman/coalition-building-publications/283-demand-accountability/file (last 
accessed 9/6/17), at 3. 
86 Ibid.   
87 See, Reilly N, “State Accountability for Women’s Human Rights in Ireland”, Women's Education 
Research and Resource Centre, University College Dublin: Dublin, (1997). 
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other gender-related forms of persecution in 1991.88 The Committee issued more 
comprehensive guidelines in 2002,89 and has also exhorted states to develop and 
implement domestic criteria and guidelines regarding protection for women who claim 
refugee status based on a well-founded fear of gender-related persecution.90 Several 
receiving states, including the case studies under examination in this thesis, have 
subsequently either enacted such guidelines or have amended refugee and asylum 
legislation to instruct adjudicators to recognize gender-based persecution as a potential 
ground for refugee protection. Focusing specifically on the approaches and 
recommendations made in the existing gender-guidelines, this thesis will examine how 
successful these approaches have been in assisting FGM refugee claims and in addressing 
the gender-bias of international refugee law. It is submitted that decision-makers and other 
interested parties within the RDP need to keep pace with, and consistently utilise, these 
developments. 
    Whilst important for raising awareness of relevant gender issues, particularly in respect 
of interpreting the Refugee Convention definition, this thesis further posits that steps taken 
to remedy the gendered or more accurately the un-gendered state of refugee law, 
particularly at an international level, have been somewhat redundant given that UNHCR 
policies and guidelines are not binding on domestic states.91 Therefore, and in light of the 
determination of States to address and prohibit violence against women, particularly at 
the domestic level, it is more pertinent to analyse successful procedural reforms at a 
domestic level, something which the UNHCR and domestic gender-guidelines fail to 
                                                 
88 See, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Guidelines on the Protection of 
Refugee Women”, U.N. Doc. ES/SCP/67 (1991). (Hereafter referred to as Guidelines on the Protection of 
Refugee Women). These guidelines are available online via the UNHCR: The UN Refugee Agency website 
at http://www.unhcr.org/3d4f915e4.html (last accessed 10/2/17). 
89 See, UNHCR Gender Guidelines, supra note 59.  
90 UNHCR Exec. Comm., Conclusion No. 73 Refugee Protection and Sexual Violence, para e., (1993), 
reprinted in UNHCR, A Thematic Compilation of Executive Committee Conclusions on International 
Protection (4th ed. 200), at 240-42 (recommending that States develop “appropriate guidelines on women 
asylum-seekers, in recognition of the fact that women often experience persecution differently from refugee 
men”); UNHCR Exec. Comm., Conclusion No. 77 (1995), reprinted in UNHCR, A Thematic Compilation 
of Executive Committee Conclusions on International Protection 432 (4th ed. 2009), at 432. The 
Compilation of Executive Committee Conclusions on International Protection is available online via the 
UNHCR website at http://www.unhcr.org/publ/PUBL/3d4ab3ff2.pdf (last accessed 27/3/10). 
91States accede to Conventions without any intention of complying, and the lack of enforcement procedures 
allow for this to take place. Thus, the treaty’s meaning may be reduced to mere theoretical guarantees. 
Hence, at present, it seems that international law affords women no adequate basis or protection of their 
fundamental human rights).  
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achieve.  In contributing to the discourse, this thesis argues that any effort made to remedy 
the gendered state of the law in the country where the individual is seeking refugee status 
will be more instructive and instrumental in effecting the likelihood of the claim’s success. 
 
F. Zero-Tolerance toward Domestic Violence  
 
Whilst, the determination of gender-based claims for refugee status within the RDP is 
problematic, at the domestic level, violence against women, committed in the private 
sphere is not tolerated. Society now widely accepts the elimination of violence against 
women, particularly domestic violence as a crucial goal, and it has been illegal in most 
countries since the late nineteenth century.92 Acknowledging the ‘unresponsiveness’, 
‘reluctance’ and ‘orientation towards non-enforcement’ of laws and procedures towards 
female victims of domestic violence, by the police, prosecutors, judges and other court 
and service personnel,93 the court system in many States, including the three case-studies, 
have begun to remedy the gender and cultural bias inherent in such cases by re-examining 
their traditional approaches to domestic violence. This traditional approach, which 
involved little or no special attention or resources dedicated to domestic violence cases, 
has been challenged by the emergence of enhanced specialised domestic violence courts. 
      The term ‘specialised domestic violence courts’ can encompass many different types 
of courts, from merely designating a few hours a week for protective order cases, to a 
court, which is dedicated to handling only domestic violence cases.94 These courts are 
unique in that they bring together police, prosecutors, magistrates, probation service and 
specialist support agencies to help ensure more domestic violence offenders are 
prosecuted, and more importantly that victims have access to an inclusive and 
                                                 
92 Pleck E, “Wife Beating in Nineteenth-Century America”, 4 VICTIMOLOGY: AN INT'L J. 60, (1979), at 
60-63. See also, Epstein D, “Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases: Rethinking the Roles of 
Prosecutors, Judges, and the Court System”, 11 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 3, (1999), at 3. 
93 Epstein, supra note 91, at 4; Tsai B, “The Trend Toward Specialized Domestic Violence Courts: 
Improvements on an Effective Innovation”, 68 Fordham Law Review 1285, (2000), at 1286 (noting the 
frustration and embarrassment of those who work within the criminal justice system at their inability to 
protect victims of domestic violence, even after the arrest and prosecution of perpetrators and despite the 
issuance of protection orders). 
94 Lemon N, “Access to Justice: Can Domestic Violence Courts Better Address the Needs of Non-English 




accommodating process, which caters for their individual and specific needs. Thus, these 
courts which consolidate judges, legal representatives, court personnel, experts and other 
domestic violence resources into one system designed primarily to provide a much more 
effective response to domestic violence cases95 convey the idea that the justice system 
recognises the distinct nature of domestic violence cases and the need for special attention 
to them.  This thesis argues that by examining these courts and their processes, and 
subsequently replicating the ethos and to some degree the relevant structures and 
procedures of the specialised domestic violence courts within the RDP, refugee 
determination can similarly become gendered and specialised, and ultimately more 
accommodating for victims of gender-based violence. A reformed RDP, specialising in 
gender-based violence could arguably reduce the inconsistency evident in FGM 
determinations and help to eliminate the occurrence of potentially wrongful denials on the 
basis of credibility, cultural relativism and misapplication of the Refugee Convention 
definition and existing gender-guidelines. This unique analysis provides for the 
opportunity to contribute to the existing literature on these pioneering courts, specifically 
in respects of ascertaining their strengths and transposing them into other judicial forums 
including the RPD.  
    It is important to note that this thesis does not argue that every woman who claims 
refugee status based on FGM, is entitled to, or should, be granted such protection. Some 
claimants, it must be recognised fabricate their claims and in some instances, it has been 
revealed that following the granting of refugee status on the purported ground of 
opposition to FGM, a parent has nevertheless gone ahead and subjected their daughter to 
the practice.96 It follows that, in cases where claims are lodged on this ground, it is 
necessary to assess the credibility of the claim very carefully, so as to avoid refugee status 
being granted on incorrect grounds. To reform the RDP to make it more accommodating 
for women, decision-makers and other interested parties must first have some means of 
benchmarking and determining fairness and success in service provision. It is argued that 
adherence to the inspiration of the specialised domestic violence courts and the processes 
                                                 
95 Tsai, supra note 93, at 1287. 
96 UNHCR, “Note 216: Guidance Note on Refugee Claims Relating to Female Genital Mutilation” (May 
2009), at 15. This note is available online via the UNHCR Refworld website at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/alerts.html (last accessed 10/11/16). 
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which they have implemented to convey the message that the criminal justice system 
recognises the distinct nature of domestic violence and the need for special attention to 
victims provides the best innovation for making, challenging and indeed reforming, the 
existing gender imbalance in the way the RDP works and the manner in which some 
decision-makers address FGM – interpretation of the Refugee Convention through a male 
perspective. 
 
IV. Choice of Case Studies 
 
In terms of advancing the overall thesis and contributing to the discourse discussed above, 
the specific jurisdictions of Canada, the US, and the UK have been chosen for several 
reasons. All three jurisdictions are significant in that they have each recognised FGM as 
a valid basis for obtaining refugee status. In Farah v. Canada,97 the IRB described FGM 
as a “torturous custom” and recognized it as a form of persecution. The US BIA 
determined in In Re Fauziya Kasinga,98 that the level of harm in FGM constituted 
persecution. In the UK, refugee status in relation to a well-founded fear of FGM was first 
upheld in Yake99 and in the leading case of Fornah100, the former House of Lords101 noted 
that, “it is common ground in this appeal that FGM constitutes treatment which would 
amount to persecution within the meaning of the Convention”. The UKHL also found that 
“it is a human rights issue, not only because of the unequal treatment of men and women, 
                                                 
97 Farah v Canada (MEI) (1994). The Board also found FGM to constitute a gross infringement of the 
applicant’s personal security, referring to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (Hereafter referred 
to as the UDHR), Article 3, as well as a number of child-specific rights. See also Annan v. Canada, Minister 
of Citizenship and Immigration, the Trial Division of the Federal Court, 6 July 1995, available online via 
the Refworld website at  
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/49997ae2f.html (last accessed 3/3/17). The Court referred to FGM as 
a “cruel and barbaric” practice and the applicant was granted refugee status. The position in Canada has 
been reinforced by many further decisions.   
98 In Re Kasinga, Int Dec 3278 (BIA 1996). Kasinga has been quoted in a series of further cases in the US, 
including in Abankwah v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, US Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit, 9 July 1999. The Court affirmed that it cannot be disputed that FGM involves the infliction of 
“grave harm constituting persecution”. 
99 Immigration and Appeals Tribunal, Appeal Number 00TH00493, 19 January 2000.   
100 Fornah (FC) (Appellant) v. SSHD (Respondent), UK House of Lords, (UKHL 46), 18 October 2006.   
101 The House of Lords has now been replaced by the Supreme Court. Hereafter referred to as UKHL. 
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but also because the procedure will almost inevitably amount either to torture or to other 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment”.102 
    A second common denominator shared by the three chosen jurisdictions is that despite 
their recognition of FGM as a valid basis for obtaining refugee status only a very small 
number of women have been subsequently granted refugee status on the grounds of FGM. 
Furthermore, irrespective of their essential similarities, like cases have resulted in 
disparate outcomes for claimants, thus reinforcing the idea of an asylum lottery.103 
    Thirdly, each of the case studies have implemented gender-guidelines regarding 
protection for women who claim refugee status based on a well-founded fear of gender-
related persecution. These implemented guidelines provide guidance to decision-makers 
on how to interpret the 1951 Refugee Convention definition and adjudicate asylum claims 
in a gender-sensitive manner.104 As such, the gender-guidelines to be examined, all advise 
decision-makers to be sensitive to the wide spectrum of cultural, religious and other 
personal reasons why female claimants might experience humiliation, pain, trauma, or 
shame in recounting certain incidents, particularly those of a sexual nature.105  The 
American, Canadian and British guidelines can be usefully compared with one another, 
to highlight just how important procedural practice is deemed to be within the respective 
guidelines in fostering an accommodating and inclusive RDP for claimants of gender-
based violence. Arguably, by comparatively examining these guidelines and their 
guidance on procedural practice it is possible to learn from each of these guidelines and 
use them as building blocks and signs of good practices when proposing reforms. 
    Finally, a zero-tolerance stance towards domestic violence is a shared characteristic of 
the case-studies domestic criminal justice systems. Since the emergence of the battered 
women’s movement in the 1970s, activists have continued to achieve success in obtaining 
                                                 
102 See, Fornah, supra note 57, para 94. 
103 According to some academics, the vast majority of FGM claimants are “deported to be mutilated”. See, 
Comment, “Deported to be Mutilated?” (2005), available online via Anarkismo.net at 
http://www.anarkismo.net/newswire.php?story_id=840 (last accessed 14/2/17).  
104 Macklin A, “Cross-Border Shopping for Ideas: A Critical Review of United States, Canadian and 
Australian Approaches to Gender-Related Asylum Claims” 13 Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 25, 
(1999), at 26. 
105 Ibid, at 35. See also, Luopajärvi K, “Gender-Related Persecution as Basis for Refugee Status: 
Comparative Perspectives” Abo Akademi University, Finland, Institute of Human Rights Research Report 
No 19, (2003), at 38. This report was previously available online at   
http://www.abo.fi/instut/imr/norfa/Katja_Genderrelated_persecution.pdf (last accessed 13/2/07). 
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legislation and funding for the protection of abused women and their children, along with 
educating the public about the horrors and devastating effects of domestic violence.106 
More importantly, over the years the concepts and manifestations associated with 
domestic violence have expanded. Definitions of domestic violence have been influenced 
by a greater variety of voices, including victims themselves, perpetrator, academics and 
legislators. Consequently, in response to the recognition of domestic violence as an ever-
widening epidemic, the legal system has begun to examine its traditional approach to such 
violence more closely. Several types of innovative and instructive domestic violence 
courts have developed throughout the case-studies and their uniting feature is that they all 
single out domestic violence for special treatment. Examining how the case studies have 
dealt with the issue of domestic violence and have sought to engender the criminal justice 
response by addressing the needs and experiences of female victims may provide 




To answer the research question set out in this thesis it is imperative that the methodology 
and methods utilised stand up to scrutiny. Unquestionably, it is difficult to categorise a 
legal thesis under any specific heading, as legal research can involve a hybrid of 
methods.107 Henn et al, makes the important distinction between ‘method’ and 
‘methodology’.108 They state that, “method refers to the range of techniques that are 
available to us to collect evidence about the social world. Methodology, however, 
concerns the research strategy as a whole’.109  This is important as the research strategy 
                                                 
106 Pleck E, “Domestic Tyranny: The Making of Social Policy Against Family Violence from Colonial Times 
to the Present” Oxford University Press: New York, (1989), at 198 (discussing the successes and 
achievements of the battered women’s movement during the first decade of its existence). The battered 
women’s movement also broadened and strengthened feminism as a whole. Ibid. Whereas organizations 
such as the National Organization for Women (NOW), founded in 1966, catered to and mainly benefited 
educated, middle class women, the battered women’s movement, through shelters, provided services and 
education to poorer, less well-educated women. Ibid. 
107 Salter M & Mason J, “Writing Law Dissertations: An Introduction and Guide to the Conduct of Legal 
Research”, Pearson: London, (2007), at 31.  
108 Henn M, Weinstein M & Foard N, “A Critical Introduction to Social Research” (2nd ED), Sage: London, 




of the thesis is doctrinal, it examines the inconsistent and inadequate treatment of FGM 
as a basis for refugee status, looking at both the legal and procedural contexts within 
which determinations are made. Consequently, the thesis adopts a comparative method, 
where appropriate, to examine the legislation and procedural refugee determination 
mechanisms in the chosen case-studies, in conjunction with the establishment of the 
specialised domestic violence courts to determine if their protective functions may be 
replicated or mirrored within the RDP. 
     Initially, it was my intention to try and adopt a qualitative structured interview-
approach aimed at examining the experiences of FGM and other victims of gender-based 
violence within the RDP of my chosen case-studies. However, after consultations with 
my supervisors, and experts and professionals within organisations such as the Centre for 
Gender and Refugee Studies in the US, Amnesty International, Cherish Others in Kenya, 
Foyle Woman’s Aid, the Canadian Council for Refuges, UNICEF Ireland, the Irish 
Refugee Council and many other organisations, it was felt that this was not achievable 
nor practical.110 Coupled with ethical considerations, a lack of forthcoming information 
from contacted organisations,111 and the fact that FGM is a complex and sensitive issue 
which victims are reluctant to discuss, it was determined that it was more important to 
change research methods.  
     Thus, the scope of the thesis encompasses qualitative research of a doctrinal and 
comparative nature. Ian Parker has defined qualitative research as, “the interpretative 
study of a specified issue or problem in which the researcher is central to the sense that is 
made”.112  This research begins with a ‘doctrinal’ or theoretical ‘black letter law’ 
methodology.  This means that some of the research is based on analysing the legislation 
and legal rules determining refugee determination within an international, regional and 
domestic context, and their disjunctions via examination of the case-studies, as well as 
existing literature.  This approach enables the researcher to critically analyse the meanings 
and implications of these rules and the principles which underpin them.  The thesis adopts 
                                                 
110 Information on file with the author. 
111 Information requests on file with the author. For a list of individuals and organisations contacted to 
provide information initially please refer to Appendix A. 
112 Parker I, “Qualitative Research” in Banister P, et al (eds), “Qualitative Methods in Psychology: A 
Research Guide”, Open University Press: Philadelphia, (1994), at 2.  
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a comparative method, as a means of assessing the need for reforming the RDP to make 
it more accommodating for FGM and in tandem other victims of gender-based violence. 
Moreover, as will be further discussed, the thesis also looks to other sources of optional 
or ‘soft law’ such as the guidance provided by the UNHCR and domestic gender 
guidelines to aid in the determination of refugee status. 
 
A. Doctrinal Methodology  
Doctrinal research has been defined as, “a detailed and highly technical commentary 
upon, and systematic exposition of, the context of legal doctrine”.113 This approach is 
suitable as the various branches of law underpinning refugee determination and gender 
violence are largely black letter law subjects which are based on the interpretation of 
statutes and cases.  However, it is important to note that whilst the study of law, in this 
case refugee and human rights law, is based on logical conclusions, these conclusions are 
not an exact science. Instead they are formed of judgement, which can be influenced by 
other factors, such as culture, economics and politics.114 Whilst these overlapping factors 
may be described as interdisciplinary, it is possible that such research can be undertaken 
at differing degrees of integration.115 The thesis aims to be neither rigid nor looking to 
establish any claims to socio-legal research, rather its primary aim is to provide a 
thorough, in-depth examination of the inconsistent and inadequate treatment of FGM 
refugee claims within the RDP. By drawing upon the protective mechanisms implemented 
with the specialised domestic violence courts, this examination allowed me to gather 
examples of good practice and shortcomings, and develop key recommendations to assist 
lawyers, decision makers and others who interact with victims of FGM within the RDP.         
       An examination of the Refugee Convention, which is ratified and adopted by different 
member States, each with its own legal traditions, will inevitably lead the researcher to 
look beyond the black letter law.  The thesis thus does not seek to be interdisciplinary, it 
is not seeking to answer the research questions from a socio-legal perspective, instead the 
researcher is using a set of interpretative tools and methods to bring order and to assess a 
                                                 
113 See, Salter & Mason, supra note 104, at 49. 
114 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr, “The Path of the Law” 10 Harvard Law Review 457, (1897), at 465–6. 
115 See, Vick D, “Interdisciplinarity and the Discipline of Law” 31 Journal of Law & Society 163, (2004), 
at 164.  
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particular area of the law. Once there is a clear and comprehensive system for assessment 
in place, the researcher will, as noted above, provide recommendations based on the 
findings. Therefore, the thesis does not encompass any strong interdisciplinary aspects to 
the research as this would expand the parameters of the thesis beyond the scope of what 
was intended and would render the thesis difficult to defend. 116  Instead the thesis is firmly 
doctrinal in its methodology as it entails a critical, qualitative analysis of legal materials 
that supports a hypothesis.117  This approach involves identifying certain legal rules and 
procedures. Once identified, general principles, common themes and discrepancies will 
begin to emerge. This enables the thesis to identify ambiguities, criticisms and solutions 
which may exist within the RDP which has resulted in disparate outcomes, such as the 
use of gender-guidelines and potential recommendations for reform. 
     The main sources of data for this research will be the legal instruments themselves, 
including the Refugee Convention, domestic legislation, gender-guidelines and those 
cases and decisions generated under them.  These instruments are examined in order to 
answer the research question. In doing so it is necessary to look at the wording and 
legislative history of Refugee law and provisions, specifically the UNHCR Refugee 
Convention. Research into the Refugee Convention and UNHCR instruments is widely 
accessible. In examining the legislative history of the Refugee Convention, the thesis can 
identify the connection between refugee and human rights law and how they have affected 
the treatment of gender-based violence. This examination allows the thesis to extract 
relevant information and demonstrate a wider understanding of the relevant issues within 
the RDP process and the domestic criminal justice system response to such violence 
within the specialised domestic violence courts. 
     This information has been made possible through an exploration of primary and 
secondary legal sources, as well as non-legal sources for investigative and supporting 
information. These sources came from official bodies, including the UNHCR and 
included treaties, statutes, regulation and decisions emanating from the courts and 
tribunals. The secondary background sources utilised to aid the research process, and 
                                                 
116 Hutchinson T & Duncan N, “Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal Research”, 17 
Deakin Law Review 83, (2012), at 84. 
117 Ibid, at 118. 
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which helped to explain, interpret and analyze my theories came from law reviews, legal 
treatises, encyclopedias, restatements and several other literature and web-based sources. 
Legal research often encompasses more than ‘legal research’ and this piece of research 
has used information from various non-legal sources including new stories, statistics and 
scholarship from other disciplines and professional publications. Consequently, this 
research has also explored both legal and non-legal databases and websites.  
 
B. Comparative Method  
 
Comparative law is in full flourish ... It is widely accepted as an effective means 
of learning about other legal cultures and improving one's own legal system... And 
yet: 'a taste of the big, wide world' should not tempt us to oversimplify things or 
regard the world as a self-service shop of legal cultures. Because again and again, 
we come up against strange obstacles, which dampen our exuberance.118 
 
Although the approach adopted is a comparative analysis per se, the thesis acknowledges 
the dangers and the benefits of comparative work. Aristotle when comparing the Greek 
city States in the fourth and fifty centuries BC stated that: 
 
As we have set out to investigate which of all is the best state-run community for 
people who, as far as possible, are capable of living their lives as they desire, we 
must also consider the other state constitutions, those which are in use in certain 
states ... as well as those suggested by individuals, in order to ascertain which 
features of them are correct and useful...119 
 
It is unlikely that this meant that Aristotle was considering the complete transplantation 
of a constitution from one position to another. Rather, he hoped to a certain extent to be 
able to extract the elements, which would result in the best possible constitution for free 
people. In a similar vein, this admonition is vital to this thesis, as it does not intend, nor 
                                                 
118 Grofifeld B, “Kernfragen der Rechtsvergieichung (Mohr/Siebeck, Tubingen 1996) pp.1, 3 (as cited by 
Eser A, “The Importance of Comparative Legal Research for the Development of Criminal Sciences”, 
(2007). This document is available online at  
http://www.freidok.uni-
freiburg.de/volltexte/3759/pdf/Eser_The_importance_of_comparative_legal_research.pdf (last  
accessed 28/2/17). 
119 See, Eser, supra note 118. 
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does it profess to undertake or provide an exhaustive comparative study of the issues 
surrounding FGM, gender-based violence and refugee status within the various case-
studies. Rather the need to compare and differentiate the phenomena emanating from the 
chosen case-studies for the reasons discussed earlier, enables the extraction of the 
elements which will firstly, generate a new way of thinking and approaching FGM, and 
secondly the extraction of constructive elements enables the proposal of a degree of 
reform of the RDP itself. This, in theory, will not only potentially make the process more 
accommodating for victims of FGM, but will also help to rectify the inconsistent and in 
some instances the inadequate treatment of such claims, which has resulted in the existing 
asylum lottery system. Thus, the experiences of the case-studies to be examined in this 
thesis offers the prospect of expanding our understanding of the problems and 
opportunities that accompany the protection of refugee women and interpreting the 1951 
Refugee Convention in a more gender-sensitive manner.  
      Therefore, from a methodological perspective, comparative law is much more than a 
summary of laws. Its use, and application will be of the uttermost importance when 
making recommendations and offering practical solutions in chapter five. Some of the 
benefits of using this particular method of research include: firstly, a greater appreciation 
of the issues to be examined; secondly, an appreciation of different legal systems and 
cultures; thirdly, facilitation of broader learning, by examining additional issues, such as 
political, economic and sociological factors; fourthly, encouraging further inquiry; and 
finally helping to identify ‘solutions’ to remedy problems.  
 
VI. Thesis Structure 
 
The structure of this thesis is as follows. In chapter one the two main branches of 
international law, human rights and refugee law, offering protection to individuals are 
examined. It argues that the determination of refugee status entails contextualized, 
practical applications of human rights norms. However, the failures inherent in human 
rights law are mirrored in the decisions concerning gender-based claims for refugee status. 
As such, in keeping with the ultimate objective of this thesis, namely to redress the 
inconsistent and inadequate treatment of gender-based claims for refugee status by 
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decision-makers in FGM cases, this chapter explores the failures of international human 
rights law to adequately address human rights violations perpetrated against women, and 
its consequential impact on the international refugee law regime when determining such 
claims.  
     The theoretical discussions in chapter one are contextualised in the next three chapters 
as they examine how the US, Canada, and the UK have dealt with and attempted to remedy 
the inadequacies inherent within refugee law. Specifically, chapter two examines the 
implemented gender-guidelines which aim to provide guidance to decision makers on 
how to interpret the 1951 Refugee Convention definition and adjudicate asylum claims in 
a gender-sensitive manner.120 The initial objective of this chapter, therefore, is to 
determine the common and distinctive features of the guidelines. Beyond that, this chapter 
also identifies issues, which the guidelines, create, expose or ignore. It queries the 
reluctance of their drafters to recognise certain state-sanctioned practices as potential 
forms of persecution, especially the practise of domestic violence. This reluctance is 
surprising given the fact that (as will be discussed more fully in chapter four) these 
countries currently operate a zero-tolerance stance in respect of domestic violence at their 
respective state, province, and jurisdictional levels.  
    Chapter three undertakes an examination of the jurisprudence emanating from my case-
studies in relation to the topical and controversial gender-based practise of FGM. Fear of 
enforced FGM has formed the basis of several refugee claims coming before Courts in 
countries throughout Europe and North America, including my case study countries. This 
chapter examines the legal, procedural and evidential hurdles FGM claimants must 
surmount to be successful, and the various courts’ assessments of such claims. This 
chapter this seeks to highlight the extent to which the gender-guidelines have redressed 
the disparity in women’s claims. It further seeks to determine the extent to which their 
weaknesses impinge on the supposedly ‘rectified’ procedural and evidential barriers 
which have unremittingly undermined the fairness of decision-making in such cases.   
     Considering the gender-guidelines limitations and non-binding nature, coupled with 
biases and preconceptions of decision-makers, chapter four aims to examine how the shift 
in attitudes and practices towards the equally comparable practice of domestic violence 
                                                 
120 Macklin, “Cross Border Shopping”, supra note 104, at 26. 
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within the domestic criminal justice systems of the case-studies might be replicated or 
mirrored in some shape or form within the RDP. This innovative shift it is argued is 
important for two main reasons: firstly, it would ensure that States give credence to their 
respective gender-guidelines by singling gender-based forms of violence, in this case 
FGM out for special attention in separate ‘courts’, with specialised ‘gender’ processes. 
Secondly, this transposition will establish a through, fair and effective mechanism through 
which FGM claimants can present and have their claims heard in a justly gender-sensitive 
manner. To determine which benefits, best practices and innovations may be transposed 
into the refugee process so as to adequately address the complexity of FGM and in tandem 
correct the legal, historical and moral disparities in the protection afforded to female 
refugee claimants, this chapter examines several model domestic violence courts which 
have been developed throughout the case-studies.  
   As a final point, chapter five draws lessons to be learned from the US, Canadian and 
UK gender-guidelines and their respective specialised domestic violence courts for the 
RDP. To this end, this chapter will put forward a series of recommendations to redress 
the treatment of FGM within the RDP, advocating specifically for procedural reforms. 
Herein lies the major contribution of this thesis, as the thesis argues that the process in 
which refugee determination is made is equally (if not more) as important as the actual 
interpretation of the 1951 Refugee Convention definition. Considering the themes 
underpinning this thesis, the chapter also proposes (albeit to a limited degree) 
recommendations for the improvement of the interpretation of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention generally, including the repeated (if unrealistic) call for the inclusion of 
gender as an addition persecution ground and making the existing gender and credibility 
assessment guidelines legally binding on decision-makers. In so doing, this thesis seeks 
to make an important contribution to the current debates and may be of assistance to those 
States seeking to improve their RDP’s to ensure that all (and not just FGM) claimants 
seeking refugee status on the basis of gender-based violence are respected and that their 
claims are determined in a gender-sensitive and accommodating manner.  
   To safeguard the rights of genuine FGM claimants and to ensure that their claims are 
treated and interpreted in a gender-sensitive manner, it is hoped that the strategies for 
reforms outlined in this thesis will give rise to constructive and principled reforms within 
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the RDP.  Like the criminal justice response to domestic violence, substantive change is 
required to ensure that FGM claimants can benefit from a gender-sensitive processes. 
Arguably, an inclusive process which challenges the status quo, respects victims and 
promotes a gendered approach will produce like the domestic violence courts, a fair and 































The Development of International Human Rights and Refugee Law and the Failure 




Despite considerable progress over the past few decades in recognising the rights of 
women generally and the forging of stronger bonds so as to encourage a wider spectrum 
of civil society to contribute to the advancement of women and their protection from 
human rights abuses, the rights of women and young girls continues to be violated.1 
According to leading academics such as Niamh Reilly, despite progressive initiatives, 
including the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against 
Women,2 international human rights law has not yet been effectively applied to redress 
the disadvantages and injustices experienced by women.3 She posits that violations of 
women rights continued to be ignored, condoned and perpetrated by governments 
worldwide.4 A particularly clear example being gender-based violence against women, 
which has not been understood as a human rights issue much less as one requiring 
                                                 
1 Concerns prevail that there remains a “persistence of stereotypes and conservative attitudes which have 
an impact on the advancement of women’s rights”. These comments were made by Silvia Pimental, chair 
of the CEDAW Committee during its 49th Session. See, “Women’s Rights Violations Still Continue Despite 
Progress on Discrimination”, (2011), available online via the Women’s News, Opinions and Current 
Affairs Website at http://www.womensviewsonnews.org/2011/07/womens-rights-violations-still-continue-
despite-progress-on-discrimination/ (last accessed 22/2/17). 
2 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, opened for signature 
Dec. 18, 1979, G.A. Res. 34/180, 34 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 46, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979), 1249 U.N.T.S. 
13 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981). Hereafter referred to as CEDAW. 
3 See, Bunch C & Reilly N, “Demanding Accountability – The Global Campaign and Vienna Tribunal for 
Women’s Human Rights”, New York: Centre for Women’s Global Leadership, Rutgers University, (1999), 
at 2. See also, Cook R, “Women’s International Human Rights Law: The Way Forward”, in Cook R, 
“Human Rights of Women: National and International Perspectives”, University of Pennsylvania Press: 
Philadelphia, (1994), at 3. See also, Canada v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, 733 (quoting Hathaway J, “The 
Law of Refugee Status”, Butterworths: Toronto, (1991), at 104-5 where it was said that, “Underlying the 
[Refugee] Convention is the international community’s commitment to the assurance of basic human rights 
without discrimination . . . . Persecution, for example, undefined in the Convention, has been ascribed the 
meaning of “sustained or systemic violation of basic human rights demonstrative of a failure of state 
protection”.  
4 Bunch & Reilly, supra note 3, at 2.   
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attention from the international human rights5 and refugee realms. Accordingly, whilst 
refugee law increasingly refers to and acknowledges its foundations in a human rights 
paradigm,6 the failure of the international human rights regime, to adequately address the 
issue of violence against women, has resulted in what can only describe as being a 
‘wondrous mess’ when it comes to determining claims for refugee status based on a 
gender-related form of persecution. In other words, because the international human rights 
paradigm has not effectively addressed human rights violations directed against women, 
and because States interpret key criteria of the refugee definition in light of human rights 
principles, women equally fail to be protected under international refugee law and they 
do not benefit equitably from refugee status determination.7 Consequently, women who 
are crossing borders to flee persecution often struggle to convince authorities that they 
deserve protection.8 This is evident from the developing jurisprudence on FGM as a basis 
for refugee status.9 Judicial attitudes have been characterised by overall inconsistency; 
some decision-makers, mindful of the immigration risks in opening a floodgate to a large 
group of would be refugees, have refused refugee status, on occasion defending this gate-
keeping approach in the language of cultural relativism despite the applicants explicit 
rejection of the custom.10 In other cases an affirmation of universal human rights norms 
                                                 
5 Ibid. 
6 See, Anker D, “Refugee Law, Gender, and the Human Rights Paradigm”, 15 Harvard Human Rights 
Journal 133, (2002), at 133. 
7 This is reflected in the fact that typically there has been no gender attached to the term ‘refugee’ and 
limited attention until relatively recently has been focused on the protection needs of women as asylum 
seekers. This is further evidenced by the fact that statistics regarding the proportion of asylum-seekers who 
are female are often inaccurate, misleading or unavailable. See, Crawley H, “Refugees and Gender: Law 
and Process” Jordan Publishing Limited: Bristol, (2001), at 1. 
8 In this sense, the discrediting of women in a process which purports to protect them, suggests that respect 
for human rights fails to be ‘universal’ and the international community’s commitment to the assurance of 
basic human rights without discrimination is called into question. See, Cook, supra note 3, at 3-4. See also, 
Dorling K, et al, “Refused: The Experience of Women Denied Asylum in the UK”, Women for Refugee 
Women: London, (2012), at 4. The reasons for this failure to enforce women’s human rights are complex 
and vary from country to country. They include a lack of understanding of the systemic nature of the 
subordination of women; the failure to recognise the need to characterize the subordination of women as a 
human rights violation; and a lack of state practice to condemn discrimination against women. Moreover, 
traditional human rights groups have been unwilling to focus on violations of women’s rights, and women’s 
groups have not understood fully the potential of international human rights law to vindicate women’s 
rights.  
9 See, Smith A, Scott A & Nash K, “New Critical Writings in Political Sociology: Globalisation and 




has been coupled with an arrogant, even racist willingness to critique the practice and 
justify international normative reference.11  
       The goal of this chapter is to explore the failures of international human rights law to 
adequately address human rights violations perpetrated against women generally, and 
how its procedural flaws, primarily a lack of procedural safeguards, have impacted upon 
the international refugee law regime and the determination of gender-based claims for 
refugee status.12  
      In this chapter (and throughout the thesis), I will examine some of the key theorists 
and critiques relevant to my research and associated issues. Specifically, I refer to the 
work of Professor Audrey Macklin, Chair in Human Rights Law, at the University of 
Toronto, who has produced outstanding scholarship and pro-bono work advocating for 
immigrant and refugee rights. She has written extensively on areas similar to my research 
interests, including transnational migration, citizenship, forced migration, feminist and 
cultural analysis, and human rights. She has written extensively on the use of the Canadian 
gender-guidelines to explore theoretical and practical aspects of gender-related 
persecution as a basis for refugee status. Influenced by her arguments and expertise as a 
frontline practitioner and decision-maker within the Canadian, Immigration and Refugee 
Board, her work has enhanced my understanding of the challenges faced by victims of 
gender violence navigating the RDP.  
    This chapter is divided into three sections. Part I examines the foundations and 
evolution of the international human rights regime, and highlights specifically the 
inadequacy of international human rights law in protecting women. The scope and 
purpose of this section is to explore the protection that international human rights law 
offers women fleeing gender-based forms of violence, including FGM. The intention here 
is to outline the international human rights law context and indicate the value and 
limitations for the protection and treatment of women. Part II provides a brief overview 
of international refugee law and its purpose and discusses how the failure of international 
                                                 
11 Ibid. 
12 For a comprehensive discussion on the interplay between international human rights and international 
refugee law, see specifically, Harvey C, “Time for Reform? Refugees, Asylum-Seekers, and Protection 




human rights law to adequately protect women has not only impacted upon but has also 
informed refugee determinations concerning women fleeing gender-based forms of 
persecution. Furthermore, Part III in addition to examining the unique experiences of 
refugee women specifically examines the difficulties that female claimants face within 
the domestic immigration framework. This chapter then concludes with an argument for 
the reform of refugee law specifically and international human rights law more generally, 
to effectively combat and protect the needs of women fleeing gender-based forms of 
violence and concurrently FGM. 
 
I. International Human Rights Law: Women’s Rights  
Every person is entitled to certain fundamental human rights. Both the UN and regional 
human rights organizations have specifically recognized the human rights of women and 
the corresponding obligations of national governments to protect and promote such rights. 
Women's human rights are enumerated by treaties, conventions, resolutions, declarations 
and guidelines, promulgated by either the UN or a regional human rights body. Treaties 
are formally adopted by national governments and they create legally binding obligations 
for those governments. Every state which has ratified a human rights treaty must ensure 
that the human rights of its citizens are protected, meaning the government commits to 
both avoid and prohibit actions that violate human rights and also to undertake positive 
steps to ensure that such violations do not occur. Under international law, specific 
enforcement bodies, usually specialised agencies, committees or special rapporteurs, 
monitor a nation's human rights situation. These bodies also review reports and 
complaints concerning human rights violations, generally submitted by NGOs but also 
sometimes by individuals. 
     Based on these positive characteristics, at first glance, the international human rights 
regime appears to offer extensive procedural and substantive legal protection to those 
women whose governments have ratified existing human rights treaties. Provisions in 
treaties pertaining directly to women have been categorised by Natalie Hevener as falling 
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into the following analytic categories: protective, corrective, and non-discriminatory.13 
Each category ultimately reflects different assumptions about women and a different 
conception of what constitutes, “a desirable, fair, and ultimately just status for women in 
society”.14  The ‘protective category’ describes the exclusionary provisions which 
ultimately reflect, “a societal concept of women as a group which either should not or 
cannot engage in specific activities”.15 In essence these types of treaties imply that women 
are in a subordinate position in comparison to men within society and should, therefore, 
be treated differently.16 While special provisions for women acknowledge the differences 
in women and men’s lives, ‘protective’ laws also tend to stereotype women as weak and 
vulnerable. Arguably, women’s rights are not necessarily paramount in such ‘protective 
regimes’. The protection afforded to women under such treaties is, however, of unlimited 
duration. The ‘corrective category’ which also identifies women as a separate group 
requiring special treatment, attempts to improve women’s treatment without making 
explicit comparisons to the situations of men. The corrective provisions, “are inclusionary 
rather than exclusionary, often removing a previous bar to activity”.17 Such treaties it 
should be noted may be of limited duration, depending on the time required to achieve the 
alteration required.18 Lastly, the non-discriminatory sex-neutral, category rejects the 
concept of women as a separate group. It reflects the idea of equal treatment between men 
and women.19 Non-discriminatory documents are inclusionary, since they seek to end 
                                                 
13 Hevener N, “An Analysis of Gender Based Treaty Law: Contemporary Developments in Historical 
Perspective”, 8 Human Rights Quarterly 70, (1986), at 71. 
14 Ibid. According to Hevener the application of these categories to the treaty provisions enables one to 
identify: (1) the dominate goal of the treaty, when its provisions on different issues fall into predominately 
one category; (2) ambiguous or even conflicting goals within the treaty when provisions fall into more than 
one category; and (3) historical patterns of change when provisions are compared with those of earlier 
documents on the same topic. Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
16 An example of such treaties includes the Convention Concerning Night Work of Women Employed in 
Industry, Revised 9 July 1948, 81 UNTS 285 and the Geneva Convention Relating to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 135, articles 14, 16 and 49. 
17 Hevener, supra note 13, at 72. 
18 A key example would be the Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, Adopted 29th January 
1957, entered into force 11 August 1958, 309 UNTS 65. That convention was drafted to address the not 
uncommon problem of involuntary loss or change of nationality of women at the time of marriage or 
divorce. The treaty explicitly defines the problem and identifies State obligations in this area, including that 
of making available, “specially privileged naturalization procedures” to alien wives of nationals. Ibid, art 3, 
para 1. 
19 A useful guide to the literature on women’s rights is Cook R & Oosterveld V, “A Select Bibliography of 
Women’s Human Rights”, 44 American University Law Review 1429, (1995). 
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discrimination against, or special treatment of women. But, unlike the corrective and 
protective provisions, they apply to all men as well as to all women, with exceptions based 
on issue-related qualifications rather than sex-based distinctions. They are of unlimited 
duration.  
   The current international legal system has dealt with non-discrimination on the basis of 
sex in both generally applicable and women-specific instruments. The right of women to 
equal treatment and non-discrimination on the basis of sex is part of the traditional canon 
of human rights. General human rights treaties at both the global and regional levels 
contain rights of non-discrimination on a number of bases which include sex and prohibit 
distinctions based on sex with respect to the enjoyment of rights.20 A number of 
international instruments, the most comprehensive being CEDAW, also focus entirely or 
in large part on discrimination against women.21 CEDAW contains a broader definition 
of discrimination than those contained in earlier treaties, covering both equality of 
opportunity (formal equality) and equality of outcome (de facto equality).22 Sandra 
Fredman has argued that the conception of equality embodied in CEDAW is a 
                                                 
20 See for example, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 
1966, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 51, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 
U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter referred to as the ICCPR], articles 2, 3 and 26; 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. 
Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 3 
(entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter referred to as the ICESCR], articles 3 and 7; American 
Convention on Human Rights, 22 November 1969, 1114 UNTS 123, article 1; African Charter of Human 
and People’s Rights, 26 June 1981, articles 2 and 18(3); European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221, article 14 (hereafter referred to as 
the ECHR). 
21 These instruments include: Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, and the Convention on 
Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages, 7 November 1962, 521 
UNTS 231. See also, Convention on the Political Rights of women, 20 December 1952, 193 UNTS 135 and 
CEDAW, supra note 2. For an overview of these instruments see Cook R, “Women”, in Schachter O and 
Joyner C (eds), “The United Nations Legal Order”, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, (1995), at 
433. See also, Halberstam M & De Feis E, “Women’s Legal Rights: International Covenants as an 
Alternative to ERA?”, Transnational Publishers: Dobbs Ferry, (1987), at 18-33 & See also, Rehof L, “Guide 
to the Travaux Preparatoires of the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Discrimination against Women”, Martinus Nijhoff: Dordrecht, (1993). 
22 Charlesworth H & Chinkin C, “The Boundaries of International Law: A Feminist Analysis”, Manchester 
University Press: Manchester, (2000), at 217. See also, CEDAW, supra note 2, article 1 which defines 
discrimination against women as meaning: 
   “any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of 
impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status 
on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, 
economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field”. 
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transformative one.23 She argues that transformative equality pursues four-overlapping 
aims: breaking the cycle of disadvantage, promoting respect for dignity and worth, 
accommodating difference by achieving structural change and promoting political and 
social inclusion and participation.24 Placing these elements together highlights the 
connection between different types of gender equality harms.25 It further highlights the 
expansive concept of equality and intersectional discrimination being used as the 
international level.26 It also, however, points out some of the shortfalls in the current 
approach to equality.27 These shortfalls pertain firstly to the articulation of the goals of 
substantive equality and secondly in applying them in assessing compliance by States 
with international obligations of equality.28 The generalized, open-texture reference to 
equality and non-discrimination has made it possible for the interpretation of equality to 
evolve as the problems faced by women are better understood and as new challenges 
arise.29 In many States, legal equality was only achieved in the first part of the twentieth 
century; but in a disturbing number of States, such equality and women’s rights in general 
has still not been achieved. This is reflected in the number of reservations entered to 
CEDAW.30 Most States formally accept the international regime31 but undermine their 
                                                 
23 Fredman S, “Beyond the Dichotomy of Formal and Substantive Equality: Towards a New Definition of 
Equal Rights” in Boerefjn et al (eds.), “Temporary Special Measures”, Antwerp: Intersentia, (2003), at 115. 
24 Fredman S, “The Potential and Limits of an Equal Rights Paradigm in Addressing Poverty”, 3 
Stellenbosch Law Review 566, (2011), at 25, as cite in Campbell M, “CEDAW and Women’s Intersecting 
Identities: A Pioneering New Approach to Intersectional Discrimination”, (2015), available online at 
http://www.scielo.br/pdf/rdgv/v11n2/1808-2432-rdgv-11-2-0479.pdf (last accessed 8/6/17), at 493. 
25 Campbell, supra note 24, at 494. 
26 Fredman S & Goldblatt B, “Gender Equality and Human Rights”, (2015), available online at 
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Beth_Goldblatt/publication/281077241_Gender_Equality_and_Hum
an_Rights/links/55d3ea6e08ae0a3417226f0a.pdf (last accessed 9/6/17), at 2. 
27 Ibid, at 2.  
28 Ibid.  
29 Ibid, at 3. 
30 Ibid. According to Freeman, many of the reservations entered come from States that cite Sharia 
law as regulating matters of personal status such as marriage, divorce, custody and inheritance. See, 
Freeman M, “Reservations to CEDAW: An Analysis for UNICEF”, Discussion Paper, United Nations 
Children's Fund (UNICEF), Gender, Rights and Civic Engagement Section, Division of Policy and Practice: 
New York, December (2009), at 6. This paper is available online at 
https://www.unicef.org/gender/files/Reservations_to_CEDAW-an_Analysis_for_UNICEF.pdf  
31 As of 9th May 2017 the ICCPR has 169 parties; the ICESCR 165; the International Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination 178; Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 10 December 1984, UN Doc. A/39/51. (Hereafter referred 
to as the Torture Convention), has 161 parties; CEDAW has 189 & Convention on the Rights of the Child 
196 (Hereafter CRC). These statistics have been taken from the United Nations Treaty Collection which is 
available online at 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/Treaties.aspx?id=4&subid=A&lang=en (last accessed 9/5/17). 
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legal commitment by use of extensive reservations,32 claw-back and derogation 
provisions33 which allow States to assert imperatives of national law, public safety and 
security34 or inadequate national implementation.35 Consequently, many States which 
have ratified these treaties are responsible for extensive human rights violations still. As 
Freeman puts it, such reservations ‘relegate laws and practices that critically affect 
women’s human rights to a system that is unreachable by and unaccountable to 
international norms’.36 
     Another form of challenge focuses on the Western origins of human rights law 
allowing claims of cultural relativism.37  For example, at the Vienna Conference on 
Human Rights in 1993, a number of Asian States claimed that human rights as interpreted 
in the West were based on a commitment to individualism and were at odds with the Asian 
tradition of concern with the community.38 The vulnerability of human rights law to non-
observance, as a result of these ‘justifiable’ limitations is exacerbated when the law 
touches women’s lives.39 CEDAW explicitly acknowledges social and cultural norms as 
                                                 
32 Steiner H & Alston P, “International Human Rights in Context” Clarendon Press: Oxford, (1996), at 766-
71. 
33 Higgins R, “Derogations under Human Rights Treaties”, 48 British Yearbook of International Law 281, 
(1976).  
34 See for example, ICCPR, supra note 20, articles 18(3), 19(3), 21 and 22. 
35 Charlesworth H, “Australia’s Split Personality: Implementation of Human Rights Treaty Obligations in 
Australia” in Alston P & Chiam M (eds), “Treaty Making and Australia”, Federation Press: Annandale, 
(1995), at 129. 
36 Freeman, supra note 30, at 6. 
37 For scholarly analysis on the issue of cultural relativism see specifically, An-Na’im A, “Religion, the 
State, and Constitutionalism in Islamic and Comparative Perspectives”, 57 Drake Law Review, 829, (2009); 
An-Na’im A, Gort J, Jansen H & Vroom H, “Preface”, in An-Na’im, A, et al, (eds), “Human Rights and 
Religious Values: An Uneasy Relationship?”, Eerdmans Publishing: Michigan, (1995) & Bell L, Nathan A, 
& Peleg I, “Introduction: Culture and Human Rights”, in  Bell L, Nathan  A & Peleg I, (eds) “Negotiating 
Culture and Human Rights”, Columbia University Press, New York, (2001). 
38 Ghai Y, “Human Rights and Governance: the Asian Debate”, 15 Australian Yearbook of International 
Law 1, (1994), at 5-6. However, this governmental view should be compared with the Bangkok NGO 
Declaration on Human Rights, 27 March 1993, Report of the Regional Meeting for Asia on the World 
Conference on Human Rights, UN Doc. A/CONF.157/ASRM/8-A/CONF.157/PC/59, (1993). 
39 For instance, despite being a signatory to CEDAW since October 2000, Saudi Arabia continues to 
discriminate against and deny women their fundamental human rights. Described as, “not persons”, women 
cannot do anything, even drive, without their guardian’s permission. Such denials continue due to the fact 
that Saudi Arabia signed CEDAW subject to the following reservations: (1) in case of contradiction between 
any term of the Convention and the norms of Islamic law, the Kingdom is not under obligation to observe 
the contradictory terms of the Convention; (2) the Kingdom does not consider itself bound by paragraph 2 
of article 9 of the Convention and paragraph 1 of article 29 of the Convention. Paragraph 2 of article 9 reads 
as follows: “States Parties shall grant women equal rights with men with respect to the nationality of their 
children”. See, Colombo V, “Human Rights vs. Sharia: Violence Against Women”, (2009), available online 
44 
 
the source of many women's rights abuses, and obliges governments to take appropriate 
measures to address such abuses. Article 5(a) of the convention obliges States to: 
modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view 
to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices 
which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the 
sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women. 
Arguably, by signing CEDAW, many States have tried to appear to protect and promote 
the rights of women, but at the same time they hesitate in modifying and reforming 
traditions and laws.40 
   Before progressing to the next section, it should be noted that the issue of non-
observance, (in other words the use of cultural relativism and reservations to justify the 
denial of human rights) is not unique to human rights law. This issue is imperative to this 
thesis as it is also one of the reasons why refugee law is failing to adequately protect 
women fleeing gender-based forms of violence, including FGM. Arguably, the wide 
margin of appreciation given to States in their interpretation of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention definition, gives decision-makers too much freedom and flexibility to 
interpret the definition in a self-serving manner. Arguably, such flexibility coupled with 
political considerations, particularly post 9/11 and ongoing ISIS terrorism attacks, are 
used as exclusion mechanisms via which States maintain control of their borders and cap 
the number of asylum-seekers seeking entry.41 
 
                                                 
via the ANNAQED website at http://www.annaqed.com/en/content/show.aspx?aid=16239 (last accessed 
8/2/10). 
40 For example, “women’s rights and duties” were the main issues at the June 2004 conference at the Centre 
Abd al-Aziz for National Dialogue in Medina, Saudi Arabia to “build and favour a culture of dialogue in 
Saudi society.” A surface equality was granted by the presence of 35 men and 35 women, however they 
discussed all issues from two different rooms connected by a closed-circuit television. The conference 
concluded with a clear victory for the conservative position, represented by Shaikh Abd Allah ibn al-
Munie’s declaration about women’s right to drive: “If women who want to drive were like women at this 
conference, we would not have any doubt in allowing it. But we are dealing with teenagers… for this reason 
we shall be firm in our position to protect them from evil.”  Ibid. 
41 See, Heckman G, “Securing Procedural Safeguards for Asylum Seekers in Canadian Law: An Expanding 
Role for International Human Rights Law”, 15 International Journal of Refugee Law 212, (2003), at 213 
(noting how States have attempted to control migration into their territories). See also, Whitaker R, 
“Refugees: The Security Dimension”, 2 Citizenship Studies 413, (1998), at 414-5. Whitaker notes that the, 
‘refugee’ is being reconstructed in the dominant State discourses as an object of fear. At best, the redefined 
refugee is a maker of false or unfounded claims that must be unmasked through effective bureaucratic 
scrutiny. At worst, the refugee is criminalised or politicized as a threat to order. 
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A. Feminist Critiques of Rights  
 
A fundamental issue in any discussion concerning women, gender violence and 
international human rights law is whether international formulations of rights are useful 
for women. A number of feminist academics have suggested, particularly within the 
context of national laws, that campaigns for women’s legal rights are a waste of energy 
and at worst detrimental to women.42 They have argued that, while the formulation of 
equality rights may be useful as an initial step towards the improvement of the position of 
women, a continuing focus on the acquisition of rights may not be useful.43 Thus, it has 
been argued that women’s experiences and concerns are not easily translated into the 
narrow, language of rights.44 In other words,  rights discourse overly simplifies complex 
power relations and their promise is constantly thwarted by structural inequalities of 
power.45 Arguably, the balancing of ‘competing’ rights by decision-making bodies often 
reduces women’s power,46 and particular rights, such as the right to the protection of the 
family, can in fact justify the oppression of women.47 Consequently, feminists have 
examined the interpretation of rights apparently designed to benefit and protect women 
by national tribunals and pointed to their characteristically ‘male’ construction.48 In other 
words, because deep-rooted laws were formulated by men with men in mind, the gender-
bias inherent in such laws (which purportedly protect women) arguably remain manifestly 
influenced by gender stereotypes which ultimately confines women’s rights and 
                                                 
42 Charlesworth & Chinkin, supra note 22 at 208. 
43 Kingdom E, “What’s Wrong with Rights? Problems for Feminist Politics of Law” Edinburgh University 
Press: Edinburgh, (1991). 
44 West R, “Feminism, Critical Social Theory and Law” 1989 University of Chicago Legal Forum 59, 
(1989). 
45 Gross E, “What is Feminist Theory” in Pateman C & Gross E (eds), “Feminist Challenges: Social and 
Political Theory”, Allen & Unwin: Sydney, (1986), at 192; Smart C, “Feminism and the Power of Law”, 
Routledge: London, (1989), at 138-44. 
46 Smart, supra note 45, at 138-44. 
47 Charlesworth et al, “Feminist Approaches to International Law” 85 American Journal of International 
Law 613, (1991), at 635-8; Arzt D, “The Application of International Human Rights Law in Islamic States” 
12 Human Rights Quarterly 202, (1990), at 203. 
48 Canadian feminists have made a distinctive contribution to this critique in their analysis of judicial 
interpretation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. See for instance, Sheehy E, “Feminist 
Argumentation before the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Seaboyer; R v Gayme: The Sound of One Hand 
Clapping” 18 Melbourne University Law Review 391, (1991), at 450; Fudge J, “The Effect of Entrenching 
a Bill of Rights upon Political Discourse: Feminist Demands and Sexual Violence in Canada”, 17 
International Journal of the Sociology of Law 445, (1989). See also, in the US context, Olsen F, “Statutory 
Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis”, 63 Texas Law Review 387, (1984). 
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experiences to the ‘private sphere’ of life, consequently justifying certain human rights 
abuses committed against women.  
       Similar critiques have been developed by the Critical Legal Studies Movement. This 
movement has posited that statements of rights are indeterminate and for that reason are 
highly manipulable both in a technical and a more basic sense.49 According to Hilary 
Charlesworth, recourse to the language of rights may give a rhetorical flourish to an 
argument, but provides only a momentary polemic advantage, often blurring the need for 
change within the social and political arenas.50 To assert a legal right, it has been argued 
by Peter Gabel and Paul Harris, is to mischaracterise our social experience and to assume 
the inevitability of social antagonism by affirming that, “social power resides in the State 
rather than in people themselves”.51 The individualism promoted by traditional 
understandings of rights limits their possibilities by ignoring, “the relational nature of 
social life”.52 According to Charlesworth and Chinkin, talk of rights is said to make 
contingent social structures appear stable and permanent and to weaken the possibility of 
their ‘radical transformation’ the only consistent function of rights has been to protect the 
most privileged groups within a respective society.53 It is this type of favouritism which 
this thesis by proposing procedural reforms based on successful domestic violence models 
aims to surmount within the context of the RDP. Arguably, by learning from the failure 
of the international human rights regime and transforming the institutional54 and 
procedural safeguards55 that surround the protection of women from human rights 
                                                 
49 Charlesworth H, “What are ‘Women’s International Human Rights’?”, in Cook R, “Human Rights of 
Women: National and International Perspectives”, University of Pennsylvania Press: Philadelphia, (1994), 
at 60. 
50 Ibid. See also, Tushnet M, “An Essay on Rights” 62 Texas Law Review 1363, (1984), at 1371-2. 
51 Gabel P & Harris P, “Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical Legal Theory and the Practice of 
Laws”, 11 NYU Review of Law and Social Change 369, (1983), at 375-6. 
52 Charlesworth & Chinkin, supra note 22 at 209. See also, Tushnet M, “Rights: An Essay in Informal 
Political Theory”, 17 Politics and Society 403, (1989), at 410. 
53  Charlesworth & Chinkin, supra note 22 at 209. See also, Kairys D, “Freedom of Speech”, in D. Kairys 
(ed), “The Politics of Law”, Pantheon Books: York, (1982), at 140-1. 
54 ‘Institutional safeguards’ are features of an asylum regime that concerns the structure of the decision-
making process and the nature of the decision-making bodies and their powers, including: providing 
decision-making authority to an independent tribunal rather than to a minister or their delegates; providing 
a tribunal or official a highly codified decision-making power as opposed to a broad unstructured discretion; 
proving a statutory appeal to an appellate authority; and proving for judicial review of a decision. 
55 ‘Procedural safeguards’ refer to the nature and content of the rights of refugee claimants to participate in 
the decision-making process and including providing claimants notice of the case that she must meet; 
allowing her the opportunity to be heard by an impartial tribunal through written representations or in person 
at an oral hearing; allowing her to be legally represented; allowing her to call witnesses or adduce other 
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violations and decision-making can genuine victims of FGM be adequately heard and 
ultimately protected within a non-discriminatory procedural process.  
      Feminist critiques of rights, remains a rarity in the literature pertaining to international 
women’s rights.56 According to Charlesworth and Chinkin “perhaps the comparatively 
radical, and vulnerable nature of human rights law within the international legal order has 
protected it from internal critique”.57 Naturally, those concerned with the protection and 
promotion of human rights may be reluctant to challenge the form of human rights law at 
a fundamental level, “fearing that such a critique may be used to reduce the hard-fought-
for advances in the area”.58 Whilst the development of women’s human rights, namely 
the development of instruments specific to women, is an important and useful approach 
in the protection of women internationally, questions which must be asked but which are 
beyond the scope of the thesis include: is this task worth the energy which it requires? 
And are we merely creating new sites for the subtle oppression of women?59       
      Without question the development of ‘women’s rights’ is an imperative tool in the 
drive to protect women within the international arena. Due to the fact that within most 
modern societies women operate from what can only be described as a disadvantaged or 
lower position than men, rights discourse “offers a recognised vocabulary to frame 
political and social wrongs”.60 Patricia Williams for instance in support of this assertion 
has pointed out that for African-Americans, talk of rights has been a constant source of 
hope: 
 
Rights’ feels so new in the mouths of most black people. It is still so deliciously 
empowering to say. It is a sign for and a gift of selfhood that is very hard to 
contemplate restructuring…….at this point in history. It is the magic wand of 
visibility and invisibility, of inclusion and exclusion, of power and no power .61 
 
                                                 
evidence; allowing her to cross-examine witnesses called against her or to respond to evidence detrimental 
to her claim; and proving her with reasons for the decision in her case. 
56 Charlesworth, supra note 49 at 61. See also, Engle K, “International Human Rights and Feminism” When 
Discourses Meet”, 13 Michigan Journal of International Law, 317, (1992).  
57 Charlesworth & Chinkin, supra note 22 at 210. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid (asking the same questions). 
60 Charlesworth, supra note 49 at 61. 
61 Williams P, “Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights” 22 Harvard Civil 
Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 401, (1987), at 431. 
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Similarly, in parallel with African-Americans, the empowering function of rights 
discourse for women, particularly in the international sphere where women remain to a 
large degree invisible, excluded and powerless, is a crucial aspect of its value. Rights 
discourse has made visible human rights abuses committed against women, and in tandem 
increased both the power and inclusion of women in this relatively new area. 
     Rights discourse also offers a focus for international feminism which can translate into 
action if responses to women’s claims are inadequate. According to Minow, it affirms “a 
community dedicated to invigorating words with a power to restrain, so that even the 
powerless can appeal to those words”.62 Thus, the need to develop a feminist rights 
discourse so that it acknowledges gendered disparities of power, rather than assuming all 
people are equal in relation to all rights, is crucial.63 The challenge therefore, according 
to some feminist scholars, is to invest a rights vocabulary with meanings which undermine 
the current “skewed distribution of economic, social and political power”.64 In non-
western societies, this task may be extremely complex, for as Radhika Commaraswamy 
has pointed out, in South Asian regions, “rights discourse is a weak discourse”, especially 
in the context of women and family relations”.65 
     The significance of rights discourse greatly outweighs its disadvantages. As such 
human rights “provides an alternative and additional language and framework to the 
welfare and protection approach to the global situation of women, which presents women 
as victims or dependents”.66 Thus, this rights discourse gives women the opportunity to 
claim their fundamental rights from the state and other specified obligation-holders. 
Consequently, by virtue of being a human being, women like men should be able to 
engage with, and contest the parameters of the human rights regime and discourse. Whilst 
it is important to claim their rights, and rights discourse has undoubtedly, provided women 
with the knowledge and energy to claim what is rightfully theirs, despite the positive 
                                                 
62 Minow M, “Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover” 96 Yale Law Journal 1869, (1987), at 1910. 
63 Charlesworth, supra note 49 at 62. 
64 Charlesworth & Chinkin, supra note 22 at 211. See also, Minow, supra note 62, at 1910. 
65 Commaraswamy R, “To Bellow like a Cow: Women, Ethnicity, and the Discourse of Rights”, in Cook R, 
“Human Rights of Women: National and International Perspectives”, University of Pennsylvania Press: 
Philadelphia, (1994), at 55. 
66 Charlesworth & Chinkin, supra note 22 at 212. See also, Brautigam C, “Mainstreaming a gender 
perspective in the work of the United Nations human rights treaty bodies”, Proceedings of the 91st Annual 
Meeting of the American Society of International Law, American Society of International Law: Washington 
DC, (1997), at 390. 
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undertones of rights discourse for women institutional and procedural discrimination and 
exclusion continues to hinder such progress. Institutional/procedural discrimination and 
exclusion in their most basic forms refer to the collective failure of States and State bodies 
to provide an appropriate, professional and accessible service to individuals because of 
their real or perceived identity which may be religious belief, political opinion, racial 
group, age, marital status, gender, sexual orientation, disability or dependency. Such 
discrimination can be seen or detected in process, attitudes and behaviour which amount 
to discrimination through ignorance, thoughtlessness, stereotyping and most commonly 
unwitting prejudice. The international community, including the UN (as already 
discussed) has taken steps to address the subordination position of women. Nonetheless, 
since it is unwilling to challenge existing statutory definitions, particularly the 1951 
Refugee Convention definition, through unwitting prejudice it continues to be part of the 
institutional and collective failure which seriously disadvantages and discriminates 
against women. Such failure ultimately denies women their human rights and in some 
instances the protection which they seek. These failures, which have largely been 
replicated within the refugee context, will now be discussed in the subsequent sections 
and can be categorized as follows: (1) public/private dichotomy; (2) the marginalization 
of women’s rights; (3) inadequate enforcement and implementation of provisions; and 
finally, (4) problems in understanding what ‘equality’ means. Whilst the issue of cultural 
relativism needs to address when examining the failure of international law (and 
subsequently refugee law) in adequately protecting women, this particular issue will not, 
however, be examined in this section as its relevance will be examined in subsequent 
chapters in respect of the examined FGM jurisprudence and domestic developments in 
respects of domestic violence. 
 
B. The Inadequacy of International Human Rights in Affording Protection to 
Women 
 
Women’s human rights have been repeatedly guaranteed in numerous international 
treaties, declarations and conferences. Despite their existence, however, blatant and 
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systematic human rights violations continue to be committed throughout the world.67 
Whilst this assertion is true in respect of most if not all human rights, one would have 
assumed that the existing women-specific instruments would have had greater built-in 
procedural safeguards, particularly enforcement mechanisms which would curtail or at 
the very least deter egregious violations including FGM.68The difference in the human 
rights violations experienced by men and women respectively lies in the fact that women 
are being abused/persecuted in this manner because of their gender. Amnesty 
International has reported that just over 21 million people, or 0.3% of the world’s 
population are refugees right now.69 The UNHCR has further stated that women and girls 
make up around 50 per cent of any refugee, internally displaced or stateless population.70 
Such a high figure not only highlights the overwhelming need for asylum by women, it is 
also arguably, evidence of the failure of the international human rights law regime and 
governments to adequately protect women.71 In theory, human rights are intended to be 
indivisible, gender-neutral agreements between the State and its citizens.72 In reality, 
                                                 
67 See, Muscati S, “Women”, Human Rights Watch, (2014), available online at 
https://www.hrw.org/topic/womens-rights (last accessed 18/7/17). See also, Reilly N et al, “Testimonies of 
the Global Tribunal on Violations of Women’s Human Rights”, Center for Women's Global Leadership, 
(1994). 
68 This is due to the fact that existing women-specific instruments have been widely ratified and make 
advances for women’s human rights. According to some leading academics, CEDAW’s transcendence of 
the divide between first and second-generation rights acknowledges that, for women, protection of civil and 
political rights is meaningless without question to the social, economic and cultural context in which they 
operate. Charlesworth & Chinkin, supra note 22 at 217. Furthermore, CEDAW also identifies areas where 
discrimination against women is most manifest and where women most need guarantees of rights. CEDAW 
also attempts to highlight, address and overcome the public/private dichotomy observed in international 
law. In particular, it asserts women’s equal rights to participate in public decision-making bodies at all levels 
and also affirms women’s rights to equality in a limited way within the ‘private’ arena of the family unlike 
other human rights instruments which designate the family as a unit to be protected. For a list of States 
which have ratified CEDAW, please refer to the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the 
Empowerment of Women website at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/states.htm (last accessed 
20/2/17). 
69 Amnesty International UK, “World leaders are spectacularly failing refugees”, (2016), available online 
via Amnesty International UK website at https://www.amnesty.org.uk/world-leaders-are-spectacularly-
failing-refugees (last accessed 28/11/16). 
70 See, UNHCR, “Women”, (2016), available online at http://www.unhcr.org/uk/women.html (last accessed 
29/12/16). 
71 According to Lee, “the municipal law of virtually of all countries guarantees the rights of their citizens to 
life, liberty, equality, property, due process, etc. The mere existence of refugees……shows that their 
governments have violated these rights. See, Lee L, “The Right to Compensation: Refugees and Countries 
of Asylum”, 80 American Journal of International Law 523, (1986), at 538. 
72 Askari L, “Girls’ Rights under International Law: An Argument for Establishing Gender Equality as a 
Jus Cogens”, 8 Southern California Review of Law and Women’s Studies 3, (1998), at 11. See also, McCabe 
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however, this has arguably translated into a “contract between the state and men”.73 This 
thesis acknowledges that men are also affected by human rights violations. It argues that 
because international human rights law focuses on the artificially construed ‘public 
sphere’ where the abuse of men prevails, this branch of law has largely ignored the abuse 
perpetrated against women within the ‘private sphere’, namely the home and community. 
Moreover, despite the plethora of comprehensive treaties and declarations delineating the 
human rights of all human beings, States cannot be compelled to abide by them and often 
do not.74 Thus, by its very nature human rights law is vulnerable to non-observance. 
     Ominously, the current gendered and unenforceable status of international law leaves 
refugee/asylum law as the most viable instrument available to women fleeing their homes 
and seeking to address the violations of their human rights in other States. This is 
extremely problematic for several reasons. Firstly, this method unrealistically places the 
entire responsibility on the female claimant to escape the abuse she experiences.  
Secondly, refugee law itself fails to adequately cover the range of human rights abuses 
which women face. Thirdly, as this chapter and Chapter Three more specifically will 
reveal, refugee status is difficult to obtain particularly in gender-related claims. Each 
refugee situation is unique, including the conflict or crisis that causes the refugee outflow, 
the culture of the refugee-producing country, the culture of the refugee-hosting country, 
the length and degree of trauma, and other lifestyle changes/choices during flight. 
Difficulty attaining legal status as refugees and issues such as violence and access to 
resources are not unique to women refugees. Through a combination of these factors, 
however, women are made one of the most vulnerable groups in the world and face greater 
difficulty in obtaining protection. Refugee women, face obstacles in both meeting the 
definition of a refugee and documenting their status as refugees. Their gender often 
functions to their disadvantage. Firstly, the unique types of persecutions that women 
endure are not enumerated as grounds for persecution in the international legal 
instruments that define refugees. The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
does not provide for a separate category for women who face gender-specific persecution 
                                                 
E, “The Inadequacy of International Human Rights Law to Protect the Rights of Women as Illustrated by 
the Crisis in Afghanistan”, 5 UCLA Journal of International Law & Foreign Affairs 422, (2001), at 422. 
73 Askari, supra note 72, at 11. See also, McCabe, supra note 72, at 422.  
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or human rights abuses which often occur in the private sphere and the sanctity of the 
home. Consequently, women arguably have less of a chance of obtaining refugee status 
as the key criteria for being a refugee are primarily drawn from the realm of public life, 
which, in many societies, is still dominated by men.75 Secondly, access to asylum 
procedures is a further obstacle for women. Barriers to access may be logistical, 
informational, cultural, or psychological. It may simply be more difficult for a woman to 
reach a location where she can claim asylum, as women tend to be less mobile than men 
and have less control over resources. Additionally, they are more likely to be solely 
responsible for children - and the logistics of travelling with children are more 
complicated than travelling alone. Furthermore, more women than men are illiterate;76 
those who have some formal education have, on average, fewer years of schooling. It may 
therefore be harder for them to get information about how and where to apply for asylum, 
or even to learn what their options are.77 In some cultures, women are prohibited from 
interacting with strangers, including governmental authorities. This can be an obstacle not 
only to asking for asylum, but also in gaining legal assistance in doing so. 
   In cases where women are travelling with male relatives, it is not uncommon for the 
male to be treated as the “primary” asylum seeker, even if it is the women’s experiences 
that might more clearly fit the requirements for a grant of refugee status. They may be 
asked, not about their own experiences, but about those of their male relatives. In many 
cultures, men do not routinely discuss their activities with their wives or other women of 
the household. This lack of familiarity may prejudice the claims of both the women and 
man in a family group.78 
    Severe difficulties often arise for women in refugee status determination hearings if 
they have experienced sexual violence, particularly FGM which is also steeped in cultural 
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and tradition. In such instances, women may be reluctant to speak about their ordeals, 
particularly to male interviewers or through male interpreters, or in the presence of other 
family members, as sexual violence is viewed in some societies as a source of shame. 
Furthermore, having to recount some experiences may become another source of trauma 
for women, which decision-makers may not understand. Coupled with the exclusion of 
gender as a persecution ground, the difficulty of proving credibility, cultural relativism 
arguments and the psychological problems associated with certain forms of abuse, women 
unquestionably have greater hurdles to overcome when seeking refugee status. These 
difficulties will be discussed in detail in Chapter Three in respects of the case-law 
pertaining to FGM-related refugee claims. In order to understand why these difficulties, 
exist for woman, the following section will now examine how the public/private 
dichotomy, in law and society, impacts women’s enjoyment of fundamental human rights. 
 
1. The Public/Private Distinction 
 
Like the clear majority of national legal systems, international human rights law operates 
largely within the confines of what Eve McCabe describes as being “the artificially 
constructed ‘public’ sphere, that is, within the world of government, politics, economics, 
and the workplace”, areas which are traditionally associated with men”.79 However, as 
previously mentioned, most forms of violence directed against women occur within the 
private sphere. Men unquestionably, can and will continue to be victims of private 
violence also, but it is characteristically not as part of a pattern of gender-based violence.80 
As many renowned feminist scholars have argued the operation of public/private 
distinctions in international law, and indeed refugee law, provides an example of the way 
in which the law can factor out the realities of women’s lives and experiences.81 As Hilary 
Charlesworth argues 
 
                                                 
79 McCabe, supra note 72, at 427. See also, Charlesworth H, “Feminist Methods in International Law”, 93 
American Journal of International Law 379, (1999), at 382.   
80 McCabe, supra note 72, at 427. 
81 Charlesworth, “Feminist Methods in International Law”, supra note 79 at 382. 
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the assumption that underlies all law, including international human rights law, is 
that the public/private distinction is real: human society and human lives can be 
separated into two distinct spheres. This division, however, is an ideological 
construct rationalizing the exclusion of women from the sources of law.82 
 
Catherine O’Rourke has described the complexity of public and private harms as 
constituting a “web of harms”.83 In fact, the public/private distinction is pliable; it can be 
defined, refined and re-defined. Governments also play a role in constructing the 
separation of public and private life.84 This distinction assumes that governments should 
not interfere in the private lives of its citizens, and according to McCabe implies that the 
‘private’ sphere is uninhibited.85 
       According to Sullivan, the law constructs and ultimately sustains power relations 
within the private sphere through both active regulations, for examples taxation systems, 
and through the failure to regulate other conduct in private life.86 In fact, while the 
parameters of public life is not uniform and what is public in one society is private in 
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another,87 the common feature of the public/private distinction is the attribution of “a 
lesser value to the activities of women within what is defined as private life”.88  
     The tension between the contending factions as to the proper jurisdiction of 
international human rights law, namely whether the law should govern the relationship 
between governments and their citizens, or relationships between individuals as well, 
“embodies this artificial distinction between the so-called ‘public’ sphere of politics, 
government and the state, and the ‘private’ sphere of home and family”.89 Those who 
argue that international human rights law should not ‘intervene’ in the ‘private’ sphere 
argue that international law should only govern the way that a nation treats its citizens, 
and not how citizens treat each other. However, such a decision leaves women in an 
extremely vulnerable position, as they will be subjected to extreme forms of harm within 
the home and family without any remedy or international source of protection.90  
       The public/private distinction, which has so deeply affected international human 
rights law has also been reproduced in refugee law.91 As will be discussed more fully in 
Chapters Two and Three, the bars to women’s eligibility for refugee status lie not solely 
in the legal categories per se (i.e., the non-inclusion of gender or sex as one of the five 
grounds) but also in the incomplete and gendered interpretation of refugee law: the failure 
of decision-makers to “acknowledge and respond to the gendering of politics and of 
women’s relationship to the state.”.92 To illustrate this point, even in cases that fit the 
traditional paradigms of refugee law, women have been denied refugee status in many 
instances, largely because the physical harm involved was sexual. A clear example of this 
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approach is the US case of Campos-Guardado,93 where a Salvadoran woman, raped by 
government vigilantes after being forced to watch anti-government family members being 
hacked to death, was denied asylum on the basis that the attackers reprisals against her 
were ‘personally motivated’ and was a form of private violence.94 Thus, the distinction 
between ‘personal/private’ harm on the one hand and ‘public’ oppression on the other had 
reproduced the dichotomy between the domestic, traditionally female sphere and the 
societal, male public arena.95 As the Campos-Guardado case illustrates, persecution 
arising out of harm in the ‘personal/private’ sphere has traditionally been held to fall 
outside of the scope of the Refugee Convention. Similar stances, as will be discussed in 
Chapter Three, have been taken in respects to FGM.96 The following section will now 
examine how effective laws and policies have been in promoting the rights of and 
protecting women. 
 
2. Inadequate Enforcement and Implementation  
 
Although States are bound by treaty and customary international human rights law, the 
effective implementation of provisions relating to women and the enforcement 
mechanisms between States or by the UN are minimal. CEDAW, which focuses solely on 
the specific suffering and disadvantage faced by women has been described as the 
“definitive international legal instrument requiring respect for and observance of the 
human rights of women”.97 Its aims are to eliminate discrimination and establish gender 
equality through challenging structural gendered power relations. But if its aspirations are 
supercilious, in relation to enforcement its wings were initially severely clipped.98 Prior 
to the introduction of the Optional Protocol there was no mechanism through which 
individuals could complain to the Committee about the violation of their rights under 
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CEDAW.99 Instead, a reporting procedure and an inter-state complaints mechanism were 
relied upon to secure States’ compliance with their treaty obligations. The flaws and 
weaknesses of such enforcement systems are now well known.100 In common with other 
UN human rights treaties, CEDAW’s inter-state complaints mechanism has never been 
used.101 As for the reporting procedure, this is generally accepted as a means of reviewing 
national implementation rather than an enforcement mechanism: Chinkin has argued that 
its nature ‘constrains the Committee from exploring issues in depth’.102 Poor compliance 
by States with reporting obligations is notorious under all international human rights 
treaties, and CEDAW has been no exception.103 The Committee initially met for only a 
two-week period each year - a uniquely short allocation of time – and consequently 
experienced a huge backlog in dealing with reports. Although authorized now to meet 
three times a year, workload problems persist.104 Furthermore, CEDAW is encumbered 
with the honour of being the most heavily reserved international human rights treaty,105 
indicating weak adherence to its normative principles.  
     In contrast to CEDAW, other mainstream human rights instruments offer a range of 
monitoring techniques. The ICCPR, the Torture Convention and the Race Convention all 
contain two other monitoring mechanisms: the right of complaint by one State against 
another for violation of the treaty106 and the right of individual communication to the 
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treaty monitoring body.107 These procedures are adopted at the discretion of the State 
party. The reason for the distinction in monitoring procedures between for the example 
the Race Convention and CEDAW according to Laura Reanda is not clear.108 She posits 
that it may have been on account of the belief that, “the condition of women, embedded 
as it is in cultural and social traditions, does not lend itself to fact-finding mechanisms 
and complaints procedures such as those developed in the human rights sphere”.109 While 
this view point can certainly be understood, unfortunately it does not allow the bias that 
arguably lies at the heart of violence against women in the sphere of international law to 
be eroded. Arguably, whilst CEDAW has been active in monitoring reports and in issuing 
recommendations, it has undeniably been hampered by resources ever more limited than 
those of other treaty-monitoring bodies.110  
    The Optional Protocol111 was adopted in 1999 and entered into force on 22 December 
2000.112 The protocol allows for Communications to be ‘submitted on behalf of 
individuals or groups of individuals, with their consent, unless it can be shown why that 
consent was not received’. The inclusion of an inquiry procedure, further empowered the 
CEDAW committee to inquire into and report on ‘reliable information indicating grave 
or systematic violations by a State Party’ of the Convention.113 While States may opt out 
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of this obligation, only four to date have done so.114 Compromises reached during the 
drafting process also resulted in States not being bound to remedy violations, but rather 
to give ‘due consideration’ to the Committee’s views and recommendations. However, 
this was ameliorated somewhat by Article 7(5), which authorizes CEDAW to adopt 
follow-up procedures in respect of communications. Further, Article 5 empowers the 
Committee to adopt interim measures to prevent ‘irreparable damage’ to a victim. Hogan 
argues that the Optional Protocol was therefore a compromised but nonetheless welcome 
development, providing an enhanced opportunity for the Women’s voices to be heard.115 
Since the emergence of the Optional Protocol it could be argued that CEDAW may be 
viewed as being placed on an equal footing with certain other international human rights 
instruments, such as the Torture Convention, which allows for individual complaints. The 
adoption of the Optional Protocol is therefore a significant step towards an equal valuation 
of women’s rights, however, the problems inherent within the Convention render it 
susceptible to failure. Coupled with the relatively weak language of the Convention, State 
reservations and the limited monitoring provisions provided for, further legislative, 
institutional and procedural reforms are needed to ensure that victims of gender-based 
violence, including those subjected to FGM are adequately protected and heard.116 
Questionably, if such international instruments aimed at eliminating discrimination and 
establishing gender equality are effectively rendered futile, the gender equality and non-
discrimination principles emanating from them will be upheld by State parties in a 
piecemeal manner. Evidently, as will now be discussed further, the ostensibly gender-
neutral nature of the RDP and the current ‘asylum lottery’ in FGM cases are clear 
examples of this. 
 
3. Problems in Understanding what ‘equality’ means 
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Another factor inhibiting the protection of women under international human rights law 
is that existing laws identify sexual equality with equal treatment.117 CEDAW requires 
that women be accorded rights equal to those of men and that women can enjoy all their 
rights and entitlements in practice. While international human rights treaties refer to 
‘equality’, in other sectors the term ‘equity’ is often used. The term “gender equity” has 
sometimes been used in a way which perpetuates stereotypes about women’s role in 
society, suggesting that women should be treated “fairly” in accordance with the roles that 
they carry out.118 This understanding risks perpetuating unequal gender relations and 
solidifying gender stereotypes that are detrimental to women. The CEDAW Committee 
has emphasized in its General Recommendations and Concluding Observations on 
different countries, that State parties are, “called upon to use exclusively the concepts of 
equality of women and men or gender equality and not to use the concept of gender equity 
in implementing their obligations under the Convention”.119 As the legal term used in the 
Convention, gender equality cannot be replaced by equity, which is a concept conditioned 
by subjective criteria.120 
      Some stakeholders have also favoured the language of equity on the misunderstanding 
that gender equality means the same or identical treatment of men and women, rather than 
considering the actual circumstances of men and women. 121 As explained above, 
substantive equality, which is the standard to be met under human rights law, requires 
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measures to achieve equality of results. This may mean that women and men are not 
always treated in exactly the same manner, in order to redress historical discrimination 
and/or take account of women’s biological differences. Thus, the fundamental problem 
for women is not primarily discriminatory treatment compared with men, but rather the 
fact that women are in a subordinate position due to the fact that they lack economic, 
social and political power in both the public and private spheres.122 
     Consequently, even the broad definition of discrimination provided for in CEDAW 
may not have much impact on the violations experienced by women across the globe. The 
non-discrimination approach of CEDAW was translated directly from the Race 
Convention.123 Although the adoption of this approach can be understood as a strategy to 
ensure the international acceptability of CEDAW, the appropriateness of the model is 
questionable. Indeed, one of the obstacles faced by women at the international level 
according to Charlesworth and Chinkin is the consensus at the State level that racial 
oppression is much more serious than gender oppression.124 The discrimination prohibited 
by CEDAW is, for the most part,125 confined to accepted human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. According to Chinkin et al, if these rights and freedoms are defined in a 
gendered manner, access to them “will be unlikely to promote any real form of 
equality”.126  
     Thus, the male-centric view of equality in international law is further reinforced by the 
focus in CEDAW on public life, the economy, the legal system and education, and its 
limited recognition that oppression within the private sphere, contributes to the inequality 
suffered by women.127 For instance, CEDAW does not explicitly prohibit violence against 
women. Perhaps this failure is a result of the conceptual difficulty of squeezing a harm 
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characterised as private into the public framework of the Convention, or because this does 
not fit directly into the equality model.128 In its General Recommendation no.19, CEDAW 
described gender-based violence as a form of discrimination against women, thereby 
underlining the significance of the private sphere as an area for the subjugation of 
women.129 
      In 1995, the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action detailed the international 
understanding of women’s equality. Equality it was determined (as previously discussed) 
is generally presented as women being treated in the same way as men, with little 
consideration of whether or not existing male standards are appropriate. The Platform 
called for the equal participation of women in all areas of life. According to Otto, however, 
despite the desire to place women on an equal footing with men, the assumption appears 
to be that inequality is removed once women participate equally in the decision-making 
arena.130 This account thus, ignores the underlying power relations and structures which 
contribute to the oppression of women. 
      At present, it seems that international law affords women no adequate basis for the 
protection of their human rights. Many of the abuses women face, such as FGM, are still 
deemed to fall into an artificially constructed ‘private’ realm of life that is for the large 
part ungoverned by current international law. To the extent that treaties are in place to set 
out and protect women, not only do State parties fail to comply with their provisions, but 
there are also no adequate enforcement mechanisms to enforce the treaties. For these 
reasons, and those discussed above, current international law is failing to adequately 
protect women. According to Colin Harvey, there remains a worry that the potential 
strength and specificity of refugee protection might be undermined in well-intentioned 
efforts to promote human rights.131 This worry, as the following discussion shows is very 
real. Like its human rights counterpart, refugee law is also inadequate in affording 
protection to women fleeing FGM and other gender-based forms of violence. In fact, it is 
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the overwhelming need by women for refugee protection which demonstrates the failure 
of international human rights law to protect them and calls for reform of refugee law and 
human rights law to create a system which will adequately protect and enforce their 
rights.132  
 
II. Women and Refugee Law 
 
A. The Law and its Purpose 
 
The fundamental purpose of refugee law is to provide surrogate international protection 
when there is a fundamental breakdown in State protection resulting in serious human 
rights violations tied to civil and political status.133 The human displacement resulting 
from World Wars I and II led to the adoption of international agreements to protect 
refugees.134 Today, the international law on refugees consists of the Statutes of the Office 
of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees,135 the 1951 Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees,136 and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.137 In 
addition to these binding international instruments, many other international and regional 
agreements also address the needs of refugees. The UDHR and the Declaration on 
Territorial Asylum also guarantee the right to asylum, but they are non-binding treaties 
and not legally enforceable. In addition, there are also several regional agreements dealing 
with the rights of refugees such as the Organisation of African Unity’s Convention 
                                                 
132 See, McCabe, supra note 72, at 436. 
133 Ibid. See also, See In re R-A, Interim Dec. 3403, at 7 (BIA 1999). 
134 The first such protections were extended by the League of Nations after World War I to Russian and 
Armenian refugees. The post World War II era saw the adoption of the Universal Declaration on Human 
Rights in 1948 which guarantees the right to seek asylum from persecution. See, Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) (hereinafter 
referred to as the UDHR). The UN originally established the International Refugee Organisation (IRO) and 
the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian refugees to deal with problems resulting from 
displacement. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees replaced the IRO in 1950.  
135 Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, G.A. Res. 428(V), U.N. 
GAOR, 5th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. HCR/INF/1/Rev.3 (1950) (hereafter referred to as the UNHCR Statute). 
136 International refugee law is based on the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for 
signature July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 137, and the Protocol relating to the Status of 
Refugees, opened for signature Jan. 31, 1976, 19 U.N.T.S. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (together hereinafter 
referred to as the 1951 Convention or the Refugee Convention). 
137 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan 21st, 1967, 19 U.N.T.S. 6223, 606, U.N.T.S. 267 
(hereafter referred to as the Refugee Protocol). 
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Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa,138 the Organisation of 
American States’ Caracas Convention on Diplomatic Asylum, and the Caracas 
Convention on Territorial Asylum.139 In 2004 the European Union, also adopted European 
Council Directive 2004/83/EC on minimum standards for the qualification and status of 
third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees and persons otherwise in need of 
international protection. It aimed firstly to ensure that member States apply common 
criteria for the identification of persons genuinely in need of international protection 
Secondly, it aimed to ensure that a minimum level of benefits is available for these persons 
in all EU member States.140 
     The Statute of the UNHCR has adopted a three-prong definition for who constitutes a 
refugee. First, it includes those individuals who were considered refugees under either: 
The Constitution of the International Refugee Organisation or the Arrangements of the 
12th May 1926 and 30 June 1928, the Conventions of 28th October 1933 and 10th February 
1938, and the 14th September 1939.141 Second, it includes those who, due to the events 
occurring before January 1st, 1951, are outside their country of nationality, have a well-
founded fear of being persecuted because their race, religion, nationality, or political 
opinion, and are unable to seek protection from their own government.142 Third, the statute 
                                                 
138 This Convention defines ‘refugee’ identically to the 1967 Refugee Protocol but expands it to include 
those fleeing ‘external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public 
order’. Organisation of African Unity: 1969 Convention on Refugee Problems in Africa, article 1, Sec.2, 
U.N.T.S. No. 14, 691. (Hereafter referred to as the African Refugee Convention). 
139 In neither of these OAS treaties is there a clear definition of whom the Conventions were meant to 
protect. The Caracas Convention on Territorial Asylum states that member States may protect those who 
are persecuted for their beliefs, opinions or political affiliations. The Caracas Convention on Territorial 
Asylum, 29th December. 1954, article 2, OAS Official Records, OEA/SER.X/1, Treaty Series 34. The 
Caracas Convention on Diplomatic Asylum is even more vague as it states asylum may be granted for 
political offences. The Caracus Convention on Territorial Asylum, 29th December 1954, article 1, OAS 
Official Records, OEA/SER.X/1, Treaty Series 34. 
140 Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and status 
of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international 
protection. (Hereafter referred to as European Council Directive 2004/83/EC). Directive 2004/83/EC does 
take the encouraging step of explicitly recognizing persecution by non-state actors and gender-based 
persecution. Directive 2004/83/EC also includes a state obligation to provide subsidiary protection status 
for individuals who are not eligible for protection as a refugee but who demonstrate, under the Directive’s 
Article 2(e): “substantial grounds … for believing that the person concerned, if returned to his or her country 
of origin, or in the case of a stateless person, to his or her country of former habitual residence, would face 
a real risk of suffering serious harm as defined in Article 15, and to whom Article 17(1) and (2) do not 
apply, and is unable, or, owing to such risk, unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that 
country.” 
141 UNHCR Statute, supra note 135, at Ch 2, S6(i). 
142 Ibid, at Ch 2, S6(ii). 
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extends protection to those who meet the requirements of the second definition but 
removes the temporal limitation of January 1st 1951.143 
     The Refugee Convention has adopted only the first two parts of the UNHCR refugee 
definition.144 It recognised as refugees those individuals with a well-founded fear of 
persecution on account of their race, religion, nationality or political opinion due to events 
occurring before 1951.145 According to the statute, the UNHCR has authority to protect 
refugees irrespective of any dateline.146 Therefore, an individual who meets the 
requirement of the statute qualifies for protection by the UNHCR regardless of whether 
or not he or she is recognised as a refugee under the Refugee Convention.147  
    The Refugee Protocol serves to broaden further the Refugee Convention refugee 
definition by removing the limitation that allowed refugee status for individuals fleeing 
events which occurred before January 1st, 1951.148 In addition, the Refugee Protocol 
expanded the refugee definition even further by including the new persecution ground 
‘membership in a particular social group’.149 The Refugee Protocol also adopted all of the 
articles of the Refugee Convention so that those States that are contracting parties to the 
Refugee Protocol but never ratified the Refugee Convention are essentially parties to the 
Convention as well.150  
         As the controlling international convention on refugee law, the Refugee Convention 
establishes the definition of a refugee as well as the principle of non-refoulment and the 
rights afforded to those granted refugee status. Thus, a claimant must show that he or she 
has: firstly, a well-founded fear of persecution; secondly, ‘for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a PSG, or political opinion’; thirdly is ‘outside of the country 
of his nationality/habitual residence’; and fourthly is ‘unable or unwilling to avail himself 
of the protection of that country’. Persons who for some reason or another do not fulfil 
                                                 
143 Ibid, Ch2, SB. 
144 Refugee Convention, supra note 136, article 1, Sa(1)-(2). 
145 Ibid. 
146 Ibid. 
147 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining 
Refugee Status (1992), paras 15-16. (UNHCR Handbook). 
148 Refugee Protocol, supra note 137, article 1(2). 
149 Ibid. Hereafter referred to as PSG. 
150 UNHCR Handbook, supra note 147, para 9. For example, the US never ratified the Refugee Convention 
but it did ratify the Refugee Protocol. As a result, it has undertaken to apply the substantive provisions of 
the Refugee Convention, absent the 1951 dateline. 
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the criteria in this definition do not qualify as refugees and are therefore not entitled to the 
protection provided by the 1951 Convention. A large proportion of the people in the third 
world commonly referred to as “refugees” are thus excluded from the refugee protection 
regime established by the 1951 Convention as natural catastrophes, war, or economic or 
political chaos are not considered persecution for the purposes of obtaining refugee status. 
Another large category excluded from the refugee protection regime are internally 
displaced persons, that is, persons who have fled, for example human rights abuses or 
civil war but are still within their country of origin.151 Moreover, since there has been no 
gender attached to the term ‘refugee’ and limited attention (until recently) has been 
focused on the protection needs of women as asylum seekers, women who are subjected 
to gender-based forms of violence are also largely excluded from the refugee protection 
regime.152  
     There is increasing evidence that refugee women may be unable to benefit equitably 
from protection and assistance efforts. Although some States, as will be discussed in 
Chapter Two have begun to recognise the specific needs of female refugee claimants and 
have taken measures to ensure their access to protection and material assistance, much 
more still needs to be done to respond to the ways in which gender shapes the experience 
of those seeking refugee status.153 From the perspective of violations of women’s human 
rights two issues are particularly problematic when it comes to fulfilling the criteria in the 
refugee definition. Firstly, the fact that gender is not included among the grounds of 
persecution in the Convention, and second, the requirement of lack of state protection in 
relation to abuses committed by non-state actors. The fact that gender is excluded as a 
persecution ground has traditionally led to interpreting the refugee definition without 
having regard to women’s experiences of persecution. Even though women and men often 
experience similar types of persecution and are often persecuted on similar grounds, 
women are also subject to both types of violence and persecution that are specific to their 
gender and are persecuted because of their gender.154 The failure to appreciate the 
                                                 
151 See, The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, UN doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (11 Feb. 1998), 
Introduction, para. 2.   
152 Crawley, supra note 7 at 1. 
153 Ibid. 
154 See generally, Crawley, supra note 7, Chapter 1.  
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differences between the nature and experiences of persecution faced by women and men 
respectively often results in not recognising (gender-specific) violence faced by women 
as persecution or misunderstanding the (gender-related) grounds of persecution. Even 
where women fear persecution for the same reasons as men, the form of persecution may 
be specific to their gender (e.g., rape or other sexual violence) and not as readily 
recognised as ‘persecution’ within the meaning of the Convention. Alternatively, the 
persecution may be gender-neutral (e.g., stoning or beatings) but the reasons (e.g., failure 
to comply with social mores) are not recognised as grounds for persecution. Moreover, 
female victims of sexual violence, may find it difficult to talk about their experiences to 
a male interviewer, or are reluctant to identify the true extent of the persecution or harm 
suffered because of shame.155 Thus, women’s claims for protection are undermined 
because of definitional and procedural issues. 
      Moreover, as the international human rights regime began to address the protection 
needs of women, questions relating to women, gender-related persecution and refugee 
status also increased in intensity, receiving an increasing amount of attention from 
academics and more lately from international organisations and some governments. Thus, 
whilst it is now recognised that gender can influence or dictate the type of 
persecution/harm suffered as well as the reasons for such treatment,156 calls for the 
addition of gender as a persecution ground157
 
are therefore no longer heard, and the 
UNHCR has concluded that the refugee definition, as “properly interpreted”, covers 
gender-related claims and that there is no need for an additional persecution ground.158 
     Even though the UNCHR is a considerable authority when it comes to interpreting the 
Refugee Convention, its guidelines are intended to provide “legal interpretive 
guidance”159
 
for governments, and many States accept direct or indirect participation by 
the UNHCR in procedures for the determination of refugee status.160
 
The Refugee 
                                                 
155 Luopajärvi K, “Gender-Related Persecution as Basis for Refugee Status: Comparative Perspectives” 
Abo Akademi University, Finland, Institute of Human Rights Research Report No 19, (2003), at 2. 
156 Ibid, at 3. See also, Guidelines on international protection: Gender-related persecution within the context 
of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, 
HRC/GIP/02/01, 7 May 2002 (hereafter referred to as the UNHCR Gender Guidelines),  para 6. 
157Cipriani L, “Gender and persecution: protecting women under international refugee law’, 7 Georgetown 
Immigration Law Journal” 7 Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 511, (1993).  
158 UNHCR Gender Guidelines, supra note 156, para. 6.   
159 Luopajärvi, supra note 155, at 3. 
160 Goodwin-Gill, “The refugee in international law,” (2nd ed), Clarendon Press, (1996), at 33.    
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Convention thus leaves States the choice of means regarding implementation of the 
Convention at the national level. This results in varying interpretations of the refugee 
definition and its different elements. For example, some States have accepted that women 
may constitute a ‘PSG’ under some circumstances, whereas other States are firmly of the 
opinion that gender does not fall under the ground ‘PSG’. Another issue where States have 
come to completely opposing interpretations of the refugee definition is the issue of 
persecution by non-state actors; where the common-law systems as a rule do not have a 
problem with accepting violations committed by non-state actors as persecution, some 
civil law systems quite consistently deny that such treatment may constitute 
persecution.161
 
    These concerns, which are both substantive and procedural, have been one of the main 
driving forces behind this thesis and will be examined in detail in Chapter Two. However, 
before examining in depth how international refugee law, like its human rights counterpart 
has failed to adequately protect women, it is firstly imperative that we examine the unique 
experiences of refugee women generally, and the attempts which have been made by the 
refugee protection regime to address the protection needs and concerns of female 
claimants. This general focus provides a context for examining the experiences and 
hurdles faced by FGM claimants within the RDP in Chapter Three. 
 
B. The Experiences of Refugee Women 
 
Refugee women suffer the same deprivation and hardship which is common to all refugees 
and they are commonly persecuted for reasons like their male counterparts. Many are 
targeted because they are political activists, members of women’s movements or persist 
in demanding that their rights or the rights of others are respected and adequately 
protected.162 In the clear majority of cases, however, the experiences of women differ 
significantly from those of men because women’s activism, resistance and political protest 
may manifest itself in different ways to those of men.163 According to Heaven Crawley, 
                                                 
161 Luopajärvi, supra note 155, at 3 
162 Crawley, supra note 7 at 1. 
163 For instance: (1) women may hide people, pass messages or provide community services, food, clothing 
and medical care; (2) women may be targeted because they are particularly vulnerable, for example those 
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women along with their dependents are all too often the first victims of, “political, 
economic and social repression in significant part because of laws and social norms which 
dictate gender-related behaviour and treatment”.164 Furthermore, governments in some 
States may exploit family relations to intensify harm. For instance, women may be 
tortured, held as substitutes for relatives and in some instances even killed as governments 
attempt to exert their power and will over those closely connected to them.165 
Furthermore, an attack on a woman may also represent an attack on her ethnic group at 
large; because women have a reproductive role, women may be viewed as the 
quintessence of a given identity’s maintenance.166 
      In many of the scenarios identified above, gender-based forms of violence are inflicted 
by the perpetrator themselves. Rape is a common method of torture inflicted on women, 
but it should be noted that sexual violence takes many forms and may also include, verbal 
humiliation, threats of violence acts or forced acts intended to degrade women. Sexual 
violence, “constitutes a particularly humiliating assault and one which often carries 
traumatic social repercussions which range from shame and social stigma to reprisals by 
relatives”.167 Such gender-specific forms of violence are additional to non-gender specific 
forms of violence and can have significant implications in the RDP both substantively and 
procedurally.168 For this reason, gender-based forms of violence, specifically FGM forms 
an important focus for this thesis.  
      A further issue which also needs to be addressed concerns the need to recognise as 
refugees those who suffer persecution within their own home borders because of their 
sexual identity. Throughout the world, women who do not live up to the moral or societal 
standards imposed on them by their respective societies can also be subjected to cruel and 
                                                 
who are young, elderly, or disabled; (3) women who do not conform to the moral or ethical standards 
imposed on women may suffer cruel or inhuman treatment; (4) women may be persecuted by family or 
community members; and finally (5) women may be subjected to human rights violations simply because 
of the fact that they are the wives, mothers or daughters of individuals who the authorities consider to be 
‘dangerous’ or ‘undesirable’. Ibid, at 3. 
164 Ibid. 
165 Ibid. 
166 See, Siemens M, “Protection of Women Refugees” 56 Refugees 22, (1988), at 22 where it is stated that, 
“In conflicts between different political or religious groups, sexual violence against women has been used 
as a means of aggression towards an entire section of the community or as a means of acquiring information 
about the activities and location of family members”. 




other horrendous forms of inhuman treatment. For instance, a refusal to adhere to dress 
codes, pre-marital sex and even an unsatisfactory dowry may result in various forms of 
persecution, including bride burning, or even death.169 
    To a large degree, the international refugee regime is founded on an ability to move, 
however, due to structural conditions and cultural patterns (including economic and social 
constraints), relatively few women have been able to flee to other countries to seek 
protection.170 Yet, for those women who have managed to flee and cross borders, their 
experiences all too often tend to be interpreted as, “discriminatory as opposed to 
persecutory”.171 Thus, Crawely posits that this implies that women are refused refugee 
status for reasons that seem to have less to do with refugee law than with the gender of 
the asylum applicant.172 In most western countries, including the UK, it has been stated 
that approximately one-third of asylum seekers are female yet statistics show that in some 
countries (if those statistics are available) women are less likely to be granted refugee 
status than men.173 As Spijkerboer suggests, the authorities in some countries might justify 
such statistics by claiming that women are less deserving, or that women tend to be denied 
refugee status more frequently than men as they tend to be less involved in the public 
sphere, namely political activities.174  
        Protection is at the heart of the responsibility that the international community bears 
towards refugees. Female refugee claimants, as the above discussion reveals are 
disadvantaged by refugee law and are vulnerable to actions that threaten their protection. 
International protection entails taking all necessary measures to ensure that refugees are 
adequately protected and effectively benefit from their rights. Like its human rights 
counterpart, the international refugee regime as the following discussion will now 
                                                 
169 Ibid. See also, Koutsoukis J, “India Burning Brides and Ancient Practice is on the Rise”, (2015), 
available online via the Sydney Morning Herald at http://www.smh.com.au/world/india-burning-brides-
and-ancient-practice-is-on-the-rise-20150115-12r4j1.html (last accessed 24/2/17).  
170 See, Tuitt P, “Rethinking the Refugee Concept” in Nicholson F & Twomey P (eds.) “Refugee Rights and 
Realities: Evolving International Concepts and Regimes”, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, (1999), 
at 110-3; Barnett L, “Global Governance and the Evolution of the International Refugee Regime” 14 
International Journal of Refugee Law 238, (2002), at 256. 
171 Crawley, supra note 7, at 4. 
172 Ibid. 
173 Ibid. 
174 Spijkerboer T, “Women and Refugee Status: Beyond the Public/Private Distinction”, Emancipation 
Council: The Hague, (1994). 
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examine has also addressed the issue of gender persecution and has also attempted to 
address the protection needs of female claimants.  
 
C. International Recognition and Response to the Need for Protection of Women 
 
Faced with the hurdles of interpretation, credibility and procedural constraints among 
others, female claimants who have been subjected to FGM and other forms of gender-
based persecution face the risk of being denied protection. Consequently, existing 
international refugee instruments have become the subject of scrutiny and heated debates 
for their lack of provisions recognising gender as a valid ground upon which a well-
founded fear of persecution may be based175 as well as for the lack of clear guidance for 
state interpretation to classify gender as one of the existing categories of the 1951 refugee 
definition.176 In response to this criticism, the UNHCR has begun to evaluate the 
provisions of these instruments in an attempt to address and remedy many of the issues of 
gender-based persecution and violence as they pertain to female refugees. These will now 
be addressed. 
                                                 
175 See, Greatbatch, supra note 91; Bower K, “Recognizing Violence Against Women as Persecution on the 
Basis of Membership in a Particular Social Group” 7 Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 173 (1993); 
Aleinikoff A, “The Meaning of Persecution in United States Asylum Law” 3 International Journal of 
Refugee Law 5, (1991); Schenk T, “A Proposal to Improve the Treatment of Women in Asylum Law: Adding 
a ‘Gender’ Category to the International Definition of ‘Refugee’” 2 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 
301, (1995); Thiele B, “Persecution on Account of Gender: A Need for Refugee Law Reform” 11 Hastings 
Women’s Law Journal 221, (2000); Macklin A, “Refugee Women and the Imperative of Categories” 17 
Human Rights Quarterly 213, (1995). See also, International Women’s Tribune Centre et al, Integrating 
Women’s Human Rights into Deliberations of the 1993 United Nations World Conference on Human Rights 
and into the Ongoing Work of the United Nations” 8 (1993) (calling on the 1993 World Conference on 
Human Rights to consider, modifying the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Refugee Protocol definitions of 
refugee to encompass gender-based persecution), as cited in Peters T, “International Refugee Law and the 
Treatment of Gender-Based Persecution: International Initiatives as a Model and Mandate for National 
Reform” 6 Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 225, (1996), at 236, note 68. 
176 See, Grahl-Madsen A, “The Status of Refugees in International Law”, A.W. Sijthoff: Leiden, The 
Netherlands, (1972), at 219. Madsen posits that the PSG category is intended to be constructed more broadly 
than other categories. He also posits that this provision was intended to allow the addition and protection 
from persecution of classes that had not yet been foreseen. Teresa Peters argues that Madsen’s theory is 
backed up by Arthur Helton, who reports that the Swedish delegation to the 1951 Refugee Convention 
insisted upon the PSG category due to the fear that the other categories would not address, “all the reasons 
for persecution an imaginative despot could conjure up”. See, Helton A, “Persecution on Account of 
Membership in a Social Group as a Basis for Refugee Status” 15 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 39, 
(1983) & Peters, supra note 175, at 236, note 69. Further analysis of the social group category and its history 
can be found in Fullerton M, “A Comparative Look at Refugee Status Based on Persecution due to 
Membership in a Particular Social Group” 26 Cornell International Law Journal 202, (1993). 
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      In 1985 the Executive Committee of the UNHCR issued Conclusion No. 39177 which 
recognised that female refugees constituted the majority of the world refugee population 
and that many of them were exposed to special problems in the international protection 
field.178 That conclusion served primarily to recognise officially that female refugees were 
(and continue to be) “in a vulnerable situation which frequently exposes them to physical 
violence, sexual abuse and discrimination” and that a need exists for a greater 
understanding of the circumstances faced by women.179 In addition to seeking measures 
to protect female refugees from violence and sexual abuse,180 Conclusion No. 39 further 
affirmed that States may recognise gender-based persecution as a valid ground for 
obtaining refugee status.181  
     In 1988, the NGO on Refugee Women organised the first international consultation on 
refugee women. The objectives behind the consultation were to provide a forum for the 
discussion of the issues facing the international community insofar as refugee women 
were concerned, and to produce a resource book182 for those within the community 
addressing these problems.183 In addition to recommending that States recognise that 
women may be persecuted on account of their gender, the consultation also recommended 
increased international dedication to eliminating, punishing, and preventing violations of 
women’s rights.184  
                                                 
177 UNHCR, “Refugee Women and International Protection”, para 205, U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/673 (1985). 
(Hereafter referred to as Conclusion No. 39). Conclusion No. 39 is available online via the UNHCR: The 
UN Refugee Agency website at http://www.unhcr.org/41b041534.html (last accessed 2771/17). 
178 Ibid, Para C. 
179 Ibid, Para D. 
180 Paragraph E of Conclusion No. 39, “Stressed the need for such protection to receive the urgent attention 
of Governments and of the UNHCR and for all appropriate measures to be taken to guarantee that refugee 
women and girls are protected from violence or threats to their physical safety or exposure to sexual abuse 
or harassment”. Ibid, Para E. 
181 It provided that, “in the exercise of their sovereignty, states are free to adopt the interpretation that 
women asylum-seekers who face harsh or inhuman treatment due to their having transgressed the social 
mores of the society in which they live may be considered as a ‘particular social group’ within the meaning 
of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention”. Ibid, Para K. 
182 See, NGO Working Group on Refugee Women, “Working with Refugee Women: A Practical Guide” 
UNHCR: Geneva, (1989). 
183 See, Kelley N, “Report on the International Consultation on Refugee Women, Geneva, November 15-19, 
1988, With Particular Reference to Protection Problems” 1 International Journal of Refugee Studies 233, 
(1989), at 233. 
184 As such, the Consultation called on all signatory States to international refugee documents to, “develop 
standards and criteria for the adjudication of asylum claims…. recognizing the necessity to determine the 
extent to which the actions of women… are seen by governments as resistance to political systems and/or 
religious beliefs:… and create reliable documentation systems that would include background information 
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      That same year the UNHCR Executive Committee issued its second report on refugee 
women,185 which effectively advocated the inclusion of refugee women in the 
development and implementation of UNHCR guidelines. The 1990 UNHCR Executive 
Committee report on refugee women reiterated this recommendation, calling for States to 
ensure that the needs and resources of refugee women are fully understood and integrated. 
It further called for States to promote measure for improving the international protection 
of refugee women. Specifically, it called for the full and active participation of refugee 
women in the planning, implementation and evaluation/monitoring of all sectors of 
refugee programs. The report further, requested the representation of female staff at all 
levels and asked that where necessary, skilled female interviewers within the RDP be 
made available.186 
     The UNHCR Guidelines were developed and adopted in 1991 called for the 
recognition of gender-based violence and discrimination as grounds for a finding of 
refugee status within the terms of the Refugee Convention and the Refugee Protocol.187 
Furthermore, the guidelines established procedures and practices to sensitize the RDP to 
the experiences of female refugees188, as recommended by the Executive Committee 
Reports. 
    In keeping with the developments in international refugee and human rights law, in 
1993, the Executive Committee of the UNHCR further issued Conclusion No. 73, which 
called upon State parties to the Refugee Convention and the UNHCR to ensure the equal 
access of women and men to refugee status determination procedures.189 In addition, the 
Conclusion supported the recognition as refugees of persons with a well-founded fear of 
                                                 
on the situation of women in countries of origin, and on the incidence of sex-directed persecution”. Ibid, at 
233-6. 
185 Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Executive Committee, 39th Sess., para 26, 
U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/721 (1988). 
186 Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Executive Committee, 41st Sess., U.N. 
Doc. A/AC.96/760 (1990), Para 23 (a)(i)-(iii). 
187 UNHCR, “Guidelines for the Protection of Refugee Women”, supra note 75. 
188 The guidelines urge implementation of procedures such as further education of administrators and judges 
on the particular situation of women in their home land. Ibid, Para. 73; education as to gender issues in 
general for translators and interviewers, ibid, Para 75; and increased hiring of women in all aspects of 
asylum determination and application. Ibid. 




persecution through sexual violence.190 Whilst sharing the basic needs of all those who 
seek protection and refugee status, and in recognising that female claimants have 
particular needs and suffer specific forms of persecution on account of their gender, 
Conclusion No. 73, also recognized gender inequality as a social system of subjugation 
and disadvantage, which is itself at odds with the norms and ideals of international human 
rights law. Unfortunately, however, the Executive Committee of the UNHCR, has not yet 
addressed the issue of creating a gender category within the 1951 international refugee 
definition, as it feels that there is no need. According to the UNHCR, even though gender 
is not specifically referenced in the refugee definition, it is widely accepted that it can 
influence, or dictate, the type of persecution or harm suffered and the reasons for this 
treatment. The refugee definition, properly interpreted, it has been claimed, therefore, 
covers gender-related claims.191 In addition to the issue of gender, there have been calls 
for the Refugee Convention to be reformed generally. Refugee rights advocates argue that 
its definition of a refugee is too narrow192 and that it doesn’t clearly spell out states’ 
obligations beyond the principle of non-refoulement.193They also point out that it lacks an 
enforcement mechanism, so its application largely relies on the good faith of signatory 
States.194 Governments have also criticized the Convention for being out of step with the 
current era of mass migration.195 Undoubtedly, the Refugee Convention is a limited 
                                                 
190 Ibid, Para D. In recognizing that women refugees often experience persecution differently from refugee 
men, the UNHCR Executive Committee noted, “with grave concern the widespread occurrence of sexual 
violence in violation of the fundamental right to personal security as recognised in international human 
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document in many respects, not least in terms of gender. Jeff Crisp, former head of policy 
development and evaluation at UNHCR has stated that the UNHCR has been under 
pressure to reconvene the Convention for the past 10 to 15 years, but their position has 
always been that we don’t want to reopen the discussion because we’d end up with 
something worse than what we have at the moment.196 Hathaway has maintained that the 
problem is not with the Convention itself, but due to “a complete failure by UNHCR and 
states to innovate the way we actually deliver protection”.197 Concurring, this thesis posits 
that reform is need to address the issue of gender within the RPD.  
   Despite its reluctance to add gender as a persecution ground, the UNHCR has 
recognized sexual violence and the transgression of social mores as forms of gender-based 
persecution that, if used in conjunction with one of the existing enumerated categories 
could potentially qualify a person for refugee status.198 In 1996, the Executive Committee 
of the UNHCR further issued Conclusion No. 79 which addressed the needs of refugee 
women specifically.199 It encouraged the UNHCR to strengthen its efforts for the 
protection of women having a well-founded fear of persecution and called on States to 
adopt an approach that was gender-sensitive to those seeking refugee status based on a 
well-founded fear of persecution, including sexual violence.200  
    In September 2001, the San Remo Expert Roundtable201 addressed the question of the 
meaning of ‘membership of a PSG’ in the refugee definition, as contained in the Refugee 
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Convention. Several summary conclusions were established. It was retriated that the 1951 
Refugee Convention is founded on the principle that human beings shall enjoy 
fundamental rights and freedoms without discrimination. The Roundtable acknowledged 
that because men, women, and children can experience persecution in different ways, 
Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention demands an inquiry into the needs of the 
individual claimant. While it was determined that gender can influence, or dictate, the 
type of persecution or harm suffered and the reasons for this treatment, it was determined 
that the refugee definition, as properly interpreted, can encompass gender-related 
claims.202 As such, it was determined that there would be no need to include gender as an 
additional persecution ground within the 1951 Refugee Convention definition.203 The 
inclusion of gender as an enumerated persecution ground is important for a number of 
reasons; firstly as an enumerated persecution ground it would mean that States would have 
to recognise exclusively gender-based forms of persecution directed against women, thus 
in some instances challenging the cultural relativism argument. Secondly, it would mean 
that gender-based forms of persecution will no-longer be wrongly categorised under other 
enumerated persecution grounds. Thirdly, such a ground would give substance and 
strength to existing international and domestic gender-guidelines which are non-binding. 
Finally, in keeping with the aims of CEDAW and international human rights law 
generally, such a ground would give positive affirmation to the principle of equality by 
requiring States parties to take all measures to develop and advance the human rights of 
women on a basis of equality with men.204 
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     Significantly, however while the San Remo Roundtable decided not to include gender 
as an additional persecution ground, it was nevertheless determined that sex could 
constitute a PSG. 205 It was further determined that in cases where there is a real risk of 
serious harm at the hands of a non-state actor for reasons unrelated to any Convention 
ground, and the lack of State protection is for reason of a Convention ground it would 
generally be recognised that the nexus requirement inherent in the refugee definition is 
satisfied.206 Furthermore, it was acknowledged that the main problem facing female 
refugee claimants was the failure of decision-makers to incorporate the gender-related 
claims of women into their interpretation of the existing enumerated grounds and their 
failure to recognize the political nature of seemingly private acts of harm to women.207 
Most importantly, it was determined that the protection of refugee women not only 
requires a gender-sensitive interpretation of the refugee definition, but also a gender-
sensitive refugee status determination procedure.208 Such procedural reforms as will be 
discussed throughout this thesis, would effectively serve to redress the inconsistent 
treatment of gender-based claims for refugee status. 
   Awareness and appreciation of the issues affecting women within the RDP has been 
enhanced by guidelines on gender-related persecution. In 2002, the UNHCR issued its 
Guidelines on International Protection on gender-related persecution.209  These guidelines 
gave effect and recognition to the Summary Conclusion of the Expert Roundtable at San 
Remo, in that they are intended to provide legal interpretative guidance for governments, 
legal practitioners, decision-makers and the judiciary, as well as UNHCR staff carrying 
out refugee status determination in the field. 210 They aim specifically to protect female 
claimants and make the RDP more accommodating to meet their specific needs. 
       Following years of neglect of the needs of female claimants within the RDP, the 
aforementioned developments indicate a new awareness and willingness by the UNHCR 
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to take gender into account in policy development and implementation. As such, the steps 
taken over the past two decades by the UNHCR in recognising the specific needs of 
refugee women has been a welcome development, which to a large degree in theory helps 
to legitimise the factual basis for women’s refugee claims. Thus, in conjunction with 
international human rights law, international refugee law has also recognised and focused 
its attention on gender-specific human rights abuses inflicted on women because of their 
gender and in turn has extended their interpretation of the Refugee Convention to women 
making claims on this basis.211 
   Unfortunately, however, despite these promising and positive developments the 
UNHCR materials do not have the force of law or form part of the Refugee Convention 
or Protocol and therefore cannot override the express terms of domestic immigration acts 
or rules. Thus, these international developments are only effective to the extent that States 
are willing to comply and implement their initiatives. Many considerations may defend 
the decision not to implement or support these provisions and recommendations, the most 
prominent being the perception that such provisions infringe upon State sovereignty.212 
Consequently, despite the strides made within the international refugee arena by the 
UNHCR, its materials merely provide, “guidance and are aids to interpretation of the 
Refugee Convention and may be relevant to the exercise of a broad discretion”.213 
Coupled with many of the same criticisms levelled against the international human rights 
regime, and the non-binding nature of UNHCR documents, international refugee law, like 
its human rights counterpart is fraught with deficiencies which ultimately work against 
women seeking refugee status. The result, as will now be discussed is that, women fleeing 
gender-based forms of violence are all too often denied protection.  
 
D. Inadequacies of International Refugee Law for Women 
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In pursuit of its ideal that “human beings shall enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms 
without discrimination”,214 international refugee law has developed to protect those 
individuals who are unjustly persecuted in their homelands and unprotected by their 
governments. However, the current standards for granting refugee status are overly 
narrow and insufficient to protect women who live in fear of/or who have been subjected 
to gender-based persecution. As discussed thus far, the rights of women are often 
overlooked due to a refugee definition which fails to encompass the type of persecution 
that women often suffer, particularly within the private sphere of society.215 In this section 
and elaborating on the above discussions, I will now discuss the inadequacies of 
international refugee law in affording protection to female claimants generally. 
Essentially, women and young girls are unable to benefit equitably from international 
protection available under the Refugee Convention, for several reasons: (1) gender-bias 
and the marginalization of women’s experiences; (2) difficulties in interpreting the 
refugee convention definition; and (3) procedural and evidential barriers.  
1. Gender Bias and the Marginalization of Women’s Experiences 
It is assumed that international law is objective and that international norms directed at 
individuals within States are universally applicable and gender-neutral. However, the 
Refugee Convention, as it is currently interpreted, presents considerable difficulties for 
women whose fears of persecution arise out of forms of protest or ill-treatment not 
considered ‘political’ or deserving of international protection. Whilst international 
refugee instruments make no distinction between male and female refugees, their 
interpretation by the State, at both the international and national levels, reflect and 
reinforce gender biases, so much so that women’s experiences are all too often relegated 
to the private sphere: the result being that their claims are not interpreted in a gender-
sensitive manner. It should be noted that the restriction on women’s ability to participate 
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equally within the public sphere of life is most prevalent in non-western societies with 
strong traditional, cultural and religious underpinnings, but such restrictions can also exist 
in ‘developed’ Western States. In many respects, the failure to incorporate the gender-
related claims of women seeking refugee status is a: 
product of the general failure of refugee and asylum law to recognise social and 
economic rights and its emphasis instead on individual targeting and specific 
deprivation of civil and political rights.216  
This is even though social and economic rights may also be violated for political reasons. 
However, this failure, as previously discussed is related to the larger criticism of human 
rights law and discourse: that it privileges male-dominated public activities over the 
activities of women which take place within the private sphere. The result being that, the 
criteria for determining refugee status are drawn from the realm of public sphere activities 
dominated by men.217 In the context of a largely male-oriented body of law, women’s 
cases are consequently, formulated in ways which reflect the decision-makers 
understanding of law rather than the reality of the claimant’s experiences.218 
     Coupled with the failure of the UNHCR to incorporate gender as an additional 
persecution grounds,219 efforts to ensure adequate protection for female claimants are 
further undermined where practitioners and decision-makers do not properly comprehend 
the concept of gender or understand what is meant by gender-based persecution. While 
the available literature on the experiences of refugee women has been important in 
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highlighting the marginalization of women and their experiences within current 
interpretations of international refugee law, it is also problematic. This quandary stems 
from its tendency to be grounded in an analysis of ‘sex’ as the key factor accounting for 
the differential experiences of refugee women rather than the construction of gender 
identity in particular historical, geographical, political and socio-cultural contexts.220 
Similarly, as alluded to in the introductory chapter, the focus on ‘women’ also, as opposed 
to gender in refugee research and practice further replicates and reinforces the 
marginalization of women’s experiences.221 It can lead to a tendency to generalize about 
the experiences of women as asylum-seekers. This inclination can be problematic for 
several reasons. First, it leads to confusion about what is meant by the term ‘gender-
related persecution’.222 Secondly it concerns the need to recognise that while there exist 
differences between the experiences of women and men respectively, there also exist 
differences between women within and between countries and contexts.223 This includes 
race, class, age, marital status etc.224 The problem with this approach is that it has created 
a female-model of persecution, which generalizes women’s experiences of persecution, 
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focusing on sexual violence and marginalizing other forms of resistance and oppression 
experienced by women.225 Thus, the effect of merely adding ‘women’ to the existing 
discourse, without actually understanding the differences between women, is that women 
are always classified as victims. Refugee women are presented as uniformly poor, 
powerless and vulnerable, while western women are the reference point for modern, 
educated, sexually liberated women.226 This generalization reinforces existing beliefs that 
non-western women, are passive victims of ‘male oppression’, ‘restrictive cultures’, and 
‘religion or traditions’. Crawley maintains that, women are neither a homogenous group 
nor are they mere victims of patriarchal domination. She posits that they “are fully fledged 
social actors, bearing the full set of contradictions implied by their class, racial and ethnic 
locations as well as their gender”.227 This sentiment was also recognized in the leading 
UKHL case of Shah and Islam where it was determined that: 
Generalizations about the position of women in particular countries are out of place 
in regard to issues of refugee status. Everything depends on the evidence and 
findings of fact on the particular case.228 
Therefore, by encouraging decision-makers to look at gender as opposed to sex enables 
an approach which can “accommodate specificity, diversity and heterogeneity”.229 It also 
ensures that the claims of women are not dismissed as culturally relative and therefore 
outside the mechanisms for protection available under the Refugee Convention. 
2. Difficulties in Interpreting the Refugee Convention definition 
 
The failure of legal representatives and decision-makers to recognise and respond 
appropriately to the experiences of women stems not only from the failure to incorporate 
or recognise gender as a ground for persecution, it also stems from the fact that the 
Refugee Convention definition is frequently approached with a partial perspective and 
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interpreted through a framework of male experiences. One of the main failings of refugee 
law, which causes problems for female refugee claimants, is the failure of decision-
makers to incorporate the gender-related claims of women into their interpretation of the 
existing ‘recognised’ grounds. In interpreting the Refugee Convention, decision-makers 
have largely failed to recognise the inherent political nature of private acts of harm. For 
instance, because rape is viewed as a sexual act rather than an act of violence, the 
perpetrator, even when a government official or a member of an anti-government force, 
is perceived as acting from personal motivation. Consequently, “the personal nature of 
the harm may serve to personalize the events in the eyes of the adjudicator”.230 The 
following subsections (which will be more fully discussed in Chapter Two) will deal 
primarily with the international stance and the position of the case-studies in respects of 
these matters will be dealt with within their respective chapters. 
      
A. Well-Founded Fear of Persecution 
 
The phrase ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ is central to the definition of refugee and 
is said to exist if the claimant can establish, to a reasonable degree, that her continued stay 
in her country of origin has become intolerable. However, since there is no universally 
accepted definition of ‘persecution’ courts in different States have defined persecution 
differently. According to Grahl-Madsen, this failure to establish a common definition was 
deliberate so as to permit a case-by-case determination of whether any given conduct 
constitutes a persecutory act.231 Whilst there is no ‘established’ definition, there are 
certain threats to life and freedom that are always considered persecution, including: 
genocide, slavery, the unlawful killing of individuals, torture and other forms of cruel or 
inhuman treatment. Consequently, scholars, judges, practitioners and legislators have 
typically equated persecution with serious human rights violations. The UNHCR has 
stated that persecution, as used in refugee law, is generally considered a, “threat to life or 
freedom….(or any) other serious violations of human rights”.232 Usually, a governmental 
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agent must issue the threat or cause the violation to qualify the action as persecution. But 
in some circumstances, actions by the local populace may also constitute grounds for 
protection.233 Consequently, States have been left with a wide margin of appreciation 
about interpreting the term ‘persecution’, and practice as will be discussed in subsequent 
chapters is neither coherent nor consistent. This lack of any intrinsic meaning is 
consequently problematic in terms of the objective assessment of individual women’s 
claims for refugee status. 
 
B. Physical Abuses of Women as Persecution: Persecution by Non-State Agents 
 
The forms of physical abuse experienced by women, such as rape, coerced prostitution, 
domestic violence, and harmful cultural practices such as FGM and bride burning, 
undoubtedly fall within the limits of the ‘definition’ of persecution, using the formulations 
listed above. Such forms of violence are so fundamental that no circumstance can ever 
justify their derogation under international law. When the State is actively involved in the 
commission of such abuse against women, there is little doubt the victim, “endures harm 
or suffering from a governmental restriction on life, liberty, and fundamental human 
rights”.234 Further, the reason for the infliction of harm, namely the victim’s sex, must be 
recognised by the State as illegitimate. Finally, as discussed throughout this chapter, 
physical acts of violence against women constitute fundamental human rights violations. 
According to the UNHCR Handbook, “serious discriminatory or other offensive acts 
committed by the local populace, or by individuals,” can be considered persecution if they 
are “knowingly tolerated by the authorities, or if the authorities refuse, or are unable, to 
offer effective protection.235 This definition is often problematic for women seeking 
refugee status, as the persecution which they typically face is perpetrated largely by non-
government agents, and thus women must prove that the government in question is unable 
or unwilling to protect her.236  
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C. Establishing the Refugee Convention Ground: The Interpretation of Politically 
Motivated Sexual Abuse as Random Acts of Violence and the PSG Category 
  
Serious harm, even where there is a sufficient link with the State, must also have a 
persecution ground if it is to form the basis for a successful refugee claim. Some of the 
most difficult issues in current jurisprudence arise over whether a gender-related refugee 
claim involves persecution ‘on account of’ one of the five enumerated grounds which are 
norms of non-discrimination: 
 
The risk faced by the refugee claimant must have some nexus to her race, religion, 
nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social group. The 
critical question is whether but for her civil or political status she could reasonably 
be said to be at risk of serious international harm. If the risk that motivates her 
flight to safety is not casually related to civil or political status, the requirements 
of the Convention refugee definition are not met.237 
 
Apart from ‘membership in a PSG’, the enumerated persecution grounds within the 
Refugee Convention are relatively clear and claims to refugee status by women can often 
be framed within them. It has been increasingly recognised, however, that in many cases 
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female refugee claimant’s face, “barriers to protect which center around the issue of 
ground, even though their claims of a well-founded fear of persecution are comparable to 
those of members of the delineated groups”.238 For example, it is evident from existing 
determinations, that sexual violence frequently obscures the relationship between 
persecution and the Refugee Convention definition persecution grounds.239 Survivors of 
sexual violence perpetrated in prison camps by officials, by the military etc often find it 
difficult to establish that their victimization was linked to their religion, race, nationality, 
political opinion or membership of a PSG, rather than a random expression of individual 
sexual violence.240 Most women seeking refugee status, consequently usually attempt to 
establish that they were persecuted on account of their membership in a PSG or on account 
of their political opinion. 
     The membership of a PSG category is the most difficult of the enumerated grounds to 
define and is the subject of many legal arguments at both the international and domestic 
levels. Different adjudicators and immigration judges also understand it somewhat 
differently. A PSG is generally understood as an identifiable group of people viewed by 
government as a threat. It is also often described as a group sharing a common 
characteristic that is so fundamental to their individual identities that the members cannot 
or should not be expected to change it. The shared characteristic might be something you 
were born with (such as gender, color, or family ties), or it may be a shared experience 
(such as former property ownership, or former gang or military conscription). Broadly 
speaking, a PSG is composed of persons who have a similar background, social status, 
lineage, experiences, or habits. In recent years, some States have recognized persecution 
based on gender as a PSG. This has allowed some women to gain asylum based on having 
undergone (or fearing that they'll be forced to undergo) cultural practices such as FGM, 
Islamic dress code requirements, forced marriage, or domestic violence. Nevertheless, 
despite this, some would argue that States are reluctant to interpret gender as a PSG 
because they, “realize that human rights violations against women are so widespread, and 
they fear that to allow asylum based on gender persecution would ‘open the floodgates’ 
                                                 





for women refugees seeking asylum” in western States.241 However, this is extremely 
unlikely. Even if the most liberal policy were adopted with respect to gender-based 
violence, which in turn recognised women as constituting a PSG, the actual number of 
women who would be able to avail themselves of such protection is extremely limited. 
Take for instance the issue of FGM, most victims who undergo FGM are subjected to it 
at puberty, or even earlier and most probably do not even question the practice which is 
entrenched within their community and indeed the very fabric of their culture. Certainly, 
they do not possess the means to leave their community, far less travel to western States 
to seek refugee status.242  In addition, the floodgates argument is not germane given the 
humanitarian and human rights underpinnings of refugee law. As such, refugee law should 
not be concerned nor influenced by considerations about reducing immigration levels. 
Instead, concerns about ensuring an effective remedy to all persons who fear that their life 
or freedom is being threaten on account of the grounds enumerated in the Refugee 
Convention should prevail.243 Furthermore, as argued by Amnesty International, whether 
a PSG consists of large numbers is irrelevant as other Convention grounds, such as 
nationality and political opinion, are also characteristics shared by large numbers of 
individuals whose human rights are not sacrificed merely because they represent a large 
group.244 
    Consequently, given the varying approaches which exist to the interpretation of the 
PSG category and the protection gaps which can result, the UNHCR advocates that the 
approaches endorsed by States ought to be reconciled.245 The protected characteristics 
approach may be understood to identify a set of groups that 
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constitute the core of the social perception analysis. Accordingly, it is appropriate to 
adopt a single standard that incorporates both dominant approaches:  
 
a particular social group is a group of persons who share a common characteristic 
other than their risk of being persecuted, or who are perceived as a group by 
society. The characteristic will often be one which is innate, unchangeable, or 
which is otherwise fundamental to identity, conscience or the exercise of one’s 
human rights.246 
 
This definition includes characteristics which are historical and therefore cannot be 
changed, and those which, though it is possible to change them, ought not to be required 
to be changed because they are so closely linked to the identity of the person or are an 
expression of fundamental human rights. It follows that sex can properly be within the 
ambit of the PSG category, with women being a clear example of a social subset defined 
by innate and immutable characteristics, and who are frequently treated differently to 
men.247 Moreover, it has been proposed by the UNHCR that if a claimant alleges a PSG 
that is based on a characteristic determined to be neither unalterable or fundamental, 
further analysis should be undertaken to determine whether the group is nonetheless 
perceived as a cognizable group within that society.248 In furtherance of this definition, 
the UNHCR has also stated that in addressing the PSG category, a PSG cannot be defined 
exclusively by the persecution that members of the group suffer or by a common fear of 
being persecuted.249 Nor is there a requirement of cohesiveness.250 Thus, mere 
membership of a PSG will not normally be enough to substantiate a claim to refugee 
status.251 Additionally, it has been stated that not all members of the group must be at risk 
of persecution,252 nor does the size matter.253 As previously stated, some jurisdictions have 
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recognized “women” as a PSG. This, does not mean that all women qualify for refugee 
status. Claimants still have to demonstrate a well-founded fear of being persecuted based 
on her membership in the PSG, not be within one of the exclusion grounds, and meet other 
relevant criteria.254 There is no requirement that the persecutor be a State actor.255 In sum 
the casual link will be satisfied if, firstly where there is a real risk of being persecuted at 
the hands of a non-State actor for reasons which are related to one of the Convention 
grounds, whether or not the failure of the State to protect the claimant is Convention 
related; or secondly, where the risk of being persecuted at the hands of a non-State actor 
is unrelated to a Convention ground, but the inability or unwillingness of the State to offer 
protection is for a Convention reason.256 
      Claimants who have experienced gender-based persecution have also often claimed 
persecution on account of a ‘political opinion’. The traditional understanding of 
persecution for reasons of political opinion implies that the individual concerned holds 
opinions which are not tolerated by the authorities, for example, opinions which are 
critical of the government’s policies or methods.257 Further, the person concerned must 
fear persecution because the authorities have knowledge of such opinions or such opinions 
are attributed by the authorities to the person concerned. In situations where the person 
has not expressed his opinions, but it can reasonably be expected that the authorities will, 
sooner or later, become aware of his opinions, and that as a result the person will come 
into conflict with the authorities, the person can be considered to have a well-founded fear 
of persecution for reasons of political opinion.258
  
A political opinion can also be implicit 
in conduct. In other words, action which is perceived to be a challenge to a governmental 
authority is considered to be an expression of a political opinion.259 
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    The image of the typical refugee as a person fleeing persecution for his or her direct 
involvement in political activities does, however, not always correspond to the reality of 
the experiences of women in some societies, as already discussed. Women are less likely 
than men to be involved in high profile political activities and are instead often involved 
in political activities that reflect dominant gender roles, such as nursing or cooking for 
rebel soldiers, or preparing and distributing leaflets.260 The problem is that such activities 
are not always recognised as political. Women are also frequently being targeted, not 
because of their own opinions but because of the political opinions or activities of their 
relatives. Because women’s imputed or real political activities or opinions often differ 
from those of men, they tend to be misunderstood.261 Unfortunately, courts have 
consistently characterized rape and other forms of sexual violence against women as mere 
random acts of violence, not entitled to the remedy of asylum, even when committed by 
government representatives.262 Although western courts are not hesitant to infer that 
torture of a male dissident by the government is politically motivated, they are 
nevertheless reluctant to make the same inferences when the persecution for a political 
opinion takes the form of rape or sexual abuse of a female dissident by the government.263 
Thus Sontag posits that, “as it works now, immigration law only recognizes rape as 
persecution for political views if the rapist says, ‘I’m raping you because of your political 
views’.264 Furthermore, it should also be noted that rape, domestic violence and other 
forms of gender-based violence for the most part are not inflicted specifically because a 
person holds a certain political opinion, and in the words of Eve McCabe, “it seems both 
offensive and absurd to require that a person subjected to one of these abuses attempt to 
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prove that she was abused because of an opinion that she holds”.265 Hence, this is an 
example of how the inadequacy of international refugee law in relation to the abuses that 
women face has forced claimants to attempt ‘artificial categorization’ in a bid to get a 
valid form of persecution deemed a basis for refugee status.266  
    As discussed throughout this chapter, gender-based violence is problematized and 
treated in the context of the intersections of gender and multiple inequalities. Effectively 
responding to gender-based violence requires addressing the multi-dimensional and 
complex circumstances of identity and oppression surrounding every claimant. The RDP 
fails in this respect when it comes to women. This is evident from the above categorization 
of politically motivated sexual abuse as random acts of violence, restrictions on the PSG 
category, and the general inadequacies inherent within refugee and human rights in 
respects of the public/private divide and cultural relativism. These failures will be 
scrutinized further in Chapter Two in respects of the domestic gender-guidelines. In 
addition to the aforementioned factors affecting refugee determination, the following 
section will now argue that the location of FGM claimants at the intersection of gender 
and nationality, class and race, makes procedural justice different than for men, but also 
different in relation to other groups of women asylum seekers. Arguably, the failure of 
the RDP to acknowledge this has not only further oppressed women but has allowed the 
limitations of human rights and refugee law to negatively influence and regulate refugee 
determinations to the detriment of FGM claimants. This discussion will look at the 
influence of gender-based violence, feminist intersectionality267 and post-colonial 
feminism268 on refugee determination. A few preliminary points pertaining to the 
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domestic gender-guidelines of the case-studies will be stated in this section to illustrate 
some of the arguments made where relevant. 
 
3. Additional Issues: The role and influence of gender and race discrimination in 
interpreting the Refugee Convention definition 
 
In respects of the application and content of the domestic gender-guidelines, and in light 
of the aforementioned discussion, it is important, firstly, to note that where individual 
women are persecuted because of their male relative’s activities or political opinions, 
there is jurisprudential authority for recognising claims grounded in familial affiliation as 
coming within the ambit of the ‘membership in a PSG’ category. All the gender-
guidelines examined in this thesis endorse this approach.269  
    Secondly, despite the possibility of defining a PSG by reference to gender, decision-
makers within the case-studies have generally demonstrated a preference for using the 
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enumerated grounds wherever possible.270 This is not always appropriate to do so. The 
following US case illustrates some of the problematic messages conveyed by the 
reasoning employed by an immigration judge who accepted a female asylum-seeker 
fleeing domestic violence.271 In Matter of A and Z, the claimant was a Jordanian woman 
who had married an influential businessman with connections to the Jordanian Royal 
family.272 She was physically abused throughout their marriage, and as a result of his 
connections he was shielded from prosecution.273 In accepting her claim, the court 
reasoned that the claimant had been persecuted on account of her perceived acceptance of  
Western values as expressed through her desire to be educated and her resistance of the 
abuse inflicted upon her.274 The court reasoned that she was targeted because, “she seeks 
to have her own identity, who believes in the ‘dangerous’ Western values of integrity and 
worth of the individual”.275 The purpose of the abuse she endured was to, “achieve her 
submission into the society’s mores”.276 
       Macklin has argued that it is inquisitive and, “not a little ethnocentric to presume that 
a belief that one should not be beaten is a distinctively western value”.277 Arguably, on 
the one hand, it patronizes and essentializes Jordanian society. On the other, if a belief 
that their partners should not abuse a woman really was a ‘western value’, one would 
expect domestic violence to be rare (or non-existent) in the West. Like the rest of the 
world, Western refugee-receiving States, including my chosen case-study countries are 
plagued by the pervasive and pernicious phenomenon of domestic violence. Indeed, the 
immigration judge describes an occurrence where the applicant and her husband were 
living in the US, and the applicant’s husband was, “terrorizing his wife and sons”.278 The 
police were called, and her husband attempted to have his family removed from their 
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home.279 Upon their arrival, the police tried to calm the situation and were offered a bottle 
of vodka by her husband and they left.280 The abuse continued. This episode does not 
speak favourably of western attitude towards domestic violence. 
    Moreover, upon examination of the immigration judge’s analysis, it has been argued 
that it is bizarre to characterise a man’s reasons for abusing his wife as ‘her’ real or 
imputed political opinion about her role and status within society.281 In fact, such a 
characterization, begets potentially, “invidious and artificial distinctions regarding men’s 
motivation for beating their intimate partners”.282 For instance, in his decision, the judge 
remarked that if a man abuses his partner because he believed she was unfaithful, “her 
claim would not, by itself, qualify as a ground for granting asylum”.283 Many abusive men 
are jealous and accuse their partners of being unfaithful. Surely, “the issue is not the 
proximate reason for the violence, but the underlying assumption that men are entitled to 
beat women”.284 Thus, the judge’s analysis appears predicated on the idea that there are 
both ‘political’ and ‘personal’ reasons for abusing women. Merely to state this proposition 
is to reveal its anti-feminist implications. This analysis further reinforces the 
misconception underlying such decisions that such violence is a private issue, 
unconnected to the social and political structures which serve to perpetuate the 
subjugation of women, and secondly, that decision-makers, are reluctant to grant refugee 
status in cases where the alleged gender-related violence appears similar to forms of 
gender-related violence that are pervasive within their own borders. Whilst this argument 
may appear to suggest that if followed through to its logical conclusion that all women 
who are abused are entitled to refugee protection, this is not my intended argument. All 
cases should be reviewed independently, and claimants need to meet the eligibility criteria 
for refugee status as outlined in Article 1A of the Refugee Convention. 
     On a more positive (if unrealistic) note, it has been proposed that the main evidence 
presented of the Jordanian women’s adherence to ‘Western’ values was her objection to 
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being abused.285 If acting on the urge to protect oneself is all that is required to manifest 
a political opinion regarding women’s role in society, then it can only be hoped (and it is 
only a hope) that every woman who flees domestic violence should be able to establish a 
nexus to a political opinion by virtue of having fled.286 As was implied in Lazo-Majano, 
it is the man’s political opinion regarding the role, status and value of women that explains 
why he abuses women.287 Thus, I would argue that men abuse women because of their 
political opinions concerning the role they believe women to have, not because of what 
women believe. Indeed, to suggest that men abuse women because of what women believe 
on the basis of their actions, might support an inference that the abuse would stop if 
women would ‘behave’ and ‘change their attitude’, a proposition which is both offensive 
and dangerous to women. Domestic violence is not about what a woman believes, but 
about her gender identity and the ‘sexist’ beliefs of the individual who abuses her. As 
such, it cannot be explained or categorised as political opinion because, political opinion 
refers to the victim’s beliefs, and not those of her persecutor. 
     Thirdly, most Western decision-makers would concede that domestic violence is 
linked to gender. Since gender is not an enumerated persecution ground, this has led to 
consideration of ‘women’ or ‘women subject to domestic violence’, as a PSG in all three 
jurisdictions under examination. Whilst the CIRB gender-guidelines cite gender as an 
example of such a characteristic, they contain no further practical guidance on whether or 
how to circumscribe a gender-based social group. In Acosta, the BIA remarked that sex 
could be a type of shared characteristic relevant to constituting a PSG. Like Canada, 
however, this remark has not resulted in further specification and, as the INS gender-
guidelines note, various US courts have proffered different opinions on whether and how 
gender may form the basis of social group ascription.288 The UK gender-guidelines are 
also guilty of this omission. 
    Finally, none of the gender-guidelines under consideration in this thesis examine the 
PSG category within the specific context of domestic violence. This is regrettable as 
domestic violence is epidemic and is possibly one of the most common and challenging 
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contexts where decision-makers must articulate a PSG.289 Whilst all three jurisdictions, 
as will be discussed in Chapter Four, have taken great strides to overcome the epidemic 
of domestic violence within their own borders, their willingness to protect their ‘own 
female citizens’ has not been incorporated into the national gender-guidelines. The fact 
that domestic violence is not mentioned within the context of the PSG category firstly 
reinforces the belief of this researcher that Western States do not want to be categorised 
within the same grouping as ‘other’ States where human rights abuses are pandemic. In 
other words, they do not want to admit that human rights abuses occur within their 
borders. Secondly, this omission affords decision-makers a wide discretion in formulating 
a PSG based on domestic violence. Finally, in tandem with the aforementioned view, such 
a deliberate oversight not only affords decision-makers discretion in formulating such 
groups, it also allows states to control the number of female refugees entering their 
borders,290 thus limiting such claimants access to refugee determination.  
     The lack of treatment of domestic violence in the guidelines, coupled with the failure 
to provide practical guidance on whether or how to circumscribe a gender-based social 
group is worrying. Such omissions whether deliberate or not, can impact significantly on 
the claims of female claimants, with the result that they may be unfairly denied protection. 
The omission of gender from the Refugee Convention has resulted in inequalities in the 
evaluation and determination of refugee claims, inequalities the CIRB, INS and UK 
gender-guidelines were designed to correct. Whilst the inclusion of gender as an 
additional enumerated persecution ground is a potential remedy and would arguably better 
address the gender-bias and subsequent marginalization of women’s experiences within 
the international refugee arena, it should be noted that since the current statutory language 
of refugee law does not necessarily preclude these claims,291 amendment is unlikely. The 
problem for women fleeing FGM, therefore, is not solely the statutory language of refugee 
law per se, but as is evident from this chapter, firstly how it is interpreted and secondly, 
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the ostensibly gender neutral discretionary process, in which refugee status 
determinations takes place. 
     But why would decision-makers interpret the law to turn away women whom they 
acknowledge have faced persecution in their home countries? More systemic than 
possible prejudice harbored by individual decision-makers, a more comprehensive answer 
(as will be discussed in the next section) lies within what Anita Sinha describes as being 
the, “legacy of gender and race discrimination in both immigration and asylum law”.292  
 
A. Race, Culture and Gender 
 
Hathaway and Foster have argued that there is merit in the argument that if refugee law 
is to be understood as part of a wider body of human rights law, it is essential that given 
the importance of understanding the claimant’s particular circumstances, it is critical that 
decision-makers approach refugee determination assessments with an open mind.293 
Similarly, Professor Colin Harvey has stated that the objective nature of refugee 
determination, “internationalises asylum decision-making and requires decision-makers 
to be openminded in their assessments”.294 Arguably, unless decision-makers come to the 
process with an open and unbiased mindset, it will remain inherently prejudiced and futile. 
The gender bias and marginalization of women’s experiences within the refugee context 
is an immensely complex issue. The application of refugee law and the 1951 refugee 
definition itself remains constrained firstly by its founding interest to protect educated 
male elite claimants and, secondly, the influence of cultural relativism, which ultimately 
misconstrues FGM and other gender-based forms of violence against women as private 
issues, unrelated to the larger political and social structure which serve to maintain their 
subordinate status.295 Race and racism may also play a significant role in how refugee 
claims are heard and decided, and as decision-makers are not accountable for failing to 
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implement the guidelines, this convergence of racial and gender stereotypes, playing out 
in the language of ‘culture’, creates a serious obstacle for gender-based refugee claims. 
Coupled with the prejudices of individual decision-makers, the likelihood of women 
fleeing FGM being denied refugee protection remains considerable. 
     Exploring narratives of culturally defined deviance, Leti Volpp states, “the terrain on 
which we articulate and understand racialized difference is frequently that of gendered 
treatment”.296 Volpp's insight that conversations about women and gender often are 
actually conversations of racial difference is illuminating in the immigration and asylum 
context.297 In an arena in which racism historically has informed policy298, early 
immigration laws provide stark examples of how racial discrimination affected the 
treatment of gender. In the early twentieth century, for example, US citizenship laws 
contained an anti-miscegenation provision directed specifically at women.299  A century 
after these laws were rescinded, the gendered treatment of racialized difference continues 
to impact the treatment of immigrant women. For example, the welfare “reform” 
movement in the 1990s in the US had a disproportionately negative impact on immigrant 
women. As this initiative was renowned for the gendered rhetoric of the “welfare 
queen300” and racialized images of the undeserving301, Sinah posits that it is hardly 
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“Feminism is for Everyone: Passionate Politics”, South End Press: Cambridge, (2000), at 57. These 
feminists of colour demanded that white feminists acknowledge the reality of race and racism in the struggle 
for American women's liberation. Cultural critic bell hooks, while acknowledging that "[o]verall feminist 
thinking and feminist theory [in the U.S.] has benefited from all critical interventions on the issue of race," 
ibid, at 58-59, nonetheless views this progress as only a "foundation for the building of a mass-based anti-
racist feminist movement." Ibid, at 60. 
298 A classic example of overt racism in U.S. immigration law is the treatment of Chinese immigrants at the 
turn of the nineteenth century. See, Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 729-30 (1893) (holding 
that Congress's plenary power permits requirement that white witness attest to Chinese aliens' residence); 
Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) (upholding 
constitutionality of law suspending all future immigration of Chinese labourers because "power of 
exclusion" is "an incident of sovereignty"). Chinese immigrants were by no means the only target of racist 
immigration laws. See, United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 213-15 (1923) (finding that immigrant from 
India was not "white" and therefore ineligible for naturalization). 
299 Sinha, supra note 292, at 1579. 
300 Ibid. See also, Dickerson M, “America's Uneasy Relationship With the Working Poor”, 51 Hastings Law 
Journal 17 (1999); Roberts S, “Food Stamps Program: How It Grew and How Reagan Wants to Cut It 
Back”, N.Y. Times, Apr. 4, 1981, §1, at 11 (discussing "legend of the so-called 'welfare queen"'). 
301 White L, “On the "Consensus" to End Welfare: Where Are the women's Voices?”, 26 Connecticut Law 
Review 843, (1994), at 854 (noting that, after World War II, -[t]he counterfactual racist stereotypes of the 
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surprising that, “the political debate over the reduction of public assistance to immigrants 
generally failed to weigh the disproportionate impact of such measures on immigrant 
women”.302 
     The discursive treatment of asylum claims involving violence against women of colour 
is reminiscent of the way in which race and gender discrimination have played out in 
immigration law generally.303 Cultural stereotypes of non-Western societies have 
informed the way in which these claims of gender-related violence in non-Western 
countries are perceived and discussed. Sinah notes that these conversations perpetuate 
problematic notions attributable to colonialist feminism304 which is predicated upon 
exoticizing notions of “the Other305” and “alien” culture.306 By fighting sexism with 
racism, colonialist feminism and advocates of intersectionality defined its mission as 
saving their Third World sisters from their uncivilized cultures.307 
    Although colonialist feminism adheres to a perspective that is over a century old, its 
roots continue to underlie the way that violence against women abroad is characterized. 
Present-day media depictions of gender-related violence abroad are one example of this 
legacy. In one article, an author enumerates examples of violence against women outside 
the US as including genital mutilation in Africa, bride burning in India, honour killing in 
the Middle East, rape as a weapon of ethnic genocide in Bosnia-and admits that, “in 
                                                 
... 'welfare queen' ... began to take hold among the white, middle class public, including women"); Kaufman 
E, “The Cultural Meaning of the "Welfare Queen": Using State Constitutions to Challenge Child Exclusion 
Provisions”, 23 New York University Review of Law and Social Change 301, (1997), at 301 ("The 
stereotype of the lazy, black welfare mother... informs and justifies the ongoing welfare debate."). 
302 Sinha, supra note 292, at 1579; Johnson K, “Public Benefits and Immigration: The Intersection of 
Immigration Status, Ethnicity, Gender and Class”, 42 UCLA Law Review 1509, (1995), at 1551. Although 
the racialized rhetoric of the welfare "reform" movement predominantly targeted African American women, 
the subsequent effect it had on immigrant women illustrates the impact that gendered treatment of racialized 
difference continues to have on this latter group. Sinha, supra note 292, at 1279, note 80. 
303 Sinha, supra note 292, at 1579. 
304 Ibid, at 1579-80.  
305 Burton A, “Burdens of History: British Feminists, Indian Women, and Imperial Culture, 1865-1915”, 
The University of North Caroline Press: London, (1994), at 17 (examining process whereby British 
feminists “created a colonized female Other on whose passivity and disenfranchisement their claims for 
imperial representation largely relied"). 
306 Immigration law scholar Kevin Johnson highlights how the term "alien" both symbolizes and influences 
how the immigrant community is thought about in the US. “The concept of the alien,” he argues, "helps to 
reinforce and strengthen nativist sentiment toward members of new immigrant groups, which in turn 
influences U.S. responses to immigration and human rights issues.” Johnson K, “Aliens” and the U.S. 
Immigration Laws: The Social and Legal Construction of Nonpersons”, 28 University of Miami Inter-
American Law Review 263, (1997), at 265. 
307 Sinha, supra note 292, at 1580. 
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certain hands, these experiences are the topics of tabloid television”.308 Another article 
began with the story of a Muslim woman from West Africa who was seeking asylum in 
the U.S. because she would be forced to marry an abusive polygamist upon returning to 
her home country.309 In what appears to be an attempt at compassionate commentary, the 
author stated, “Aminah's story is incredible, difficult for a westerner to fully 
comprehend”.310 According to Sinah: 
 
One does not have to look hard to find remnants of the colonialist paradigm 
running through these accounts-men steeped in a backwards culture subjugating 
helpless women in ways that cannot even be grasped by the Western imagination. 
Such depictions are drawn from racialized concepts of the non-Western (couched 
as "culture"). They also rely on the idea of a primitive collective pathology 
(manifesting itself in unimaginable stories of violence against women at the hands 
of barbaric men).311 
 
Refugee claims that relate to stories of gender-based persecution, including FGM have 
suffered similar treatment. As such, it is this ‘difficulty to grasp’ which this thesis by 
analogizing FGM with the domestic treatment of domestic violence aims to redress within 
the domestic refugee determination systems. Chapter Three will among other issues, 
highlight the extent to which the convergence of racial and gender stereotypes in the law 
affects the way decision-makers have handled FGM asylum claims. 
     The regulation of non-citizens, including asylum-seekers, remains one of the few areas 
in which governments, invoking State sovereignty, purport to wield near-absolute 
discretion. Measures adopted by the case-studies to restrict the flow of asylum-seekers, 
including the use of expedited/fast-track procedures have eroded the statutory institutional 
and procedural safeguards that, “surround decision-making in asylum law, and mark a 
reassertion of this broad discretion”.312 Due process is a right enshrined in law which 
                                                 
308 Ibid (quoting Gross J, “Uniting World Against Violence to Women”, N.Y. Times, May 31, 2000, 
at B2). 
309 Hull J, “Battered, Raped and Veiled: The New Sanctuary Seekers”, L.A. Times Mag., Nov. 20, 1994, at 
26, 26-28. 
310 Ibid. See also, Sinha, supra note 292, at 1580-1. 
311 Ibid, at 1581. 
312 Heckman, supra note 41, at 251-2. 
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extends to all individuals.313 To be fair, the RDP must be free from bias, prejudice and 
political influence. However, it is impossible to guarantee due process in the current 
‘refugee lottery’ system when refugee decision-makers’ rates of denial are inconsistent.314 
To secure women’s right to due process under the law, there must be a more uniform 
approach to decision-maker’s substantive interpretation of the gender-guidelines and the 
development of an exclusive gender-sensitive process for hearing such claims. 
    Only by understanding how women’s overlapping identities, including race, gender, 
ethnicity, religion etc, can those within the RDP, understand the impact these aspects have 
on a claimant’s experience of oppression and discrimination. Thus, attention to women’s 
intersectionality provides increased visibility to diversity among women, facilitating a 
more in-depth understanding of their experiences and the creation of more effective 
prevention and response efforts. This understanding is important not just in interpreting 
                                                 
313 International instruments contain five different kinds of provisions bearing on the scope and content of 
institutional and procedural safeguards surrounding asylum law decision-making: (1) provisions that 
expressly address the right to seek asylum and refugee status; (2) provisions that expressly stipulate  
minimum procedural safeguards applicable to the removal of aliens from the territory of a State party; (3) 
general guarantees of the right of individuals to a fair hearing before an independent and impartial tribunal; 
(4) provisions prohibiting discriminatory treatment; and (5) substantial provisions prohibiting specific State 
conduct (for example, exposing individuals to a real risk of torture or unreasonably interfering in an 
individual’s family life) which, combined with rights to an effective remedy, imply certain procedural 
safeguards. The right to claim refugee status and to seek asylum is provided for under the 1951 Refugee 
Convention; Art 12(1) UDHR (‘everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from 
persecution’). Minimum safeguards for the expulsion of aliens is provided for under Art 13 ICCPR (‘An 
alien lawfully in the territory of a State Party to the present Covenant may be expelled there from only in 
pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law and shall, except where compelling reasons of 
national security otherwise require, be allowed to submit the reasons against his expulsion and to have his 
case reviewed by, and be represented for the purpose before, the competent authority or a person or persons 
especially designated by the competent authority’). Several international instruments guarantee a fair 
hearing before an independent tribunal. These include, Art 14 ICCPR; Art 6 ECHR; Art XVIII American 
Declaration; Art 10 UDHR; and Art 8 American Convention. Most international human rights treaties 
contain equality provisions requiring States to guarantee to individual’s equality before the law and equal 
protection of the law without discrimination. See for example Art 26 ICCPR; Art 14(1) ICCPR. Most treaties 
also guarantee substantive rights, such as the right to life, to security of the person, and to freedom from 
torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. For a substantive analysis on international provisions 
bearing on the scope and content of institutional and procedural safeguards surrounding asylum law 
decision-making, see Heckman, supra note 41, at 220-30. 
314 Thompson N, “Due Process Problems Caused by Large Disparities in Grants of Asylum: Will New 
Department of Justice Recommendations Solve the Problem?”, 22 Emory International Law Review 385, 
(2008) (discussing disparities in grants of asylum); Crawley, supra note 7, at 1 (noting that statistics 
regarding the proportion of asylum seekers who are female are often inaccurate, misleading, or unavailable); 
Love C, “Unrepeatable Harms: Female Genital Mutilation and Involuntary Sterilization in US Asylum 
Law”, 40 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 173, (2009) (discussing the disparate treatment of FGM 
and involuntary sterilization cases). 
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the Refugee Convention definition, but also in how refugee determination is conducted, 
as will now be briefly addressed. 
 
III. Procedural and Evidential Issues 
 
Procedures for refugee determination in many western States, as will be discussed more 
fully in Chapter Two have undergone extensive change in recent years. They have also 
been the subject of considerable criticism by those concerned that both the information 
gathering process and the assessment of evidential issues fails adequately to consider the 
difficulties experienced by women in putting forward information relevant to their claims. 
     When a claimant presents her case, she must convince the decision-maker that she has 
either suffered persecution or that she has a well-founded fear of suffering persecution in 
the future. Documentary evidence of gender-based forms of violence is often difficult to 
produce.315 Official documentary evidence may not even exist if the government has 
participated in the persecution or attempted to conceal it.316 Alternatively, the persecution 
of women may be deemed a cultural norm and not subject to state action. Under any of 
these circumstances the claimant, “is forced to rely only upon her own testimony, which 
often proves insufficient”.317 
     Female claimants who have been subjected to horrific forms of sexual violence may 
also be reluctant (as already discussed) to speak about their experiences, especially to a 
male interviewer.318 This reluctance is exacerbated by the cultural stigma and 
embarrassment attached to sexual crimes in many States where women are rejected for 
                                                 
315 Martin S, “Refugee Women”, Zed Books: London, (1992), at 19. The lack of documentary evidence is 
sometimes the result of a conspiracy in which the government participates to protect the persecutors from 
punishment in their home countries and sometimes the result of the victim’s fear of testifying as to her 
experience. 
     “Prosecuting those who attack or exploit women has proved to be difficult in many situations. The women 
are often reluctant to talk about the attacks and go through the emotional and sometimes threatening 
process of identifying and testifying against the culprits. The perpetrators may be individuals in positions 




317 Ibid. See also, Schenk, supra note 175, at 321. 
318 Ibid. See also, Martin, supra note 315, at 26 (arguing for specially trained female officials in the asylum 
screening process to assist female applicants who have suffered sexual abuses). 
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‘failure’ to protect their dignity319 Consequently, female victims of violence, 
discrimination and abuse often do not volunteer information about their experiences and 
may be reluctant to do so in the presence of family members,320 especially male family 
members and children. Discussing experiences of sexual violence in front of family 
members may become a further source of isolation. A distrust of authorities, created by 
the claimant’s experience of persecution in her country of origin, may also prevent 
openness within the RDP. Coupled with language barriers and an unfamiliarity with the 
laws and customs of the host state,321 female applicants can be perceived as being 
unpersuasive322 and therefore deemed to lack credibility.  
      Many of the same problems are encountered, and possibly exacerbated, when a 
claimant is testifying to her well-founded fear of persecution.323 To satisfy the objective 
test of a well-founded fear of persecution, there must be, “a showing, by credible, direct, 
and specific evidence in the record, of facts that would support a reasonable fear of 
persecution”.324 Documentary evidence of persecution generally occurring throughout the 
claimant’s home country may be more easily accessible than evidence of a specific act of 
persecution against the claimant. But if such evidence is unavailable the claimant’s 
testimony alone is the basis of any determination.325 Again, as discussed above problems 
arise regarding a claimant’s willingness to speak openly, fear of speaking to authorities, 
and ability to effectively operate within the RDP.326 
      Refugee law in its present form is not adequate to address the wide range of human 
rights violations committed primarily against women. The failure to enumerate gender as 
a persecution grounds, coupled with cultural relativism arguments has resulted in 
institutionalized discrimination.327 This system “allows human rights violations against 
                                                 
319 Ibid. See also, Schenk, supra note 175, at 321. 
320 Crawley, supra note 7, at 204. 
321 Ibid. See also, Wong Yang Sung v McGrath, 339 U.S. 46 (1950). 
322 Schenk, supra note 175, at 322. 
323 Ibid. 
324 Ibid. See also, Diaz-Escobar v INS, 782 F.2d 1488, 1492, (9th Cir. 1986). 
325 Schenk, supra note 175, at 322. 
326 Ibid. See also, Estrada-Posadas v INS, 924 F.2d 916, 918-9, (9th Cir 1991) (claimant’s testimony alone 
can suffice to establish a well-founded fear of persecution, but only if it is ‘credible, persuasive, and 
specific’). 
327 Weisblat C, “Gender-Based Persecution: Does United States Law Provide Women Refugees with a Fair 
Chance?” 7 Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law 407, (1999), at 428. 
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women around the world to continue to flourish, with tacit acceptance by 
governments”.328 Accordingly, as stated in the Introduction to this thesis, refugee law and 
its processes must be reformed in order to accomplish its purpose, which is to provide 
surrogate international protection where there is a fundamental breakdown in state 
protection resulting in serious human rights violations. Refugee law should therefore, 
“serve to internationalize human rights norms by providing international protection when 
a country does not adequately protect the human rights of its citizens”.329 In this sense, 
refugee law serves as a short-term ‘pressure value’ while human rights issues within the 




Unquestionably, a revolution has taken place in the last decade. Women’s rights have 
been projected onto the human rights agenda with a speed and determination that has 
rarely been matched in international law.330 Nevertheless, considerable challenges remain 
and a protection gap between what is theoretically guaranteed for women and what 
women experience exists, within both the international human rights and refugee law 
paradigms. Reform is needed at the international level to bring the experiences of FGM 
claimants specifically and in tandem the rights of women generally into line with the 
fundamental human rights that they were guaranteed.331 To fulfil its purpose, refugee law 
must recognise gender-based violence in the same manner as it recognises persecution on 
account of race, religion, membership of a PSG, nationally and political opinion. In other 
                                                 
328 McCabe, supra note 72, at 446. 
329 Ibid. 
330 Coomaraswamy R, “Reinventing International Law: Women’s Rights as Human Rights in the 
International Community” (Harvard Law School Human Rights Programme (1997), at 7, as cited in 
McCabe, supra note 72, at 459. 
331 Such reforms which are not the focus of this thesis could include the following institutional and 
procedural reforms: (1) the public/private distinction should be dismantled, and international human rights 
law must uniformly and adequately cover discrimination and violence against women in the areas where 
there are most vulnerable; (2) governments should be required to take additional actions to address women’s 
human rights abuses, beyond the requirement that they add or reform laws relating to women; (3) an 
enforcement mechanism could be put in place to better ensure compliance with international treaties such 
as CEDAW, and (4) mechanisms put into place to increase the number of women in decision-making 
positions of power would potentially move issues that primarily affect women into the mainstream 
international legal order. See, McCabe, supra note 72, at 459-60. See also, Charlesworth, Feminist 
Approaches to International Law, supra note 47 at 624-5. 
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words, refugee law needs to acknowledge the theoretical guarantees underpinning human 
rights instruments pertaining to women and put them into practice. This branch of law, 
whilst influenced by the human rights regime, needs to stand on its own two feet and 
actively protect woman.332    
      Despite existing flaws within both paradigms, a sea-change is slowly occurring and 
there is a new awareness and willingness to take gender into account in policy 
development and implementation. There have been some encouraging developments 
legitimising the factual basis for women’s asylum claims, particularly those with a gender-
persecution element, not just at the international but also at the domestic level. Chapter 
Two, will now examine how the case-studies have attempted to remedy the inadequacies 
inherent within refugee law and the extent to which these reforms are procedurally and to 
a lesser extent substantively inadequate. It is only by identifying these limitations, that 









                                                 
332 According to McCabe, “requiring countries to accept refugees under this standard could serve as an 
international pressure valve, temporally protecting persons experiencing serious human rights abuses until 
the human rights situation in the home country is abated”. Such an approach would also potentially cause 
host countries to put pressure on the countries from which women flee to end human rights abuses. See, 










Although the Refugee Convention does not include an explicit reference to sex and/or 
gender, the importance of gender in shaping the experiences of refugees is increasingly 
recognized.1 Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women were first issued by the 
UNHCR in 1991 and were followed in 1995 by guidelines specifically on responding 
to cases involving sexual violence. In 2002, UNHCR updated its guidelines to include 
explicit reference to the ways in which gender should be considered when deciding 
whether an individual is in need of international protection. These guidelines are intended 
to provide legal interpretative guidance for governments, legal practitioners, decision-
makers and the judiciary, as well as UNHCR staff carrying out refugee status 
determination in the field. In 2008, the UNHCR also produced a Handbook for the 
Protection of Women and Girls. This Handbook describes some of the protection 
challenges faced by women and girls of concern to UNHCR. It sets out the legal standards 
and principles that guide UNHCR’s work to protect women and girls and outlines the 
different roles and responsibilities of States and other actors. UNHCR has also 
issued guidelines on membership of a PSG the application of the Refugee Convention in 
cases involving those who have been, or are at risk of FGM and other forms of gender-
based persecution. In response as discussed in the previous chapter, several countries 
including Canada, the US and UK have now included explicit reference to gender or sex 
as grounds for refugee status in their domestic refugee legislation, or have recognized that 
particular forms of gender-related violence or harm constitute forms of persecution.2 In 
                                                 
1 Crawley H, “Refugees and Gender: Law and Process” Jordan Publishing Limited: Bristol, (2001), at 12. 
2 Other notable countries to have followed this trend include Ireland, Germany, Australia, the Netherlands, 
Sweden and South Africa. See, Macklin A, “Cross-Border Shopping for Ideas: A Critical Review of United 
States, Canadian and Australian Approaches to Gender-Related Asylum Claims” 13 Georgetown 
Immigration Law Journal 25, (1999), at 26 discussing how the introduction of gender guidelines provide 
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1993 the Canadian government published the first national gender guidelines 
entitled Guidelines on Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution.3 
The Canadian gender guidelines were subsequently updated in 1996 and have formed the 
template for many of the guidelines subsequently published in other countries.4 In 1995, 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), predecessor of the US Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (USCIS), issued Considerations for Asylum Officers Adjudicating 
Asylum Claims from Women,5 instructing Asylum Officers on issues to consider when 
                                                 
guidance to decision makers on how to interpret the 1951 United Nations Refugee Definition and adjudicate 
asylum claims in a gender-sensitive manner. 
3 Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution - Guidelines issued by the Chairperson 
pursuant to section 65(3) of the Immigration Act, Immigration and Refugee Board, Ottawa, Canada, 9 Mar. 
1993. The Guidelines are available online via the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Homepage at 
http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/Eng/BoaCom/references/pol/GuiDir/Pages/GuideDir04.aspx (last accessed 
8/3/17). Since that time, the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) has issued an updated 
Guideline 4: Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution (November 13, 1996) as well 
as a Compendium of Decisions: Guideline 4: Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related 
Persecution: Update (February 2003). The guidelines provide that women may belong to a “gender-defined 
social group” where they “fear persecution as the consequence of failing to conform to, or for transgressing, 
certain gender-discriminating religious or customary laws and practices in their country of origin”. These 
updated guidelines are available online via the Centre for Gender and Refugee Studies, at 
https://cgrs.uchastings.edu/search-materials/gender-asylum-guidelines (last accessed 1/3/16). For the 
purposes of this chapter, I will refer to the guidelines as the CIRB Gender guidelines, focusing on the 
provisions of the updated versions since 1993. Reference should also be made here to the fact that the IRB 
also released guidance specific to child asylum applicants: Guideline 3: Child Refugee Claimants: 
Procedural and Evidentiary Issues (September 30, 1996). Finally, the IRB released the Guideline 8: 
Procedures with Respect to Vulnerable Persons Appearing Before the IRB (December 15, 2006), which 
proposes best practices and procedural accommodations for particularly vulnerable asylum claimants 
appearing before the Board, including children, women with gender-based persecution claims, and survivors 
of torture. Section 14 of the Guideline 8: Procedures with Respect to Vulnerable Persons Appearing Before 
the IRB provides that, “The RPD will consider the IRB Guideline on Women Refugee Claimants Fearing 
Gender-Related Persecution in all cases involving refugee cases based on gender”. 
4 Including the US, Australia and more recently Sweden, the Netherlands and South Africa. In describing 
this process of influence, Macklin states that, by “demonstrating what could be achieved – politically and 
legally- in one jurisdiction, made it politically feasible for others to follow suit”. See, Macklin, supra note 
2, at 68. In other words, Canada validated the normative enterprise of the UNHCR, and through practical 
exemplarity persuaded other States to develop their own interpretative guidelines. See, Erdman J & Sanche 
A, “Talking about Women: The Iterative and Dialogic Process of Creating Guidelines for Gender-Based 
Refugee Claims” 3 Journal of Law & Equality 69, (2004), at 78. 
5 The guidelines are not binding on adjudicators outside of USCIS. However, they have been cited in asylum 
decisions by immigration judges, the Board of Immigration Appeals, and federal courts. See, Considerations 
for Asylum Officers Adjudicating Asylum Claims From Women, 26 May 1995, Phyllis Coven, Office of 
International Affairs, Immigration and Naturalization Service, USA, p. 1 (hereafter INS Gender 
Guidelines). In July 1995, the INS issued a memorandum, Follow Up on Gender Guidelines Training, to 
further clarify guidance. See, Melville R, Asylum Division, Office of International Affairs, Follow Up on 
Gender Guidelines Training, Memorandum to Asylum Office Directors, SAOs, AOs, (Washington, DC: 
1995). The US Government has also issued the following related guidance since the 1995 memorandum: 
Department of Homeland Security, Guidelines for Children’s Asylum Claims (1998); Department of State, 
Gender Guidelines for Overseas Refugee Processing (2000) and the 2007 U.S. DOJ, Executive Office for 
Immigration Review, Operating Policies and Procedures Memorandum 07-01: Guidelines for Immigration 
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interviewing and evaluating gender-related claims. In 2000, the UK Immigration Appeal 
Authority (IAA) launched their ‘Asylum Gender Guidelines’ for use in the determination 
of asylum appeals in the UK. In 2006, following changes in emanation of the tribunal that 
took place in 2005, creating, a single tier tribunal (the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal), 
the Gender Guidelines were summarily removed and declared not to be the policy of the 
AIT.6 Since which time offers to update them have been declined.7 On account of the 
positive impact which the UK IAA guidelines made in respects of FGM, and the call for 
them to be consulted by Home Office case-workers, the UK Gender Guidelines effectively 
remain in use and will therefore form a central focal point of analysis and discussion 
throughout this thesis.8  
    Whilst these guidelines can all be usefully compared with one another, notable 
differences exist between the legal environments of these countries, in matters of process 
and, to some extent, the substance of refugee determination. The objective is not to 
compare the merits of each system. Rather, the focus is exclusively on the gender-
guidelines formulated. The effectiveness of the guidelines to respond to the issues raised 
by gender-related claims within their respective political, legal and administrative settings 
will be examined. The initial objective of this chapter, is therefore, to determine the 
                                                 
Court Cases Involving Unaccompanied Alien Children. While all these initiatives are welcome 
developments, they merely reinforce the principles laid down in the INS Gender Guidelines. 
6 Jarvic C, “Gender in Refugee Law: From the Margins to the Centre”, (2014). The edited version of this 
speech is available online via the Asylum Aid Website at http://www.asylumaid.org.uk/gender-refugee-
law-margins-centre/ (last accessed 1/5/17). 
7 Ibid. 
8 Asylum Gender Guidelines, Immigration Appellate Authority, UK, Nov. 2000, (hereafter referred to as the 
UK Gender guidelines). It should also be noted that the Home Office integrated the UK Gender Guidelines 
into its own instructions to asylum case-workers in March 2004 and again in 2006 (last updated 2010). 
Unless, otherwise noted, the UK Gender Guidelines will be the primary focus of this chapter in relation to 
the refugee determination process in Britain. This focus stems from the fact that the Home Office Asylum 
Policy Instruction on Gender does not substantially differ from the UK Gender Guidelines. In fact, the 
policy instruction, which is not as exhaustive as the UK Gender Guidelines, explicitly state that, “further 
information can also be obtained from the Asylum Gender Guidelines published by the Immigration 
Appellate Authority in November 2000”. Thus, where relevant, consideration will also be given to the Home 
Office’s 2010 Gender Asylum Policy Instructions.  See, Asylum Policy Instruction: Gender Issues in the 
Asylum Claim , Home Office, 2010. Available online via the Gov.UK website at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/gender-issue-in-the-asylum-claim-process (last accessed 
8/6/17). For a complete listing of Asylum Policy Instructions implemented by the Home Office in respects 
of all areas of the asylum determination process please refer to this website. See also, Bennett C, 
“Relocation, Relocation: The Impact of Internal Relocation on Women Asylum Seekers”, (2008), at 11. This 
document is available online via the Asylum Aid website at  
http://www.asylumaid.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Relocation_Relocation_research_report.pdf 
(last accessed 8/6/17) (discussing the reluctance of the IAT to follow the UK Gender-Guidelines). 
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common and distinctive features of the guidelines. Beyond that, issues, which the 
guidelines create, expose or ignore, will also be identified. The reluctance of decision-
makers to recognise certain state-sanctioned practices as potential forms of persecution, 
specifically domestic violence will be queried. This reluctance is surprising given the fact 
that the case studies have taken a zero-tolerance stance in respect of domestic violence 
within their respective jurisdictions. In addition to floodgates arguments,9 this reluctance 
as will be discussed in due course, suggests that notions of culture that animate refugee 
jurisprudence are deeply rooted in racial and gender stereotypes.10 Arguably, decision-
makers are reluctant to grant refugee status in cases where the alleged gender violence 
appears like forms of gender-related violence that are pervasive within their own 
borders.11   
    This chapter further aims to compare and critically assess the different strategies 
deployed by the three guidelines to establish a link between a woman’s fear of persecution 
and a relevant convention ground. In effect, this examination will detail the strengths, 
weaknesses, and limitations of the guidelines, which ultimately affect the adjudication of 
                                                 
9 Another reason, as discussed in Chapter One concerns the floodgates argument. So far, each State that has 
chosen to recognise gender- persecution within its RDP, has had to contend with the argument (made by 
anti-immigration lobbies within governments and civil society) that such an inclusion would open a 
‘floodgate’, swamping those countries with claimants. The case studies under consideration in this thesis 
are no exception. However, this fear as already discussed has little foundation. The experience of countries 
such as Canada and the US in adopting gender-guidelines attests to the fact that the ‘floodgate’ does not 
‘open’. Per UNHCR statistics, the percentage of women asylum seekers in Canada remained relatively 
stable across the five-year period from 1989 to 1993. In fact, Musalo argues, that the experience of Canada 
since 1993, and the US since the Matter of Kasinga decision further belie the floodgates myth: neither 
country has experienced a surge of claims following their acceptance of the legitimacy of gender-based 
claims. Lastly, accepting gender persecution as grounds for refugee status does not imply that all such 
applicants would be granted asylum. Recognising women’s experiences merely affords equality of 
opportunity. It does not in any way require a State to accept more refugees. It is simply a means of reforming 
the RDP to more accurately and equitably include the experiences of those who form the majority of the 
world’s displaced persons and refugees. See, Musalo K, “A Short History of Gender Asylum in the United 
States: Resistance and Ambivalence May Very Slowly Be Inching Towards Recognition of Women’s 
Claims”, 29 Refugee Survey Quarterly 46, (2010), at 48. For further information on this issue see, Neal D, 
“Women as a Social Group: Recognising Sex-Based Persecution as a Grounds of Asylum”, 20 Columbia 
Human Rights Law Review 203, (1988) and Minister of Employment and Immigration, 1982. as cited in 
Valji N, Hunt L & Moffett H, “Where are the Women? Gender Discrimination in Refugee Polices and 
Practice” 55 Agenda 61, (2003), at 68. 
10 See, Sinha A, “Domestic Violence and US Asylum Law: Eliminating the ‘Cultural Hook’ for Claims 
Involving Gender-Related Persecution”, 76 New York University Law Review 1562, (2001), at 1565. 
11 In other words, a more enlightened understanding of violence against women is needed and as Sinha 
argues, refugee claims based on gender persecution should be given the full consideration of refugee law 
based on a ‘gendered’ understanding of the political, social and institutional character of violence against 
women rather than on ‘cultural’ culpability. Ibid, at 1562.  
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refugee claims, based on gender-related forms of persecution. Due to the wide discretion 
afforded to States in both interpreting and applying the Refugee Convention definition 
and the need to control their borders, Part I looks at the objectives of the guidelines and 
how they protect female claimants fleeing persecution. Part II embarks on an examination 
of the substantive content of the guidelines. Part III addresses the actual interpretation and 
application of the refugee definition in a gender context. The conclusion identifies the 
limitations of the guidelines. It posits that procedural reform and development is needed 
within the domestic RDP to ensure that victims of gender-based violence have their claims 
heard in a gender-sensitive manner, within a process which enforces and secures their 
right to due process under the law.12 
    Before, examining the guidelines in the following sections, it is important to note that 
whilst the specific focus of the thesis is on examining the treatment of FGM within the 
RDP, the examination of the guidelines in this chapter will deliberately look at the 
treatment of gender-based violence generally. This approach helps to provide an insight 
into the way in which the case-studies treat violence against women generally and their 
attitudes to specific forms of gender violence, before examining the treatment of FGM 
within the RDP in Chapter Three. 
 
I. Gender Guidelines: Do they Help Refugee Women? 
 
Despite, or perhaps, because of the occurrence of gender inequality and violence against 
women globally, the individualised method of refugee determination under the Refugee 
Convention has failed to protect women who face serious harm and who are not 
adequately protected by their respective States. The very nature of gender discrimination, 
and the fact that many forms of violence are common to refugee receiving States, 
including the case-studies, as well as to the refugee producing States, tend to make some 
forms of violence almost invisible. Thus, whilst victims of FGM may be seen as having a 
real fear of persecution, victims of domestic violence and rape may be less easily 
                                                 
12 Other salient subtopics addressed in this chapter include the meaning of persecution, the availability of 
state protection, the nexus between the persecution feared and a recognised persecution ground, and the 
definition of a PSG. 
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distinguished from women in the country of refuge, and her fear may be minimized.13 On 
the other hand, cultural practices such as FGM and bride burning not unique to Western 
States, tend to be hidden under the cloak of ‘culture’ and decision-makers may be inclined 
to be influenced by cultural relativism arguments. The use of gender guidelines, arguably, 
help to overcome these barriers for female refugees, because they are firmly rooted in 
various human rights instruments.  
    Stating the forms of oppression and violence endured by women, including domestic 
violence and rape, the gender guidelines aim to bring the reality of gender-based 
persecution into focus for the decision-makers and locate such forms of violence within 
the context of human rights. Essentially, the UNHCR and domestic gender-guidelines are 
supposed to make it easier to protect women through the Refugee Convention. Thus, the 
interpretation approach endorsed by the UNHCR and domestic States of the refugee 
definition is in theory a holistic, gender-sensitive interpretation. This interpretation takes 
into account the claimant’s personality, background and personal experiences, with an 
analysis and up to-date knowledge of historically, geographically and culturally specific 
circumstances in the country of origin.14 
     Despite the positive objectives and undertones of the gender guidelines some criticisms 
need to be mentioned before proceeding. Firstly, one of the inherent dangers of the 
existing guidelines is the tendency of advocates to stereotype the claimant to easily fit the 
categories of the gender guidelines. Thus, an advocate may present a claimant as a passive 
victim fleeing a patriarchal society, asking a decision-maker to buy into those stereotypes, 
when in fact the reality of both the claimant and the State from which she comes is more 
complex. A second, more problematic criticism of gender guidelines is the backlash 
against them, based on reactionary, neoconservative and antifeminist attitudes towards 
women.15 This is particularly evident in cases involving the more universal forms of 
violence, including rape and domestic violence. In the case of domestic violence, Helena 
                                                 
13 Sadoway G, “The Gender Factor in Refugee Determination and the Effect of Gender Guidelines”, in 
Hajdukowski-Ahmed M, et al, “Not Born a Refugee Woman – Contesting Identities, Rethinking Practices”, 
Oxford: Berghahn Books, (2009), at 245. 
14 Ibid. See also, UNHCR, “Guidelines on International Protection: Gender-related persecution within the 
context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees”, 
UN Doc. HCR/GIP/02/01, 7 May 2002. (Hereafter referred to as the UNHCR Gender Guidelines), Section 
IIA(6)-(8). 
15 Sadoway, supra note 13, at 247.  
112 
 
Moussa suggests that decision-makers have been quick to applaud efforts by States to 
remedy protection issues, so that the passage of domestic violence legislation for instance 
might be enough to satisfy them that the situation has changed and that state protection is 
now available.16  Thirdly, as will be discussed in due course, decision-makers need to be 
continually trained on issues surrounding domestic violence, sexual violence and battered 
women syndrome.  
      Despite the existence of gender guidelines, some decision-makers are prone to make 
assumptions about victims of rape and domestic violence.17 In one Canadian case for 
instance it was assumed that a woman who was, ‘educated’ ‘intelligent’ and ‘assertive’ 
would not remain in a situation of spousal abuse.18 Such characteristics did not fit with 
the stereotype of a helpless victims. Her claim was found to be ‘exaggerated’ and 
‘fabricated’.19 Similarly, rape is often regarded as a private, criminal act of lust, outside 
of the scope of the Refugee Convention.20 Fourthly, the decision by States to use 
guidelines instead of incorporating into legislation the legal interpretative guidance and/or 
procedural safeguards of the UNHCR, reinforces the sovereignty of states and their ability 
to control refugee flows by retaining the right to decide who can and cannot enter their 
borders.21 Whilst States have a right to deny entry and a right to set visa and other entry 
requirements, political considerations and motivations should not be a determining factor. 
States have implemented various restrictive measures to ensure that refugees and other 
immigrants do not flux into their boundaries.22 Some have implemented visa requirements 
and carrier sanctions and have in some instances physically interdicted such claimants. 
                                                 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid, at 148. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 The current notion of State sovereignty was laid down in the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, which, in 
relation to States, codified the basic principles of territorial integrity, border inviolability, and supremacy 
of the State. For academic commentary on the Treaty of Westphalia and State Sovereignty see generally, 
Lyons GM & Mastanduno M, “Beyond Westphalia? State Sovereignty and International Intervention”, The 
John Hopkins University Press: London, (1995); Barkin J, “The Evolution of the Constitution of Sovereignty 
and the Emergence of Human Rights Norms”, 27 Journal of International Studies 229, (1998); Osiander A, 
“Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth”, 55 International Organisation 251, 
(2001). 
22 Heckman G, “Securing Procedural Safeguards for Asylum Seekers in Canadian Law: An Expanding Role 
for International Human Rights Law”, 15 International Journal of Refugee Law 212, (2003), at 213 (noting 
how States have attempted to control migration into their territories). 
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Others have devised measures to screen out economic migrants. For instance, the case-
studies have adopted preliminary screening mechanisms, applied legislative or 
administrative presumptions of unfoundedness, truncated time limits, and restricted the 
rights of claimants to seek review of decisions.23 Designed to limit access to refugee 
determination, these measures: 
 
mark a reassertion by governments of a broad discretion in their treatment of aliens 
and erode the institutional and procedural safeguards that surround decision-
making in asylum law and, in particular, those decisions that severely impact 
asylum seekers.24 
 
These measures have affected the ability of refugee claimants to either enter the host State, 
or to claim refugee states once they have crossed borders. In this regard, Sesay’s 
contention that States pay lip service to the importance of honoring the right to seek 
asylum, but in practice devote significant resources to keep refugees away from their 
borders appears to be a reality.25 In the wake of the 2016 world immigration crisis26, after 
                                                 
23 Ibid, at 213-4. See also, Goodwin-Gill G, “The Refugee in International Law”, (2nd ED), Clarendon Press: 
Oxford, (1996), at 191-3; Hailbronner K, “The Right to Asylum and the Future of Asylum Procedures in the 
European Community”, 2 International Journal of Refugee Law 341, (1990), at 344-6; Hydman P, “The 
1951 Convention and its Implications for Procedural Questions”,  6 International Journal of Refugee Law 
245, (1994), at 248-52; Billings P, “A Comparative Analysis of Administrative and Adjudicative Systems 
for Determining Asylum Claims”, 52 Administrative Law Review 253, (2000), at 259; Legomsky S, “An 
Asylum Seekers Bill of Rights in a Non-Utopian World”, 14 Georgetown Immigration Law Review 619, 
(2000), at 625-34; Acer E, “Refuge in an Insecure Time: Seeking Asylum in the Post-9/11 United States”, 
28 Fordham International Law Journal 1391, (2005); Robin-Oliver S, “Immigration Law and Human 
Rights: Legal Line Drawing Post September 11: Symposium Article: Citizens and Non-Citizens in Europe: 
European Union Measures Against Terrorism After September 11”, 25 Boston College Third World Law 
Journal 197, (2005). 
24 Heckman, supra note 22, at 214. Such decisions include eligibility decisions, where authorities decide 
whether asylum seekers are eligible to have their claims for protection examined; refugee determination 
decisions, where they decide, by reference to the 1951 Convention, whether the State recognises asylum 
seekers as refugees; risk of return assessments, where they decide whether the removal of non-Convention 
refuges would expose them to an objectively identifiable risk to life, extreme sanctions or inhuman 
treatment; and removal decisions generally. Ibid, at footnote 7. 
25 Sesey A, “State Sovereignty: A Hindrance to Refugee Protection”, (2010), available online via The 
Patriotic Vanguard Website at http://www.thepatrioticvanguard.com/state-sovereignty-a-hindrance-to-
refugee-protection (last accessed 25/07/17). 
26 Described as the continent’s worst humanitarian crisis since World War II, in 2015, over one million 
people - refugees, displaced persons and other migrants – made their way to the EU, either escaping conflict 
in their country and in search of better economic prospects. For further information see, European 
Commission, “Refugee Crisis in Europe”, (2016), available online via the European Commission website 
at http://ec.europa.eu/echo/refugee-crisis_en (last accessed 23/5/17); Kingsley P, “The New Odyssey: The 
Story of Europe’s Refugee Crisis”, Guardian Faber: London, (2016); Lesser I, “The Refugee Crisis: 
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initially welcoming refugees in September 2015, European states are now refusing to 
share resettlement burdens and failing to take action that could help reduce the number of 
refugees drowning in the Mediterranean. Coupled with terrorist incidents throughout 
Europe and the US, States and citizens alike are more reluctant to accept refugees.27 These 
fears, coupled with domestic political upheaval, have rendered several European States 
less willing to welcome refugees and have raised new questions about the long-term 
viability of European unity.28 This is particularly evident considering the UK’s decision 
to leave the European Union (EU).  Arguably, this contentious immigration issue will 
have a detrimental effect on FGM claimants seeking refugee status. Finally, the gender-
guidelines under examination are not binding-law, rather they are administrative 
directives.29 Consequently, as will be discussed in due course, decision-makers do not 
need to consult them when making a refugee determination. 
       Despite these notable criticisms, the development of gender guidelines at the 
domestic level has made an improvement in the protection of women fleeing gender-based 
forms of violence and raised awareness of the inequality and, oppression endured by 
women. The guidelines implemented by the case-studies offer gender sensitive 
interpretations of the Refugee Convention definition. Whilst, their approaches are 
strikingly similar, each must abide by the jurisprudence of their respective higher courts. 
All three sets of guidelines outline forms of persecution directed primarily against women. 
Each addresses the question of whether women may constitute a PSG within the meaning 
of the Refugee Convention definition. Furthermore, each addresses the question of State 
protection, noting that a refugee claim may be established where a State persecutes 
directly or where the persecutor is a non-State actor, but the State is either unable or 
unwilling to protect the victim. The recognition of inherently ‘private’ forms of harm as 
constituting persecution within the meaning of the Refugee Convention is particularly 
                                                 
Perspectives from Across Europe and the Atlantic”, Policy Brief: Washington, (2015). This document is 
available online at 
file:///C:/Users/User/Downloads/LesserEtAl_MigrationCrisis_Sep15.pdf (last accessed 25/7/17). See also, 
Zizek S, “Against the Double Blackmail: Refugees, Terror and Other Troubles with the Neighbours”, 
Penguin: UK, (2016). 
27 See, Zizek, supra note 26.  
28 Ignatieff M et al, “The Refugee and Migration Crisis: Proposals for Action, U.N. Summit 2016”, The 
Brookings Institute: Massachusetts, (2016), available at https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-refugee-
and-migration-crisis-proposals-for-action-u-n-summit-2016/ (last accessed 19/5/17).  
29 See, Erdman J & Sanche, supra note 4, at 76. See also, Macklin, supra note 2, at 27. 
115 
 
important for those women fleeing FGM and those who face other gender-based forms of 
harm. Notably, the INS, UK and CIRB gender-guidelines, all acknowledge the precedent 
set by the Executive Office of the UNHCR in formulating guidelines and 
recommendations with respect to female refugees,30 although each national initiative 
arguably goes much further and is more sophisticated in their substantive analyses. 
Furthermore, the case-studies also recognise the contribution of NGO’s, scholars, and 
activists in the formulation of the guidelines.31  
      Guidelines alone, however are not enough to ensure good decision-making if the RDP 
itself lacks safeguards, and if decision-makers are not trained. Thus, as will be highlighted 
in Chapter Three, refugee determination has become about the, “luck of the draw”.32 
Reform of the RDP, can be achieved by examining innovative and effective procedural 
                                                 
30 As discussed in Chapter One, throughout the 1980s and 1990s the UNHCR began to address and remedy 
many of the issues of gender-based persecution and violence as they pertain to female refugees. Therefore, 
prior to the adoption of domestic gender-guidelines, the UNHCR had already begun to acknowledge the 
specificity of female refugee’s experiences and needs. In 1985 the Executive Committee of the UNHCR 
adopted Conclusion Number 39 concerning the international protection of refugee women. This Conclusion, 
for the first time, officially and internationally recognised that women and girls constituted the majority of 
the world’s refugee population, and that many are victims of human rights violations solely on account of 
their gender. See, Refugee Women and International Protection Report, U.N. HCR Executive Comm., 36th 
Sess, para 115(4)(k), U.N. Doc. A/AG.96/673 (1985). Six years later in 1991, the Committee sought to 
effectively implement Conclusion Number 39 by releasing Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women, 
and in 1993 the UNHCR Executive Committee further issued Conclusion Number 73 which called upon 
state parties and the UNHCR to ensure the equal access of women and men to RDP’s, and further supported 
the recognition as refugees of persons with a well-founded fear of persecution through sexual violence. See, 
UNHCR Exec. Comm., Conclusion No. 73 Refugee Protection and Sexual Violence, para e., (1993), 
reprinted in UNHCR, A Thematic Compilation of Executive Committee Conclusions on International 
Protection (4th ed. 2009). See also, Saso D, “The Development of Gender-Based Asylum Law: A Critique 
of the 1995 INS Guidelines” 8 Hastings Women’s Law Journal 263, (1997), at 270. These were following 
in 2002 with the introduction of two further comprehensive guidelines on gender-related refugee claims. 
See, UNHCR Gender Guidelines, supra note 14 and UNHCR, Guidelines of International Protection: 
“Membership of a particular social group” within the context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/ 
or its 1967 Protocol relating to the status of Refugees, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/02/02 (2002). (Hereafter 
referred to as the UNHCR, PSG Guidelines). 
31 The INS Gender Guidelines describe the product as a ‘collaborative effort’. INS Gender Guidelines, supra 
note 5, at 703. In Canada, a Working Group on Women Refugee Claimants had been active within the IRB 
since 1991, building relations with NGOs and gathering documentation relating to women refugees. See 
Liebich F & Ramirez J, “A History of Institutional Change: The Immigration and Refugee Board (Toronto) 
Working Group on Refugee Women” in Giles W et al (eds), “Development and Diaspora: Gender and the 
Refugee Experience” Dundas, Artemis Enterprises, (1996), at 100. The UK Gender Guidelines also 
acknowledge the assistance and information which has bee obtained by various academics, organisation, 
and organisations; in particular the Refugee Women’s Legal Group, whose own gender guidelines form the 
basis for the INS Gender Guidelines. They also acknowledge the work of the UNHCR, judges and the 
authors of the CIRB, INS and Australian gender guidelines. See also, UK Gender guidelines, supra note 8, 
at Thanks and Acknowledgement. 
32 Sadoway, supra note 13, at 249.  
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developments and learning from practices and gender-specific processes implemented in 
other legal/quasi-judicial forums which address equally challenging and complex gender 
forms of violence.  
    Before proceeding, it should also be noted that all three guidelines deal with the process 
by which women’s claims are heard, as well as the substance of the refugee definition as 
it applies to women making gender-related claims. The content of the advice given is also 
very similar. As will be illustrated throughout this chapter, each country has a distinctive 
administrative and legal context within which refugee determinations are made, and their 
respective guidelines reflect these differences. Moreover, even though the case-studies 
apply the same refugee definition, the interpretation varies between the jurisdictions, and 
this also affects the interpretive space available to the drafters of the guidelines to respond 
sensitively to gender-related claims.33  
 
A. The Decision-making Bodies: Structures and Processes 
 
Although the US, Canada and the UK have all adopted the same refugee definition, the 
process for determining refugee status remains under the control of the State. It is thus, 





The Canadian court system is complex, like the society which it serves. There are several 
levels and types of court, and questions of jurisdiction can be difficult to sort out, 
especially since courts that share the same functions may go by different names.34 Within 
                                                 
33 Macklin, supra note 2, at 30.  
34 Canadian Department of Justice, “Canada’s Court System”, (2015), at 1. This document is available 
online via the Canadian Department of Justice website at http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/ccs-
ajc/pdf/courten.pdf (last accessed 12/4/17) (noting that Both the federal government and the provincial and 
territorial governments pass laws, and they also share the administration of justice, but the relationship is 
not simple. For instance, the provinces and territories are responsible for providing everything necessary 
for their courts, from building and maintaining the courthouses, to providing staff and resources such as 
interpreters, court reporters to prepare transcripts, sheriffs, and registry services, to paying provincial/ 
territorial court judges; yet the judges for the superior courts are appointed and paid by the federal 
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the Canadian context there are effectively four levels of courts. First there are 
provincial/territorial courts, which handle the great majority of cases that come into the 
system.35 Second are the provincial/territorial superior courts. These courts deal with 
more serious crimes and also take appeals from provincial/territorial court judgments.36 
On the same level, but responsible for different issues, is the Federal Court.37 At the next 
level are the provincial/territorial courts of appeal and the Federal Court of Appeal,38 
                                                 
government. Administration of the Supreme Court of Canada and federally created courts is the 
responsibility of the federal government). 
35 Each province and territory, with the exception of Nunavut, has a provincial/territorial court, and these 
courts hear cases involving either federal or provincial/territorial laws. (In Nunavut, there is no territorial 
court – matters that would normally be heard at that level are heard by the Nunavut Court of Justice, which 
is a superior court.) The names and divisions of these courts may vary from place to place, but their role is 
the same. Provincial/territorial courts deal with most criminal offences, family law matters (except divorce), 
young persons in conflict with the law (from 12 to 17 years old), traffic violations, provincial/territorial 
regulatory offences, and claims involving money, up to a certain amount (set by the jurisdiction in question). 
Private disputes involving limited sums of money may also be dealt with at this level in Small Claims courts. 
In addition, all preliminary inquiries – hearings to determine whether there is enough evidence to justify a 
full trial in serious criminal cases – take place before the provincial/territorial courts. A number of courts at 
this level are dedicated exclusively to particular types of offences or groups of offenders, i.e. Drug 
Treatment Courts, Domestic Violence Courts and Youth Courts to name but a few. See, “Canada’s Court 
System”, supra note 34, at 2-3. 
36 Ibid, at 3-4. “Each province and territory has superior courts. These courts are known by various names, 
including Superior Court of Justice, Supreme Court (not to be confused with the Supreme Court of Canada), 
and Court of Queen’s Bench. But while the names may differ, the court system is essentially the same across 
the country, with the exception, again, of Nunavut, where the Nunavut Court of Justice deals with both 
territorial and superior court matters. The superior courts have “inherent jurisdiction,” which means that 
they can hear cases in any area except those that are specifically limited to another level of court. The 
superior courts try the most serious criminal and civil cases, including divorce cases and cases that involve 
large amounts of money (the minimum is set by the province or territory in question). In most provinces 
and territories, the superior court has special divisions, such as the family division. Some have established 
specialized family courts at the superior court level to deal exclusively with certain family law matters, 
including divorce and property claims. The superior courts also act as a court of first appeal for the 
underlying court system that provinces and territories maintain. Although superior courts are administered 
by the provinces and territories, the judges are appointed and paid by the federal government”. Ibid.  
37 Ibid, at 4-5. “The Federal Court and Federal Court of Appeal are essentially superior courts with civil 
jurisdiction. However, since the Courts were created by an Act of Parliament, they can only deal with 
matters specified in federal statutes (laws). In contrast, provincial and territorial superior courts have 
jurisdiction in all matters except those specifically excluded by a statute. The Federal Court is the trial-level 
court; appeals from it are heard by the Federal Court of Appeal. While based in Ottawa, the judges of both 
Courts conduct hearings across the country. The Courts’ jurisdiction includes inter-provincial and federal-
provincial disputes, intellectual property proceedings (e.g. copyright), citizenship appeals, Competition Act 
cases, and cases involving Crown corporations or departments of the Government of Canada. As well, only 
these Courts have jurisdiction to review decisions, orders and other administrative actions of federal boards, 
commissions and tribunals; these bodies may refer any question of law, jurisdiction or practice to one of the 
Courts at any stage of a proceeding. For certain matters, such as maritime law, a case may be brought either 
before the Federal Court or Federal Court of Appeal, or before a provincial or territorial superior court. In 
this respect, the Federal Court and the Federal Court of Appeal share jurisdiction with the superior courts”. 
Ibid. 
38 Ibid, at 4. “Each province and territory has a court of appeal or appellate division that hears appeals from 
decisions of the superior courts and provincial/territorial courts. The number of judges on these courts may 
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while the highest level is occupied by the Supreme Court of Canada.39 There are many 
other elements in the Canadian justice system which are closely related to the courts but 
are not strictly part of the court system, a prominent example being administrative 
tribunals.40     
      The Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRB) is Canada's largest independent 
administrative tribunal. It is responsible for making well-reasoned decisions on 
immigration and refugee matters, efficiently, fairly and in accordance with the law. The 
IRB decides, among other responsibilities, who needs refugee protection among the 
thousands of claimants who come to Canada annually.41 It consists of four tribunals, 
                                                 
vary from one jurisdiction to another, but a court of appeal usually sits as a panel of three. The courts of 
appeal also hear constitutional questions that may be raised in appeals involving individuals, governments, 
or governmental agencies”. Ibid. 
39 Ibid, at 6-7. “The Supreme Court of Canada is the final court of appeal from all other Canadian courts. 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over disputes in all areas of the law, including constitutional law, 
administrative law, criminal law and civil law. The Court consists of a Chief Justice and eight other judges, 
all appointed by the federal government. The Supreme Court Act requires that at least three judges must 
come from Quebec. Traditionally, of the other six judges, three come from Ontario, two from western 
Canada, and one from the Atlantic provinces. The Supreme Court sits in Ottawa for three sessions a year – 
winter, spring and fall. Before a case can reach the Supreme Court of Canada, it must have used up all 
available appeals at other levels of court. Even then, the Court must grant permission or “leave” to appeal 
before it will hear the case. Leave applications are usually made in writing and reviewed by three members 
of the Court, who then grant or deny the request without providing reasons for the decision. Leave to appeal 
is not given routinely – it is granted only if the case involves a question of public importance; if it raises an 
important issue of law or mixed law and fact; or if the matter is, for any other reason, significant enough to 
be considered by the country’s Supreme Court. In certain situations, however, the right to appeal is 
automatic. For instance, no leave is required in criminal cases where a judge on the panel of a court of 
appeal has dissented on how the law should be interpreted. Similarly, where a court of appeal has found 
someone guilty who had been acquitted at the original trial, that person automatically has the right to appeal 
to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court of Canada also plays a special role as adviser to the federal 
government. The government may ask the Court to consider questions on any important matter of law or 
fact, especially concerning interpretation of the Constitution. It may also be asked questions on the 
interpretation of federal or provincial/territorial legislation or the powers of Parliament or the legislatures. 
(Provincial and territorial courts of appeal may also be asked to hear references from their respective 
governments)”. Ibid. 
40 “Canada’s Court System”, supra note 34, at 9. 
41 Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) has the overall responsibility for immigration and refugee 
matters. CIC determines claims for refugee protection made abroad at Canadian embassies and consulates. 
It is responsible for selecting immigrants, issuing visitors' visas, and granting citizenship. It is also CIC that 
determines the eligibility of all refugee protection claims made in Canada and refers eligible claims to the 
IRB for a decision. The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) is responsible for carrying out 
enforcement functions related to immigration and refugee matters. These include detention, removals, 
investigations, and intelligence and immigration control functions overseas. The IRB reports to Parliament 
through the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, but the IRB remains independent from CIC and the 
Minister. For further information on the mandate of the IRB please refer to the IRB website at 
http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/Eng/BoaCom/Pages/index.aspx (last accessed 20/4/17). Decisions of the 
Immigration Division, the Immigration Appeal Division and the Refugee Protection Division are all subject 
119 
 
which are designated as divisions: (1) the Refugee Protection Division;42 (2) the 
Immigration Division;43 (3) the Immigration Appeal Division;44 and (4) the Refugee 
Appeal Division.45 Members of the IRB are appointed by the Cabinet, and their formal 
independence from government is a key feature of the Canadian refugee system. Members 
hear and determine claims from all refugee claimants who make port of entry or inland 
claims in Canada, regardless of when or how they arrived.46 
       The CIRB Gender-Guidelines were promulgated by the Chair of the IRB,47 and only 
apply to members of the IRB. They do not apply to visa officers abroad, with the 
consequence that women who apply for refugee status outside of Canada’s borders do not 
benefit from the protection of the CIRB Gender-Guidelines.48 While each division of the 
IRB is responsible for making decisions on different immigration or refugee matters, they 
all follow an administrative tribunal process like what happens in a court, though less 
formal. The process is flexible and can take many forms so long as it ensures that the IRB 
makes well-reasoned, efficient and fair decisions. A claim for refugee protection can be 
made by speaking to an officer at any port of entry when a claimant arrives in Canada, or 
at an inland office. An officer from the CBSA or CIC will decide whether a claim is 
                                                 
to judicial review, with leave, by a Higher Court, namely, the Federal Court of Canada – Trial Division. 
Decisions of that Court are subject to further appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal, if the Trial Division 
certifies a question, and then to the Supreme Court of Canada, with leave. Decisions of the Supreme Court 
are final and binding on the federal courts and the courts from all provinces and territories. See, IRB, “Policy 
on the Use of Jurisprudential Guides”, (2003), available online via the IRB website at http://www.irb-
cisr.gc.ca/Eng/BoaCom/references/pol/pol/Pages/PolIntervention.aspx (last accessed 22/5/17). The IRB 
must follow decisions of the Federal Court and the Supreme Court of Canada. However, a decision of any 
division of the IRB is not binding on a subsequent panel of that division. Ibid 
42 The Refugee Protection Division decides claims for refugee protection made within Canada. 
43 The Immigration Division conducts immigration admissibility hearings for certain categories of people 
believed to be inadmissible to, or removable from, Canada under the law and conducts detention reviews 
for those being detained under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (S.C. 2001, c. 27). 
44 The Immigration Appeal Division hears appeals of sponsorship applications refused by officials of 
Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC); appeals from certain removal orders made against permanent 
residents, refugees and other protected persons, and holders of permanent resident visas; and appeals by 
permanent residents who have been found outside of Canada not to have fulfilled their residency obligation; 
and appeals by CIC from decisions of the Immigration Division at admissibility hearings. 
45 The Refugee Appeal Division was created by the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act in November 
2001. 
46 Macklin, supra note 2, at 30. See also, IRB, Procedures, (2010), available online at http://www.irb-
cisr.gc.ca/Eng/BoaCom/references/procedures/Pages/index.aspx (last accessed 23/5/17) (discussing the 
various tribunals and their duties). 
47 Pursuant to authority granted under the Immigration Act, Section 65(3). 
48 For instance, about half of all refugees admitted into Canada in 1997 were selected from overseas. See, 
Macklin, supra note 2, at 30.  
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eligible to be referred to the IRB. If eligible, a claim will be referred to the Refugee 
Protection Division of the IRB to start the claim for refugee protection process.49  
      The IRB then selects one of three possible ways to decide the claim: a fast-track 
expedited process; a fast-track hearing; or a full hearing. The fast-track expedited process 
is used for claims from certain countries or for certain types of claims. The categories of 
claims change from time to time, for example, depending on country conditions. In the 
expedited process, the refugee protection officer interviews the claimant. The officer then 
makes a recommendation about the claim. If the recommendation is favorable, the claim 
is forwarded to a member who will decide if it should be accepted without a hearing. A 
hearing is held if the claimant is not granted refugee protection through the expedited 
process. Fast-track hearings are held for claims that appear to be simple because they may 
be decided on the basis of one or two issues. A refugee protection officer does not attend 
these hearings.50 Finally, full hearings are held for claims that involve more than two 
issues and may be complex. Full hearings follow the general tribunal process described 
above. In a limited number of cases, Minister's counsel participates in the hearing to argue 
against the claim. A refugee protection officer may assist the member to ensure that all 
relevant evidence is presented. Representatives of the UNHCR may observe the hearing.51 
   The IRB will assign the claimant to one of these processes. It should be noted that whilst 
at the Refugee Protection Division, individual claims are normally heard by a single 
member, in some circumstances the Chairperson may request a panel consisting of three 
members.52 Claimants are usually represented by counsel and are entitled to legal aid in 
most provinces.53 A Refugee Hearing Officer assists the panel by presenting documentary 
                                                 
49 IRB, “Claimant’s Guide”, (2013), available online via the IRB website at http://www.irb-
cisr.gc.ca/Eng/RefClaDem/Pages/ClaDemGuide.aspx#_Toc340245781 (last accessed 24/5/17). 
50 International Business Publications, “Canada: Immigration Handbook – Strategical and Practical 
Information”, International Business Publications: Washington, (2013), at 132. 
51 IRB, “Interpreter Handbook”, (2007), at 10. This document is available online via the Canadian IRB 
website at http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/Eng/BoaCom/pubs/Pages/Interpret.aspx (last accessed 4/5/17). 
(Hereafter referred to as the IRB Interpreters Handbook). 
52 If three members sit on the panel, the decision of the majority is the decision of the Panel. See, Dolin B 
& Young B, “Canada’s Refugee Protection System” (2002), available online at 
http://publications.gc.ca/Collection-R/LoPBdP/BP/bp185-e.htm (last accessed 8/6/17).  
53 In Prince Edward Island, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, legal aid is denied to refugee claimants and 
they often appear unrepresented. Macklin, supra note 2, at 31. See also, Buckley M, “The Legal Aid Crisis: 
Time for Action”, Canadian Bar Association: Ottawa, (2000), at 43 (stating that “refugee women who make 
claims of gender persecution are being denied legal aid coverage for their residency applications; even when 
there is coverage for refugee claimants, the tariffs are so low that lawyers simply refuse cases”. 
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evidence relating to the case, and questioning the claimant. The panel may also question 
the claimant. The IRB supplies professional interpreters for the refugee determination 
hearing and proceedings are usually recorded on tape. Transcripts may be ordered for 
purposes of seeking leave to apply for judicial review to the Federal Court of Canada.54 
    In December 2012, refugee reform provisions that amended the IRPA came into force. 
These amendments significantly modified the refugee determination process at the IRB. 
Specifically, the amendments allowed for regulatory time limits to be implemented which 
require refugee claims be heard within 30, 45, or 60 days, with limited exceptions.55 Prior 




The US judicial system is made up of two different court systems: the federal court system 
and the state court systems. While each court system is responsible for hearing certain 
types of cases, neither is completely independent of the other, and the systems often 
interact.56 Within the State court system, no two systems are exactly alike. Most, however, 
are made up of (1) two sets of trial courts: (a) trial courts of limited jurisdiction57 and (b) 
                                                 
54 Macklin, supra note 2, at 31. See also, IRB Interpreters Handbook, supra note 51. 
55 IRB, “Policy on the Expedited Processing of Refugee Claims by the Refugee Protection Division”, (2015), 
available online at  
http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/Eng/BoaCom/references/pol/pol/Pages/polRpdSprExpProAcc.aspx (last  
accessed 23/4/17). 
56 The U.S. Constitution created a governmental structure for the US known as federalism. Federalism refers 
to a sharing of powers between the national government and the state governments. The Constitution gives 
certain powers to the federal government and reserves the rest for the states. Therefore, while the 
Constitution states that the federal government is supreme with regard to those powers expressly or 
implicitly delegated to it, the states remain supreme in matters reserved to them. This supremacy of each 
government in its own sphere is known as separate sovereignty, meaning each government is sovereign in 
its own right. Both the federal and state governments need their own court systems to apply and interpret 
their laws. Furthermore, both the federal and state constitutions attempt to do this by specifically spelling 
out the jurisdiction of their respective court systems. See, Administrative Office of the US Courts, 
“Understanding Federal and State Courts”, (2010), available online via the US Courts website at  
http://www.uscourts.gov/EducationalResources/FederalCourtBasics/CourtStructure/UnderstandingFederal
AndStateCourts.aspx (last accessed 3/1/16). Hereafter referred to as “Understanding Federal and State 
Courts”. 
57 Trial courts of limited jurisdiction are courts that deal with only specific types of cases. They are often 
located in/near the county courthouse and are usually presided over by a single judge. A judge sitting 
without a jury hears most of the cases heard by these courts. Some examples of trial courts of limited 
jurisdiction include:  
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trial courts of general jurisdiction (main trial-level courts);58 (2) intermediate appellate 
courts (in many, but not all, states);59 and (3) the highest state courts (called by various 
names).60 Unlike federal judges, most state court judges are not appointed for life but are 
either elected or appointed (or a combination of both) for a certain number of years.61 
        Most of the federal court system is divided into districts and circuits. There is at least 
one federal district in every state, but populous states can have multiple districts. 
Generally, federal cases begin at the district level in a federal court.62 Each federal circuit 
                                                 
  Probate court: This court handles matters concerning administering the estate of a person who has died 
(decedent). It sees that the provisions of a will are carried out or sees that a decedent's property is distributed 
according to state law if he/she died intestate (without a will).  
  Family court: This court handles matters concerning adoption, annulments, divorce, alimony, custody, 
child support, etc.  
  Traffic court: This court usually handles minor violations of traffic laws.  
  Juvenile court: This court usually handles cases involving delinquent children under a certain age, for 
example, 18 or 21.  
  Small claims court: This court usually handles suits between private persons of a relatively low dollar 
amount, for example, less than $5,000.  
  Municipal court: This court usually handles cases involving offences against city ordinances. 
58 Trial courts of general jurisdiction are the main trial courts in the state system. They hear cases outside 
the jurisdiction of the trial courts of limited jurisdiction. These involve both civil and criminal cases. One 
judge (often sitting with a jury) usually hears them. In such cases, the judge decides issues of law, while the 
jury decides issues of fact. A record of the proceeding is made and may be used on appeal. These courts are 
called by a variety of names, including (1) circuit courts, (2) superior courts, (3) courts of common pleas, 
(4) and even, in New York, supreme courts. In certain cases, these courts can hear appeals from trial courts 
of limited jurisdiction. 
59 Many, but not all, states have intermediate appellate courts between the trial courts of general jurisdiction 
and the highest court in the state. Any party, except in a case where a defendant in a criminal trial has been 
found not guilty, who is not satisfied with the judgment of a state trial court may appeal the matter to an 
appropriate intermediate appellate court. Such appeals are usually a matter of right (meaning the court must 
hear them). However, these courts address only alleged procedural mistakes and errors of law made by the 
trial court. They will usually neither review the facts of the case, which have been established during the 
trial, nor accept additional evidence. These courts usually sit in panels of two or three judges. 
60 All states have some sort of highest court. While they are usually referred to as supreme courts, some, 
such as the highest court in Maryland, are known as courts of appeal. In states with intermediate appellate 
courts, the highest state courts usually have discretionary review as to whether to accept a case. In states 
without intermediate appellate courts, appeals may usually be taken to the highest state court as a matter of 
right. Like the intermediate appellate courts, appeals taken usually allege a mistake of law and not fact. In 
addition, many state supreme courts have original jurisdiction in certain matters. For example, the highest 
courts in several states have original jurisdiction over controversies regarding elections and the 
reapportionment of legislative districts. These courts often sit in panels of three, five, seven, or nine 
judges/justices. 
61 “Understanding Federal and State Courts”, supra note 56. 
62 The US district courts are the trial courts of the federal court system. Within limits set by Congress and 
the Constitution, the district courts have jurisdiction to hear nearly all categories of federal cases, including 
both civil and criminal matters. There are 94 federal judicial districts, including at least one district in each 
state, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico. Each district includes a US bankruptcy court as a unit of 
the district court. Three territories of the US — the Virgin Islands, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands 
— have district courts that hear federal cases, including bankruptcy cases. There are two special trial courts 
that have nationwide jurisdiction over certain types of cases. The Court of International Trade addresses 
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includes more than one district and is home to a Federal Court of Appeal.63 At the head 
of the federal court system is the U.S. Supreme Court.64 The judgment of the Supreme 
Court is final.65 
       Like its Canadian counterpart there also exist a number of other entities, which exist 
outside of the judicial branch, such as the Federal administrative agencies and Boards, 
including those dealing with asylum and immigration matters. An applicant for asylum 
begins the process either already in the US or at a port of entry seeking admission. This 
process differs from a potential refugee who begins a separate process outside of the US. 
Depending on whether or not the claimant is currently in removal proceedings, two 
avenues exist to seek asylum: (1) affirmative applications; and (2) defensive 
applications.66  
     To obtain asylum through the affirmative asylum process a claimant must be physically 
present in the US. They may apply for asylum status regardless of how they arrived in the 
US or their current immigration status.67 They must apply for asylum within one year of 
the date of their last arrival in the US, unless they can show, firstly that they have changed 
                                                 
cases involving international trade and customs issues. The US Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction 
over most claims for money damages against the US, disputes over federal contracts, unlawful "takings" of 
private property by the federal government, and a variety of other claims against the US. See, Mechan L, 
“Understanding the Federal Courts”, (2017), at 8. This document is available online at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/understand03/media/UFC03.pdf  (last accessed 27/3/10). 
63 The 94 judicial districts are organized into 12 regional circuits, each of which has a US court of appeals. 
A court of appeals hears appeals from the district courts located within its circuit, as well as appeals from 
decisions of federal administrative agencies. In addition, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has 
nationwide jurisdiction to hear appeals in specialised cases, such as those involving patent laws and cases 
decided by the Court of International Trade and the Court of Federal Claims. Ibid, at 8. 
64 The US Supreme Court consists of the Chief Justice of the US and eight associate justices. At its 
discretion, and within certain guidelines established by Congress, the Supreme Court each year hears a 
limited number of the cases it is asked to decide. Those cases may begin in the federal or state courts, and 
they usually involve important questions about the Constitution or federal law. Ibid, at 9. The nine justices 
who sit on the Supreme Court are nominated by the President and approved by the U.S. Senate. They can 
remain on the court until their death or until they resign. 
65 Lovorn K, “Overview of the United States Court System”, (2002), available online via the Animal Legal 
& Historical Center website at 
 http://www.animallaw.info/articles/dduspleadingsoutline.htm#Structure (last accessed 25/7/17). 
66 Wasem R, “CRS Report for Congress: Asylum and ‘Credible Fear Issues in U.S. Immigration Policy”, 
(2011), at 6. This report is available online at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R41753.pdf (last accessed 
25/7/17). See also, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, “Obtaining Asylum in the United States”, 
(2015), available online via the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services website at 
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/obtaining-asylum-united-states (last 
accessed 23/5/17). 
67 An individual may apply for affirmative asylum by submitting Form I-589, Application for Asylum and 
for Withholding of Removal, to USCIS. See, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, “Obtaining 
Asylum in the United States”, supra note 66. 
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circumstances that materially affect their eligibility for asylum or extraordinary 
circumstances relating to the delay in filing. Secondly, they must have filed within a 
reasonable amount of time given those circumstances. If unsuccessful, the case of referred 
to an Immigration Judge at the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR). The 
Immigration Judge conducts a ‘de novo’ hearing of the case. This means that the judge 
conducts a new hearing and issues a decision that is independent of the decision made by 
USCIS.68  
      A defensive application for asylum occurs when a claimant requests asylum as a 
defense against removal from the U.S. EOIR’s immigration judges and the BIA, entities 
in the Department of Justice separate from the USCIS, have exclusive control over such 
claims and are under the authority of the Attorney General.69 Immigration Judges hear 
defensive asylum cases in adversarial (courtroom-like) proceedings.70 The judge will hear 
arguments from both of the following parties: the claimant, legal representative and the 
US Government, which is represented by an attorney from Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement. The Immigration Judge then decides whether the individual is eligible for 
asylum. If found eligible, the Immigration Judge will order asylum to be granted. If found 
ineligible for asylum, the Immigration Judge will determine whether the individual is 
eligible for any other forms of relief from removal. If found ineligible for other forms of 
relief, the Immigration Judge will order the individual to be removed from the US. The 
                                                 
68 Ibid. Distinct from asylum law and policy, aliens claiming relief from removal due to torture may be 
treated separately under regulations implementing the United Nations Convention Against Torture. For a 
full legal analysis of this convention, see CRS Report RL32276, The U.N. Convention Against Torture: 
Overview of U.S. Implementation Policy Concerning the Removal of Aliens, by Michael John Garcia, 
footnote 3. As cited in CRS Report for Congress, ‘US Immigration Policy on Asylum Seekers’ (2005), 
available online at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32621.pdf  (last accessed 25/7/17). 
69 Wasem, supra note 66, at 13.  
70 Usually an individual will be placed into defensive asylum processing in one of two ways. One they are 
referred to an Immigration Judge by USCIS after they have been determined to be ineligible for asylum at 
the end of the affirmative asylum process. Secondly, they were placed in removal proceedings because they 
were caught at a port of entry without proper legal documents or in violation of their immigration status; or 
were caught by U.S. Customs and Border Protection trying to enter the US without proper documentation, 
were placed in the expedited removal process, and were found to have a credible fear of persecution or 
torture by an Asylum Officer. 
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Immigration Judge’s decision can be appealed by either party to the BIA71 and a right to 
review in a federal court thereafter.72 
       The process before the asylum officer, immigration judge and BIA is relatively 
informal, usually with single-member panels making determinations.73 The majority of 
cases at the BIA are adjudicated by a single board member, unless the case falls into one 
of six categories that require a decision by a panel of three Board Members.74 Like the 
                                                 
71 The BIA or Board is the highest administrative body for interpreting and applying immigration laws. It 
is authorized up to 17 Board Members, including the Chairman and Vice Chairman who share responsibility 
for Board management. The Board is located at EOIR headquarters in Falls Church, Virginia. Generally, 
the Board does not conduct courtroom proceedings - it decides appeals by conducting a "paper review" of 
cases. On rare occasions, however, the Board does hear oral arguments of appealed cases, predominately at 
headquarters. The BIA has been given nationwide jurisdiction to hear appeals from certain decisions 
rendered by Immigration Judges and by District Directors of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
in a wide variety of proceedings in which the Government of the US is one party and the other party is either 
an alien, a citizen, or a business firm. In addition, the BIA is responsible for the recognition of organizations 
and accreditation of representatives requesting permission to practice before DHS, the Immigration Courts, 
and the BIA. See, US Department of Justice, “Board of Immigration Appeals”, (2016), available online at 
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/board-of-immigration-appeals (last accessed 27/5/17). 
72 Within the US, there are different levels of refugee decisions. Firstly, there are immigration judge 
decisions, which are unpublished, and not binding on anyone. They affect only the applicant him or herself. 
The next level of decision is at the administrative appeals body – the BIA. Whether a BIA decision is 
binding on other courts depends on whether it is issued as published or not. Most decisions by the BIA are 
unpublished and thus not binding, but some are issued as binding precedent. Those cases then would bind 
immigration courts (judges) and DHS officers across the US, unless modified or overruled by the Attorney 
General or a Federal court.  While BIA decisions are not “binding” on federal courts, the courts give great 
deference to the agency decisions in their review. The next level of appeal is the federal circuit courts of 
appeal. Furthermore, Federal Circuit court decisions can/may be binding, but it depends on a few factors. 
First, some of the circuit decisions are unpublished, and thus also not binding on anyone other than the 
claimant. Second, some decisions are clearly based solely on the facts of a particular case, rather than a 
broader legal issue, and thus would not really affect others. If, however, a published decision is issued by a 
circuit court, it would bind immigration judges within the particular circuit, and it would also be controlling 
on the BIA's review of any cases coming from the particular circuit. However, in some instances, the BIA 
can supersede a circuit court's prior ruling on an issue. Finally, any decisions issued by the US Supreme 
Court, the highest court in the country, would bind all circuit courts, the BIA, and immigration judges. 
Information supplied by Lisa Frydman, Managing Attorney, Centre for Gender and Refugee Studies (on 
file with the author). 
73 See, Board of Immigration Appeals, “Practice Manual”, (2015), at 3. This manual is available online at 
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/file/431306/download (last accessed 28/5/17). 
74 These categories are: 1. the need to settle inconsistencies among the rulings of different immigration 
judges; 2. the need to establish a precedent construing the meaning of laws, regulations, or procedures; 3. 
the need to review a decision by an Immigration Judge or DHS that is not in conformity with the law or 
with applicable precedents; 4. the need to resolve a case or controversy of major national import; 5. the need 
to review a clearly erroneous factual determination by an Immigration Judge; and 6. the need to reverse the 
decision of an Immigration Judge or DHS in a final order, other than nondiscretionary dispositions. Cases 
not suitable for consideration by a single Board Member are adjudicated by a panel consisting of three 
Board Members. The panel of three Board Members renders decisions by majority vote. Cases are assigned 
to specific panels pursuant to the Chairman’s administrative plan. The Chairman may change the 
composition of the sitting panels and may reassign Board Members from time to time. The Board may, by 
majority vote or by direction of the Chairman, assign a case or group of cases for full en banc consideration. 
8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(5). By regulation, en banc proceedings are not favoured. See, US Department of 
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Canadian system, the US immigration system has also undergone a number of reforms.75 
In 2002, the then-Attorney General John Ashcroft announced plans to streamline BIA 
reviews of immigration decisions in order to reduce an increasing backlog of cases.76 
These changes, essentially reversed the course set by the previous attempts at 
streamlining.77 Prior to the 2002 changes, most appeals to the BIA were reviewed by a 
three-judge panel, which characteristically issued written opinions.78 Ashcroft’s changes, 
however, reversed this course, requiring review by a single BIA member in most cases,79 
and instructing an increase in one-sentence summary orders.80 Furthermore, the 2002 
reforms, reduced the BIA’s ‘scope of review’, resulting in fewer cases meeting the 
eligibility requirements for any consideration by the Board.81 According to Burkhardt, the 
BIA is now more likely to dispose of cases that it does not hear without opinion.82 The 
2002 reforms, however, prohibit BIA members from issuing a written opinion in cases 
where they are simply affirming an immigration judge’s decision.83 In such cases, the BIA 
does not even have discretion over the wording of his/her opinion; that language was 
dictated by the procedural reforms.84 Most significantly, the 2002 reforms halved the 
                                                 
Justice, “Board of Immigration Appeals”, (2016), available online at https://www.justice.gov/eoir/board-of-
immigration-appeals (last accessed 27/5/17), at 3-4.  
75 For inform on the development and reform of the US immigration system, see, Acer E & Hughes A, “The 
Post-September 11 Asylum System”, 32 Litig 41, (2006), at 43, as cited in Vaala L, “Bias on the Bench: 
Raising the Bar for US Immigration Judges to Ensure Equality for Asylum Seekers”, 49 William & Mary 
Law Review 1017, (2008). 
76 Acer & Hughes, supra note 75, at 43, as cited in Vaala L, “Bias on the Bench: Raising the Bar for US 
Immigration Judges to Ensure Equality for Asylum Seekers”, 49 William & Mary Law Review 1017, 
(2008), footnote 30. Between 1992 and 2000, the number of appeals filed with the BIA doubled. Eventually, 
the number of appeals pending was more than the BIA could handle and a backlog developed. Growing 
steadily from 20,000 in 1992, the backlog reached a staggering 60,000 cases by 2000. In an attempt to 
decrease4 this backlog, changes were made to BIA procedures in 1995. Most significantly, the size of the 
Board grew from five members to twelve. By 2002, before the Ashcroft changes, the number of BIA 
members had grown to twenty-three. See, Burkhardt S, “The Contours of Conformity: Behavioural Decision 
Theory and the Pitfalls of the 2002 Reforms of Immigration Procedures”, 19 Georgetown Immigration Law 
Journal 35, (2004), at 44-45. 
77 Burkhardt, supra note 76, at 45. 
78 Acer & Hughes, supra note 75, at 43.  
79 Acer & Hughes, supra note 75, at 43; Burkhardt, supra note 76, at 47 (noting that the 2002 Procedural 
Reforms ‘dramatically expanded this summary form of review’.) 
80 Acer & Hughes, supra note 75, at 43; Burkhardt, supra note 76, at 49. 
81 Vaala, supra note 75, at 1019; Acer & Hughes, supra note 75, at 43. 
82 Burkhardt, supra note 76, at 49. 
83 Ibid, at 49-50. 
84 Vaala, supra note 75, at 1020. See also 8 C.F.R. Section 1003.1(e)(4)(B)(ii)(e)(5) (2006) (instructing that 
orders affirming a decision below without opinion shall read as follows ‘The Board affirms, without 
opinion, the result of the decision below. The decision below is, therefore, the final agency 
determination’…. An order affirming without opinion…. shall not include further explanation or 
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number of BIA members from twenty-three to eleven.85 This reduction according to Vaale 
has affected not only the Boards size, but also its character86 and the number of cases filed 
within the federal courts.87 
     Following a review of EOIR in 2006, then Attorney-General Alberto Gonzales 
directed EOIR to implement a number of specific measures to enhance the performance 
of the immigration courts and the BIA.88 The memorandum required the institution of 
performance evaluations, trial periods after appointment, written immigration law exams 
for Board members, improved training, mechanisms to detect poor conduct and quality in 
Board adjudication, and a complainants procedure.89 The measures further proposed 
changes to the 2002 Streamlining Reforms90 to encourage the use of one-member written 
opinions and three member panels, and to encourage the publication of precedent.91 The 
response to these reforms were piecemeal92 and in an effort to implement them in 2008 
the DOJ proposed further revisions.93 Those reforms made changes to the use of 
                                                 
reasoning”). The 2002 Procedural reforms it should also be noted also authorise the use of summary 
decisions for cases meriting remand and modification. Burkhardt, supra note 76, at 50. 
85 Ibid, at 51; See also Durham D, “The Once and Future Judge: The Rise and Fall (And Rise?) of 
Independence in US Immigration Courts”, 81 Notre Dame Law Review 655, (2006), at 682 (noting that the 
size of the BIA had grown from five to twenty-three under Ashcroft’s predecessors).  
86 Vaala, supra note 75, at 1020; Burkhardt, supra note 76, at 51. 
87 Vaala, supra note 75, at 1021 & footnotes 70-75 and accompanying text. 
88 See, Memorandum from the Attorney General, “Measures to Improve the Immigration Courts and the 
Board of Immigration Appeals”, (2006), available online at 
http://trac.syr.edu/tracatwork/detail/P104.pdf (last accessed 20/3/17). 
89 See, American Bar Association, “Reforming the immigration system: proposals to promote independence, 
fairness, efficiency, and professionalism in the adjudication of removal cases”, American Bar Association: 
Washington, (2010), at 8. This report is also available online at  
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/Immigration/PublicDocuments/full_report_part3.
authcheckdam.pdf (last accessed 25/7/17).  
90 In February 2002, the then-Attorney General John Ashcroft announced plans to streamline BIA reviews 
of immigration decisions in order to reduce an increasing backlog of cases. These changes essentially 
reversed the course set by the previous attempts at streamlining. Prior to the 2002 changes, most appeals to 
the BIA were reviewed by a three-judge panel, which characteristically issued written opinions. Ashcroft’s 
changes, however, reversed this course, requiring review by a single BIA member in most cases and 
instructing an increase in one-sentence summary orders. See, Acer & Hughes, supra note 75, at 43; 
Burkhardt, supra note 76. 
91 See, “Measures to Improve the Immigration Courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals”, (2006), supra 
note 88, at 4-6. 
92  See, “Reforming the immigration system: proposals to promote independence, fairness, efficiency, and 
professionalism in the adjudication of removal cases”, supra note 89, at 9. 
93 BIA, “Affirmance Without Opinion, Referral for Panel Review, and Publication of Decisions as 
Precedent”, (2008), available online at 
http://regulations.justia.com/regulations/fedreg/2008/06/18/E8-13435.html (last accessed 25/5/17). 
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affirmances without opinions, expanded the scope of panel reviews and devolved power 
to designate decisions as precedent to individual panels.94  
     Following the streamlining reforms, concerns have arisen as to whether the BIA is 
fulfilling its purpose. Some critics have characterised the BIA as performing merely a 
‘rubber-stamp’ of immigration judge’s decisions,95 having abdicated its responsibility to 
correct errors of the decision-makers below and craft uniformity to immigration law.96 
Arguably, ‘rubber-stamping’ is merely a ‘legitimate’ extension of the restrictive measures 
implemented so as to ensure that refugees do not flux into their boundaries. It further 
prevents the success of appeals to the federal courts, and makes it more likely, that those 
involved in immigration proceedings will not benefit from the fair, unbiased, and 
thoughtful consideration their cases deserve. Ultimately, whilst summary decisions from 
the BIA may move cases through more quickly, they fail to catch instances of blatant bias 
or flawed decisions by immigration judges. A number of Circuit Court decisions have 
also complained about ‘shoddy’ decision-making by immigration judges, and to a lesser 
extent, by the BIA itself, and have accused the BIA of abdicating its oversight role.97 
Academics, practitioners and other interested parties have criticised numerous aspects of 
the BIA’s operation including: the continuing backlog of unresolved appeals at the Board; 
the prevalence of single-panel reviews; the publication of short, perfunctionary decisions 
which fail to provide sufficient evidence that the Board considered certain arguments 
made by claimants; an inadequate volume of precedent decisions; restrictions on the 
                                                 
94 See, “Reforming the immigration system: proposals to promote independence, fairness, efficiency, and 
professionalism in the adjudication of removal cases”, supra note 89, at 9-10. 
95 Acer & Hughes, supra note 75, at 43. The US Commission on International Religious Freedom studied 
the impact of the 2002 changes on asylum seekers who were detained upon arrival in the US. Ibid. 
According to the Commission’s findings, the BIA sustained 24% of asylum appeals in such cases in 2001. 
After the 2002 changes, that number dropped to 2-4%. The commission pointedly concluded that, 
“statistically, it is highly unlikely that any asylum-seeker denied by the immigration judge will find 
protection by appealing to the BIA”. Ibid. Consequently, the Immigration Courts are some claimants only 
opportunity to have their claim heard while in the immigration system. The next meaningful opportunity is 
the federal circuit courts. Ibid. See, Iao v Gonzales, 400 F.3d 530 (7th Cir. 2005), at 533-35; Burkhardt, 
supra note 76, at 68 (predicting that, “the unprecedented expansion of the use of single-member 
review…will undermine the quality of administrative adjudication of immigration cases and increase the 
propensity of judges to allow their ideological predilections to determine the result of those cases”). 
96 See, Appleseed, “Assembly Line Injustice – Blueprint to Reform America’s Immigration Court’s”, (2009), 
available online at http://appleseednetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Assembly-Line-Injustice-
Blueprint-to-Reform-Americas-Immigration-Courts1.pdf (last accessed 20/5/17), at 32.  
97 See, “Reforming the immigration system: proposals to promote independence, fairness, efficiency, and 
professionalism in the adjudication of removal cases”, supra note 89, at 10. 
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Boards ability to review the factual findings and credibility determinations made by 
immigration judges de novo; and the issuance of AWO’s.98Although the BIA has reduced 
its use of AWOS,99 the absence of an opinion leaves FGM and other refugee claimants 
who are facing deportation and potential human rights violations within their countries of 
origin unconvinced that the BIA actually considers their plight and federal appellate 
jurists without any legal reasoning to review when the affirmance comes before their 
bench.100 Moreover, earlier efforts to reduce the size of the BIA and the skyrocketing of 
appeals from the BIA to the Federal Court of Appeals in the wake of the 2002 reforms led 
some to suggest that a loss of faith in the BIA’s adjudicatory ability was to blame for this 
expansion.101 Commentators have suggested that changing the BIA’s character was the 
reforms primary goal.102 Taken together, these changes103 undermine, “the ability of 
asylum seekers to obtain a full and fair hearing on their claims”.104 Arguably, it can be 
said with certainly that the process before the BIA is procedurally unfair, undermining the 
quality of administrative adjudication of immigration cases and increasing the propensity 
of judges to allow their ideological predilections to determine the result of those cases. 
                                                 
98 Ibid, at 10.  
99 See, Batara C, “Immigration Appeals: 49 Minutes for Justice, Fairness and Due Process”, (2014), 




100 Vaala, supra note 75, at 1018.  
101 American Bar Association, “Ensuring Fairness and Due Process in Immigration Proceedings”, 
American Bar Association: Washington (2008). This report is also available online at  
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/poladv/priorities/immigration/2008dec_immigrati
on.authcheckdam.pdf (last accessed 19/5/17). For a more in-depth analysis of these criticisms see, 
“Reforming the immigration system: proposals to promote independence, fairness, efficiency, and 
professionalism in the adjudication of removal cases”, supra note 89, at 10-27. 
102 Durham, supra note 85, at 683 (noting that, “following the voluntary retirement of several of the most 
liberal members of the Board, the five members selected for ‘reassignment’ by the Attorney-General were 
those with essentially the most immigrant-friendly and anti-agency decision record). The former INS 
General Counsel declared that, “until the attorney general discloses his reasons (for letting certain BIA 
members go), this has all the appearances of a purge of dedicated civil servants based on a perception of 
their policy views”. Burkhardt, supra note 76, at 51. 
103 Other changes not discussed at length here include heightened standard of review for factual findings 
and credibility determinations, as well as shortened deadlines for disposition of appeals. These will be 
discussed where necessary throughout the thesis. See, 8 C.F.R. Section 1003.1(e)(8) (2006); Burkhardt, 
supra note 76, at 50-51. 
104 Acer & Hughes, supra note 75, at 43. See also, Burkhardt, supra note 76, at 41 (arguing that changes to 
procedures governing BIA proceedings, “make it much more likely that those involved in immigration 
proceedings will not benefit from the fair, unbiased, and thoughtful consideration their cases deserve”). 
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    Moving away from the composition and reforms surrounding the US immigration 
system, it is also important to note that legal aid is not universally available, though some 
legal clinics do serve asylum claimants.105  Claimants are typically responsible for 
supplying their own interpreters, particularly at the Asylum Office level, who are all too 
often family members, friends, or a representative of the claimant’s community. 
Consequently, the competence of interpreters may vary accordingly, and in some 
instances (as discussed in Chapter One) may prove to be detrimental to the claimant’s 
case.106 The asylum officer conducts an interview and takes notes, which form the only 
official record of the proceedings. The hearing before the immigration judge will be 
officially recorded however, as mandated by the Immigration and Nationality Act.107 
Legal representatives may make submissions, but their role is relatively limited. The INS 
Gender-Guidelines apply explicitly to asylum officers and not Immigration Judges. The 
BIA and Immigration judges are not formally subject to the Guidelines, although they 
may choose to be guided by them. Like the CIRB Gender-Guidelines, the INS Gender-
Guidelines do not apply to the overseas selection process.108 
                                                 
105 See, Thompson N, “Due Process Problems Caused by Large Disparities in Grants of Asylum: Will New 
Department of Justice Recommendations Solve the Problem?”, 22 Emory International Law Review 385, 
(2008), at 406 (discussing the impact of single-member BIA panels). See also, Macklin, supra note 2, at 31. 
See also, Dastyari A, “United States Migrant Interdiction and the Detention of Refugees in Guantanamo 
Bay”, Cambridge University Press: New York, (2015), at 163 (discussing the impact of having legal 
representation at immigration hearings). See further, Houseman A, “Civil Legal Aid in the United States – 
An Update for 2015: A Report for the International Legal Aid Group”, Consortium for the National Equal 
Justice Library, (2015), available online at 
https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/761858/%20Houseman_Civil_Legal_Ai
d_US_2015.pdf?sequence=1 (last accessed 28/5/17). 
106 Macklin, supra note 2, at 31. Whilst, claimants are responsible for providing their own interpreters at the 
Asylum Office level, at the Immigration Court level, interpreters are provided by the court for free. 
Information supplied by Lisa Frydman, Managing Attorney for the Centre for Gender and Refugee Studies 
(on file with the author). 
107 Immigration and Nationality Act, Section 101(a) (42), 8 USC Section 240 (b)(4)(c), which provides that, 
“a complete record shall be kept of all testimony and evidence produced at the proceedings”. The act is 
available online via the US Citizenship and Immigration Services homepage at 
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=f3829
c7755cb9010VgnVCM10000045f3d6a1RCRD&vgnextchannel=f3829c7755cb9010VgnVCM10000045f3
d6a1RCRD (last accessed 29/4/17). (Hereafter referred to as the INA Act).For a more detailed commentary 
on the recording of hearings before immigration judges in the US, see specifically, US Department of 
Justice, “Memorandum: Procedures for Going-Off Record During Proceedings” (2003), available online at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/efoia/ocij/oppm03/03-06.pdf (last accessed 28/2/16). 
108 Macklin, supra note 2, at 32. It should be noted, however, that while the INS Gender-Guidelines do not 
apply to overseas applicants, in 2000 the US Department of State issued Gender Guidelines for Overseas 






The hierarchy and structure of the court system with the UK can be considered as 
consisting of five levels: (1) the Supreme Court (formerly known as the UKHL) and the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council;109 (2) the Court of Appeal;110 (3) the High 
Court;111 (4) the Crown and County Courts;112 and (5) the Magistrates Courts and the 
                                                 
109 The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council is the court of final appeal for Commonwealth countries 
that have retained appeals to either Her Majesty in Council or to the Judicial Committee. It is also the court 
of final appeal for the High Court of Justiciary in Scotland for issues related to devolution. Some functions 
of the Judicial Committee were taken over by the new Supreme Court in 2009. In 2009 the Supreme Court 
replaced the UKHL as the Highest Court in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. As with the UKHL, the 
Supreme Court hears appeals from the Court of Appeal and the High Court (only in exceptional 
circumstances). It also hears appeals from the Inner House of the Court of Session in Scotland.  Appeals are 
normally heard by five justices (formerly Lords of Appeal in ordinary, or Law Lords), but there can be as 
many as nine. 
110 The Court of Appeal consists of 2 divisions, the Criminal Division and the Civil Decision. Decisions of 
the Court of Appeal may be appealed to the Supreme Court. The Civil Division of the Court of Appeal hears 
appeals concerning civil law and family justice from the High Court, from Tribunals, and certain cases from 
the County Courts. The Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal hears appeals from the Crown Court. 
111 The High Court consists of three divisions, the Chancery Division, the Family Division and the Queen’s 
Bench Division. Decisions of the High Court may be appealed to the Civil Division of the Court of Appeal. 
(1) The Companies Court of the Chancery Divisions deals with cases concerning commercial fraud, 
business disputes, insolvency, company management, and disqualification of directors. (2) The Divisional 
Court of the Chancery Division deals with cases concerning equity, trusts, contentious probate, tax 
partnerships, bankruptcy and land. (3) The Patents Court of the Chancery Division deals with cases 
concerning intellectual property, copyright, patents and trademarks, including passing off. (4) The 
Divisional Court of the Family Division deals with all matrimonial matters, including custody of children, 
parentage, adoption, family homes, domestic violence, separation, annulment, divorce and medical 
treatment declarations, and with uncontested probate matters. (5) The Administrative Court of the Queen’s 
Bench Division hears judicial reviews, statutory appeals and application, application for habeas corpus, and 
applications under the Drug Trafficking Act 1984 and the Criminal Justice Act 1988. It also oversees the 
legality of decisions and actions of inferior courts and tribunals, local authorities, Ministers of the Crown, 
and other public bodies and officials. (6) The Admiralty Court of the Queen’s Bench Division deals with 
shipping and maritime disputes, including collisions, salvage, carriage of cargo, limitation, and mortgage 
disputes. The Court can arrest vessels and cargoes and sell them within the jurisdiction of England and 
Wales. (7) The Commercial Court of the Queens Bench Division deals with cases arising from national and 
international business disputes, including international trade, banking, commodities, and arbitration 
disputes. (8) The Mercantile Court of the Queens Bench Division deals with national and international 
business disputes that involve claims of lesser value and complexity than those heard by the Commercial 
Court. (9) The Technology and Construction Court of the Queens Bench Division is a speciality court that 
deals primarily with technology and construction disputes that involve issues or questions, which are 
technically complex, and with cases where a trial by a specialist judge is required. 
112 The Crown Courts deal with indictable criminal cases that have been transferred from the Magistrates 
Courts, including hearing of serious criminal cases (i.e. murder), cases sent for sentencing, and appeals. 
Cases are heard by a judge and jury. Decisions of the Crown Court may be appealed to the Criminal Division 
of the Court of Appeal. The County Courts deal with all expect the most complicated and the most simple 
civil cases (including most matters under £5000), such as claims for the repayment of debts, breach of 
contract, personal injury, family and housing issues, and the enforcement of previous County Court 
judgements.  Cases are heard by a judge, without a jury and decisions may be appealed to the appropriate 
division of the High Court. 
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Tribunals Service, which deals with matters pertaining to asylum and immigration among 
other issues.113 Decisions of the Supreme Court are binding on all courts below it and the 
Supreme Court is bound by no other court, other than by the European Court of Justice 
on matters of European Community Law only. Though considering the 2016 Brexit 
referendum decision, this will eventually result in a revised hierarchy. Nonetheless, under 
the current system the Court of Appeal is bound by the Supreme Court but its decisions 
are binding on all courts below it.  Below the Court of Appeal, only the divisional courts 
and the High Court create precedent. Inferior courts and tribunals do not create precedent 
but must abide by the precedents set in higher courts.114 
   Individuals and families can apply for asylum at their point of entry into the UK, or 
directly to the Asylum Screening Unit within the Home Office’s Border Agency.115 Since 
March 2007 all new asylum claims are considered under the ‘New Asylum Model’116 
introduced by way of the UK governments five-year plan in February 2005. The aim of 
the NAM was to introduce a faster, more tightly managed asylum process with an 
emphasis on rapid integration or removal.117 As soon as UKBA receives a claim, it 
conducts a screening interview with the applicant to establish their identity and collect 
basic personal information. A far more detailed interview with a UKBA case-owner takes 
                                                 
113 The Magistrates’ Courts deal with summary criminal cases and committals to the Crown Court, with 
simple civil cases including family proceedings courts and youth courts, and with licensing of betting, 
gaming and liquor. Cases are normally heard by either a panel of 3 magistrates or by a District Judge, 
without a jury. Criminal decisions of the Magistrates’ Courts may be appealed to the Crown Court. Civil 
decisions may be appealed to the County Courts. The Tribunal’s Service makes decisions on matters 
including asylum, immigration, criminal injuries compensation, social security, education, employment, 
child support, pensions, tax and lands. Decisions of the Tribunals Service may be appealed to the appropriate 
Division of the High Court. 
114 For an overview of the UK Court Structure please refer to the JustCite: The Good Law Guide website at 
http://new.justcite.com/kb/editorial-policies/terms/uk-court-structure/ (last accessed 25/7/17).  
115 Formally known as the Immigration and Nationality Directorate and the Border and Immigration 
Agency.  The Asylum Screening Unit offices are situated in Croydon and Liverpool. See, Refugee Council, 
“Asylum Process: Support Pack for Advisors”, (2007), at 3. This document is available online at  
http://www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/Resources/Refugee%20Council/downloads/practice/advice_guides/Asy
lumProcess_Apr07.pdf (last accessed 18/11/16). 
116 Hereafter referred to as the NAM. 
117 In this model, the first interview is a screening interview which does not deal with the substance of the 
claim, but determines which route the claim is to follow. The NAM involves five routes, or ‘segments’ 
which determine: the speed at which the claim is processed; how the asylum seeker can obtain legal advice; 
the type of accommodation where they are required to live; how and where they are to remain in contact 
with the Border Agency; and whether they are subject to electronic monitoring. See, Clayton G, “Textbook 
on Immigration and Asylum Law”, Oxford University Press: Oxford, (2009), at 414. For a comprehensive 
discussion of the refugee determination system in the UK and the NAM, including the ‘Fast-Track 
procedures’ which is beyond the scope of this thesis, see chapter 12 specifically.  
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place a few weeks later. This second interview usually lasts for several hours and follows 
a rigid question and answer format. The case-owner focuses here on establishing the basic 
chronology of the applicant’s narrative and on testing its internal credibility. At both 
interviews interpreters hired by UKBA are present.118 After the interview, the case-owner 
must decide whether the asylum claim should be granted or refused. In the former case, 
the applicant is granted refugee status or another form of international protection, and 
notified of this decision without any specific reasons being given. More frequently, 
however, the claim is refused and the case-owner writes a Reasons for Refusal Letter 
(RFRL) explaining and justifying this decision.119  
      If the claimant is refused asylum they may have the right to appeal. In 2010, 
Immigration and Asylum Chambers were established in both tiers of the Unified Tribunals 
framework created by the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, replacing the 
Asylum and Immigration Tribunal.120 The First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum 
Chamber) is in effect an independent Tribunal dealing with appeals against decisions 
made by the Home Secretary and his officials in immigration, asylum and nationality 
                                                 
118 See, Good, A, “Tales of suffering: Asylum narratives in the refugee status determination process”, 68 
West Coast Line 80, (2011) at 80–89; Good, A, “Witness statements and credibility assessments in the 
British asylum courts”, (2011), in Holden L (ed.), “Cultural expertise and litigation: Patterns, conflicts, 
narratives”, London: Routledge, (2011), at 94–122, See also, Gibb R & Good A, “Interpretation, 
translation and intercultural communication in refugee status determination procedures in the UK and 
France”,14  Language and Intercultural Communication 385, (2014), at 385-99. 
119 See, Gibb & Gold, supra note 118 (noting that most RFRLs claim that the applicant’s story lacks 
credibility as a result of alleged inconsistencies in their answers or on the grounds that aspects of their 
narrative are inconsistent with the cited COI or because their story is deemed inherently unlikely).  
120 The Asylum and Immigration Tribunal was the successor to the Immigration Appellate Authority (IAA). 
The IAA was an independent judicial body in the UK constituted under the Immigration Act of 1971. It 
consisted of two tiers: immigration adjudicators and the Immigration Appeal Tribunal (IAT). The AIT was 
set up under the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc) Act 2004 and came into being on 4 
April 2005. It effectively abolished the two-tier structure and created a single tier tribunal. The purpose of 
the tribunal was to hear and decide appeals against decisions made by the Home Office in matters of asylum, 
immigration and nationality. Applicants may appeal on the grounds of: (1) race discrimination; or (2) human 
rights, if the decision is against their rights under the European Convention in Human Rights or if it would 
be against an applicant’s rights for the UK to remove them because of that decision. See, UK Border 
Agency, “Asylum”, (2009), available online at http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/asylum/ (last accessed 
17/7/17). See, Section, When do I have a right to appeal? Other grounds upon which an appeal may be made 
include: (1) if the decision was not in line with immigration rules; (2) if the decision was not in line with 
the law; or (3) if the immigration rules allowed the individual who made the decision to exercise his/her 
own judgment on the circumstances of the case and his/her judgment should have been exercised differently. 
Ibid. From this time, appeals have been sent to the Immigration and Asylum Chamber of the First-tier 
Tribunal. Onward appeal rights are to a separate Immigration and Asylum Chamber of the Upper Tribunal 
with permission. Onward appeals from the Upper Tribunal are to the Court of Appeal, Inner House of Court 
of Session in Scotland, and Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland, with permission.  
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matters. The main types of appeal which the tribunal will deal with concern decisions to: 
refuse a person asylum in the UK; refuse a person entry to, or leave to remain in the UK; 
and decisions to deport someone already in the UK.121 Appeals are heard by one or more 
Immigration Judges who are sometimes accompanied by non-legal members of the 
Tribunal. These judges and non-legal members are appointed by the Lord Chancellor and 
together form an independent judicial body.122 Claimants are usually accompanied by a 
legal representative, and the UK Border Agency will also have a legal representative at 
the hearing. Once a decision has been made the claimant will usually receive the decision 
in writing. In certain circumstances claimants, may be able to apply to have the Tribunals 
decision reconsidered. The UK Border Agency may also be able to ask to have it 
reconsidered.  
   If a claimant believes that the first-tier tribunal made an error of law, they can apply for 
permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal.123 If the First-tier Tribunal does not grant 
permission, a second application can then be made to the Upper Tribunal. If permission 
to appeal is granted by either the First-tier Tribunal or the Upper Tribunal, the Upper 
Tribunal will then hold a substantive hearing to determine whether an error of law was 
made and may set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal, and either remake the 
decision, or remit the case to the First-tier Tribunal with directions for its 
reconsideration.124 Decisions of the Upper Tribunal are binding on the tribunals and public 
authorities below.125 Under this new system, there also exists an onward right to appeal 
to the Court of Appeal, and then to the Supreme Court if appropriate.  
    The RDP in the UK is relatively informal with both UK Border Agency case-workers 
working alone, and immigration judges, either sitting alone or working together as part of 
                                                 
121 Ibid. 
122 Ibid. See also, Clayton, supra note 117, at 255-6 (discussing the composition of the AIT). 
123 The main functions of the newly established Upper Tribunals, including the Upper Tribunal 
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) include: (1) To take over hearing appeals to the courts, and similar 
bodies from the decisions of local tribunals; (2) To decide certain cases that do not go through the First-tier 
Tribunal; (3) To exercise powers of judicial review in certain circumstances and; (4) To deal with 
enforcement of decisions, directions and orders made by tribunals. See, Tribunals Service, “Upper 
Tribunal”, (2010), available online via the Tribunal Service Website at  
http://www.tribunals.gov.uk/Tribunals/upper/upper.htm (last accessed 25/7/17). 
124 Tribunals Service, “Immigration Appeals Response to Consultation: Fair Decisions; Faster Justice”, 
supra note 120, at 8. 
125 See, Tribunals Service, “Upper Tribunal”, supra note 123. 
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a two or three-member panel. Both rely much more on written submissions and evidence 
than on oral procedure when making their determinations.126 Both the UK Border Agency 
and the Immigration and Asylum Chambers provide claimants with an interpreter if 
requested.127 However, it should be noted that, only the interpreters that the Tribunal 
provides can take part in the appeals hearing. In exceptional cases, however, the 
claimant’s representatives can instruct an independent interpreter although it may be 
difficult to fund this.128 
     As previously discussed, with the establishment of the IAT, the UK gender-guidelines 
were effectively withdrawn. Presently, UK immigrant judges in theory currently have no 
existing guidelines on gender tailored to asylum claims in which to base their knowledge, 
application of law and decision-making. However, this is not to say that the IAA UK 
gender-guidelines cannot be consulted by immigration judges if they so wish.129 Whilst, 
                                                 
126 See, Save the Children, “Child, Asylum and Refugee Issues in Scotland: The Adjudicator/Immigration 
Judge” available online at http://www.savethechildren.org.uk/caris/legal/asylumproc/ap_p2_22.php (last 
accessed 28/2/15). 
127See, Tribunals Service: Immigration and Asylum, available online at  
http://www.tribunals.gov.uk/ImmigrationAsylum/FAQs/FAQ9.htm (last accessed 19/2/16) (stating that an 
interpreter will be provided free of charge and that, “You can bring your own interpreter, but they will not 
be allowed to speak to the Tribunal or interpret the proceedings for you. This is because the interpreters we 
use are from a panel of interpreters, they are impartial and have shown they have skills which have been 
independently assessed”. In relation to the UK Border Agency policy on interpreters see, Home Office UK 
Border Agency, “Central Intepreter’s Unit: Code of Conduct for UK Border Agency  
Registered Intepreters”, (2008), available online at  
http://www.bia.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/policyandlaw/asylumprocessguidance/relateddo
cuments/Theasyluminterview/conductingtheasylumintervie2.pdf?view=Binary (last accessed 25/7/17). 
128 “Child, Asylum and Refugee Issues in Scotland: The Adjudicator/Immigration Judge”, supra note 126. 
With the issue of funding in mind, it is important to note that whilst legal aid is available for immigration 
and asylum appeal it has been reported by some that legal aid, within the UK immigration and asylum 
system, is not usually available for representation at appeal hearings, but is available during the application 
stage, and for assistance prior to and after the hearing. See, The Guardian, “Immigration: Appeals” (2001), 
available online at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2001/jul/19/mpsurgery18 (last accessed 25/7/17). See also, Ceneda S & 
Palmer C, “Lip Service or Implementation? The Home Office Gender Guidance and Women’s Asylum 
Claims in the UK”, Asylum Aid: London (2006), at Section Eleven (discussing the obstacle of poor legal 
advisors in gender-based asylum claims as a result of the UK legal aid cuts introduced in 2004). For further 
information on legal aid in immigration cases in the UK please refer to the Immigration Advice Service 
Website at https://iasservices.org.uk/legal-aid/ (last accessed 20/7/17). 
129 UK Gender Guidelines, supra note 8, Section 1.8 (noting that the gender-guidelines aim to provide the 
judiciary of the IAA with the tools to enable them to fully and effectively consider and decide asylum 
claims). See also Bennett, supra note 8, at 11. Similarly, it should also be noted that the Asylum Policy 
Instructions, including policy on gender issues in the asylum claim, implemented by the Home Office are 
to be followed by asylum case owners in the UK Border Agency. See, Asylum Policy Instructions, available 
online via the Home Office UK Border Agency website at https://www.gov.uk/topic/immigration-
operational-guidance/asylum-policy/latest  (last accessed 15/7/17). 
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the position of the UK gender-guidelines is uncertain, asylum case owners in the UK 
Border Agency, however, under the NAM are advised to consider the UK Border 
Agency’s asylum policy instructions. Like its North American counterparts, the UK 
Gender-Guidelines only apply to inland claims, since it is not legally possible to apply for 
asylum from outside the UK.130 
     As this short review indicates, the US, Canada, and the UK share several similar 
procedural features, but differ in important ways regarding the scope of their respective 
guidelines and the RDP. Before examining these differences in the next section, a 
preliminary point in relation to the examined decision-making bodies needs to be made. 
Whilst institutional safeguards are in place within each of the case-studies, insofar as 
independent tribunals exist and the right to appeal exists to an appellate authority, as does 
the remedy of judicial review, arguably, these safeguards are undermined by fast-track 
and expedited removal proceedings. Such policies, give unprecedented authority to 
decision-makers to issue removal orders that are often unreviewable, thus undermining 
the principle of due process and ultimately dismissing procedural safeguards. Whilst 
research in respect of the treatment of FGM claims has not uncovered any such expedited 
cases, and expedited removal proceedings are not a focal point of this thesis, these 
restrictive policies and their influence have arguably undermined the very fabric of RDP’s 
with decision-makers now considering speed to be the primary desideratum in the RDP, 
to the detriment of claimants. In this regard, speed, must be balanced against the need for 
procedural justice.131 Expedited and fast-track procedures may jeopardize some valid 
asylum claims by rushing claimants through a process that lacks adequate procedural 
protections. The push for stricter immigration legislation results, arguably, not from 
legitimate policy concerns, but rather from the fear that terrorists and economic migrants 
will use asylum as a means of entering Western States.132 U.S. President Donald Trump’s 
controversial immigration orders are prime examples.133 In January 2017, he banned 
                                                 
130 See, Asylum Aid, “The Asylum Process Made Simple” (2017), available online at  
http://www.asylumaid.org.uk/the-asylum-process-made-simple/ (last accessed 25/7/17). 
131 Harvey C, “Taking Human Rights Seriously in the Asylum Context? A Perspective on the Development 
of Law and Policy”, in Nicholson F & Twomey P (ed), “Current Issues in UK Asylum Law and Policy”, 
Imprint: Ashgate, (1998), at 21. 
132 Thompson, supra note 105, at 405. See also, Fears B, “Bill Shifts Burden to Asylum Seekers”, Washington 
Post, May 1st 2005, at A4. 
133 See, Executive Order: Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States  
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travel from seven Muslim-majority countries to the US for 90 days.134 He also suspended 
refugee admissions for 120 days. After the first travel ban was blocked by the courts, 
Trump unveiled a new ban on 6th March. This ban, too, was blocked by the courts135 and 
has been described as dripping with, “religious intolerance, animus, and 
discrimination”.136 Genuine FGM claimants must not be penalised because of political 
fears. Considering the numerous challenges claimants must face when attempting to 
obtain refugee protection, each decision-maker must apply refugee laws, guidelines and 
standards fairly by considering each claimant’s situation without being hasty, capricious, 
or biased.  
 
II. Evidentiary and Procedural Issues 
 
Evidentiary issues invoke the evaluation of credibility, and the use of factual documentary 
sources. Procedural issues on the other hand, define the conduct of refugee-determination 
hearings, including the personnel present at the hearing/interview and how those 
individuals conduct themselves and the proceedings.  All of the gender-guidelines under 
consideration in this thesis include provisions relating to procedural questions or problems 
and evidentiary considerations that are particular to women’s claims. As will be 
highlighted in due course, they all advise decision-makers to be sensitive to the wide 
spectrum of cultural, religious and other personal reasons why female claimants might 
experience humiliation, pain, trauma, or shame in recounting certain incidents, 
particularly those of a sexual nature.137  
                                                 
(2017), available online via the White House: Office of the Press Secretary at  
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/01/27/executive-order-protecting-nation-foreign-
terrorist-entry-united-states (last accessed 29/5/17). 
134 Guardian Panel, “'A rollercoaster ride': how Trump's Muslim travel ban has affected lives”, 24th May 
2017, available online at https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/may/24/how-trumps-muslim-
travel-ban-affects-us-panel (last accessed 25/5/17). 
135 See, Executive Order, supra note 133. See also, Valverde M, “4th Circuit Court of Appeals Upholds Block 
on Trump Travel Ban”, (2017), available online at 
http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/promises/trumpometer/promise/1402/suspend-immigration-
terror-prone-places/ (last accessed 30/5/17). 
136 Ibid. 
137 Macklin, supra note 2 at 35. See also, Luopajärvi K, “Gender-Related Persecution as Basis for Refugee 
Status: Comparative Perspectives” Abo Akademi University, Finland, Institute of Human Rights Research 
Report No 19, (2003), at 38. 
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    Until 2006, the CIRB gender-guidelines whilst encouraging decision-makers to 
familiarise themselves with the UNHCR Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women, 
which provide a few practical suggestions on how to conduct interviews in a gender-
sensitive manner138 were relatively weak in respect of procedural and evidentiary issues. 
They failed to refer to the UNHCR Executive Committee’s 1995 publication, Sexual 
Violence against Refugees: Guidelines on Prevention and Response,139 which contains a 
more extensive discussion and provides additional guidance regarding interviews of 
women who have been subjected to sexual violence. They also failed to focus on the actual 
conduct of decision-makers in the hearing rooms.140 However in 2006, the IRB released 
Guideline 8: Procedures with Respect to Vulnerable Persons Appearing before the IRB, 
which proposes best practices and procedural accommodations for particularly vulnerable 
claimants appearing before the IRB, including children, women subjected to gender-based 
forms of violence, and survivors of torture.141 This guideline arguably brings the CIRB 
gender-guidelines in line with its UK and US counterparts, which equally devote 
significant attention to this topic. Specifically, Guideline 8 emphasises the importance of 
accommodating women and making the proceedings as fair as possible, so as to ensure 
that women are not unfairly disadvantaged as a result of their experiences.142 As such, it 
ensures the, “on-going sensitization of members and other hearing room participants to 
the impact of severe vulnerability”.143 In addressing the gender-based claims of women, 
Guideline 8 explicitly states that, the CIRB Gender-Guidelines will be considered in all 
cases based on gender.144 
                                                 
138 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee 
Women”, U.N. Doc. ES/SCP/67 (1991). (Hereafter referred to as Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee 
Women)., para 72. For instance, the UNHCR Guidelines advise against questioning in detail about sexual 
abuse, since what matters is simply that it occurred. Ibid. Audrey Macklin, notes that in her experience as a 
member of the IRB, the UNHCR Guidelines were not actually distributed to members. Macklin, supra note 
2, at 35. 
139 UNHCR, “Sexual Violence Against Refugees: Guidelines on Prevention and Response (Extracts)”, 7 
International Journal of Refugee Law 720, (1996). 
140 Prior to 1996, this particular topic was left to member training sessions. 
141 See, Guideline 8, supra note 3. Section 2.1 of Guideline 8 defines a vulnerable person as: 
   “individuals whose ability to present their cases before the IRB is severely impaired. Such persons, may 
include, but would not be limited to, the mentally ill, minors, the elderly, victims of torture, survivors of 
genocide and crimes against humanity, and women who have suffered gender-related persecution”. 
142 Ibid, section 2.3. & 5.1. 
143 Ibid, section 3.4. 
144 Ibid, section 14.1. 
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     Like its Canadian counterpart, the INS gender-guidelines equally emphasise the 
importance of creating a ‘customer-friendly’ asylum interview environment, which allows 
female claimants to discuss freely the elements and details of their claims.145 As such they 
call on asylum officers to remain aware of the fact that most claimants come from 
countries where they have good reason to distrust those in authority.146 Asylum officers 
are, therefore, encouraged to create a rapport with the claimant, move gradually into 
sensitive areas of questioning, and confine questioning about sexual violence to 
confirming whether it happened and the motives of the perpetrator.147 Like the CIRB 
gender-guidelines, the INS gender-guidelines also allude to the possibility that the 
claimant may be traumatized.148 The INS gender-guidelines, however, further describe 
how this may affect the claimant’s testimony and lead to erroneous negative inferences 
concerning her credibility.149 Similar comments are made about culturally specific body 
language.150 
     The UK gender-guidelines, also discuss the interview process, but go considerably 
further than their American or Canadian counterparts in focusing as much on what the 
decision-maker can do to diminish a claimant’s distress, as with the reasons why the 
claimant may be distressed or uncomfortable. These guidelines discuss arranging the 
physical environment to ease the discomfort of claimants and promote confidentiality, the 
importance of establishing a rapport with the claimant, and culturally sensitive 
communication techniques.151 They also contain practical advice about the decision-
                                                 
145 INS Gender Guidelines, supra note 5, at 4. 
146 Ibid. 
147 Ibid, at 6. 
148 Ibid, at 7. See also, CIRB gender-guidelines, supra note 3, Section D.3 & Guideline 8, supra note 3, 
section 2.3. 
149 INS Gender Guidelines, supra note 5, at 6-7.  
150 Ibid, at 7 
151 UK Gender Guidelines, supra note 8, Section 5 (generally). Unfortunately, the Home Office Gender 
Asylum Instruction is not as comprehensive as the 2000 guidelines and do not discuss arranging the physical 
environment to ease the discomfort of claimants and promote confidentiality, the importance of establishing 
a rapport with the claimant, and culturally sensitive communication techniques. Nor does the instruction 
refer to practical advice about the decision-makers body language and listening skills to minimize 
intimidation and reassure the claimant that she is in a safe environment, where she can speak freely. It 
should be noted, however, that this Gender Asylum Instruction does note that in respect of conducting 
interviews, decision-makers should be aware that victims of sexual violence may suffer trauma and that this 
trauma may affect the how a woman responds during interview. No further practical advise is given, except 
for a statement to the effect that further guidance may be obtained from the Home Offices Asylum Policy 
Instruction on Conducting the Asylum Interview. See, Asylum Policy Instruction: Gender Issues in the 
Asylum Claim, supra note 8, at 18. Section 15: Interviews Requiring Particular Care of the Asylum Policy 
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makers body language and listening skills to minimize intimidation and reassure the 
claimant that she is in a safe environment, where she can speak freely.152 
     The demeanour/behaviour of decision-makers during hearings can have a profound 
impact on the willingness of claimants to divulge pertinent evidence and the quality of 
evidence disclosed.153 Regrettably, not all decision-makers approach their duties with the 
appropriate degree of respect and sensitivity required in such cases. For instance in Yusuf 
v Canada,154 the Federal Court of Appeal remarked that the Panel’s, “sexist, unwarranted, 
and highly irrelevant observations by a member of the Refugee Division was capable of 
giving the impression that their originator was biased”155 and ordered that the claimant 
receive another hearing before a different IRB panel.156 This case reinforces the concern 
and reality that, while the guidelines provide for a gender-sensitive RDP, and there is the 
possibility of appeal, decisions-makers may bring their own preconceptions and biases to 
the proceedings and female claimants may be unfairly disadvantaged. Ultimately whilst 
this assertion holds true for all types of cases, it is asserted that such bias may be even 
more prevalent in refugee cases where decision-makers may be untrained, unqualified and 
easy influenced by political considerations.  
       The CIRB gender-guidelines do not address the issue of whether or not gender-based 
claims should be conducted with all-female personnel (including interpreters).157 Within 
the Canadian context, some counsel representing female claimants before the IRB have 
                                                 
Instruction on Conducting the Asylum Interview makes provision for same-sex interpreters and 
interviewing officers; conducting of hearings in foreign languages; and also, addresses steps to be taken in 
instances of illness, financial difficulties, child-care provisions, Transport, Weather and religious festivals 
disruptions and the lack of interpreters or rooms among others. 
152 See, UK Gender Guidelines, supra note 8, sections 5.23-5.25 (discussing effective communication) & 
The Asylum Policy Instruction: Gender Issues in the Asylum Claim, supra note 8, at 17-18 (in my own 
personal opinion the 2010 gender policy instruction does not elaborate on or provide as much practical 
guidance as that outlined in the UK Gender Guidelines). With admirable candour, the UK Gender 
Guidelines acknowledge that: “Even where the interviewer and the interviewing environment have been 
supportive of an asylum seeker and good practice has been followed, the interview process itself will impact 
on the manner in which an asylum seeker gives her testimony and the information which she reveals”. See, 
UK Gender Guidelines, supra note 8, Section 5.19. 
153 Macklin, supra note 2, at 36. 
154 Yusuf v Canada, (1992) F.C. 629. 
155 Ibid, at 637-8. 
156 Ibid at 638. 
157 CIRB Gender-Guidelines, supra note 3, Section D.3. (“In some cases, it will be appropriate to consider 
whether claimants should be allowed to have the option of providing their testimony outside the hearing 
room by affidavit or by videotape, or in front of members and refugee claims officers specifically trained 
in dealing with violence against women”). 
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requested all-female panels, with the assistance of a female refugee hearing officer and a 
female interpreter, in the hope that this will reduce the claimant’s uncommunicativeness 
and enable her to disclose the full nature of her claim.158 According to former IRB member 
Audrey Macklin, no consistent policy exists with respect to acceding to these requests, 
and they are generally dealt with on an ad hoc basis in the various regions of the IRB.159 
She states that in her experience, opinion was divided at the IRB regarding a policy of 
assigning exclusively female personnel to hear claims involving gender-related 
persecution. Some members she remarks objected because they believed that it would 
foster the perception that male members of Refugee Hearing Officers were inherently less 
competent and sensitive in dealing with gender-related claims than their female 
counterparts.160 Others expressed concern about the burden placed on female personnel 
in dealing with gender-related claims, since they may be particularly draining and 
demanding.161 The CIRB gender-guidelines remain silent on the question, leaving 
accommodation of requests for all female personnel to the exercise of decision-maker’s 
discretion.162 
       Both the INS and UK gender-guidelines take a more forceful approach, and 
encourage assigning female officers to cases of a traumatic or sensitive nature.163 They 
explicitly recognise that women may be justifiably inhibited about disclosing details of a 
sexual nature to men.164 More specifically, they also acknowledge the reluctance to speak 
                                                 




162 Ibid. In, CRDD T97-06447 et al., October 22, 1999, it was determined that, “all Members are presumed 
to be competent to carry out their professional obligations in the context of gender-related claims”. 
163 INS Gender Guidelines, supra note 5, at 5. See also, UK Gender Guidelines, supra note 8, section 5.32. 
In a similar vein to the UK Gender Guidelines, the Home Office Asylum Policy Instruction also states that, 
“Each applicant will have been asked at screening to indicate a preference for a male or female interviewer, 
and it should normally be possible to comply with a request for a male or female interviewer or interpreter 
that is made in advance of an interview.  Requests made on the day of an interview for a male or female 
interviewer or interpreter should be met as far as is operationally possible”. See, Asylum Policy Instruction: 
Gender Issues in the Asylum Claim, supra note 8, at 17. The European Union Minimum Guarantee on 
Asylum Procedures, para 28 also states that, “Member States must endeavour to involve skilled female 
employees and female interpreters in the asylum procedure where necessary, particularly where female 
asylum-seekers find it difficult to present the grounds for their application in a comprehensive manner 
owing to the experiences they have undergone or to their cultural origin”, as cited in the UK Gender 
Guidelines, supra note 8, section 5.32. 
164 INS Gender Guidelines, supra note 5, at 5. See also, UK Gender Guidelines, supra note 8, section 5.30 
& 5.31. The UK Asylum Policy Instruction: Gender Issues in the Asylum Claim, whilst acknowledging that, 
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through a male interpreter.165 According to some academics, the phenomenon of ‘blaming 
the victim’ of gender-based violence is universal, and a claimant may justifiably fear 
negative consequences for divulging certain facts in front of a decision-maker, male or 
female, who may not only stigmatize her, but also violate her confidentiality.166 Only the 
UK gender-guidelines highlight the importance of reassuring the claimant about the 
confidential nature of the interview/hearing process.167 
     As noted earlier, a claimant in the US is largely responsible for providing their own 
interpreter at the Asylum Office level, unlike Canada and the UK who tend to provide 
interpreters at all stages of the claim. This can severely disadvantage women and result in 
negative determinations. The interpreter that the claimant may bring may be the only 
person she knows who can or will interpret for her, and not necessarily someone whom 
she would usually trust. If the interpreter is a friend or family member from the same 
cultural community as the claimant, her reluctance to disclose certain facts may be 
intensified.168 Whilst, the INS and UK gender-guidelines acknowledge this limitation, 
they offer no constructive alternative to proceeding with whomever the claimant has 
brought. In fact, the INS guidelines explicitly state that, “interviews should not generally 
be cancelled and rescheduled because women with gender-based asylum claims have 
brought male interpreters”.169  
 
                                                 
Victims of sexual abuse may not feel comfortable recounting their experiences in front of relatives, do not 
explicitly acknowledge that such victims may equally be inhibited about disclosing details of a sexual nature 
to men or male interpreters. UK Asylum Policy Instruction: Gender Issues in the Asylum Claim, supra note 
8, at 17. 
165 UK Gender Guidelines, supra note 8, section 5.31. See also, INS Gender Guidelines, supra note 5, at 5. 
166 Macklin, supra note 2, at 37.  
167 See, UK Gender Guidelines, supra note 8, Section 5.12 & 5.20. Similar provisions are not apparent in 
the Asylum Policy Instruction: Gender Issues in the Asylum Claim, supra note 8. 
168 See, Macklin, supra note 2, at 37. Within some societies, family members may alienate victims of sexual 
violence, viewing such violence as the woman’s fault for failing to preserve her virginity or marital dignity. 
See also, Saso, supra note 30, at 274; INS Gender Guidelines, supra note 5, at 5-6; UK Gender Guidelines, 
supra note 8, Section 5.26 - 5.28. The Home Office Asylum Policy Instruction also notes that, victims of 
sexual abuse may not feel comfortable recounting their experiences in front of relatives, who may not know, 
and especially their own children who, frequently, will not have been told about allegations. Applicants 
should be interviewed by themselves, especially in cases where a claim of sexual abuse has been made or 
it is considered to be a possibility. All applicants are advised in their letter of invitation not to bring their 
children to the interview but to make alternative arrangements. If their children do attend the interview, 
childcare facilities may be provided. See, Asylum Policy Instruction: Gender Issues in the Asylum Claim, 
supra note 8, at 17. 
169 INS Gender Guidelines, supra note 5, at 5. 
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III. Interpretation of the 1951 Refugee Convention Definition 
 
Whilst the case-studies all employ the same refugee definition, variations in interpretation 
have emerged throughout the years. The general approach to the refugee definition taken 
in each of the respective jurisprudences forms the background against which their gender 
directives were drafted, constraining certain interpretive moves and enhancing others.170 
     The Refugee Convention definition upon which claims are made can be broken down 
into the following components: (1) Does the claimant have a well-founded fear of 
persecution; (2) for reasons of an enumerated persecution ground; and (3) are they unable 
or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country. Although the gender-
guidelines under consideration are organised differently, both the INS and UK guidelines 
tend to follow the above questions. This approach thus reminds decision-makers that a 
gender-sensitive interpretation of the refugee definition does not require a departure from 
or exception to, the general principles, which apply to all refugee claims.171 This message, 
Macklin argues, is of the utmost importance, because critics of the guidelines may be 
inclined to dismiss them, “as some form of ‘special treatment’ for women that represent 
a capitulation to external political pressure, rather than a sensible and legitimate 
application of existing principles”.172 In comparison to the UK and INS guidelines, the 
CIRB gender-guidelines commence with a series of questions, which randomly 
incorporate various elements of the refugee definition.173 Whilst the effect of these 
questions is to cover the necessary elements of the refugee definition, this approach gives 
the appearance of a separate scheme for determining refugee status. As such, Macklin has 
asserted that this approach is both confusing to the decision-maker, and strategically 
imprudent, in as much as it fosters the erroneous impression that a different more lenient 
standard applies to gender-related claims.174 
 
                                                 
170 Macklin, supra note 2, at 38. 
171 Ibid. 
172 Ibid. 
173 CIRB Gender Guidelines, supra note 3, at the Update. See also, Macklin, supra note 2, at 38. 
174 Macklin, supra note 2, at 38-9. There is some attempt to dispel this notion at the end of the CIRB gender-
guidelines, where the drafters set out a ‘Framework of Analysis’ which relates the initial series of questions 





The UK, INS and CIRB gender-guidelines recognise that women often experience types 
of persecution different from those faced by men and acknowledge that these forms of 
persecution can be the basis for a refugee claim.175 Whilst the respective guidelines raise 
the profile of gender-based forms of persecution, including FGM, the recognition of such 
forms of sexual violence as persecution has been particularly challenging within the US 
context. This stems in part from, “a confusing tendency to conflate the question of whether 
the harm is serious enough to constitute persecution with the question of whether the 
persecution is on account of an enumerated Refugee Convention ground”.176 The result is 
that decision-makers, therefore, tend to rule that sexual forms of violence will not amount 
to persecution unless committed for a Refugee Convention reason.177 Consequently, 
sexual violence tends to be summarized under the dichotomy of private/personal violence. 
This dichotomy is particularly apparent in the case of Klawitter v INS,178 involving sexual 
harassment and threats of rape by a colonel in the Polish secret police. The court 
determined that, “harms or threats of harm based solely on sexual attraction do not 
constitute persecution”.179 This reasoning highlights the ignorance of the court in 
recognising both the power dynamics of sexual harassment and the ways in which sex can 
be used as a weapon of abuse.180 It also fails to keep the question of whether harassment 
                                                 
175 See generally, CIRB Gender Guidelines, supra note 3, Section B: Considerations; INS Gender 
Guidelines, supra note 5, at 4-5; UK Gender Guidelines, supra note 8, Section 2A.17. These forms of abuse 
include, but are not limited to FGM, sexual abuse, domestic violence and bride-burning to name but a few. 
The Home Office Asylum Policy Instruction also provides that, there are many forms of harm that are more 
frequently or only used against women that may constitute torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
and which may amount to persecution. Such persecution, if for a Convention reason, could result in the 
woman being recognised as a refugee. These include but are not limited to: marriage-related harm (e.g. 
forced marriage); violence within the family or community (e.g. honour killings); domestic slavery; forced 
abortion; forced sterilization; forced prostitution; trafficking; female genital mutilation; sexual violence and 
abuse; and rape. See, Asylum Policy Instruction: Gender Issues in the Asylum Claim, supra note 8, at 5. 
176 Macklin, supra note 2, at 39. 
177 Ibid. 
178 Klawitter v INS, 970 F.2d 149 (6th Cir. 1992). 
179 Ibid, at 152. The subtext seems to be that if a perpetrator happens to deprive personal pleasure from 
inflicting harm, the motive can be described as sexual gratification and the conduct does not constitute 
persecution. Macklin, supra note 2, at 39. 
180 Macklin, supra note 2, at 39. 
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constituted persecution analytically distinct from whether the harassment was motivated 
by a Convention ground.181  
     Conversely, however, in 1987 the Ninth Circuit in a case concerning the enslavement 
and abuse of a woman by a military officer ruled that this ‘private harm’ took on an 
inherently public character because the officer falsely denounced the claimant for alleged 
political subversion when she resisted his abuse.182 As such the court characterised the 
claim as persecution for imputed political opinion. On the other hand, in another case 
decided in the same year as Lazo-Majano, it was determined that the gang-rape of female 
family members of politically active males was not evidence of persecution on grounds 
of imputed political opinion, but rather a ‘personal harm’, based on an unlawful 
expression of sexual desire.183 In Matter of Krome,184 decided in 1993, the BIA in a case 
with strikingly similar facts to Campos, determined that the gang-rape and beating of a 
Haitian woman in retaliation for her political activities was ‘grievous harm’ amounting to 
persecution.185 The INS gender-guidelines do not reconcile these divergent cases, instead 
they emphasise that the, “appearance of sexual violence in a claim should not lead 
adjudicators to conclude automatically that the claim is an instance of purely personal 
harm”.186 According to leading academics in the field it can only be hoped that the explicit 
recognition in the INS guidelines that, “severe sexual abuse does not differ analytically 
from beatings, torture, or other forms of physical violence that are commonly held to 
amount to persecution”, will negate the tendency of some US decision-makers to view the 
motivation for rape as ‘sexual desire’ as stated in Campos, and therefore not causally 
connected to an enumerated persecution ground.187 
                                                 
181 Ibid. 
182 Lazo-Majano v INS, 813 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1987). 
183 Campos-Guardado v INS, 809 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1987), supra note 63. 
184 See, INS Gender Guidelines, supra note 5, at 9 (citing Matter of Krome, BIA May 25, 1993). 
185 Ibid. 
186 Ibid. See also, Macklin, supra note 2, at 40. 
187 Macklin, supra note 2, at 40. It should be noted here that I do not advocate that all forms of beating 
amount to persecution, in fact it is possible that grievous bodily harm may be occasioned without a 
persecutory motive. It might also be argued that not every instance of rape and sexual assault constitutes 
persecution either, ultimately this depends on the facts/surrounding circumstances of the case. 
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     Despite the divergent decisions discussed, some progress at the US Federal Court level 
has emerged, arguably as a result of the implementation of the INS gender-guidelines.188 
In 1996 and 1997 respectively, the Courts of Appeal for the Ninth and Seventh Circuits 
rejected the lower tribunals’ view that sexual abuse of political dissidents was a product 
of sexual desire and did not constitute persecution189 even though these courts are not 
bound nor formally subject to the gender-guidelines.190 In 2004, the Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit granted Guatemalan Reina Izabel Garcia-Martinez’s Petition for Review 
of an adverse BIA decision.191 A victim of gang-rape by soldiers in her native country in 
1993, the decision recognized that Ms. Garcia-Martinez was entitled to protection under 
national and international laws that offer sanctuary for individuals who have been 
subjected to torture and other egregious treatment in their homelands.  
      Thus, the danger of characterizing some forms of violence against women as ‘private’ 
and not ‘persecutory’ is particularly evident in relation to domestic violence.192 The INS 
gender-guidelines, however, designate domestic violence to be both ‘private action’193 
and a form of persecution.194 Unfortunately, the guidelines only make reference to one 
case concerning domestic violence, and its treatment.195 The guidelines treatment of 
domestic violence hardly proceeds beyond this. This is surprising given the fact that the 
US criminal justice system has criminalized domestic violence. Such violence is treated 
as a serious crime, not as a private family matter. A more telling sign of the guidelines’ 
inadequacy regarding domestic violence within the refugee context is evident in the post 
gender-guidelines adoption era of scholarly articles, arguing that asylum claims based on 
domestic violence do fit within the refugee definition as applied and interpreted by US 
                                                 
188 Anker D et al, “Rape in the Community as a Basis for Asylum: The Treatment of Women Refugees’ 
Claims to Protection in Canada and the United States” 2 Bender’s Immigration Bulletin 608, (1997), at 
612-4. 
189 Angoucheva v INS, 106, F.3d 781 (7th Cir. 1997), at 790, 791, 793; Lopez Galarza v INS, 99 F.3d 954 
(9th Cir, 1996), at 963 (in this case, the 7th Cir also ruled that the claimant had been raped and beaten on 
account of her political beliefs). Ibid, at 960. 
190 Please refer to Section 2B detailing the courts and bodies subject to the various gender guidelines under 
consideration. 
191 Reina Izabel Garcia-Martinez vs. John Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 1066 (2004). 
192 Macklin, supra note 2, at 40. 
193 INS Gender Guidelines, supra note 5, at 18. 
194 Ibid, at 9. 
195 Ibid, at 17 (citing the case of Matter of Pierre, 15 I & N Dec. 461 (BIA 1975) (In that particular case the 
BIA determined that spousal abuse by a Haitian legislator did not itself make abuse of his wife persecution 
on account of political opinion even though the Haitian Government would not restrain the husband). 
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decision-makers.196 Furthermore in 1999, the BIA denied asylum to Rody Alvarado, a 
Guatemalan woman who fled years of brutal domestic violence.197 Whilst initially granted 
asylum, on appeal the BIA reasoned that the claimant was ineligible for refugee protection 
because the abuse she suffered resulted from ‘personal circumstances’ that lacked larger 
societal relevance.198 The BIA’s decision in Matter of R-A- provoked a firestorm of 
criticism, leading to a series of Executive actions. In 2000, under the leadership of then- 
Attorney General Janet Reno, the DOJ proposed regulations to address cases such as Ms. 
Alvarado’s.199 After the R-A rule was issued, Reno vacated the BIA’s decision in Matter 
of R-A-, denying relief and remanding the case to the BIA with instructions to stay the 
case until the proposed regulations were finalized. Then, in 2003, AG John Ashcroft took 
jurisdiction and ordered lawyers for the parties to brief the issues in the case. In its 2004 
brief, the Department of Homeland Security reversed course from the government’s 
previous position and argued that Ms. Alvarado had established statutory eligibility for 
asylum based on her membership in a PSG.200 Ashcroft did not rule on the case but sent 
it back to the BIA with the same instructions as his predecessor, for the BIA to reconsider 
the case once the proposed regulations were issued as final. To date, the proposed 
regulations have not been issued in final form.201 In 2008, Attorney General Michael 
                                                 
196 See, Anker D et al, “Women Whose Governments are Unable or Unwilling to Provide Reasonable 
Protection from Domestic Violence May Qualify as Refugees Under United States Asylum Law” 11 
Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 709, (1997). 
197 For a detailed analysis of the case and resulting implication, see CGRS, “Domestic-Violence Based 
Asylum Claims: CGRS Practice Advisory”, (2014), available online at  
https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/pdfs/Domestic%20Violence-
Based%20Asylum%20Claims%20(Sept%2012,%202014).pdf (last accessed 22/3/17), at 3-6. See also, 
Sinha, supra note 10, at 1586-1590. See also, In re R-A, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (B.I.A. 1999). 
198Ibid, at 915-920. 
199 Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76588 (proposed Dec. 7, 2000) (hereafter R-A Rule). 
Although the actual regulation is very short, it is preceded by a lengthy preamble, which includes a 
substantial amount of guidance favourable to gender claims based on domestic violence. Notably, the 
preamble states that the purpose of the regulation is to remove “certain barriers that the In re R-A- decision 
seems to pose” to domestic violence claims, and recognizes that gender is an immutable characteristic and 
that marital status may be considered immutable in appropriate circumstances. See, CGRA Practice 
Advisory, supra note 197, at 4. 
200 See, DHS’s Position on Respondent’s Eligibility for Relief, Matter of R-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 694 (A.G. 
2005) (A 73 753 922), available online at 
 https://cgrs.uchastings.edu//sites/default/files/Matter%20of%20R-A-%20DHS%20brief.pdf (last  
accessed 28/5/17). 
201 See, Domestic Violence Based Asylum Claims -Fuentes-Erazo v. Sessions, 848 F.3d 847 (8th Cir. 2017), 
(2017), available online at https://www.law.umn.edu/sites/law.umn.edu/files/cna_2017_cle_-
_federal_immigration_litigation_-_dv_asylum.pdf (last accessed 8/6/17). 
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Mukasey lifted the stay previously imposed on the BIA, as the regulations were still 
pending, and remanded the case for reconsideration of the issues presented with respect 
to asylum claims based on domestic violence. Because of the length of time the case had 
been pending, Ms. Alvarado and DHS made a joint request to send the case back to the 
immigration judge for the submission of additional evidence and legal arguments. After 
the submission of these materials, DHS stipulated to a grant of asylum, and finally, in 
December 2009, after enduring more than a decade of legal limbo, Ms. Alvarado was 
granted asylum. Because the grant was by stipulation, there is no extensive decision; the 
judge’s order, which is less than a sentence long, simply refers to the agreement of the 
parties.202 Because the R-A- case had become the battleground on which the issue of 
domestic violence as a basis of asylum had been fought for more than a decade, the victory 
had great symbolic significance. However, it has no binding precedential value.203 
      On a positive note, following a 15-year silence since its decision in R-A-, the BIA 
issued a precedential decision, Matter of A-R-C-G-, recognizing domestic violence as a 
basis for asylum in 2014.204 The applicant in that case, a mother of three had suffered 
what the decision deems “repugnant abuse” at the hands of her husband, including 
beatings and rapes. The BIA found that women fleeing domestic violence can be members 
of a PSG.  Although the BIA in that case affirmed the principle that cognizability of a 
social group must be determined on a case-by-case basis, the BIA’s analysis should help 
advocates in building their cases to establish group membership for women fleeing 
                                                 
202 The Immigration Judges decision simply stated that: “Inasmuch as there is no binding authority on the 
legal issues raised in this case, I conclude that I can conscientiously accept what is essentially the agreement 
of the parties [to grant asylum].” See, CGRA Practice Advisory, supra note 197, at 5. 
203 After AG Mukasey’s 2008 order issued, the BIA remanded some domestic violence cases back to the 
immigration court for attorneys to supplement the records in their cases. And, on at least one occasion, the 
BIA provided an applicant with the opportunity to submit an application for asylum in light of the AG’s 
decision. See, e.g., In re: Ventura-Aguilar, A 98-400-001, 2009 Immig. Rptr. LEXIS 781 (BIA Dec. 2009) 
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removal in light of vacatur of R-A-). See also, e.g., Morrison v. INS, 166 F. App’x 583 (2d Cir. 2006) 
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violence claim in light of vacatur of R-A-). On the other hand, CGRS’s non-official tracking of cases has 
revealed that the BIA has also denied several motions to reopen to present asylum claims based on domestic 
violence in light of Mukasey’s 2008 order and the DHS’s position taken in Matter of L-R-, discussed infra. 
This is not to say that attorneys should forego filing a motion to reopen where the circumstances so require, 
but rather, to alert attorneys to one potential outcome. The argument for reopening is stronger now after the 
BIA’s long-awaited precedential decision (discussed in the following section), issued on August 26, 2014, 
recognizing domestic violence as a basis for asylum. See Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (BIA 
2014). See, CGRA Practice Advisory, supra note 197, at 5. 
204 Matter of A-R-C-G- 26 I. & N. Dec. 388. 
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domestic violence from Guatemala and elsewhere. This sentiment could also be applied 
to women fleeing FGM. Importantly, the BIA’s recent recognition that women fleeing 
domestic violence at the hands of their intimate partners are deserving of asylum 
protection where their governments are unable or unwilling to protect them, sends a clear 
mandate to decision-makers that these cases must be carefully considered and cannot be 
rejected categorically as “unworthy” of relief.205 
       While the CIRB gender-guidelines are very brief on the issue of types of gender-
specific serious harm, the main principle is that what constitutes persecution should be 
determined by reference to various international human rights instruments, including 
CEDAW.206 As such, the CIRB gender-guidelines arguably acknowledge domestic 
violence as a form of persecution directed against women. Similarly, the UK gender-
guidelines state that whether treatment amounts to ‘serious harm’ should be decided on 
the basis of international human rights standards.207 More specifically, the UK guidelines 
note that harm within the family includes various cultural practices relating to marriage, 
such as forced marriages, honour killings, dowry deaths and sati.208 There is, however, no 
further discussion on domestic violence as persecution, other than a note to the effect that 
treatment which would constitute serious harm if it occurred outside the home, will also 
constitute serious harm if it occurs within a family context.209 Arguably, the reference to 
international standards in both guidelines is intended to demonstrate that the conduct in 
question, whether it is domestic violence or another form of gender-based violence, 
violates universally recognised human rights.210 
                                                 
205 See, CGRA Practice Advisory, supra note 197, at 6. 
206 See, CIRB Gender Guidelines, supra note 3, Section B: Considerations. 
207 UK Gender Guidelines, supra note 8, Section 2A.1. (“Whether harm, including gender-specific harm, 
amounts to persecution should be assessed on the basis of internationally recognised human rights 
standards”). For a more detailed discussion, see Section 2A generally. Refer also to Annex II for a list of 
International Instruments referred to in the guidelines. The Home Office Asylum Policy in defining gender, 
refers explicitly to the definitions/approaches endorsed in the UNHCR Handbook, the EU Qualification 
Directive, the Refugee or Person in need of International Protection (Qualification) Regulations 2006 and 
the European Convention on Human Rights. The policy does state that further guidance can be obtained 
from the Asylum Policy Instruction on Assessing the Claim. See generally, Asylum Policy Instruction: 
Gender Issues in the Asylum Claim, supra note 8.  
208 UK Gender Guidelines, supra note 8, Section 2A.24. See also, Asylum Policy Instruction: Gender Issues 
in the Asylum Claim, supra note 8, at 5 (detailing forms of harms committed against women which may 
amount to persecution. Such violence includes violence within the family or community). 
209 UK Gender Guidelines, supra note 8, Section 2A.23. 
210 Macklin, supra note 2, at 41. 
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      The INS gender-guidelines do not unequivocally identify international human rights 
instruments as aids to defining persecution.  Instead, they interpret persecution to mean, 
“threats to life, torture, and economic restrictions so severe that they constitute a threat to 
life or freedom”211 by referring to leading US jurisprudence. According to some experts, 
the decision to rely on jurisprudence may indicate that the drafters were not concerned 
about allegations of cultural imperialism,212 or that international law does not have the 
same status of legitimacy in the US as it does in Canada and the UK.213  
     Another set of gender-specific practices which decision-makers have traditionally 
resisted labelling as persecutory relates to discriminatory law/policies which apply to 
women. Discrimination as a form of persecution has also been addressed in the gender-
guidelines. According to  the UK gender-guidelines discrimination may amount to 
‘serious harm’, or be a factor which turns ‘harm’ into ‘serious harm’ or be a factor in 
failure of state protection (for example, discriminatory access to police protection).214
 
A 
discriminatory measure may, in itself or cumulatively with others, be ‘serious harm’ for 
example if the discrimination has prejudicial consequences for the person concerned (e.g., 
restrictions on freedom of movement or lack of access to education).215
 
The guidelines 
continue to note that a wide range of (discriminatory) penalties that may be imposed on 
women for disobeying restrictions placed on women may also constitute serious harm.216 
Further, the guidelines note that some discriminatory restrictions on women may also have 
for example, social or medical consequences which constitute serious harm.217 Arguably, 
therefore the collective effect of the “web of discriminatory laws, policies and practices 
restricting where a woman can travel, what she can wear, her education and job 
                                                 
211 INS Gender Guidelines, supra note 5, at 8-9 (citing Matter of Acosta, 19 I & N Dec. 211, 222 (BIA 
1985)). 
212 Macklin, supra note 2, at 41-2. 
213 See Anker D, ‘Rape in the Community as a Basis for Asylum’, supra note 188, at 609.  
214 UK Gender Guidelines, supra note 8, Section 2A.7. See also, Asylum Policy Instruction: Gender Issues 
in the Asylum Claim, supra note 8, at 6 (addressing the issue of Discrimination and the circumstances in 
which discriminatory measures may amount to persecution). 
215 UK Gender Guidelines, supra note 8, Section 2A.10 & 2A.11. See also, Asylum Policy Instruction: 
Gender Issues in the Asylum Claim, supra note 8, at 6. 
216 UK Gender Guidelines, supra note 8, Section 2A.12. 
217 Ibid, Section 2A.13. For example, consequences for women in child or arranged marriages, or on divorce 
or widowhood.  
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opportunities, her ability to marry, divorce, and have custody of children could amount to 
persecution”.218 
     The CIRB gender-guidelines similarly provide that discriminatory laws may constitute 
persecution if the law or policy is inherently persecutory, or is used as a means of 
persecution for one of the enumerated grounds; if the law or policy, although having 
legitimate goals, is administered through persecutory means or if the penalty for non-
compliance with a policy or law is disproportionately severe.219 Usually in cases of this 
nature, decision-makers will focus on the penalties for non-compliance with the law.220 
Accordingly, in Namitabar v Canada,221 decided shortly after the adoption of the CIRB 
gender-guidelines the Federal Court determined that seventy-five lashes for breach of the 
Iranian law governing women’s dress was disproportionate to the objective of the law and 
thus constituted persecution. This approach according to Indra, circumvents judgements 
about the legitimacy of the law itself, and focuses instead on the penalty as persecutory in 
relation to its purpose. 222 
      The INS gender-guidelines also explore this particular issue through case-law 
involving female claimants who have objected to the discriminatory strictures imposed 
upon them. In the US, the position is that compelling obedience to a law constitutes 
persecution if it requires a person to renounce or violate deeply held religious or 
fundamental beliefs.223
 
The guidelines further assert that, certain penalties for violating 
discriminatory laws might constitute persecution.224 
    According to Macklin, the 1996 US judgement in Fisher v INS,225 as discussed in the 
guidelines adopts an even harsher stance.226 In Fisher, the Ninth Circuit ruled that while 
dress restrictions on Iranian women constituted sex discrimination, they did not amount 
                                                 
218 Macklin, supra note 2, at 42. 
219 CIRB Gender Guidelines, supra note 3, Section B: Considerations. 
220 Macklin, supra note 2, at 42. 
221 Namitabar v Canada, (1994) F.C. 42, 47. 
222 Ibid. See also, Indra D, “Engendering Forced Migration: Theory and Practice”, Berghahn Books: 
Oxford, (2008), at 285. 
223 See, for example, Fatin v. INS: “governmental measures that compel an individual to engage in conduct 
that is not physically painful or harmful but is abhorrent to that individual’s deepest beliefs.” 12 F.3d 1233, 
US Court of Appeal (3rd Cir.) 1993.   
224 Macklin, supra note 2, at 43. See also, Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, US Court of Appeals (9th Cir.) 1996.   
225 Fisher v INS, supra note 224. 
226 INS Gender Guidelines, supra note 5, at 10. Macklin, supra note 2, at 43. 
152 
 
to persecution. Judge Wallace declared that, “the mere existence of a law permitting the 
detention, arrest, or even imprisonment of a woman who does not wear the chador in Iran 
does not constitute persecution any more than it would if the same law existed in the 
United States”.227 The court did not find it necessary to address the length or conditions 
of imprisonment, nor did it allude to the possibility of flogging described in other cases 
including Fatin, concluding that, “there also is no evidence suggesting that if she returned 
to Iran, Fisher would not conform with the regulations”.228 Finally, even though the 
claimant testified that, as a Muslim, she opposed the fundamentalist regime in Iran, the 
court reasoned that: 
 
she failed to show that the Iranian government took action against her because of 
her political or religious beliefs. Indeed, the record indicates that Fisher received 
routine punishment for violating generally applicable laws.229 
 
Only the dissent in Fisher mentions the INS gender-guidelines.230 According to Judge 
Noonan, the guidelines are an invitation to develop asylum law with special attention to 
the problems of women oppressed on account of their nonconformity with the moral codes 
of a rigorist regime.231 Arguably, the guidelines were not applied because the case began 
before they were issued.232 I would agree, however, with her assertion that the fact that 
they were not applied is disappointing, insofar as the legal analysis contained in the 
guidelines, “do not change the law, and thus are applicable anytime to any set of facts by 
anyone who finds them persuasive”.233 
 
B. Well-Founded Fear of Persecution 
 
                                                 
227 Fisher v. INS, supra note 224, at 962. 
228 Ibid, at 963. 
229 Ibid, at 964. 
230 Ibid, at 967-8. 
231 Ibid. 




In addition to a fear of persecution, a claimant must also establish that her fear is well-
founded. It can, therefore, be said that there is a well-founded fear of persecution when it 
is likely that the individual concerned will face persecution if returned to their country of 
origin. It is generally accepted that this particular concept has both a subjective and an 
objective element and to determine whether a well-founded fear of persecution exists both 
elements must be addressed.234 
      The standards of proof as to when fear is well-founded applied by authorities in 
different countries vary. In the US, a claimant must demonstrate ‘a reasonable possibility 
of persecution’,235 and in Canada, the courts require that there be a ‘reasonable chance’ 
(or ‘good grounds for fearing persecution’) standard;236 whereas an (arguably somewhat 
more restrictive) ‘reasonable degree of likelihood’ or ‘real and substantial danger of 
persecution’ test is applied in the UK.237 It seems, however, that most jurisdictions 
recognise a standard of proof, which requires degrees of likelihood far short of any 
balance of probability test (that is, persecution is more likely than not).238  
         The appropriate starting point in determining whether the claimant’s fear of 
persecution is well-founded is an examination of the general human rights record of a 
claimant’s country. It should be noted here, however, that human rights information is not 
determinative of a claim to refuge status; the usefulness of human rights data is to establish 
a (rebuttable) presumption of risk of harm which then must be tested against the whole of 
the evidence presented, in particular the claimant’s own evidence and testimony.239
 
The 
fear of persecution must not (necessarily) be based on personal experiences of the 
claimant. Experiences of friends or relatives or other persons belonging to the same race 
or social group can indicate that the claimant’s fear of being persecuted is well-founded. 
                                                 
234 UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 
Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, Geneva, 1979. (Hereafter UNHCR 
Handbook), para 37-8. 
235 “[A] moderate interpretation of the ‘well-founded fear’ standard would indicate that so long as an 
objective situation is established by the evidence, it need not be shown that the situation will probably result 
in persecution, but it is enough that persecution is a reasonable possibility.” INS v. Cardoza Fonseca, US 
Supreme Court, 467 US 407 (1987).  
236 Adjei v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, [1989] 2 FC 6680, 683 OR (1989) 7 Imm. L.R. (2d) 
169 (FCA).  
237 R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Sivakumaran et al, [1988] All ER 193.  
238 See, Goodwin-Gill, supra note 23, at 39. See also, Luopajärvi, supra note 137, at 9-10. 
239 Luopajärvi, supra note, 137, at 10. See also, Hathaway J, “The Law of Refugee Status”, Butterworths: 
Toronto, (1991), at 80-3.  
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Furthermore, a person is considered as having a well-founded fear of being persecuted is 
he/she has already been subject to harm amounting to persecution.240
 
Past persecution is, 
however, not a prerequisite to recognition as a refugee.241 
       In Canada, most documentation concerning country conditions used in the hearing 
rooms is assembled and generated by the IRB Documentation Centre. Since the 
introduction of the CIRB gender-guidelines, the Documentation Centre has sought and 
gathered information concerning the condition of women in many countries, and has 
produced various country profiles synthesizing information from a range of sources.242 
The UK gender-guidelines in acknowledging the limited documentary evidence available 
in relation to the problems faced by women encourages decision-makers to conduct their 
own research into country of origin conditions, including use of country of origin 
information (COI) reports produced by the Country Information and Policy Unit of the 
Home Office.243 Similarly, in acknowledging that asylum officers must be able to rely on 
objective and current information on the legal and cultural situation of women in their 
countries of origin, on the incidence of violence, and on the adequacy of state protection 
afforded to them, the INS gender-guidelines stipulate that the Resource Information 
Centre will deal with these issues and in turn will, “attempt to assure that information 
concerning violations of the rights of women are distributed regularly and systematically 
to all asylum officers”.244 
     Nevertheless, despite such innovative efforts, violence against women has long been 
shrouded in a culture of silence. Consequently, reliable statistics are hard to come by, as 
sexual and physical violence against women is underreported at all levels because of 
                                                 
240 UNHCR Handbook, supra note 234, para 42-5. 
241 Luopajärvi, supra note, 137, at 10. 
242 Macklin, supra note 2, at 47. 
243 Commonly referred to as the Country of Origin Information Service (COI Service). Further information 
on the COI Service is available online via the Gov.UK website at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/country-policy-and-information-notes (last accessed 23/7/17). 
See also, UK Gender Guidelines, supra note 8, Section 5.50-51. Compare with, Asylum Policy Instruction: 
Gender Issues in the Asylum Claim, supra note 8, at 7 (which merely states that, “Case owners should: refer 
to objective country of origin information provided by the Country of Origin Service (COIS), in particular 
the sections on women; make (where necessary) a case specific research request to COIS; refer to Country 
Guidance cases (principally found in the country Operational Guidance Notes); and take into account the 
relevant sections on actors of persecution and the sufficiency of state protection in the AI Considering the 
protection (asylum) claim and assessing credibility).  
244 INS Gender Guidelines, supra note 5, at 8. 
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shame, stigma and fear of retribution. Accordingly, the type of detailed information 
capable of confirming an individual claimant’s narrative regarding FGM may not be 
readily available.245 Decision-makers in Canada and the UK are cautioned to be sensitive 
to these limitations.246 
 
C. Lack of State Protection and Agents of Persecution 
 
As already established, the purpose of refugee law is to provide substitute protection of 
the international community in situations where it is not reasonable to expect national 
protection of basic human rights in the claimant’s country of origin. Thus, when 
determining whether there is a risk of persecution, the State’s ability and willingness to 
effectively respond to such a risk must be assessed.247 When determining whether a 
certain treatment can be called persecution, two elements must be satisfied; first, whether 
the harm feared amounts to ‘persecution’; and second, whether the State can be held 
responsible for the harm.248
 
If it can be established that meaningful national protection is 
available a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ cannot be said to exist.249
 
      The “most obvious” form of persecution is confined to situations where human rights 
are violated by organs of the State, in pursuance of a “formally sanctioned persecutory 
                                                 
245 Macklin, supra note 2, at 48. 
246 Ibid. See also, UK Gender Guidelines, supra note 8, Section 5.50; CIRB Gender Guidelines, supra note 
3, at Framework of Analysis, para 3. Whilst the Home Office Asylum Policy Instruction do not caution to 
be sensitive to these limitations, they do state that, “It is important to consider fully relevant objective 
evidence including the country information provided by the Country of Origin Information Service. The 
absence of objective information to corroborate a claimant’s account is likely to be an important factor but 
should not necessarily be taken to mean that human rights abuses do not occur. For instance, systematic 
abuse of a certain group would usually be documented, but isolated acts of ill treatment perpetrated by one 
person on another would not”. Asylum Policy Instruction: Gender Issues in the Asylum Claim, supra note 
8, at 19.  
247 Hathaway, “The Law of Refugee Status”, supra note 239, at 125. This line of reasoning has been approved 
in national case law, see for example, Islam and Shah, R v IAT ex parte Shah [1999] INLR 44, [1999] Imm 
AR 283 (HL). (Hereafter referred to as Islam and Shah); Horvath v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, UK House of Lords, [2001] 1 AC 489; Refugee Appeal no. 71427/99, New Zealand Refugee 
Status Appeals Authority, [2000] NZAR 545; and MIM v. Khawar, High Court of Australia 2002, [2002] 
HCA 14. See also, Luopajärvi, supra note, 137, at 14. 
248 Macklin A, “Refugee Women and the Imperative of Categories” 17 Human Rights Quarterly 213, (1995), 
at 222. 





This could be called “State persecution.”251
 
Second, persecution may also 
consist of “non-conforming behaviour” by State officials, which is not subject to a timely 
and effective rectification by the State.252 Third, seriously harmful acts, including human 
rights violations, committed by private individuals or groups of persons, when the 
government is unwilling to offer protection also amounts to persecution.253
 
Thus, as long 
as the State fails to protect a person at risk, the reason for failure to protect is irrelevant; 
whether it is indifference or genuine incapability. Neither does the fact that the authorities 
are willing to offer protection change the situation if the authorities still remain incapable 
of offering such protection.254 Hence, the need for surrogate protection arises when the 
State ignores or is unable to react to legitimate expectations of protection and thus fails 
its duty to protect its citizens.255 
     One of the central questions regarding persecution by non-State actors and failure of 
State protection is what standard of protection the State must be able to afford the 
individuals concerned. According to the UK gender-guidelines failure of State protection 
may occur as a result of: legal provisions or the absence of such provisions; lack of access 
to justice and police protection; lack of police response to requests for assistance, or a 
reluctance, refusal, or a failure to investigate, prosecute or punish individuals; and 
encouragement or toleration of particular social, religious or customary laws, practices, 
and behavioural norm, or an unwillingness or inability to take action against them.256 In 
                                                 
250 Ibid. 
251 Yeo C, ‘Agents of the state: When is an official of the state and agent of the state?’ 14 International 
Journal of Refugee Law 4, (2002), at 517.  
252 Hathaway, “The Law of Refugee Status”, supra note 239, at 125. See also, Luopajärvi, supra note, 137, 
at 14-15. 
253 Hathaway, “The Law of Refugee Status”, supra note 239, at 126. 
254 Luopajärvi, supra note, 137, at 15. 
255 Ibid. See also, Macklin, “Refugee Women and the Imperative of Categories”, supra note 248, at 234; 
Hathaway, “The Law of Refugee Status”, supra note 239, at 126-8; Hyndman P, ‘The 1951 Convention 
definition of refugee: An appraisal with particular reference to the case of Sri Lankan Tamil Applicants’, 9 
Human Right Quarterly 49, (1987), at 67.  
256 UK Gender Guidelines, supra note 8, Section 2B.8 & 2B.9. See also, Asylum Policy Instruction: Gender 
Issues in the Asylum Claim, supra note 8, at 7-8 (discussing the failure of state protection: “The ways in 
which particular laws, social policies or practices (including traditions and cultural practices) are 
implemented may constitute or involve a failure of protection. Thus, for example, (1) a law, policy or 
practice may have a "legitimate" goal, e.g. the maintenance of law and order out of respect for genuine 
religious or social sensitivities, but be administered through persecutory means; (2) the penalty for non-
compliance with the law or policy may be disproportionately severe against certain women/groups; or (3) 
a law, policy or practice may not be enforced in practice and therefore fail to deter or prevent the banned 
behaviour). The Policy Instruction, like the UK Gender-Guidelines further posits that, “Women may be 
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the UK the leading decision on the issue comes from Horvath v SSHD,257 Decided in 
2000, this decision, argues that the standard of required protection is not one that which 
would eliminate all risk but, “a practical standard, which takes proper account of the duty 
which the State owes to all its own nationals”.258 Referring to the European Court of 
Human Rights’ decision in the Osman case,259 Lord Clyde formulated the test for 
sufficient protection as follows: 
 
there must be in place a system of domestic protection and machinery for the 
detention, prosecution and punishment of acting’s contrary to the purposes which 
the Convention requires to have protected. More importantly there must be an 
ability and a readiness to operate that machinery. But precisely where the line is 
drawn between beyond that generality is necessarily a matter of the circumstances 
of each particular case.260   
 
   In reference to Horvath, the Court of Appeal in Skenderaj261 further notes that the 
sufficiency of State protection has to be measured against the practical limitations on a 
State to protect its citizens from violence or threats of violence to which it is not alerted 
and its protection is deliberately not sought. To do so arguably would impose on the State 
a duty of guarantee which would be disproportionate.262 Thus, in cases of non-State 
persecution, to satisfy the sufficiency of protection test in the UK, a claimant would need 
to show that the system of protection has failed her and is ineffective. According to Yeo, 
unless the claimant has approached the authorities on a number of occasions in relation to 
                                                 
subject to gender-related abuse resulting from social customs or conventions because there is no effective 
means of legal recourse to prevent, investigate or punish such acts. Such failure of state protection may 
include, but is not limited to, legislation (e.g. marital rape exemptions in law), lack of police response to 
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257 Horvath, supra note 247. 
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259 Osman v UK, 28th Oct. 1998, ECHR Reports 1998-VIII. 
260 Horvath, supra note 247, per Lord Clyde as reprinted in 13 International Journal of Refugee Law ½ 
(2001), at 194. 
261 Skenderaj v. SSHD, CA Civ. 26 Apr. 2002, [2002] EWCA Civ 567. 
262 Luopajärvi, supra note, 137, at 75. See also, Skenderaj, supra note 261, per Auld L.J. para 43 (referring 
to Osman v UK, supra note 259, para 116). 
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a number of separate incidents, and has consistently been denied protection, the 
sufficiency of protection test will not be met.263 
    In Canada, the traditional standard of State protection has been that of, “adequate 
though not necessarily perfect” protection.264 The Canadian Federal Court has determined 
that: 
 
where a state is in effective control of its territory, has military, police and civil 
authority in place, and makes serious efforts to protect its citizens from terrorist 
activities, the mere fact that it is not always successful at doing so will not be 
enough to justify a claim that the victims of terrorism are unable to avail 
themselves of such protection.265 
 
In the 2001 Nduwimana case, the Federal Court further stipulated that, protection must 
not be one-hundred percent effective, but it must be such that a claimant will not be 
exposed to a serious risk of persecution if returned to the country of origin.266 In 
conjunction with established jurisprudence, the CIRB gender-guidelines support the 
notion that decision-makers should consider evidence indicating a failure of State 
protection if the State or its agents in the claimant’s country of origin are unable or 
                                                 
263 Yeo, supra note 251, at 516 citing SSHD v. Havlicek, IAT, 7 Jun. 2000, 00/TH/01488, approved by the 
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unwilling to provide adequate protection from gender-related persecution.267 When 
considering whether it is objectively reasonable for the claimant not to have sought the 
protection of the State, the decision-maker should consider, among other relevant factors, 
the social, cultural, religious, and economic context in which the claimant finds herself.268  
      The guidelines further urge decision-makers that when determining whether the State 
is willing or able to provide protection to a woman fearing gender-related persecution, 
including FGM, they should consider the fact that the forms of evidence which the 
claimant might normally provide as “clear and convincing proof” of State inability to 
protect, will not always be either available or useful in cases of gender-related 
persecution.269 For instance, where a gender-related claim involves threats of or actual 
sexual violence at the hands of government authorities or non-State agents of persecution, 
where the State is either unwilling or unable to protect, the claimant may have difficulty 
in substantiating her claim with any “statistical data” on the incidence of sexual violence 
in her country.270 As such the guidelines stipulate that in such cases, reference may need 
to be made to alternative forms of evidence to meet the “clear and convincing” test, 
including testimony of women in similar situations where there was a failure of State 
protection, or the testimony of the claimant herself regarding past personal incidents 
where State protection did not materialize.271 This, as will be discussed in Chapter Three 
is a major hurdle for FGM claimants. Moreover, the guidelines state, in situations where 
a woman's fear is related to personal-status laws or where her human rights are being 
violated by private citizens, a change in country circumstances may not mean a positive 
change for the woman, as these areas are often the last to change. An assessment should 
be made of the claimant's particular fear and of whether the changes are meaningful and 
effective enough for her fear of gender-related persecution to no longer be well-
founded.272 In sum as summarized in Antoniy Zhuravlev v. MCI: 
 
                                                 





272 Ibid, Section C.3. 
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When the agent of persecution is not the state, the lack of state protection has to be 
assessed as a matter of state capacity to provide protection rather than from the 
perspective of whether the local apparatus provided protection in a given 
circumstance. Local failures to provide effective policing do not amount to lack of 
state protection.  However, where the evidence, including the documentary 
evidence situates the individual claimant’s experience as part of a broader pattern 
of state inability or refusal to extend protection, then the absence of state protection 
is made out.273 
  
    Unlike Canada, this question has not been as clearly addressed within the US case-law. 
Before addressing the case-law it is important to note however that the INS gender-
guidelines are relatively silent on the issue of State protection, except for the following: 
 
…..the persecutor might also be a person or group outside of the government that 
the government is unable to or unwilling to control. If the applicant asserts a threat 
of harm from a non-government source, the applicant must show that the 
government is unwilling or unable to protect its citizens. It will be important in this 
regard, though not conclusive, to determine whether the applicant has actually 
sought help from government authorities. Evidence that such an effort would be 
futile would also be relevant.274 
 
Unfortunately, the guidelines fail to address evidentiary issues regarding State protection 
or the standard of ‘adequacy’ that citizens are entitled to expect.275 US jurisprudence, 
however, sheds some light on these issues. 
    Whilst the terminology seems to differ (the US courts use the terminology of ‘unable 
or unwilling to control’), the substantial reasoning is similar to that concerning the 
adequate standard of protection by UK and Canadian courts.276 The US courts have 
concluded that a government is, “unable or unwilling to control” if a pattern of 
government unresponsiveness to serious harm can be determined.277 For instance, in 
Aguirre-Cervantes v. INS the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals referring to the reluctance 
of the police to intervene in domestic violence cases, as well as the legality to use 
‘correction’ discipline to handle wives and children, determined that the Mexican 
                                                 
273 Antoniy Zhuravlev v. MCI, FCTD no. IMM-3603-99, 14 Apr. 2000, as cited in Luopajärvi, supra note, 
137, at 76-77, note 366. 
274 INS Gender Guidelines, supra note 5, at 17. 
275 Macklin, supra note 2, at 52. 
276 Luopajärvi, supra note, 137, at 77. 
277 See, R-A Rule, supra note 199, at 76591. 
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government was unable or unwilling to control the abusive behaviour of the applicant’s 
father.278 Also, in Abankwah v. INS, in a case concerning a woman who had sought asylum 
in the US and withholding of deportation on the grounds that should she return to Ghana, 
she would be forced to undergo FGM as a consequence of having engaged in premarital 
sex, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that as the number of prosecutions had been 
insignificant (only seven arrests between 1994 and 1999) there was not sufficient State 
protection even if the practice of FGM had been criminalized in Ghana.279 Alternatively, 
in Elnager, the Ninth Circuit has held that where there exists full administrative and 
judicial mechanisms for remedy, and the government goes to considerable effort to ensure 
that violence or threat of it against religious minorities does not occur, the government is 
not unable or unwilling to control persecutors.280 
   Furthermore, the proposed R-A- Rule further states that: 
 
in evaluating whether a government is unwilling or unable to control the infliction 
of harm or suffering, the immigration judge or asylum officer should consider 
whether the government takes reasonable steps to control the infliction of harm or 
suffering and whether the applicant has reasonable access to the state protection 
that exists.281 
 
According to some experts, based on the jurisprudence, the US takes a similar approach 
to the British courts in Horvath, emphasizing the existence of legislation, machinery for 
prosecution and punishment of private harm, as well as willingness to operate such 
systems.282 
 
D. “For reasons of…” or Nexus to a Persecution Ground 
 
                                                 
278 Luopajärvi, supra note, 137, at 77. See also, Aguirre-Cervantes v. INS, No. 99-70861 (9th 
 Cir. 2001), at 595-96. 
279 Abankwah v. INS, CA (US) 2nd Cir., 9 Jul 1999, 185 F.3d 18, at 21. 
280 Elnager v. INS, (9th Cir. 1991), 930 F.2d 784, 789, as cited in Aguirre-Cervantes v. INS, supra note 278, 
at 368, 596.  
281 R-A Rule, supra note 199, at 76597, Section 208.15(a)(1) (emphasis added). See also, Luopajärvi, supra 
note, 137, at 78. 
282 Luopajärvi, supra note, 137, at 78. 
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After a claimant proves that she has a well-founded fear of persecution, she must then 
satisfy the statutory requirement that her persecution was on account of one of the 
enumerated persecution grounds. Meeting this requirement has presented the greatest 
challenge to female claimants, including those fleeing FGM. Decision-makers have 
determined either that the claimant does not fall within the statutorily protected category 
claimed, or that the violence was not inflicted on account of the protected ground.283 
Underlying such decisions, as will be reinforced in Chapter Three in relation to FGM, “is 
the misconception that gender-related violence is a private issue, unconnected to the 
political and social structures that serve to perpetuate the subjugation of women”.284 
     Another inherent difficulty experienced by women in establishing that their claim was 
on account of one of the enumerated persecution grounds stems from the absence of 
gender as an enumerated persecution ground. None of the gender-guidelines under 
examination have taken such an innovative step, instead, they merely encourage decision-
makers to let gender inform their assessment under the existing grounds if possible. As a 
last resort, ‘women’ might qualify under the PSG category.  
     The nexus issue is particularly problematic in cases of non-State persecution, and it is 
in this respect that the national application of the nexus clause of the refugee definition 
differs most. According to UNHCR’s interpretation, in cases where there is a risk of being 
persecuted by non-State actors, for reasons that are related to one of the Convention 
grounds, the causal link is established, whether or not the absence of State protection is 
Convention related. Alternatively, where the risk of being persecuted at the hands of a 
non-State actor is not related to a Convention ground, but the inability or unwillingness 
of the State to offer protection is for reasons of a Convention ground, the causal link is 
equally established.285 
                                                 
283 Sinha, supra note 10, at 1573. See also, Klawitter, supra note 178 (finding that the claimants rape by a 
government official was not motivated by ‘any interest on his part to persecute her); Campos-Guardado, 
supra note 183, (affirming the BIA’s determination that the rapes suffered by the claimant were ‘personally 
motivated’ and where therefore not on account of her political opinion).  
284 Sinha, supra note 10, at 1573. 
285 For example, where a woman is abused by her husband in a state that takes no action against such abuse, 
the woman may not be able to establish that her husband has abused her for reasons of her membership in 
a PSG, or any other Convention ground. Nonetheless, if the state is unwilling to extend protection against 
the abuse based on one of the Convention grounds, the requirement of a causal link is satisfied. Conversely, 
in a case where a woman is threatened with FGM by her tribe—on account of her being a female member 
of a tribe practicing FGM—in a state that prohibits but cannot prevent circumcision, the causal link is 
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1. Grounds for Persecution 
 
While race is clearly not specific to women, persecution of women for reasons of race 
frequently takes a gender-specific form, and both the UK and CIRB gender-guidelines 
note that race and gender may operate in tandem to explain why a claimant fears 
persecution. The CIRB gender-guidelines note that, “a woman from a minority race in 
her country may be persecuted not only for her race, but also for her gender”,286 whilst 
the UK guidelines stipulate that, “women may be targeted, not simply because of their 
race, but also because they are perceived as propagating a racial group or ethnic identity 
through their reproductive role”.287 The INS gender-guidelines are silent on the 
intersection of gender and race. Arguably, this omission was because such a broad 
category could potentially open the flood gate of asylum claimants, as all women from a 
specific race could in theory apply for asylum. In the case of FGM for instance, with 
statistics revealing that 88% of women in Sierra Leone undergo FGM,288 the US would 
fear having to potentially offer protection to all those women. Whilst it is recognised that 
not all women in Sierra Leone fear FGM289 and the “flood-gate” theory has shown to be 
unsubstantiated, many courts and anti-immigration advocates continue to use it as 
                                                 
established irrespective whether the lack of state protection is related to a Convention ground or not. See, 
Luopajärvi, supra note, 137, at 17-18. See also, UNHCR Gender Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 21; 
UNHCR, PSG Guidelines, supra note 30, paras. 20-23; Aleinikoff T, “Protected characteristics and social 
perceptions: An analysis of the meaning of ‘membership of a particular social group”, in Feller E, Türk V 
& Nicholson F, ‘Refugee Protection in International Law: UNHCR’s Global Consultations on International 
Protection’, Cambridge University Press: London, (2003), at 301-303; Summary of Conclusions: 
Membership of a particular social group, Global Consultations on International Protection, San Remo 
Expert Roundtable, 6-8 September 2001, No. 6. (Hereafter referred to as UNHCR Summary of 
Conclusions). 
286 CIRB Gender Guidelines, supra note 3, Section A.2. 
287 UK Gender Guidelines, supra note 8, Section 3.6. See also, Home Office Asylum Policy Instruction: 
Gender Issues in the Asylum Claim, supra note 8, at 9 which states that, “Whilst actual or attributed racial 
identity is not specific to women, gender may affect the form that persecution takes in race-related cases. 
For example, whilst the destruction of ethnic identity and/or prosperity of a racial group may be through 
killing, maiming or incarcerating men, women may be viewed as propagating ethnic identity through their 
reproductive role, and may be persecuted through, for example, sexual violence or control of reproduction”. 
288 Fofana U, “Captured and Cut: FGM returns to Sierra Leone despite official ban”, (2016). This article is 
available online via The Guardian Website at  
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/sep/29/female-genital-mutilation-returns-sierra-




justification for narrow asylum definitions. Perhaps the silence in the INS gender-
guidelines is a manifestation of this immigration fear. 
     In respect of nationality, the UK and CIRB gender-guidelines both proclaim that a fear 
of persecution may also be linked to reasons of nationality where a law causes a woman 
to lose her nationality because of her marriage to a foreign national. They further caution 
that, it is not the loss of citizenship that constitutes persecution, but the consequences 
which result from that loss, i.e. loss of residence rights.290 The INS gender-guidelines 
regrettably do not discuss nationality as a ground of persecution in a gender context. 
      With respect to religion, both the CIRB and UK gender-guidelines propose that 
freedom of religion encompasses the right to practice, or not practice, a prescribed 
religion. Thus, in a society where “religion assigns certain roles to women”, a woman who 
“does not fulfil her assigned role and is punished for that….may have a well-founded fear 
of persecution for reasons of religion”.291 The UK gender-guidelines go a step further than 
their Canadian counterpart and posits that, a woman’s religious identity, like her race may 
be perceived to be aligned with that of other members of her community or family, 
including those of her husband or partner who may be of a different religion, and thus 
faces the risk of losing her own religious identity.292         
     Strangely, the INS gender-guidelines do not articulate religion as a ground of 
persecution in such cases, but rather incorporates it into the definition of persecution. The 
guidelines quote Fisher v INS,293 a case concerning an Iranian woman who objected to 
Iranian dress codes. In its determination, the court stated that: 
  
                                                 
290 CIRB Gender Guidelines, supra note 3, Section A.2; UK Gender Guidelines, supra note 8, Section 3.9. 
See also, Home Office Asylum Policy Instruction: Gender Issues in the Asylum Claim, supra note 8, at 10 
which states that, “Whilst actual or attributed national identity is not specific to women, it may operate in 
tandem with gender to explain why a woman fears persecution. For example, women may be deprived of 
full citizenship rights in certain circumstances, if they marry a foreign national. In such circumstances, it 
may be necessary to consider what harm results from this loss and whether it amounts to persecution on the 
basis of nationality”. 
291 CIRB Gender Guidelines, supra note 3, Section A.2; UK Gender Guidelines, supra note 8, Section 3.11-
3.14. See also, Home Office Asylum Policy Instruction: Gender Issues in the Asylum Claim, supra note 8, 
at 9-10 (equally discussing the connection between gender and religion). 
292 UK Gender Guidelines, supra note 8, Section 3.16. See also, Home Office Asylum Policy Instruction: 
Gender Issues in the Asylum Claim, supra note 8, at 10 what states that, “A woman's religious identity may 
be perceived to be aligned or shared with that of other members of her family or community. Imputed or 
attributed religious identity may therefore be important”. 
293 Fisher v INS, supra note 224, at 1371. 
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When a person with religious views different from those espoused by a religious 
regime is required to conform to, or is punished for failing to comply with laws 
that fundamentally are abhorrent to that persons deeply held religious convictions, 
the resulting anguish should be considered in determining whether the authorities 
have engaged in extreme conduct that is tantamount to persecution.294 
 
The guidelines do not, however, mention that this persecution may be on grounds of 
religion.295 Again, this silence could be because of floodgates arguments. 
     In respect of political opinion, the examined guidelines all acknowledge that 
persecution caused by a woman’s resistance to ‘institutionalized discrimination’, as 
manifest by her speech or conduct, may amount to persecution on account of her political 
opinion.296 The CIRB gender-guidelines explicitly state that where women are, “assigned 
a subordinate status and the authority exercised by men over women results in a general 
oppression of women”, their political protest and activism may not always manifest 
themselves in the same way as men.297 Similar caution is evident in the UK gender-
guidelines,298 which lists the following examples of political activities carried out within 
the cultural confines of the ‘private sphere’ as roles assigned to women: providing 
community service, food, clothing, medical care, hiding people and passing messages 
from one person to another.299 Thus, decision-makers are encouraged to accept that while 
these activities are not ‘traditionally’ recognised forms of male political 
                                                 
294 Ibid, at 1379. 
295 Macklin, supra note 2, at 53. 
296 Ibid, at 53. See also, INS Gender Guidelines, supra note 5, at 11; CIRB Gender Guidelines, supra note 
3, Section A.2; UK Gender Guidelines, supra note 8, Section 3.19; Home Office Asylum Policy Instruction: 
Gender Issues in the Asylum Claim, supra note 8, at 12. Per some leading experts, not only can political 
opinion be labelled feminist, political opinion would also be the preferred choice where the laws or practices 
in question are, “putatively justified not by religion but by culture. See, Macklin, supra note 2, at 54. 
297 CIRB Gender Guidelines, supra note 3, Section A.2. 
298 UK Gender Guidelines, supra note 8, Section 3.22. See also, Home Office Asylum Policy Instruction: 
Gender Issues in the Asylum Claim, supra note 8, at 12, which states that, “Whilst many women will be 
involved in such conventional political activities and raise similar claims this does not always correspond 
to the reality of the experiences of women in some societies. The gender roles in many countries mean that 
women will more often be involved in low level political activities, for instance hiding people, passing 
messages or providing community services, food, clothing or medical care. Decision-makers should beware 
of equating so-called "low-level" political activity with low risk. The response of the state to such activity 
may be disproportionately persecutory because of the involvement of a section of society, namely women, 
where because of their gender it is considered inappropriate for them to be involved at all”. 
299 Ibid; UK Gender Guidelines, supra note 8, Section 3.23; CIRB Gender Guidelines, supra note 3, Section 
A.2 (see in particular the 2003 Compendium of Decisions: Guideline 4: Women Refugee Claimants Fearing 
Gender-Related Persecution: Update, supra note 3, which provides a number of cases detailing these 
particular forms of ‘private’ political activities by women.).  See generally, Greatbatch J, “The Gender 
Difference: Feminist Critiques of Refugee Discourse” 1 International Journal of Refugee Law 518, (1989). 
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activity/opposition, the cultural contexts in which these “activities are performed makes 
them political, regardless of whether they are inherently political”.300 
      According to Macklin, the US takes a far more expansive view of political opinion 
than Canada or the UK.301 For example, in Lazo-Majano, as discussed earlier the Ninth 
Circuit ruled that a Salvadoran woman who had been beaten, enslaved and raped by her 
military official employer, had been persecuted on account of her political opinion. The 
court determined that her employer was, “asserting the political opinion that a man has a 
right to dominate”.302 It further concluded that he had persecuted the claimant, “to force 
her to accept his opinion without rebellion”.303 Her employer although he knew that his 
victim held no such opinions, threatened to accuse her of being a political subversive if 
she resisted him.304 He used this threat to ensure her silence. Arguably, the court’s analysis 
was designed to overcome the assertion that the harm inflicted on the claimant was simply 
‘personal’, and thus it strained to find that she had a political opinion in relation to the 
Salvadoran Government.305 It would not suffice to suggest that the nexus to the 
Convention ground was the persecutor’s political opinion regarding the role of women 
because, as the US Supreme Court determined in 1991, the persecution must be, “on 
account of the victim’s political opinion, not the persecutors”.306 The INS gender-
guidelines do not elaborate on the potential scope of political opinion in relation to gender-
based claims. However, it should be noted that following the promulgation of the INS 
Gender Guidelines in 1995, US immigration law was amended to compel the recognition 
                                                 
300 UK Gender Guidelines, supra note 8, Section 3.23 & Home Office Asylum Policy Instruction: Gender 
Issues in the Asylum Claim, supra note 8, at 12. For instance, posting posters is not inherently political, but 
will be if, for example, they support a particular party or cause, similarly cooking food is not inherently 
political, but if it is part of or supportive of Trade Union activities, such an activity becomes inherently 
political. 
301 Macklin, supra note 2, at 54. 
302 Lazo-Majano, supra note 182, at 1435. 
303 Ibid. 
304 Macklin, supra note 2, at 54. 
305 Ibid. 
306 Ibid, at 54-5. See also, INS Gender Guidelines, supra note 5, at 10 (referring to INS v Elias-Zacarias, 
112 S.Ct. 812 (1991). 
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of forcible sterilization and abortion as persecution on account of political opinion.307 The 
legislation did not articulate what the political opinion consisted of.308 
      Domestic violence is one of the most evident examples of women’s powerlessness 
within the private sphere. A divergence appears to be emerging with respect to the 
treatment of domestic violence in each of my respective case-studies within the RDP. 
Whilst Canada and the UK tend to link domestic violence to membership in a PSG, within 
the US, in addition to this ground some decision-makers have also used the ground of 
political opinion. To appreciate the implications of these competing approaches, the 
following section will describe and compare them. 
 
2. Membership in a PSG  
 
In its guidelines on Membership in a PSG, the UNHCR defines a PSG as being: 
 
a group of persons who share a common characteristic other than their risk of being 
persecuted, or who are perceived as a group by society. The characteristic will 
often be one which is innate, unchangeable, or which is otherwise fundamental to 
identity, conscience or the exercise of one’s human rights.309 
 
This definition includes characteristics which are historical and as a result cannot be 
changed, and those which, though it is possible to change them, ought not to be required 
to be changed because they are so closely linked to the identity of the individual, or are 
an expression of fundamental human rights.310 Furthermore, if a claimant alleges a social 
group that is based on a characteristic determined to be neither unalterable or fundamental, 
                                                 
307 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pun. L. NO. 104-208, sec. 601, 
§ 101(a)(42), 110 Stat. 2009-546, 3009-689. Section 601(a) of the Act effectively amended the refugee 
definition by adding the following: 
   “For the purposes of determination under (the Immigration and Nationality) Act, a person who has been 
forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo involuntary sterilization, or who has been persecuted for failure 
or refusal to undergo such a procedure or for other resistance to a coercive population control programme, 
shall be deemed to have been persecuted on account of political opinion, and a person who has a well-
founded fear that he or she will be forced to undergo such a procedure or subject to prosecution for such 
failure, refusal, or resistance shall be deemed to have a well founded fear of persecution on account of 
political opinion”. Ibid. 
308 Macklin, supra note 2, at 55. 
309 UNHCR, PSG Guidelines, supra note 30, para 11. 
310 Ibid, para 12. 
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further analysis should be undertaken to determine whether the group is nonetheless 
perceived as a cognizable group in that society.311  
    It should be noted, however, that a PSG, “cannot be defined exclusively by the 
persecution that members of the group suffer or by a common fear of being persecuted”.312 
Nonetheless, persecutory action towards a group may be a relevant factor in determining 
the visibility of a group in a particular society.313 Also a fundamental human right can 
constitute a unifying characteristic of a social group if a society regards those persons as 
a group because of their common right to exercise a specific human right.314 Further, there 
is no requirement to prove that every member of the group has a well-founded fear of 
persecution in order to establish a PSG in accordance with the Refugee Convention.315 
Moreover there is no requirement that the group be cohesive,316 or that the size of the 
group be a relevant consideration in determining whether a PSG exists.317 
     Finally, it should be noted that mere membership of a PSG, “will not normally be 
enough to substantiate a claim for refugee status. There may, however, be special 
circumstances where mere membership can be a sufficient ground to fear 
persecution.”318Also, one or more Convention grounds may overlap with each other, 
depending on the circumstances of each individual case.319 
 
A. Women as a PSG320 
 
                                                 
311 Ibid, para 13. 
312 Ibid, para 14. 
313 See also, UNHCR Summary of Conclusions, supra note 285, no.6. 
314 Luopajärvi, supra note 137, at 27. See also, Aleinikoff, supra note 285, at 293-4 (quoting Applicant A v 
MIMA, para 246). 
315 Aleinikoff, supra note 285, at 288. See also, UNHCR, PSG Guidelines, supra note 30, para 17; UNHCR 
Summary of Conclusions, supra note 285, no.7. 
316 UNHCR, PSG Guidelines, supra note 30, para 15; UNHCR Summary of Conclusions, supra note 285, 
no.4. 
317 UNHCR, PSG Guidelines, supra note 30, para 18-19. 
318 UNHCR Handbook, supra note 234, para 79; UNHCR, PSG Guidelines, supra note 30, para 16. 
319 UNHCR Handbook, supra note 234, para 77; UNHCR Summary of Conclusions, supra note 285, no.3. 
320 These comments aim at identifying the current, gender-sensitive interpretation. As the development of 
the concept has received considerable attention elsewhere those issues will not be considered here. See, 
Neal, supra note 9; Fullerton M, “A comparative look at refugee status based on persecution due to 
membership in a particular social group”, 26 Cornell Journal of International Law 3 (1993), at 55; Kelly 
N, “Gender-related persecution: assessing the asylum claims of women”, 26 Cornell Journal of International 
Law 626 (1993), at 625; Macklin, “Refugee Women and the Imperative of Categories”, supra note 248. 
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According to Hathaway, gender-based groups are typical examples of “social subsets” 
defined by an innate and unchangeable characteristic.321
 
As women are identified as a 
group in society, they are often subject to different treatment and standards in some 
countries.322
 
In accordance with the UNHCR’s definition of a PSG, ‘women’ both share 
a common characteristic (their gender), which is both innate and unchangeable, and are 
usually perceived as a group by society. The UNHCR Executive Committee recognised 
already in 1985 that women fleeing persecution may be considered as a PSG.323 The 
Executive Committee reiterated this position in 1993 in relation to persecution through 
sexual violence.324
 
In its recent guidelines on membership of a PSG, the UNCHR states 
that sex falls within the ambit of the social group category, “with women being a clear 
example of a social subset defined by innate and immutable characteristics, and who are 
frequently treated differently from men”.325 
      Arguably, as there is no cohesiveness requirement in the UNHCR definition of a social 
group, women may therefore constitute a PSG under certain circumstances, whether or 
not they associate with one another based on that shared characteristic.326 Occasionally 
the size of a social group has been used as a reason for not recognising ‘women’ as 
constituting a social group.327 The UNCHR PSG guidelines have ended this restriction 
and state that, “the purported size of the social group is not a relevant criterion in 
determining whether a PSG exists”.328
 
The UNHCR also notes that even though ‘women’ 
have been recognised as a PSG, this does not mean that all women would be eligible for 
refugee status;329
 
a claimant must naturally fulfil all the other criteria in the refugee 
definition. 
                                                 
321 Hathaway, “The Law of Refugee Status”, supra note 239, at 162. 
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In considering the application of the ‘membership in a PSG’ category, the CIRB gender-
guidelines encourage decision-makers to refer to the Supreme Court of Canada decision 
in Ward330 which formulated its understanding of a PSG. Prior to the decision, the PSG 
category had been considered in a few Federal Court cases, including Mayers331 and 
Cheung.332 In Ward, the Supreme Court recognised that a PSG may constitute: (1) groups 
defined by an innate or unchangeable characteristic; (2) groups whose members 
voluntarily associate for reasons so fundamental to their human dignity that they should 
not be forced to forsake the association; and (3) groups associated by a former voluntary 
status, unalterable due to its historical permanence.333 The court listed gender as an 
example of such a characteristic.334 Unfortunately, the CIRB gender-guidelines contain 
no further practical guidance on whether or how to identify or define a gender-based social 
group. 
 
       In 1995 the Supreme Court again had the opportunity to elaborate on their 
understanding of membership of a PSG. In a split decision in Chan335 a case concerning 
forced sterilization, the majority determined that the claimant did not meet the burden of 
proof regarding well-founded fear of persecution, and refrained from addressing the social 
                                                 
330 Ward v. Canada (Attorney General), SC (CA) 30 Jun. 1993, 2 S.C.R. [1993] 689. See also, CIRB Gender 
Guidelines, supra note 3, Section A. 3. 
331 Canada (MEI) v. Marcel Mayers, FC (CA), 5 Nov. 1992, [1993] 1 FC 154 (C.A.). Mayers concerned a 
woman from Trinidad and Tobago who had been abused and raped by her husband. The Federal Court held 
that ‘Trinidadian women subject to wife abuse’ was a PSG. A ‘PSG’ was defined as “(1) a natural or non-
natural group of persons with (2) similar shared background, habits, social status, political outlook, 
education, values, aspirations, history, economic activity or interests, often interests contrary to those of the 
prevailing government, and (3) sharing basic, innate, unalterable characteristics, consciousness and 
solidarity, or (4) sharing a temporary but voluntary status, with the purpose of their association being so 
fundamental to their human dignity that they should not be required to alter it.”   
332 Cheung v. MEI, FC (CA) [1993] 2 FC 314 (C.A.). Applying the test proposed in Mayers the Federal 
Court held that women in China who have more than one child and are faced with forced sterilization 
constituted a PSG.   
333 Ward, supra note 330, at 739. 
334 The court noted that the first category “would embrace individuals fearing persecution on such bases as 
gender, linguistic background and sexual orientation, while the second would encompass, for example, 
human rights activists. The third branch is included more because of the anti-discrimination influences, in 
that one's past is an immutable part of the person”. Ibid, at 739. 
335 Chan v. Canada (MEI), SC (CA) 19 Oct. 1995, 3 S.C.R. [1995] 593.   
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group question. In his dissent, Justice, La Forest did, however, elaborate on the question 
of membership of a PSG and clarified the reasoning in Ward:336 
 
a refugee alleging membership in a particular social group does not have to be in 
a voluntary association with other persons similar to him- or herself. Such a 
claimant is in no manner required to associate, ally, or consort voluntarily with 
kindred persons. The association exists by virtue of a common attempt made by its 
members to exercise a fundamental right.337
 
 
Thus, the association in this case was so fundamental that the claimant could not be 
required to forsake it, and the claimant was found to be a member of a PSG.  
   As gender is an innate characteristic, ‘women’ as well as sub-groups of women may 
constitute a PSG.338 Such subgroups according to the CIRB gender-guidelines may be 
identified by reference to characteristics, in addition to gender, which may also be innate 
or unchangeable, such as age, race or marital or economic status.339
 
Examples of social 
groups identified by Canadian jurisprudence relevant to gender-related claims include the 
family; homosexuals (sexual orientation); women subject to domestic abuse; women 
forced into marriage without their consent; women subject to FGM; women subjected to 
forced sterilization; and educated women.340 It should be noted that even though a social 
group cannot be defined solely by the fact that a group of persons is subject to 
persecution,341 social groups have been defined through gender and the feared 
persecution, for example, as ‘women subject to circumcision’.342 The CIRB gender-
guidelines clarify this issue by stating that a group is not considered to be “defined solely 
                                                 
336 In particular, the dissent discussed the second category of social groups, namely, voluntary associated 
groups, and held that the right of a person or a couple to freely decide the number, spacing and timing of 
their children was a fundamental human right, and that parents asserting their right to have more than one 
child formed an association. Although made in dissent, Justice La Forest’s comments on the social group 
issue were joined by two other Court members and were not contradicted by the majority. It should also be 
recalled that Ward was an unanimous judgment. See, Daley K & Kelley N, “Particular social group: A 
human rights based approach in Canadian Jurisprudence”, 12 International Journal of Refugee Law 148 
(2000), at 151.   
337 Chan, supra note 335, dissent per La Forest, at 643-46.  
338 Luopajärvi, supra note 137, at 88. 
339 Ibid. See also, CIRB Gender Guidelines, supra note 3, Section A.3: Application of the Statutory Ground. 
340 Luopajärvi, supra note 137, at 88-9. See also, Interpretation of the Convention Refugee Definition in the 
Case Law, Legal Services—Immigration and Refugee Board, 31 Dec. 2002, (hereafter IRB Interpretation), 
at 4-6 & 4-9, as cited in Luopajärvi, supra note 137, at 89, note 422. 
341 Ward, supra note 330, at 729-33. 
342 Luopajärvi, supra note 137, at 89. 
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by common victimisation if the claimant’s fear of persecution is also based on her gender, 




Islam and Shah344 was the first case concerning the construction the PSG ground to reach 
the UKHL.345 In this case the UKHL determined that a PSG comprises of a group of 
individuals who share a common, immutable characteristic that is either beyond the power 
of a person to change, or is so integral to the individual’s identity that it ought not to be 
required to be altered.346 The Court further stated that it was not required that a PSG 
should possess a component of cohesiveness—even though cohesiveness might prove the 
existence of a PSG.347 Therefore, the PSG phrase applies to groups falling within the 
Refugee Convention’s anti-discriminatory objectives. Thus, women who live in countries, 
which discriminate against them on the grounds of sex, can constitute such a group.348 
Consequently, the claimants, two Pakistani women who had been subject to domestic 
                                                 
343 CIRB Gender Guidelines, supra note 3, at Section A,3.  
344 See, Islam & Shah, supra note 247, as reprinted in 11 International Journal of Refugee Law 3 (1999), at 
496. See also Islam & Shah in the Court of Appeals, [1998] 1 WLR 74; [1997].   
345 Before 1999 the UK Court of Appeals had considered the question of how a PSG should be construed 
for the first time in Savchenkov. In that case the Court of Appeal accepted that ‘membership of a PSG’ 
should be interpreted esjudem generis, and that the concept of ‘PSG’ must have been intended to apply to 
social groups which exist independently of persecution. See, Savchenkov v. SSHD, (1996) Imm. AR 28, at 
34. See also, Lazarevic v. SSHD, CA (UK), [1997] Imm AR 251, where the Court of Appeals held that 
‘PSG’ must be construed esjudem generis with the other Convention grounds but there is no requirement 
that the social group must possess a civil or political status in order to be recognised as a social group. Vidal 
M, “Membership of a particular social group” and the effect of Islam and Shah”, 11 International Journal 
of Refugee Law 528, (1999), at 532. 
346 Luopajärvi, supra note 137, at 89. 
347 Ibid at 89-90. Islam & Shah, per Lord Steyn, and Lord Hoffmann, supra note 247, International Journal 
of Refugee Law, at 501-503; 511-12 respectively. See also comments by Goodwin-Gill G, “Judicial 
reasoning and ‘social group’ after Islam and Shah”, 11 International Journal of Refugee Law 537, (1999) 
at 538.   
348 Islam & Shah, per lord Steyn, and Lord Hoffmann, supra note 247, International Journal of Refugee 
Law, at 503; 511-12 respectively. See also, Vidal, supra note 345, at 533. The emphasis on the principles 
of non-discriminatory has been criticised. For example, Goodwin-Gill has expressed fears that the non-
discrimination argument may be unnecessarily limiting. Goodwin-Gill, “Judicial Reasoning”, supra note 
347, at 538-39. See also judgment per Auld LJ in Skenderaj v. SSHD, supra note 261, paras. 19, 23-27, 
where he questions the relevance of non-discrimination considerations in cases of persecution by non-state 
actors. He states that “it is not necessary to insist upon discrimination as a defining element of a particular 
social group to satisfy […] that the latter must exist independently of, and not be defined by, persecution.” 
(para. 27) In addition, see judgment by the High Court of Australia in Chen Shi Hai v. MIMA, (2000) 201 
CLR 293.   
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violence and accused of adultery, had a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of 
their membership in the PSG ‘Pakistani women’.349 Furthermore, the UKHL determined 
that a PSG must exist independently from the persecution claimed. However, it was also 
held that the actions of the persecutors may serve to identify or even cause the creation of 
a PSG in society.350 
     Affirming the Islam and Shah determination, the UK gender-guidelines state that a 
PSG will exist where “a group of individuals with a particular characteristic are 
recognised by society as being different from others in the society”.351 According to the 
guidelines, whether that will be the situation will depend on the evidence and the factual 
situation in the particular country of origin.352 Thus, the society of a country of origin, the 
acts of persecutors as well as other external factors have a role in defining, identifying 
and even causing the creation of a PSG.353 As examples of relevant particular 
characteristics (innate, unchangeable or such that a person should not be required to 
change them) the guidelines include gender, age, race, marital status, family, kinship ties, 
sexual orientation, economic status and tribal or clan affiliation.354 Furthermore, the 
                                                 
349 Lords Steyn, Hope of Craighead and Hoffman favoured the broader formulation of ‘Pakistani women’. 
Lord Steyn also held in the alternative that the group consisted of ‘Pakistani women accused of transgressing 
social mores and who are unprotected by their husbands or other male relatives’. Lord Hutton concurred 
with Lord Steyn’s alternative, narrower group, and Lord Millet dissented and would have dismissed the 
appeals.   
350 Luopajärvi, supra note 137, at 90. See also, Islam & Shah, per Lord Steyn, supra note 247, International 
Journal of Refugee Law, at 504-505. Lord Steyn citied with approval the Australian case of A v. MIEA, 142 
ALR 331, 359 (McHugh J.). See also, Yake v. SSHD, IAT 19 Jan. 2000, UK IAT 00TH00493. The PSG 
was held to be “Yopougon women who may be subject to FMG”.   
351 UK Gender Guidelines, supra note 8, section 3.35. See also, Home Office Asylum Policy Instruction: 
Gender Issues in the Asylum Claim, supra note 8, at 11 (noting the Islam and Shah approach and 
encouraging decision-makers to follow this approach which has been identified by the European Council 
Directive (2004/83/EC) of 29th April 2004 on Minimum Standards for the Qualification and Status of Third 
Country Nationals or Stateless Persons as Refugees or as Persons who otherwise need International 
Protection and the content of the protection granted. This Directive has been transposed into UK law through 
the Refugee or Person in need of International Protection (Qualification) Regulations 2006 – “Qualification 
Regulations” – and changes to the immigration rules, and will apply to all asylum and human rights claims 
from 9 October 2006). 
352 Ibid, at 10 (“A definition of what constitutes a PSG is provided in the Qualification Regulations, which 
state that:  “A group shall be considered to form a particular social group where, for example: (1) Members 
of that group share an innate characteristic, or a common background that cannot be changed, or share a 
characteristic or belief that is so fundamental to identity or conscience that a person should not be forced to 
renounce it, and (2) That group has a distinct identity in the relevant country, because it is perceived as 
being different by the surrounding society.”  See also, UK Gender Guidelines, supra note 8, section 3.36. 
353 Ibid, section 3.37. 
354 Ibid, section 3.39; Home Office Asylum Policy Instruction: Gender Issues in the Asylum Claim, supra 
note 8, at 11. See also, Luopajärvi, supra note 137, at 90. 
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guidelines note that whether such factors are unchangeable depends on the social and 
cultural context in which the woman lives, as well as of the perception of the agents of 




In 1985 the BIA in Acosta,356 described a PSG as a group of individuals who share a 
common, immutable characteristic. The shared characteristic might be an innate one such 
as sex, colour, or kinship ties, or in some circumstances it might be a shared past 
experience such as former military leadership or land ownership. The court further 
determined that the characteristic must be one that the members of the group either cannot 
change, or should not be required to change because it is fundamental to their individual 
identities or consciences.357 In Sanchez-Trujillo, decided a year later, the Ninth Circuit 
took a different approach and determined that a PSG implied: 
 
a collection of people closely affiliated with each other, who are actuated by some 
common impulse or interest. Of central concern is the existence of a voluntary 
associational relationship among purported members, which imparts some 
common characteristic that is fundamental to their identity.358 
 
According to Luopajärvi, since the Sanchez-Trujillo decision US practice on the social 
group issue has been divided into two streams, with the BIA and the vast majority of 
Circuit Courts of Appeals following Acosta, and the minority of Circuit Courts following 
                                                 
355 UK Gender Guidelines, supra note 8, section 3.39. The Asylum Policy Instruction: Gender Issues in the 
Asylum Claim, supra note 8, also states that, “whether a PSG exists will depend on the conditions in the 
‘society’ from which the applicant comes”. Ibid, at 11.  
356 Acosta, supra note 211. 
357 The formulation in Acosta has had a considerable influence of the understanding of the phrase ‘PSG’ in 
many other jurisdictions. See for example, Ward, supra note 330, and Islam & Shah, supra note 247. See 
also, Matter of Kasinga, where the BIA applying the criteria for defining a PSG set down in Acosta, held 
that a “particular social group is defined by common characteristics that members of the group either cannot 
change, or should not be required to change because such characteristics are fundamental to their individual 
identities.” Thus, the BIA found that the applicant was a member of a PSG consisting of young women 
members of a certain tribe who had not undergone FGM, and who opposed the practice. In re Kasinga, BIA 
13 Jun. 1996, Interim decision no. 3278, (21 I & N dec. 357), at 10.  
358 Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, CA (US) 2nd Cir., 801 F.2d 1571 (1986).   
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Sanchez-Trujillo.359 However, in 1999, the BIA held in the Matter of R.A. that the 
immutable or fundamental characteristic-criterion was only a threshold, and that an 
additional criteria must be demonstrated in order to fall under the social group category—
namely that group members “understand their own affiliation with the grouping, as do 
other persons within the particular society” and the suffered harm is “itself an important 
societal attribute”.360 As already discussed, the decision was originally vacated by the BIA 
and the INS issued proposed rules on interpreting the refugee definition. They restate the 
Acosta PSG definition.361 The commentary to the rules affirms that gender is “clearly such 
an immutable trait” and that membership of a social group cannot be defined by the 
persecution suffered.362 
    Irrespective on what the fate of the proposed rules is, it should be noted that the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals seems to have revised its position on the social group issue. In 
its decision in Hernandez-Montiel,363 which concerned a young homosexual Mexican 
with a female gender identity, the Court noted that the US case-law on the issue “is not 
wholly consistent” and held that its decision in Sanchez-Trujillo should be interpreted as 
consistent with the Acosta test and that the so called voluntary association test is an 
alternative basis for establishing membership in a PSG.364 Referring to the INS proposed 
rules, the Court reaffirmed this approach in Aguirre-Cervantes, and found that the 
claimant had been persecuted by her father for reasons of her membership in a PSG, 
namely her family.365      
                                                 
359 Luopajärvi, supra note 137, at 92. See also, Aleinikoff, supra note 285, at 275-280. See also, Geovanni 
Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, CA (US) 9th Cir., 24 Aug. 2000, 225 F.3d 1084, as reprinted in 12 International 
Journal of Refugee Law 4 (2001), 608, 615, as cited in Luopajärvi, supra note 137, at 92, note 436. 
360 In re R.A, BIA 11 Jun. 1999, Interim dec. no. 3402. The decision was subsequently (2001) overturned 
by the Attorney General (Janet Reno) and remanded to the BIA for reconsideration until after the adoption 
of the INS proposed rules (65 Fed. Reg. 76588, 7 Dec. 2000). No decision as already discussed has yet been 
taken in the case. See also, Schaffer H, “Domestic violence and asylum in the United States: In re R- A-” 
95 Northwestern University Law Review 779, (2001); Binder A, “Gender and the “membership in a 
particular social group’ category of the 1951 Refugee Convention”, 10 Columbia Journal of Gender and 
Law 167, (2001).   
361 Luopajärvi, supra note 137, at 92. See also, R-A Rule, supra note 199, Section 208.15(c)1.   
362 Ibid. Sections 76593-76594. It is also important to note that the rules include a list of factors the may be 
considered in determining whether a social group exists, but which are not necessarily determinative. These 
factors are largely inspired by Sanchez-Trujillo and Matter of R.A. Luopajärvi, supra note 137, at 92. 
363 Geovanni Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, supra note 359, as reprinted in 12 International Journal of Refugee 
Law 608, (2001), at 614. 
364 Ibid, at 615.  Luopajärvi, supra note 137, at 93. 
365 Aguirre-Cervantes, supra note 278, at 593. The Aguirre-Cervantes case was, however, subsequently 
vacated per stipulation and remanded to the BIA (Aguirre-Cervantes v. INS, 270 F.3d 794, 9th Cir. 2001; 
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       While the examined gender guidelines attempt to be comprehensive in their treatment 
of the relevance of gender, certain significant omissions remain that could undermine the 
cases of genuine claimants. These omissions recollected below in Table 1 have exposed 
bigger issues which need to be addressed within the RDP. Like many other events in 
human experience, refugee determination is a process in which the subject's agency is 
subordinated to the definitional power of others. Nevertheless, these guidelines are merely 
a template upon which one can devise a model tailored to the particular jurisdiction in 
which it will operate. Ultimately, by remedying the flaws inherent within the guidelines 
and learning from the protective processes implemented within specialised domestic 
violence courts, the RDP can be more inclusive and accommodating of the needs of 
claimants.  
 




















Non-Binding on Decision 
Makers 
 
Approach must abide 
by the jurisprudence of 
their respective higher 
courts 
 
Approach must abide 
by the jurisprudence of 
their respective higher 
courts 
 
Approach must abide by the 
jurisprudence of their 
respective higher courts 
 
• Advocates tend to 
stereotype claimant’s to 
easily fit the categories 
of the guidelines 
Guidelines apply 
explicitly to asylum 
officers. Immigration 
Judges and the BIA are 
not formally subject to 
the Guidelines, 
although they may 
Guidelines apply only to the 
members of the IRB 
 
                                                 
273 F.3d 1220, 9th Cir. 2001), as Aguirre-Cervante’s father was found dead in Mexico in December 2001. 
The BIA will hear the case again, but as the source of persecution does not exist anymore, the claim may 
be moot. See, Daugherty M, “The Ninth Circuit, the BIA, and the INS: The shifting state of the particular 
social group definition in the Ninth Circuit and its impact of pending and future cases”, 41 Brandeis Law 
Journal 631, (2003), at 653.   
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choose to be guided by 
them 
 
• Decision-makers need 
to be continually 
trained on issues 
Acknowledgement and 
treatment of 
international law is very 
perfunctory 
 
• Do not apply to the overseas 
selection process 
• Guidelines only apply 
to inland claims 
• Do not apply to the 
overseas selection 
process 
• The Guidelines do not focus 
on the actual conduct of 
decisionmakers in the hearing 
room 
• UK gender-guidelines 
were effectively 
withdrawn. Asylum 
case owners in the UK 
Border Agency, are 
advised to consider the 
UK Border Agency’s 
asylum policy 
instructions 
• The Guidelines offer no 
constructive alternative 
to proceeding with 
whomever the claimant 
has brought, stating that 
"interviews should not 
generally be cancelled 
and rescheduled 
because women with 
gender-based asylum 
claims have brought 
male interpreters” 
• The Guidelines do not 
address whether gender-
related claims should be 
conducted with all-female 
personnel, including 
interpreters 
• Resist labelling gender-
specific practices as 
persecutory which 
relate to sexist laws or 
polices that apply to all 
women. 
• Designate domestic 
violence to be both 
"private action” and “a 
form of persecution” 
• Resist labelling gender-
specific practices as 
persecutory which relate to 
sexist laws or polices that 
apply to all women. 
• Information on the use 
and collection of 
documentation about 
country conditions is 
generic 
• Domestic Violence is 
inadequately designated 
as form of persecutory 
harm 
• Information on the use and 
collection of documentation 
about country conditions is 
generic 
• Inconsistent treatment 
of apparently similar 
cases is one of the most 
conspicuous 
weaknesses of refugee 
determination in the 
UK, and features 
prominently in the 
jurisprudence around 
domestic violence and 
state protection 
• The Guidelines do not 
explicitly identify 
international human 
rights instruments as 
aids to defining 
persecution. Instead, 
they rely on American 
caselaw interpreting the 
term "persecution” 
• Inconsistent treatment of 
apparently similar cases is 
one of the most conspicuous 
weaknesses of refugee 
determination in Canada, and 
features prominently in the 
jurisprudence around 




• Variation in the 
assessment of state 
protection in situations 
of domestic violence 
• Resist labelling gender-
specific practices as 
persecutory which 
relate to sexist laws or 
polices that apply to all 
women. 
• Variation in the assessment of 
state protection in situations 
of domestic violence 
• Do not add gender as an 
enumerated ground of 
persecution 
• Information on the use 
and collection of 
documentation about 
country conditions is 
generic 
• Do not add gender as an 
enumerated ground of 
persecution 
• Drafted at a fairly high 
degree of generality, 
and in language that is 
always equivocal 
enough to avoid the 
appearance of fettering 
the discretion of 
decisionmakers 
• Inconsistent treatment 
of apparently similar 
cases is one of the most 
conspicuous 
weaknesses of refugee 
determination in the 
US, and features 
prominently in the 
jurisprudence around 
domestic violence and 
state protection 
• Contain no substantive 
practical guidance on whether 
or how to circumscribe a 
gender-based PSG 
• Offer no constructive 
alternative to 
proceeding with male 
interpreters and other 
personnel 
• The Guidelines provide 
little information about 
state protection that 
applies to the situation 
of domestic violence 
• Do not examine the PSG 
category in the context of 
domestic violence 
• Domestic Violence is 
inadequately designated 
as form of persecutory 
harm 
• The Guidelines do not 
address evidentiary 
issues regarding state 
protection or the 
standard of "adequacy" 
that citizens are entitled 
to expect 
• Provide little direction and 
invite inconsistency in 
respects of defining women 
as a PSG  
 • Do not add gender as an 
enumerated ground of 
persecution 
• Drafted at a fairly high degree 
of generality, and in language 
that is always equivocal 
enough to avoid the 
appearance of fettering the 
discretion of decisionmakers 
 • Silent on the 
intersection of race and 
gender 
• Advocates tend to stereotype 
claimant’s to easily fit the 
categories of the guidelines 
 • The Guidelines do not 
discuss nationality as a 
• Decision-makers need to be 
continually trained on issues 
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ground of persecution 
in a gender context 
 • The Guidelines do not 
articulate religion as a 
ground of persecution 
in such cases, but rather 




 • The Guidelines do not 
elaborate on the 
potential scope of 
political opinion in 
relation to gender 
claims 
•  
 • Do not examine the 
PSG category in the 
context of domestic 
violence 
•  
 • Proffers different 
opinions on whether 
and how gender may 
form the basis of social 
group ascription 
•  
 • Drafted at a fairly high 
degree of generality, 
and in language that is 
always equivocal 
enough to avoid the 
appearance of fettering 
the discretion of 
decisionmakers 
•  





 • Advocates tend to 
stereotype claimant’s to 
easily fit the categories 
of the guidelines 
•  
 • Decision-makers need 
to be continually 








The INS, CIRB and UK Gender-Guidelines represent innovative initiatives by States to 
address the specificity of women's experiences of persecution within the context of the 
archaic definition of "refugee" promulgated at the 1951 Refugee Convention. The 
UNHCR certainly took the lead in promoting gender awareness, however, the normative 
influence of the UNHCR, on account of having no formal authority regarding the 
interpretation of the refugee definition by States, has not been directly translated into 
action at the domestic level. Whilst, the international movement for recognition of 
women's rights as human rights engendered attention to refugee women by the UNHCR, 
which the UNCHR in turn diffused to States Party, it is probably the perceived success 
(or failure) of the guidelines, as seen through the lens of domestic political concerns, that 
has generated much discussion.  
        The gender-guidelines examined in the thesis may appear as final solutions to the 
difficulties surrounding the application of the Refugee Convention to the specific needs 
of FGM and other claimants of gender-based violence. They are not, and reform is needed. 
It has been said that identifying an issue of concern and formulating a response rarely 
solves a problem and can actually expose a deeper set of issues that might not have come 
to the fore but for the fact that the initial response cleared enough conceptual space to 
problematize those deeper issues.366 This is exactly what this chapter has done. It has 
shown that whilst a welcome development, the examined gender-guideline, are not 
comprehensive and have left several issues unaddressed.367 Whilst the guidelines attempt 
to address the issue of gender-based persecution within the RDP, they have also 
unconsciously exposed States unwillingness to truly condemn certain practices. The 
treatment (or lack thereof) of domestic violence in the guidelines furnishes one example 
of these limitations. Each has been drafted very generally, and in language that is always 
equivocal enough to avoid the appearance of fettering the discretion of judges.368 Thus, 
                                                 
366 Macklin, supra note 2, at 69. 
367 As noted by Wairimu Karago, Deputy Director, Division of International Protection, UNHCR, in 
Bissland J & Lawand K, “Report of the UNHCR Symposium on Gender-Based Persecution” 9 International 




some commentators argue, to the extent that the INS Gender Guidelines rely heavily on 
restating existing jurisprudence from American sources, issues that have sparsely been 
considered by the courts, such as domestic violence, receive relatively little attention.369 
Furthermore, the advice offered by the UK and CIRB gender-guidelines in relation to 
domestic violence is so vague (and confusing at times) so as to provide little by way of 
concrete guidance.370 Moreover, several key questions - what is the nexus to the definition 
in cases of domestic violence? What are the criteria for assessing the ability or willingness 
of the state to protect? What constitutes adequate protection? -remain unacknowledged 
and unaddressed. As discussed in this chapter and Chapter One, I do not agree with the 
use of political opinion in domestic violence cases, but it is understandable that legal 
advocates will employ such strategies if they are likely to produce a favorable outcome. 
The INS gender-guidelines, through their retrospective focus on established 
jurisprudence, “miss the opportunity to suggest new alternatives that may be preferable 
both in theory and practice”.371 The consequence is that political opinion, within the 
context of the PSG will become more entrenched and used as the main vehicle of choice 
in determining such claims within the US. 
      Similarly, while each of the guidelines addresses the issue of State protection, such an 
issue arguably is far too complex to adequately address in administrative guidelines. 
Furthermore, in the context of FGM, one of the biggest problems is the absence of any 
standard against which to assess the ability/willingness of the State to protect women. 
Whilst the standard of ‘due diligence’ as set out in CEDAW may be used, States 
(including the case-studies) still need to take seriously harms inflicted on women within 
the private sphere. If one subscribes to the view that women occupy a subordinate status 
to a greater or lesser degree all over the world, there is arguably no exact standard against 
one might measure the adequacy of protection in a particular State unless one resorts to 
the (mistaken) belief that Western States adequately protect women from such forms of 
violence.372 Whilst it might be useful for decision-makers to turn their search for guidance 
back to the international arena this is not mandatory and States do not have to endorse 




372 Ibid, at 69-70. 
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such ideas. Such instruments could potentially help to fill the gaps inherent within the 
gender-guidelines.  
      However, despite the influence of the UNHCR, regardless of how committed activists, 
researchers, and interested parties are, and however good or bad the guidelines, nothing 
counts unless decision-makers within the actual RDP open their hearts and minds to the 
women who have risked all to flee their home and seek refuge in a new country. The 
success of the guidelines should be judged solely by the extent to which they enhance 
decisionmakers' ability to genuinely listen to the stories of women who are persecuted as 
or because they are women and hear them as the stories of refugees. The FGM caselaw in 
chapter three, shows that this is not the case and claimants are continually being let down 
by a system supposedly intended to protect them. For instance, the fact that the gender-
guidelines are not binding on the courts and decision-makers severely affects their 
effectiveness. For instance, if States restructured their RDP, newly-established bodies can 
choose to ignore any guidelines implemented by their predecessors. Thus, the withdrawal 
of the IAT in 2005 of the UK gender-guidelines implemented by the IAA reinforces this 
point and the ability to remove such innovative and essential guidelines instils a lack of 
confidence that gender is understood and prioritised within the RDP.  
      Moreover, unless decision-makers come to the process with an open and unbiased 
mindset, then the process will remain inherently prejudiced and futile. The gender bias 
and marginalization of women’s experiences within the refugee context is an immensely 
complex issue. The application of refugee law and the 1951 refugee definition itself 
remains constrained firstly by its founding interest to protect educated male elite claimants 
and secondly the influence of cultural relativism, which ultimately misconstrues FGM 
and other gender-based forms of violence against women as private issues, unrelated to 
the larger political and social structure which serve to maintain their subordinate status.373 
As discussed in Chapter One, race and racism may also play a significant role in how 
refugee claims are heard and decided, and as decision-makers are not accountable for 
failing to implement the guidelines, this convergence of racial and gender stereotypes, 
playing out in the language of ‘culture’, creates a serious obstacle for gender-based 
                                                 
373 Sinha, supra note 10, at 1574-8. 
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refugee claims. Coupled with the prejudices of individual decision-makers, the likelihood 
of women fleeing FGM being denied refugee protection remains considerable. 
    The FGM jurisprudence emanating from the case-studies, highlights the inconsistent 
application of the 1951 Refugee Convention definition in affording protection to women. 
It further, reinforces the weaknesses and general ineffectiveness of the use of existing 
gender-guidelines. Even though FGM, has been recognised as a form of persecution 
giving rise to a claim for refugee status within the case-studies this does not mean that 
claimants are automatically or more likely to be granted refugee status. Whilst the legal 
arguments may have been won, the procedure for claiming refugee status, and the widely 
observed ‘culture of disbelief’ within the RDP makes the road to recognition as a refugee 




















Refugee determination is arguably the single most complex adjudication function in 
contemporary Western Societies.1 This complexity stems from the need for the decision-
maker to have sufficient knowledge of the social, cultural and political environment of 
the country of origin, a capacity to bear the psychological burdens of stories of 
persecution, and an ability to deal with the legal issues pertaining to the international 
refugee definition and the procedures of quasi-judicial hearings involving various pieces 
of evidence.2 Herlihy and Turner have further argued that refugee determination is made 
difficult by arbitrary refugee policy, the lack of objective evidence available, and 
inconsistencies in the application of justice amongst decision-makers.3 Other factors, 
including the complexity of gender-based violence may also intersect to create additional 
layers of intricacy. 
     Gender, as already discussed, has typically been neglected in the interpretation of the 
1951 Refugee Convention because it is not listed as one of the enumerated grounds of 
persecution. Consequently, women have been unable to benefit equitably from protection 
under the Refugee Convention. The reasons are two-fold, firstly procedural and evidential 
barriers prevent women’s access to the RDP; and secondly, in interpreting the Refugee 
Convention, women’s experiences have been marginalized. As discussed in Chapter Two 
attempts have been made to remedy this marginalization, the gender-guidelines being one 
such reform.  
                                                 
1 Rousseau C, et al, “The Complexity of Determining Refugeehood: A Multidisciplinary Analysis of the 
Decision-making Process of the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board”, 15 Journal of Refugee Studies 
43, (2002), at 43. 
2 Ibid, at 43-44. 
3 Herlihy, J & Turner S, “Asylum Claims and Memory of Trauma: Sharing Our Knowledge” 191 British 
Journal of Psychiatry 3, (2007), at 3-4. 
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       The aim of this chapter, therefore, is to present the findings drawn from an analysis 
of the FGM jurisprudence emanating from the case-studies. The elucidation of the 
findings will help determine, firstly, if the gender-guidelines have helped to redress the 
disparity in women’s claims for refugee status and secondly, determine the extent to 
which their weaknesses impinge on the supposedly ‘rectified’ procedural and evidential 
barriers which have continuously undermined the fairness of decision-making in such 
cases. 
    An increasing number of individuals who reject FGM are seeking asylum in the West. 
This chapter identifies the legal hurdles claimants must surmount to be successful, and 
the various courts’ assessments of claims. FGM claimants have great difficulty in 
engaging the Refugee Convention definition. Even though FGM constitutes persecution 
and can be linked to any of the Refugee Convention grounds,4 some claimants continue 
to be denied protection because it is claimed that they can evade FGM.5 Arguably, to 
ensure genuine claimants, receive protection it is vital that decision-maker gain an 
understanding of the cultural context of FGM but also of the situation of women in the 
country of origin in general. These factors need to be addressed within the already 
complex RDP.   
                                                 
4 In order to qualify for refugee status, a claimant must show that the persecution she fears is for reason of 
her race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group (PSG) or political opinion. Even 
though the most common Convention ground in connection with FGM claims is membership of a PSG, fear 
of FGM can be connected to all of these reasons. Since the definitions of race and nationality include ethnic 
group membership, it can be argued that persecution happens for reasons of belonging to an ethnic group 
affected by FGM. Where FGM is thought to be a religious requirement, or where the woman’s religion 
prohibits FGM/C, there is a nexus to the Convention ground religion. Further, opposition to FGM can 
constitute a political opinion. Since FGM is a practice that affects only women and since women experience 
discrimination in their countries of origin, with FGM being an ‘extreme expression of the discrimination’ 
they can be said to belong to the PSG “women.” This argument incorporates gender into the refugee 
definition. See, Rights in Exile Programme, “Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting: Asylum Claims and 
Appeals”, (2017). This document is available online via the International Refugee Rights Initiative Rights 
in Exile Programme at http://www.refugeelegalaidinformation.org/female-genital-mutilationcutting-
asylum-claims-and-appeals (last accessed 11/6/17). 
5 The suggested reasons mentioned for refusing claims based on FGM/C have been identified in research 
on asylum claims based on FGM/C made in the UK between 2000 and 2014, as well as on the experiences 
of Rights in Exile’s co-director Barbara Harrell-Bond who serves as an expert witness on FGM/C in Sierra 
Leone. See, Rights in Exile Programme, “Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting: Asylum Claims and Appeals”, 
supra note 4; and Grundler M, “The Protection of Asylum Seekers against Female Genital Mutilation in the 
UK”, (2015), available online at https://www.gbz.hu-
berlin.de/downloads/pdf/the_protection_of_asylum_seekers_against_fgm_in_the_uk_mbs_thesis_maja_gr
undler.pdf (last accessed 11/6/17). 
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    Part I examines the FGM jurisprudence6 and the extent to which existing RDPs and the 
gender-guidelines are failing to adequately accommodate and protect victims. This 
examination reveals that unless the RDP itself is inclusive, accommodating and respectful 
of women’s gender-based claims, interpretations of the guidelines and the Refugee 
Convention definition will continue to result in disparate outcomes irrespective of 
essential similarities between cases, and genuine claimants being denied protection.  Part 
II examines the issue of credibility and finds that the gender-guidelines have not solved 
all the problems facing women seeking refugee status based on a claim of gender-based 
persecution with any finality. This section highlights several additional hurdles exposed 
by the FGM-jurisprudence which negatively affects decision-making and which needs 
further clarification and rectification within the domestic gender-guidelines and RDP 
itself. These additional hurdles pertain to the issues of cultural relativism and more 
specifically credibility assessments. 
      From the outset, it should be noted that whilst the interpretation of the FGM 
jurisprudence is subjective, the examined cases expose the procedural and substantive 
limitations of the RDP, the gender-guidelines and the complexities facing decision-
makers. Findings from the case-law reveals that despite a new awareness to take gender 
into account in terms of policy development and implementation, refugee law and the 
RDP continues to be implemented through a male perspective, which consigns gender-
based forms of violence to the private sphere.  
 
I. The Complexity of Determining Refugee Status 
                                                 
6 These cases were chosen firstly, as they reaffirm the case-studies recognition of FGM as a basis for refugee 
status. Secondly, others highlight the inconsistent treatment and non-use of the gender-guidelines in 
seemingly similar cases. Finally, selection was also made on access and availability of cases.  
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As a recognised form of gender-based persecution7 and a human rights violation,8 to 
return a women/girl to a country where she would be subjected to FGM could arguably 
amount to a breach by the State concerned of its obligations under international human 
rights law. States worldwide, have enacted laws that specifically9 and more generally 
prohibit FGM.10 Moreover, since the 1990s, States have begun to recognize FGM as a 
form of persecution in their asylum decisions. In France, the Commission des Recours 
des Réfugiés accepted in Aminata Diop,11 that FGM could constitute persecution, and that 
refugee status could be granted to a woman exposed to FGM against her will, where FGM 
was officially prescribed, encouraged or tolerated. In Farah v. Canada,12 the IRB 
                                                 
7 UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection No. 1: Gender-related persecution within the context of 
Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, 7 May 
2002, (HCR/GIP/02/01), available online at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3d36f1c64.html, para. 9. 
Hereafter referred to as the UNHCR Gender Guidelines). The recognition of FGM as already discussed 
throughout the thesis as a form of persecution is supported, in the first instance, by developments in 
international and regional human rights law. See, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women, General Recommendation No. 14: Female circumcision, 1990, (A/45/38), available online via the 
UNHCR Refworld website at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/453882a30.pdf (last accessed 28/7/17); 
UNHCR Executive Committee, Conclusion on Refugee children and adolescents, No. 84 (XLVIII), 1997, 
para. (a)(v), available online via the UNHCR Refworld website at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae68c68c.html (last accessed 1/7/17). See also, Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on Violence against women, its causes and consequences: Cultural practices in the family that 
are violent towards women, 31 Jan. 2002, (E/CN.4/2002/83), paras, 12–20, available online via the Office 
of the UNHCR website at http://www.refworld.org/docid/3d6ce3cc0.html (last accessed 17/7/17). 
8 FGM violates a plethora of human rights, including the right to non-discrimination, to protection from 
mental and physical violence, to the highest attainable standard of health and, most importantly the right to 
life. FGM also constitutes torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment as affirmed by international 
jurisprudence and legal doctrine, including by many of the UN treaty monitoring bodies. It also violates the 
rights of the child, the right to protection of physical and psychological integrity, and the rights of persons 
with disabilities. Several treaties, General Comments/Recommendations of treaty monitoring bodies, and 
consensus documents explicitly condemn FGM as a human rights violation. Other core human rights treaties 
of the United Nations and African Union provide general protections for the human rights of women and 
girls, which have been interpreted to prohibit FGM. Many of the sources of international law that are most 
frequently referenced to end FGM are listed in Appendix B. 
9 See, UNHCR, “Guidance Note on Refugee Claims Relating to Female Genital Mutilation”, (2009), at 6. 
This note is available online at http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4a0c28492.pdf (last accessed 1/7/17). 
(Hereafter referred to as the FGM Guidance Note). 
10 If States do not have specific legislation prohibiting FGM, they tend to apply general provisions of their 
criminal codes with respect to intentional wounds or strikes, assault causing grievous harm, attacks on 
corporal and mental integrity, or violent acts which result in mutilation or permanent disability. Ibid. 
11 CRR, 17 juillet 1991, 164078, Mlle Diop Aminata, 164078, France: Commission des Recours des 
Réfugiés (CRR), 17 July 1991. While this particular claim failed on factual grounds, the principle has since 
been reaffirmed in France, upholding refugee status in, for instance, Mlle Kinda, CRR, 366892, 19 March 
2001. 
12 Farah v Canada (MEI) (1994). The Board also found FGM to constitute a gross infringement of the 
applicant’s personal security, referring to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Resolution 217 (III) 
1948 (Hereafter referred to as the UDHR), Article 3, as well as a number of child-specific rights. See also 
Annan v. Canada, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, the Trial Division of the Federal Court, 6 
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described FGM as a “torturous custom” and recognized it as a form of persecution. The 
US BIA determined in In Re Fauziya Kasinga,13 that FGM constituted persecution. In the 
UK, refugee status in relation to a well-founded fear of FGM was first upheld in Yake14 
and in the leading case of Fornah,15 the UKHL recognised FGM as a human rights 
violation and a form of persecution.16 Similar approaches have been adopted throughout 
Europe, including Austria,17 Germany18 and Belgium.19 The ECtHR has also determined 
that subjecting a woman to FGM amounts to ill-treatment contrary to Article 3 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights.20  
    Despite this recognition, only a small number of women have been granted refugee 
status on the grounds of FGM and many claimants continue to be denied protection.21 
Obstacles continue to hinder claimants, not least of which is concerns pertaining to 
cultural imperialism and gender and racial stereotypes. Other obstacles include credibility 
and a lack of firm evidence. Research undertaken by the Refugee Women’s Resource 
                                                 
July 1995, available online via the Refworld website at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/49997ae2f.html (last accessed 17/7/17). The Court referred to FGM 
as a “cruel and barbaric” practice and the applicant was granted refugee status. The position in Canada has 
been reinforced by many further decisions.   
13 In Re Kasinga, Int Dec 3278 (BIA 1996). Kasinga has been quoted in a series of further cases in the US, 
including in Abankwah v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, US Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit, 9 July 1999. The Court affirmed that it cannot be disputed that FGM involves the infliction of 
“grave harm constituting persecution”. 
14 Yake, Immigration and Appeals Tribunal, Appeal Number 00TH00493, 19 January 2000.   
15 K & Fornah, (2006) UKHL 46. 
16 In this case it was stated that, “FGM constitutes treatment which would amount to persecution within the 
meaning of the Convention”, and that FGM, “is a human rights issue, not only because of the unequal 
treatment of men and women, but also because the procedure will almost inevitably amount either to torture 
or to other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment” Ibid. 
17 GZ (Cameroonian citizen), 220.268/0-X1/33/00, Austrian Federal Refugee Council, Independent Federal 
Asylum Senate, 21 March 2002.   
18 See for instance, Aleinikoff T, “Protected characteristics and social perceptions: An analysis of the 
meaning of ‘membership of a particular social group”, in Feller E, Türk V & Nicholson F, ‘Refugee 
Protection in International Law: UNHCR’s Global Consultations on International Protection’, Cambridge 
University Press: London, (2003), at 183-4.  
19 Jurisprudence n° 979-1239, Conseil du Contentieux des Etrangers, Belgium, 25 July 2007, available 
online via the UNHCR Refworld website at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4874d5082.html  (last 
accessed 1/7/17). 
20 See, Emily Collins and Ashley Akaziebie v. Sweden, European Court of Human Rights, Application no. 
23944/05, 8 March 2007, available online via the UNHCR Refworld website at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/46a8763e2.html (last accessed 1/7/17). (Hereafter referred to as the 
ECtHR). 
21 According to some academics, the vast majority of FGM claimants are “deported to be mutilated”. See, 
Comment, “Deported to be Mutilated?” (2005), available online at 
http://www.anarkismo.net/newswire.php?story_id=840 (last accessed 14/8/07).  
189 
 
Project,22 has found that refugee decision-makers hold preconceived ideas about 
claimants and their motives. They found that in some cases decision-makers held sexist 
and racist views, or applied cultural relativism, expecting women to accept abuse as it was 
part of their culture: all of which undermined a fair assessment of claims.23 This culture 
of disbelief, as the jurisprudence and RWRP report had revealed, stems primarily from a 
lack of understanding in respect of the position of women within communities and gender-
based violence generally. Coupled with fears of being labelled an economic migrant, 24 a 
lack of COI to substantiate claims, and the use of COI which is both spurious or does not 
reflect the reality of women’s experiences, 25 these obstacles and misunderstandings act 
as impediments in determinations and may lead to credibility denials.26  
      Before examining these obstacles in detail, it is important to note that the UNHCR has 
published a Guidance Note on Refugee Claims relating to Female Genital Mutilation27 
which advises on the substantive and procedural elements to be considered in such cases 
and establishes the grounds on which a claimant can qualify for refugee status under the 
1951 Refugee Convention.28 Promoting gender equality and working towards the 
elimination of violence against women and girls, is an integral part of the UNHCR’s 
                                                 
22 The Refugee Women’s Resource Project had undertaken research into the usage and implementation of 
the UK Home Offices Asylum Policy Instruction: Gender Issues in the Asylum Claim. Hereafter referred to 
as the RWRP.  
23 See, Ceneda S & Palmer C, “Lip Service or Implementation? The Home Office Gender Guidance and 
Women’s Asylum Claims in the UK”, Asylum Aid: London, (2006), at 91-92.   
24 In a number of instances, the unsuccessful asylum seeker is, in fact, an economic migrant who has tried 
to take advantage of the asylum system in the absence of any other available means of obtaining lawful 
entry into their chosen host state. For further information on these ‘bogus’ refugees as they have commonly 
been referred to and their use of asylum as a means of obtaining entry into ‘wealthier’ States see generally, 
Neumayer E, “Bogus Refugees? The Determinants of Asylum Migration to Western Europe”. 49 
International Studies Quarterly 389, (2005), at 389-409; Bhagwati J, “Borders Beyond Control”, 28 Foreign 
Affairs 98, (2003); Stanley D, “Economic Migrants or Refugees from Violence? A Time-Series Analysis of 
Salvadorian Migration to the United States”, 21 Latin American Research Review 132, (1987); Heckman 
G, “Securing Procedural Safeguards for Asylum Seekers in Canadian Law: An Expanding Role for 
International Human Rights Law”, 15 International Journal of Refugee Law 212, (2003), at 214 (noting that 
restrictive immigration policies and policies limit asylum seekers’ access to refugee determination). 
 
25 Ceneda & Palmer, supra note 23, at 61. 
26 Ibid, at 55. 
27 See, FGM Guidance Note, supra note 9. 
28 The Note finds that the threat of FGM or even FGM performed previously can constitute a well-founded 
fear of persecution, considering the ways in which FGM can be a child-specific form of persecution and a 
continuing form of harm.  The issue of agents of persecution and availability of State protection are 
important and addressed within the Note. Under Convention grounds, FGM may constitute persecution due 
to a girl or woman’s membership of a PSG, political opinion, or religion. The Note also addresses whether 
internal flight or relocation are sufficient alternatives. 
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protection mandate29 and this note is a feature of this. However, this thesis suggests that 
another reason for the FGM Guidance Note, has been the recognized inconsistency in 
increasing FGM determinations. It firstly, reinforces the complexity of FGM claims, 
particularly its inherent gendered and discriminatory nature which makes it worthy of 
individualised consideration; and secondly it offers guidance on the interpretation and 
application of the applicable law and legal standards, which includes the substantive 
content of domestic gender-guidelines. In other words, where States, are failing to 
implement or interpret existing gender-guidelines appropriately in cases of FGM, this note 
purports to steer them in the right direction. 
      UNHCR documents, policies and guidelines are largely valued and proven to be 
influential. This is evident from the enactment of domestic gender-guidelines and 
amendments to refugee/asylum legislation to instruct decision-makers to recognize 
gender-based persecution as a potential ground for refugee protection30 in light of the 
UNHCR gender-guidelines, which called on States to follow suit.31 Unfortunately, as a 
soft law document, the FGM Guidance Note does not live up to expectations or its 
objectives. Whilst it provides interpretative guidance for decision-makers, it fails to 
adequately examine procedural issues, which define the conduct of determination 
hearings, including the personnel present at the hearing and how those individuals conduct 
themselves and the proceedings. As discussed in Chapter Two, FGM claimants have 
particular needs that are often not considered in the RDP. The process can be difficult and 
affect the emotional well-being of claimants. The FGM Guidance Note fails to sensitize 
its audience to the wide spectrum of reasons as to why women experience humiliation, 
                                                 
29 For further information on the protection mandate of the UNHCR, see UNHCR Global Report, 
“UNHCR’s Protection Mandate”, (2001), available online via the UNHCR Refugee Agency Website at 
http://www.unhcr.org/3dafdd0014.html (last accessed 27/7/17); Baines E, “Gender Construction and the 
Protection Mandate of the UNHCR: Responses from Guatemalan Women”, in Meyer K & Prugl E (eds), 
“Gender Politics in Global Governance”, Rowman & Littlefield: New York, (1999), Chapter 16; Clarence 
B, “UNHCR: Protection and Contemporary Needs”, (2006), available online at 
http://www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/FMR26/FMR2637.pdf (last accessed 30/3/17). 
30 See, Centre for Gender and Refugee Studies, “Review of Gender, Child, and LGBTI Asylum Guidelines 
and Case Law in Foreign Jurisdictions: A Resource for US Attorneys”, Centre for Gender and Refugee 
Studies: San Francisco, (2014), at 3. This report is available online at 
http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/54fd6f204.pdf (last accessed 28/7/17). 
31 The UNHCR Gender-Guidelines called upon States to develop and implement domestic criteria and 
guidelines regarding protection for women who claim refugee status based on a well-founded fear of gender-
related persecution. Ibid. 
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pain, trauma, or shame in recounting degrading experiences and what can be done to 
alleviate their discomfort. This omission is surprising given the fact that the UNHCR and 
the domestic gender-guidelines all acknowledge the obstacles and specific difficulties 
facing women within the RDP and their effects on credibility. Arguably, this omission 
reinforces the belief that the UNHCR, like the case-studies is more concerned with 
interpreting the black letter of the law, rather than ensuring that the Refugee Convention 
definition and gender-guidelines are interpreted within a procedurally gender-sensitive 
environment.  
      Whilst it is remains unclear to what extent the FGM Guidance Note is or will be used 
by decision-makers because of its non-binding nature, it certainly identifies FGM as an 
emerging legal and operational refugee issue which needs further clarification.  It further 
suggests that the UNHCR is dissatisfied with domestic interpretations of FGM cases or at 
the very least concerned that FGM as a gender-based form of violence, is not being 
properly addressed within the RDP of States. 
     Despite these criticisms the enactment of gender-guidelines have been an important 
development and in some instances, they have been effectively applied in FGM cases. 
The following section will now discuss several of these cases where claimants have been 
granted either refugee status or humanitarian protection. This focus is important as it 
highlights successful application and interpretation of the examined gender-guidelines 
and Refugee Convention. Furthermore, it reinforces the argument that if the gender-
guidelines were made legally binding and decision-makers were held accountable for their 
determinations then such claims would be decided in a more gender-sensitive manner; 
biases could be overcome; and the legal, historical and moral disparities in the protection 
afforded to female refugee claimants could be addressed and effectively remedied. 
 
A. Correct Applications of the Gender-Guidelines  
    
Increasing migration has led to a growing number of claimants from FGM practicing 
countries seeking protection and States, including the case-studies have recognised FGM 
as a form of persecution in their asylum decisions.  
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     In 1994, in a landmark ruling, Canada became the first country in the world to grant 
refugee status based on a fear of FGM. 32 Khadra Hassan Farah was a Somali national33 
who following the collapse of her marriage went to Canada with her two children and 
sought political asylum.34 It was argued before the IRB that her ten-year-old daughter 
would be subjected to FGM if she were deported to Somalia.35 In evidence, she testified 
about her own circumcision at the age of eight and resulting complications.36 Farah further 
testified that, if deported, she would surrender her daughter for adoption in Canada rather 
than have her subjected FGM.37 Farah argued that she feared losing custody of her 
children, because as a divorced woman, under Islamic law, her husband would have 
custody of their children and could prevent them from maintaining contact with her.38 She 
testified that if is she lost custody, she would be powerless to prevent the custom of FGM 
widely practiced in Somalia.39 On the 10th May 1994, a two-member panel of the IRB 
rendered its decision.40 It was determined that Farah’s daughter’s, “right to personal 
security would be grossly infringed” if her mother was forced to return to Somalia.41 In 
support of its decision, the panel cited the CIRB Gender Guidelines and the CRC.42 They 
concluded that, according to the principles enshrined in these documents, Farah’s 
daughter was subject to persecution based on her membership in "two particular social 
                                                 
32 The IRB is an independent administrative tribunal that makes legally binding decisions. Similarly, within 
the Canadian context it is also important to note that orders of the Federal Court are binding in every 
province and territory in Canada, thus providing efficient, national coverage. The Federal Court has 
exclusive jurisdiction to review the legality of actions of most federal offices, boards, commissions, and 
tribunals. On this basis, most government decisions at the federal level may be challenged in the Federal 
Court, including immigration and refugee matters.  
33 Farah v Canada, supra note 12, at 1-2. 
34 Ms. Farah testified that her marriage was very abusive: “there were frequent arguments about her desire 
to be more independent. After three years of marriage she asked for a divorce, but her parents were opposed 
to it and her husband began to verbally and physically abuse her. She testified that he drank excessively and 
repeatedly beat her and their daughter”. Ibid, at 2.  
35 Ibid, at 2. 
36 Ibid, at 9-10. 
37 Ibid, at 3. 
38 Ms. Farah's ex-husband had previously abducted their oldest son and prevented him from contacting her, 
and therefore Ms. Farah had a realistic fear that if her husband obtained custody of their daughter, he would 
prevent contact between them as well. Ibid, at 2. 
39 Ibid, at 3. It was concluded by the panel based on COI that even though FGM had been outlawed in 
Somalia since 1947, an estimated 98% of women had been subjected to the practice. Ibid, at 8. 
40 Farah v Canada, supra note 12. 
41 The panel also said that they were "satisfied that the authorities in Somalia will not protect [Hodan] from 
the physical and emotional ravages of FGM, given the evidence of its widespread practice in that country." 
Ibid, at 11.  
42 Ibid, at 10-11. 
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groups, namely, women and minors."43 The panel stated that her gender, “is clearly an 
'innate or unchangeable characteristic,' and the fact that she is below the age of majority 
is also, for the foreseeable future, something she cannot change."44 Thus, she qualified as 
a member of both PSG’s45 and was eligible for asylum.46 The Farah decision created a lot 
of controversy because some feared that the ruling would cause a flood of refugees 
seeking asylum in Canada to escape FGM.47 Whilst that fear was unfounded48, this case 
highlights the importance of adopting a gender lens when determining FGM cases. The 
positive implications of adopting a gender-sensitive approach to the Refugee Convention 
definition and the use of the CIRB gender-guidelines are evident in this case and reinforce 
the objectives at the heart of this thesis. 
       The US, a purported leader in the human rights campaign, has historically refused to 
expand existing immigration law to provide a haven for women fleeing FGM.49 Like the 
fears expressed in wake of the Farah decision, the fear of "opening the floodgates," had 
served as a justification for the failure of the US to recognize FGM as a legitimate basis 
                                                 
43 Ibid, at 11. 
44 Ibid (citing Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward, 103 D.L.4th 1 (1993)). 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. The IRB also granted political asylum to Ms. Farah as a member of a PSG, namely women. The 
IRB found that "as a divorced mother under the jurisdiction of Sharia law [Ms. Farah's] rights as a parent 
and her right to personal security are not upheld as the international human rights instruments require." Ibid, 
at 7. Additionally, the IRB granted political asylum to Ms. Farah's son, determining that his "being forcibly 
removed from the care and nurture of his mother" by his father under Sharia law constituted persecution. 
Ibid, at 11. The panel further determined that Ms. Farah's ex-husband "would exercise his prerogative under 
Sharia law to take custody of his son and deny him access to his mother, the only custodial parent with 
whom he has formed an enduring bond." Ibid. Citing Articles 3, 9, and 12 of the CRC, the panel found that 
the "best interests of the child" (in this case, the son) would not be considered by his father because of his 
violent nature. The panel, citing Ward, found that based on the son's "innate or unchangeable characteristic" 
and the fact that he was below the age of majority (he was seven at the time of the hearing), his was "minors." 
Ibid, at 12-13.  
47 However, Nurjehan Mawani, chairperson of the IRB, said that she did not expect a flood of claims because 
of the Farah decision. She stated that, “Refugee determination is always on a case-by-case basis ... I expect 
we may see a few more cases, but certainly no floodgates. If you look at the overall worldwide situation, 
only 5 percent of world refugees are able to claim refugee status in the West, and of these the proportion of 
women is abysmally small. Women do not have the same mobility as men”. See, Kelson G, “Granting 
Political Asylum to Potential Victims of Female Circumcision”, 3 Institute for Women and Children’s Policy 
257, (1996), at 274 (discussing the Farah Case and its impact). 
48 Ibid. 
49 See, Bashir L, “Female Genital Mutilation in the United States: An Examination of Criminal and Asylum 
Law”, 4 The American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy and the Law 415, (1996), at 417-18 
(1996) (noting US failure to respond to practice of FGM).  
194 
 
for asylum. 50 In In re Kasinga,51 the BIA, however, granted asylum to a woman fleeing 
FGM and set binding precedent for the 179 immigration judges who thus far had been 
divided on the issue”.52  
    Fauziya Kassindja fled her home in Togo when she was 17 to escape FGM. Her father 
had been protecting her from the custom, practiced among their tribe in Togo, but after 
his death, Fauziya’s aunt took over their household and forced her into a polygamous 
marriage with an older man and informed her she was to undergo FGM. Fauziya fled first 
to Ghana, then to Germany. She arrived in the US in 1994 and immediately requested 
asylum.53 The BIA in its first case involving gender-related persecution since the 
introduction of the INS gender-guidelines,54 found that FGM as practiced by the 
Tchamba-Kunsuntu tribe, to which Fauziya belonged, constituted persecution.55 Having 
explicitly referred to the suggestions set out in the INS Gender Guidelines56, COI and 
other sources detailing the trauma of FGM,57 the BIA made strong reference to the 
permanent effects of FGM in general.58 It found Fauziya to be at risk of future FGM in 
Togo because she was a member of the PSG, “young women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu 
                                                 
50 See, Sheridan M, “In re Fauziya Kasinga: The United States Has Opened Its Doors to Victims of Female 
Genital Mutilation”, 71 St. Johns Law Review 433, (1997), at 457. For a more thorough review of the 
history of gender asylum in the US and relevant international instruments, see Musalo K, “A Short History 
of Gender Asylum in the United States: Resistance and Ambivalence May Very Slowly Be Inching Towards 
Recognition of Women’s Claims”, 29 Refugee Survey Quarterly 2, (2010).  See also, Centre for Gender and 
Refugee Studies, “Domestic Violence Based Asylum Claims: GCRS Practice Advisory”, Centre for Gender 
and Refugee Studies: San Francisco (2014), at 2-3. This document is available online at 
https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/pdfs/Domestic%20Violence-
Based%20Asylum%20Claims%20(Sept%2012,%202014).pdf (last accessed 17/7/17). 
51 See, In re Kasinga, supra note 13. See also, Sinha A, “Domestic Violence and US Asylum Law: 
Eliminating the ‘Cultural Hook’ for Claims Involving Gender-Related Persecution”, 76 New York 
University Law Review 1562, (2001), at 1563. 
52 Sheridan, supra note 50, at 457. 
53 Following her request for asylum, she was placed in detention, where she remained for over a year. 
54 Sinha, supra note 51, at 1563. 
55 In Re Kasinga, supra note 13 at 362. 
56 Sinha, supra note 51, at 1563. 
57 The decision of the BIA relied upon the claimant’s testimony and secondary sources to describe FGM, as 
practised by the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe, as “an extreme type of FGM, involving cutting the genitalia 
with knives, extensive bleeding, and a 40-day recovery period. See, In Re Kasinga, supra note 13, at 365. 
The panel also relied upon secondary sources to establish the serious physical and psychological trauma of 
FGM as well as its prevalence. In fact, the decision cites two reports compiled by the US Department of 
State in its discussion of the conditions in Togo. Ibid. 
58 The BIA stated that, “FGM permanently disfigures the female genitalia. FGM exposes the girl or woman 
to the risk of serious, potentially life-threatening complications. These include, among others, bleeding, 
infection, urine retention, stress, shock, psychological trauma, and damage to the urethra and anus. It can 




Tribe who had not had FGM, as practiced by that tribe, and who oppose the practice.”59 
The BIA found that Togo did nothing to prevent the forced infliction of FGM on women, 
and that the practice was a country-wide problem. It thus determined that Fauziya had a 
well-founded fear of persecution in the form of FGM.60  
       The Kasinga ruling represents a long overdue effort by the INS to expand antiquated 
laws to afford women protection from gender-related persecution such as FGM. The 
decision, and more specifically the use of the INS Gender-Guidelines in the case, 
implicitly overcame interpretive barriers that often stand in the way of relief in gender-
based asylum claims. The decision is limited, however, and therefore is only a small step 
toward gender equality under asylum law. The BIA narrowly defined the PSG to be 
specifically, "young women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe who have not had FGM, as 
practiced by that tribe, and who oppose the practice”.61 The board further declined, to 
"speculate on, or establish rules for, cases" not before it”.62 Thus, while a binding 
precedent has been set, it is limited such that disparate rulings may still continue.  
      Until the seminal case of Fornah in 2006, the UK showed a clear reluctance to allow 
asylum appeals based on a fear of FGM.63 Like its American and Canadian counterparts, 
                                                 
59 Ibid, at 368. The court applied the test set forth in In re Acosta, 19 I & N. Dec 211 (BIA. Mar. 1, 1995), 
which established that a PSG is defined by characteristics members of the group possess that either cannot 
be changed, or that should not be required to change because they are central to their identities. In re 
Kasinga, supra note 13, at 365-66. In the Kasinga case the court found that, “the characteristics of having 
intact genitalia is one that is so fundamental to the individual identity of a young women that she should not 
be required to change it”. Ibid, at 366. 
60 Kasinga also involved a forced marriage claim, adjudication of which the BIA did not reach in its final 
holding. However, the relationship between FGM and forced marriage was noted in Judge Rosenberg’s 
concurrence (Ibid, at 374). 
61 In Re Kasinga, supra note 13 at 368. 
62 The Board rejected the INS’s request to "endorse a significant new framework for assessing asylum 
claims in the context of a single novel case," noting that such a task should be left to Congress (Filppu, 
Board Member, concurring). But see, Kasinga, Int. Dec. 3278, 1996 WIL 379826 (Rosenberg, concurring) 
(noting that majority decision implicitly established "road map" for future gender-based claims). 
63 In fact, between 2001 and 2006 there was only one successful reported appeal upheld under the Refugee 
Convention, despite earlier political statements to the contrary and the Home Office’s own guidance. See, 
P and M [2004] EWCA Civ. 1640. See also, Asylum Policy Instruction: Gender Issues in the Asylum Claim, 
Home Office, October 2006, at 9-10. Available from the Home Office Immigration and Nationality 
Directorate’s website: 
http://www.ind.homeoffice.gov.uk/ind/en/home/laws___policy/policy_instructions/apis/gender_issues_in
_the.html. (last accessed 2/11/15) (“Women who may be subject to FGM have been found by the courts in 
some circumstances to constitute a PSG for the purposes of the 1951 Convention. Whether a PSG exists 
will depend on the conditions in the ‘society’ from which the claimant comes. If there is a well-founded 
fear, which includes evidence that FGM is knowingly tolerated by the authorities or they are unable to offer 
effective protection, and there is no possibility of an internal flight option, a claimant who claims that she 
would on return to her home country suffer FGM may qualify for refugee status”). See further the comments 
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it has been suggested that claims based on FGM may be rejected because UK immigration 
officers, are concerned about opening up ‘floodgates’ to female victims of violence 
globally.64      
      Fornah was a 15-year-old girl who claimed that she was entitled to recognition as a 
refugee because she would be subjected to FGM if returned to Sierra Leone.65 She was 
confirmed as a refugee by the unanimous decision of the UKHL judicial committee on 
18th October 2006. Reversing the Court of Appeal, the Lords held that women in societies 
which practiced FGM were members of a PSG for the purposes of the Refugee 
Convention. The Court of Appeal had determined that FGM constituted torture or 
inhuman or degrading treatment, so that a risk of it at home meant that removal from the 
UK would violate Article 3 of the ECHR. However, the majority in the Court of Appeal 
held that although FGM constituted ‘persecution’, the young women facing it could not 
bring themselves within the definition of refugee, since the only relevant group was 
‘young women at risk of FGM’, and the rule could not be defined by the persecution its 
members feared. The UKHL dismissed this reasoning. Relying on extensive 
documentation, including the Home Office’s Asylum Policy Instruction on Gender,66 and 
the UNHCR PSG Guidelines,67 they accepted that Fornah had a well-founded of 
                                                 
of Ann Widdecombe, ““We would regard enforced abortion as torture, as we would have enforced 
mutilation or sterilization. I stress that both personally and as a Minister I utterly accept that forcible 
…genital mutilation and allied practices would almost always constitute torture. In fact, they would 
probably always constitute torture. There is no doubt in my mind that anyone making a case to us on those 
grounds would have an extremely good case for asylum.” Anne Widdecombe, then M.P. and Minister of 
State for the Home Office, Lords Amendments to the Asylum & Immigration Bill 1995/1996, Hansard Col. 
842-844; 822-825 and 476-477. 
64 FORWARD, “Female Genital Mutilation as Grounds for Asylum”, (2014), available online at 
http://www.forwarduk.org.uk/keyissues/fgm/fgm-asylum, (last accessed 20/8/16). 
65 Before coming to the UK, the applicant had had to move from her home to shelter from the civil war at 
her father’s village in Sierra Leone.  At the age of 15 she overheard discussions of plans to initiate her into 
womanhood by her undergoing FGM. She ran away and was captured by rebels and made pregnant through 
repeated rape by the rebel leader.  She escaped to the United Kingdom with the help of her uncle. The 
Secretary of State for the Home Department accepted the applicant was telling the truth and that she would 
be subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment if she was returned to Sierra Leone, granting protection 
under Art 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.  The applicant appealed on the basis that she 
should be recognised as a refugee. 
66 Fornah, supra note 15, para 26. 
67 Ibid, para 98-103 (noting the influence of the UNHCR Guidelines on Membership of a Particular Social 
Group: 2002 San Remo Expert Roundtable conclusions; and international case-law defining the 
construction of the PSG category). See also, para 95 (discussing information supplied by UNICEF, NGOs 
and Medical Experts). 
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persecution68 and that in a society which discriminates against them, women can 
constitute a PSG, although the majority preferred to define the group in this case more 
narrowly, as ‘uninitiated, intact women’.69  
     The decision in Fornah is important in establishing a gender-sensitive and gender-
inclusive interpretation of the Refugee Convention. Its contextual and straightforward 
approach to the Refugee Convention and the PSG definition, widely recognized as the 
ground with least clarity, has won support from organizations and individuals working 
with women in the refugee system.70 The decision set a new precedent heralding a 
comparatively late acceptance in the UK that FGM can indeed constitute persecution in 
terms of the Refugee Convention, and that females fleeing a well-founded fear of FGM 
can form a ‘PSG’.71 
      Farah, Kasinga and Fornah overturned their respective courts protracted line of 
restrictive authorities72 and in doing so, supposedly “signalled the end of the exclusion of 
                                                 
68 Ibid, para 96 (“No-one disputes that FGM amounts to persecution or that Miss Fornah’s fear of 
persecution is well-founded. The evidence also suggests that the treatment she would face were she to 
succeed in resisting FGM might itself amount to persecution. Nor is there any dispute that, although the 
treatment itself would be meted out by non-State actors, the State is unable or unwilling to offer her adequate 
protection against it”). 
69 Ibid, para 114. 
70 See, Chaudhry M, “Particular Social Group Post Fornah”, 21 Journal of Immigration, Asylum and 
Nationality Law 132, (2008). 
71 Previously, as mentioned, the IAT had steadfastly rejected the very legal arguments which were later 
accepted unanimously in Fornah. The proposition that females at risk of FGM could form a PSG for the 
purposes of the Refugee Convention had been repeatedly dismissed by the Tribunal between 2001 and 2006. 
It is interesting to contrast the approach to legal tests and concepts involved in FGM appeals across 
international jurisdictions, i.e. contrast decisions of the UK Asylum and Immigration Tribunal 2001-2006 
with the decisions of the Immigration Appellate authorities in: US e.g. Kasinga, supra note 13;  Canada e.g. 
MAI-OO356/367/378 IRB) and Australia e.g. V97/06156; V98/09568 RRT) – all of which accepted women 
as a ‘PSG’ and FGM as persecution and the basis of a successful refugee appeal years – even a decade - 
before the UK Immigration & Asylum Tribunal. According to Loughran, until the Lords’ ruling in Fornah, 
there had been an exceedingly restrictive interpretation in the UK courts of key concepts such as ‘PSG’ and 
‘Convention Reason’. The most common reason for dismissing FGM-asylum claims prior to Fornah in the 
Lords was rejection of definitions of PSG because of an inability to define the relevant PSG without 
reference to FGM. Prior to Fornah, two Court of Appeal cases revealed a split of opinions. Loughran N, 
“Female Genital Mutilation” (2006), available online via the Child Asylum and Refugee Issues in Scotland 
website at http://www.savethechildren.org.uk/caris/legal/srandi/sr_22.php (last accessed 19/6/16). 
72 The measure of the volte face in approach to FGM in the UK courts which the Lords’ ruling heralded, 
can be illustrated by contrasting the decision of the earlier Court of Appeal ruling in 2005 of Fornah, 
(ZAINAB ESTHER GORNAH (2005) EWCA. CIV 680.9/6/05) in particular the opinions of Lords Auld and 
Chadwick, with the opinions of their Lordships in the Lords in 2006 in the same case (2006 UKHL 46). In 
a reversal of the reasoning of Lords Auld and Chadwick, FGM was accepted as ‘persecution’ in terms of 
the Refugee Convention and Sierra Leone females fearing FGM were accepted as forming a PSG. See, 
Loughran, supra note 71. 
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women from the protection of the Refugee Convention”.73 They offer a new approach to 
the treatment of women’s rights and show that a gender-sensitive approach to the 
interpretation of laws is possible and ensures that women’s experiences are recognized. 
The positive sentiments emanating from these authorities has been repeated in a corpus 
of other FGM-related cases, including claims pertaining to past persecution and FGM 
parent-child claims, which will now be examined. 
 
1. Parent-Child FGM Claims 
 
Immediately following Kasinga, US immigration judges applied asylum law to the claims 
of parents fearing that their daughters would be subjected to FGM. In In re Adeniji, a 
father was granted withholding of removal74 on the basis that this US born daughter would 
be subjected to FGM if he was returned to Nigeria.75 It was determined that if the father 
were to be deported, his daughters would be “de facto” removed and subjected to FGM.76 
In another case, Matter of Konate, a mother received asylum as a result of the persecution 
she would face because her “opposition to gender norms, demonstrated in part by her 
attempts to protect her daughter from FGM, constituted a political opinion”.77 Similarly 
in, Matter of Dibba, decided in 2001, it was recognized that persecution would result for 
a mother if she was forced to return to Gambia, where her daughter would face the threat 
of FGM. This time, the Board concluded that the psychological harms she would 
personally experience - exposing her child to torture or forced abandonment of her child 
                                                 
73 See, Loughran, supra note 71, (“For only the second time in the UK in six years, an appeal court had 
accepted that a well-founded risk of FGM should ground a claim for asylum, not just human rights. The 
highest Court in the UK had overturned the UK Immigration and Asylum Tribunal’s long line of authority 
and accepted that FGM should be considered persecution in terms of the Refugee Convention, and that a 
Convention ground does exist-membership of the PSG– females in the country of origin”). 
74 Withholding of removal is granted according to a standard very similar to asylum except that when an 
alien meets the withholding criteria, the remedy is mandatory, whereas asylum grants are always 
discretionary. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) with 8 U.S.C.A § 1158(b)(1)(A). Also, the withholding of 
removal standard requires a showing of a greater probability of harm (more likely than not) 
than does the asylum standard (reasonable possibility). See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 423, 
440 (1987). 
75 In re Adeniji, No. A41 542 131 (oral decision) (U.S. Dept. of Justice, Immigration Court, York, Pa., Mar. 
10, 1998), discussed in Bah v. Gonzales, 462 F.3d 637, 642 (6th Cir. 2006). 
76 Rice, M, “Protecting Parents: Why Mothers and Fathers Who Oppose Female Genital Cutting Qualify 
for Asylum”, Immigr. Briefings, (2004) at 1-1.  




- would rise to the level of persecution.78  Furthermore, in Abay v Ashcroft,79 a mother and 
daughter sought asylum based on their fear that, should they be returned to Ethiopia, 
Amare would be subjected to FGM a practice “nearly universal” in Ethiopia and to which 
an estimated 90% of women are subjected, according to State Department reports.80  An 
immigration judge had held that neither Abay nor Amare established that she was a 
“refugee” eligible for asylum or withholding of deportation. The Sixth Circuit, Court of 
Appeal, reversed the decision of the BIA, reasoning that based on the evidence on the 
record both the minor child Amare and her mother had a well-founded fear that Amare 
would be subjected to FGM should they be returned to Ethiopia and were consequently 
“refugees” eligible for asylum under the Act.81 This decision, along with the decisions 
discussed above, suggest a governing principle in favour of refugee status in cases where 
a parent is faced with exposing her child to the clear risk of being subjected against her 
will to a practice that is a form of physical torture causing grave and permanent harm.  
    Comparable, stances have been taken in parent-child FGM cases emanating from the 
UK and Canada. In the 2006 case of Ndegwa v. Canada,82 the court dealt with the case of 
a Kenyan man who claimed asylum on grounds of fear of persecution in Kenya due to 
refusing to have FGM performed on his daughter. HIs wife and daughter were granted 
refugee status, the man was initially refused but then given status upon review.83 Other 
additional Canadian cases, reinforce this sentiment and illustrate a proper gender-sensitive 
interpretation of the sentiments of the CIRB gender-guidelines particularly in respects of 
construing PSG’s, taking note of COI and properly construing the IFA by recognizing that 
                                                 
78 Matter of Dibba, No. A73 541 857 (B.I.A. 2001) discussed in Rice, supra note 76; see also Bah v. 
Gonzales, supra note 75. 
79 Abay v Ashcroft, 368 F.ed 634, 641 (6th Cir.2004). 
80 Ibid, at 634. 
81 It was stated that, “Given the evidence in the record that female genital mutilation is “nearly universal” 
in Ethiopia; that Abay herself underwent the procedure at a young age; that Abay’s mother has already 
attempted to mutilate Abay’s older daughters, who still faced that prospect upon their marriage; that Abay 
would not be able to override any of her daughters’ future husbands or in-law’s wishes; and that the 
government of Ethiopia does not, as a practical matter, enforce laws intended to curb harmful traditional 
practices, we conclude that a rational factfinder would be compelled to find that Abay’s fear of taking her 
daughter into the lion’s den of female genital mutilation in Ethiopia and being forced to witness the pain 
and suffering of her daughter is well-founded.  Accordingly, we find that Abay is also a “refugee” within 
the meaning of the Act”. 
82 Ndegwa v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), (2006) F.C. 847 (Can.). 
83 The Supreme Court of Canada explained that “there was a sufficient nexus between the claimants claim 
and his wife and daughter’s persecution” and that the IRB erred by “not considering whether the claimant 
would be persecuted as a member of his family. Ibid, para 9-10. 
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if forced to relocate, a woman may face hardship, including having to rely on prostitution 
or being vulnerable for further abuse or exploitation.84 
     Case-law from the UK further reinforces the theoretical basis for granting asylum to 
parents with children at risk of FGM. In FM (FGM) Sudan CG85 heard before the AIT in 
2007, a Sudanese woman appealed against an adjudicator’s decision to refuse her and her 
children leave to remain in the UK. The woman feared that her two daughters would be 
subjected to FGM if returned.86 The adjudicator had discounted evidence by the woman 
dealing with the ‘real risk’ posed to her daughters of being compelled to undergo FGM87 
and the risk to the mother who had campaigned against FGM while outside Sudan.88 The 
AIT decided to take into consideration fresh evidence by an expert in order to come to a 
decision.89 The expert considered the risk of FGM to be  “very real”90 and that the 
                                                 
84 For instance, in CRDD T97-03141, May 27 (1998), claimants from Somalia sought protection based on 
their feared persecution as members of the Darod clan and the Majerten and Marehan subclans. Three of 
the minor claimants also feared persecution because of the practice of FGM. The Refugee Division found 
that the CIRB gender-guidelines applied to the three minor claimants, that they had a well-founded fear of 
persecution because of their membership in the PSG of female children, and that State protection would not 
be available to them from FGM. Since FGM is a widespread practice in Somalia, the existence of an IFA 
was not an issue for these claimants. The Division further reasoned that, the principal claimant was a woman 
alone with seven children in her care. All of the claimants had a well-founded fear of persecution in 
Mogadishu because they were Darod. Mogadishu was not yet a stable environment for a lone woman with 
seven dependents. An IFA was not available to the claimants because the family was a mixture of Majerten 
and Marehan sub-clans. Similarly, in another case, the claimants alleged that they had a fear of persecution 
by reason of their membership in the social groups, namely women and illegitimate children. The principal 
claimant, a member of the Peul ethnic group, was the mother of two illegitimate minors born of a 
relationship with a friend whom she planned to marry. The man's marriage proposal was rejected by the 
claimant’s father because it was contrary, not only to the customs practiced in the Peul community, but also 
to Islamic moral principles. The claimant stated that, in order to punish her, her father forced her to marry 
another man. The claimant feared for herself, her daughter-who would have to undergo FGM -as well as 
for her son, who would be condemned to live in shame his whole life. Finding the claimant’s testimony 
credible, the panel determined that the forced marriage, the threatened FGM, and the prejudice feared by 
the claimant's son amounted to persecution. According to the panel, given that the documentary evidence 
indicated that in Guinea custom had precedence over written law, it was unreasonable to seek, in this case, 
State protection, much less an IFA. The claimants were granted refugee status. For further information on 
these and other cases, see, IRB, “Compendium of Decisions, Guideline 4:  Women Refugee Claimants 
Fearing Gender-Related Persecution: Update (February 2003), at 32-4. This compendium is available 
online via the IRB Website at 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4713831e2.html (last accessed 17/7/17). 
85 FM (FGM) Sudan v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2007] UKAIT 00060 (U.K. Asylum 
and Immigration Tribunal), available online via the BAILLI website at 
http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKIAT/2007/00060.html (last accessed 17/7/17). 
86 Ibid, at 1. 
87 Ibid, at 2 
88 Ibid, at 12. 
89 Ibid, at 5. 
90 Ibid, at 6. 
201 
 
mother’s activities put her at risk as well.91 The tribunal found that the daughters were ‘at 
real risk on return of treatment that would be contrary to article 3 of the ECHR’92 and that 
they belonged to a PSG.93 Further, it was held that the mother was ‘at real risk of 
persecution for a Refugee Convention reason’, not because of her political opinion but 
due to her abhorrence of FGM. It was determined that, any infliction of FGM upon either 
of her daughters was reasonably likely to have so profound an effect upon as to amount 
to the infliction on her of persecutory harm.94 The AIT also found that state protection 
and internal relocation were not an option.95 Essentially, the decision was overturned due 
to a flawed assessment of the risk of undergoing FGM made due to a dismissal of 
evidence. This decision which reinforces the importance of applying the guidelines and 
using appropriate COI information, is consistent with several other UK cases where the 
AIT granted relief to parents because the harm they would experience from their inability 
to prevent their daughter’s subjection to FGM.96 Similar, positive sentiments have been 
applied in cases where claimants have a well-founded fear of FGM. These cases will now 
be examined in the next section. 
 
2. Individual Claims 
 
Women who flee prospective FGM, or who have undergone FGM seek protection on 
account of its attendant harms. Such claims have generally drawn upon the legal theory 
that FGM is a persecutory act in its execution and in its myriad of on-going consequences. 
Where a woman has not yet been subjected to FGM and has sought protection, it can be 
argued that she has a well-founded fear of future persecution in the form of FGM. The 
clear precedent established in Kasinga supports asylum grants based on this theory. If 
COI indicates a widespread approval or practice of FGM, and where personal history 
                                                 
91 Ibid, at 12. 
92 Ibid, at 163. 
93 Ibid, at 145. 
94 Ibid, at 161. 
95 Ibid, at 160. 
96 See, Conroy M, “Refugees Themselves: The Asylum Case for Parents of Children at Risk of Female 
Genital Mutilation”, 22 Harvard Human Journal 109, (2009). See also, M.H. & Others v. Secretary of State 
for the Home Department, [2002] UKIAT 02691 (U.K. Asylum and Immigration Tribunal), available online 
at http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKIAT/2002/02691.html (last accessed 17/7/17); Hashim v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department, IAT 16 Jul. 2002, [2002] UK IAT 02691. 
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shows individualized risk or intent of a third party to force FGM upon the claimant,97 
cases should hypothetically be straightforward to make.  With a risk of future coercion or 
inability to resist FGM in the country of origin established, claimants should be able to 
establish both a subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable fear of future FGM. 
       In addition to the fear of FGM, claimants who have rejected the custom face 
additional reprisals from family and friends, including physical assaults. Other may have 
a well-founded fear of persecution in societies where un-circumcised women are 
ostracized, targeted for violence, or otherwise harmed due to their “unclean” status. They 
may also fear other, related harms on account of the same grounds upon which they are 
threatened with FGM.98 
    Women already subjected to FGM, generally assert a claim for asylum based on the 
past persecution of FGM, which entitles them to a presumption of a well-founded fear of 
persecution. First, in cases where the claimant comes from a community where women 
can be subjected to FGM more than once, the likelihood of additional FGM should of 
course be explored and asserted.99 Secondly, women who have already been subjected to 
FGM may also assert eligibility for asylum based on the continuing consequences of the 
practice.100 Regulations governing rebuttal of the presumption of a well-founded fear do 
not require that individuals fear identical harm as that which was suffered in the past.101 
This has been affirmed in the UNHCR FGM Guidance Note.102 Aside from its harmful 
consequences, it can further be asserted that FGM is related to a larger system of female 
                                                 
97 Frydman L & Seelinger K, “Kasinga’s Protection Undermined? Recent Developments in Female Genital 
Cutting Jurisprudence”, 13 Bender’s Immigration Bulletin 1073, (2008), at 1075. The Centre for Gender 
and Refugee Studies (CGRS) database of unpublished asylum office and immigration judge decisions 
indicate the clear precedent of Kasinga supports asylum in cases where an applicant can prove likely 
subjection to FGC upon return. Asylum has been denied mainly in cases where the applicant simply failed 
to make this requisite showing. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Ibid. 
100According to the CGRS, this ‘on-going’ theory of past FGM follows the BIA’s reasoning in In re Y-T-L-
, in 2003, in which the board determined that certain acts of persecution, including forced sterilization, 
constitute, “a permanent and continuing act of persecution.” See, In re Y-T-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 601 (BIA 
2003). Arguably, claimants who have already undergone the practice can argue that their persecution in the 
form of FGM is similar in its continuing impact: As already discussed in this chapter, FGM is often 
accompanied  by both short and long term consequences  that reach far beyond the period of actual cutting, 
including formation of abscesses, loss of sexual sensation, painful sexual intercourse, child-birth 
complications, increased infant mortality, and varying degrees of emotional and psychological 
traumatization.  
101 Frydman & Seelinger, supra note 97, at 1075. 
102 FGM Guidance Note, supra note 9, at 8-9. 
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subjugation, wherein a woman who has already undergone FGM may remain at risk of 
forced marriage, domestic violence, marital rape, and other related harms that COI may 
indicate.103 
      The leading US case on the treatment of FGM as past persecution is Mohammed v. 
Gonzales.104  In this case, a Somali woman who had undergone FGM105 claimed that the 
FGM constituted past persecution which warranted the presumption that she had a well-
founded fear of future persecution.106 The government contended that the past infliction 
of FGM should have rebutted the presumption because, having already suffered FGM, it 
was unlikely that the claimant would be inflicted with the procedure in the future.107 
Referring to the INS Gender-Guidelines and COI,108 the Ninth Circuit rejected this 
argument, analogizing FGM to forced sterilization, which had been classified as a 
                                                 
103 Finally, it should also be noted that, women who have already undergone FGM are able to assert 
eligibility for humanitarian asylum due to the “severe and atrocious” nature of the FGM which they have 
suffered. There have been successful grants of protection made to claimants based on the legal theory that 
FGM is a persecutory act in its execution and in its myriad of on-going consequences. See, Frydman & 
Seelinger, supra note 97, at 1075. See also, Matter of Chen, 20 I. & N. Dec. 16 (BIA 1989). 
104 Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785 (9th Cir. 2005). According to Mohamed, her family fled Somalia 
during the civil war, when she was a young child. The flight was precipitated by the disappearance of her 
father and brother, the rape of her sister, and an attempt by the militia of a majority clan to imprison her 
family along with other members of her clan. She lived in Ethiopia for a number of years without legal 
status, before arriving in the US. 
105 After the BIA denied her appeal, Mohamed hired a new attorney who filed a motion to reconsider and 
remand. The motion asked the BIA to reconsider on the ground that Mohamed feared that she would be 
subjected to FGM should she be returned to Somalia. It stated that over ninety-eight percent of women in 
Somalia are subjected to FGM, that Mohamed's first attorney did not raise the issue at the hearing or on 
appeal, and that Mohamed had not yet been genitally mutilated. attached to the motion was a letter from 
Mohamed's prior counsel, in which she admitted that she failed to ask her minor client whether she had 
been subjected to FGM and did not consider raising it as part of the asylum claim, although she believed 
that such treatment was “clearly past persecution” (and although the State Department reports contained in 
the record of the hearing stated that “virtually all” Somalian women were victims of that practice). Ibid. at 
789-790. 
106 Ibid, at 791. 
107 Ibid, at 799. 
108 The Ninth Circuit cited country conditions information indicating that a Benadiri woman returned to 
Somalia faced great risk of other harm, including gender-based subordination and that Ms. Mohammed 
risked further FGM in the form of later infibulation, which is inflicted upon 80% of Somali women. Ibid 
“The State Department Reports in the record make clear that the subordination and persecution of women 
in Somalia is not limited to genital mutilation. Rather, "[w]omen are subordinated systematically in the 
country's overwhelmingly patriarchal culture," and "[r]ape is commonly practiced in inter-clan conflicts.” 
The court also stated that, “As a member of the minority Benadiri clan, Mohamed is “especially vulnerable 
to attack” and has “little or nothing to which to return.” See, Awale v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 527, 531 (8th 
Cir.2004) (explaining that Somalian women of minority clans “who lack the protection of powerful clan 




“continuing harm that renders a petitioner eligible for asylum, without more”.109 This 
holding effectively made a showing of FGM sufficient to create an irrebuttable 
presumption of a well-founded fear of persecution. 
     The Ninth Circuit further stated that even if FGM created a mere rebuttable 
presumption of a well-founded fear, the presumption would still be difficult to rebut 
because of the risk of violence and gender persecution, as evidenced by the applicant’s 
FGM, if the applicant was removed to her home country.110 This alternative theory has 
been endorsed by the Eighth Circuit in Hassan v. Gonzales, which held that a showing of 
past FGM would create a presumption of a well-founded fear since the applicant could 
still suffer from forms of future persecution other than FGM.111 Similar sentiments have 
been expressed by the Fourth112 and Second Circuit Courts of Appeals.113 
     Jurisprudence from the UK and Canada further supports the proposition that where a 
claimant had sought protection to avoid FGM, they have a well-founded fear of future 
persecution of FGM and the ostracizing and harmful consequences of rejecting the 
                                                 
109 It was reasoned that, “like forced sterilization, genital mutilation permanently disfigures a woman, causes 
long term health problems, and deprives her of a normal and fulfilling sexual life.” Ibid. See also, Qu v. 
Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1195, 1203 (9th Cir. 2005) (characterizing forced sterilization as a form of permanent 
and continuous persecution which creates an irrebuttable presumption of a well-founded fear of 
persecution). 
110 Mohammed, supra note 104, at 800. The State Department Reports in the record make clear that the 
subordination and persecution of women in Somalia is not limited to genital mutilation. Rather, "[w]omen 
are subordinated systematically in the country's overwhelmingly patriarchal culture," and "[r]ape is 
commonly practiced in inter-clan conflicts.” The court also stated that, “As a member of the minority 
Benadiri clan, Mohamed is “especially vulnerable to attack” and has “little or nothing to which to return.” 
See, Awale v. Ashcroft, supra note 108, (explaining that Somalian women of minority clans “who lack the 
protection of powerful clan structures or who belong to particularly vulnerable groups, such as ethnic 
minorities, are particularly at risk.” 
111 See, Mohammed, supra note 104, at 518. In Hassan v. Gonzales, the Eight Circuit held that FGM 
constitutes persecution. It further found, in light of country condition information regarding the practice of 
FGM in Somalia, that the claimant suffered FGM on account of her being a member of the PSG ‘Somali 
females.’ Once past persecution on account of a protected ground was established, the court found Ms. 
Hassan to be entitled to an as of yet unrebutted presumption of a well-founded fear of future harm. The 
court found that the BIA had not properly shifted the burden of proof to the government with regards to 
rebutting the presumption with evidence of changed circumstances. In response to the government’s 
argument that no well-founded fear of harm existed because Ms. Hassan allegedly could not be subjected 
to FGM again, the court noted that there were other prevalent forms of persecution aside from FGM to 
which Ms. Hassan could be subjected if returned to Somalia. Notably the court wrote, “We have never held 
that a petitioner must fear the repetition of the exact harm that she has suffered in the past. Our definition 
of persecution is not that narrow.” Ibid, at 518. 
112 Barry v Gonzales, 445 F.3d 741 (4th Cir. 2006). 
113 Bah v Mukasey, 2008 U.S. App LEXIS 12507 (2d Cir., June. 11, 2008). For further grants of asylum and 
humanitarian protection on the basis of FGM as past persecution and a continuing harm as treated within 
the US, see Frydman & Seelinger, supra note 97, at 1083-5. 
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practise. In the 2004 UK case of P and M,114 an 18-year-old woman from Kenya appealed 
to the Court of Appeal against the decision of the IAT to refuse her asylum claim on 
grounds of fear of FGM. The claimants father had joined the Mungiki sect in Kenya and 
performed FGM on the claimant’s mother (who died as a result) and sister. She did not 
want to undergo FGM. Taking note of relevant case-law and objective evidence,115 it was 
held that the decision of the adjudicator to grant asylum had been correct and that women 
in Kenya formed a PSG, there was no IFA and no sufficient state protection 
available.116 The appeal was allowed. 117  
      In, Annan v Canada,118 decided in the wake of Farah, the claimant, a twenty-three-
year-old Roman Catholic woman from Ghana, fled her country when a Muslim religious 
leader decided that FGM should be done to purify her. The religious leader was acting at 
the instigation of a local Muslim police inspector's son who, having failed to convince her 
to marry him, had kidnapped the applicant and, with a few friends, gang-raped her. The 
Canadian Refugee Division rejected her claim to Convention refugee status on the basis 
that Ghana was not a Muslim country, that the practice of FGM occurred only in certain 
parts of the north, that the government did not approve of the practice and that it was about 
to declare it illegal. Her judicial review was allowed. It was determined that the facts 
presented demonstrated that the claimants fear was valid.  Since it was established that 
FGM, while officially condemned, was still tolerated in Ghana, there was no basis upon 
which to conclude that if the applicant returned to her country, she could expect protection 
from the State. The state's willingness to act must be considered as well as its ability to 
provide protection. It was further reasoned that an IFA was not available. The panel 
                                                 
114 P and M, supra note 63. 
115 Consulted COI indicated that the police did not intervene in FGM matters and that whilst the Kenyan 
Government had issued presidential decrees against FGM, further reports indicated that the practice is on 
the increase rather than decrease. Additionally, the court accepted that the general view of the police in 
Kenya was that violence against women is regarded as a family matter and not a crime. Ibid, para 48. 
116 It was determined that the claimant had a well-founded fear of persecution and that State protection for 
M would be neither adequate nor effective and that there was no reasonable possibility of an IFA in her 
case. Ibid, para 49. 
117 The court concluded that, “In these circumstances, it is our view that M’s appeal has to be allowed and 
the decision of the Adjudicator restored. This case did not require and should not have engaged such a 
sophisticated analysis of the technical requirements of the Refugee Convention. We would have thought 
that if the story of M was true, she was clearly entitled to asylum. The Adjudicator thought it was, and the 
IAT should not have intervened. The decision of the Adjudicator should be restored”. Ibid, para 49. See 
also, para 41-42 detailing the original decision of the Adjudicator. 
118 Annan, supra note 12. 
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reasoned that Ghana was a small country with largely tribal cultural foundations and it 
was not unreasonable to believe that the police inspector had the necessary resources at 
his disposal to obtain information from his colleagues elsewhere in the country and find 
her wherever she might settle.119  
     Similarly, in another Canadian case, decided in 2002, the claimant, aged 17, feared 
persecution in her country of origin by reason of her membership in the PSG women.120 
She alleged that her father wanted to force her to marry a 65-year-old man, a polygamist 
and the father of 15 children. The claimant's testimony was found to be credible and the 
panel reasoned that it was likely she would likely be subjected to FGM. The panel in 
reaching its decision had engaged the CIRB Gender-Guidelines and available COI, 
because the feared harm was tantamount to persecution. According to the COI, in Guinea, 
custom took precedence over written law. It was therefore unreasonable to invoke State 
protection in this case, even less an IFA.121 The panel concluded that the claimant was a 
convention refugee. 
    The above cases highlight the extent to which gender-guidelines can be effectively used 
and implemented. These cases are illustrations of good practices utilized by some 
decision-makers and indicate that if properly trained in gender-sensitive issues pertaining 
to the persecution suffered by women, decision-makers will either apply the guidelines or 
interpret them in a gender-sensitive manner.  
    Considering these positive cases, one might ask: why the need for this thesis? Firstly, 
FGM claimants continue to be denied protection. Findings from the available 
jurisprudence has revealed that in FGM cases there is a high degree of inconsistency in 
seemingly identical fact situations, resulting in disparate outcomes. The application and 
interpretation of the gender-guidelines is a welcome development, but other obstacles 
need to be remedied to ensure that FGM claimants are treated in a procedurally fair and 
gender-sensitive manner. Secondly, a common theme runs throughout the cases, namely,   
the apparent racial and gender biases and assumptions of decision-makers. Opposition to 
FGM lies in part in the ideological assumptions about ‘non-Western cultures’ that direct 
                                                 
119 Ibid. 




the gaze towards particularized cultural practices instead of the overall problem of 
violence against women. Most of the judgments examined refer to FGM as a practice, 
tribal custom or a rite of passage. This characterization suggests that decision-makers are 
failing to recognize that, “FGM is a generalized form of violence aimed at controlling 
female sexuality”.122 Western scholars have similarly adopted this approach, privileging 
culture-based explanations of gender-related persecution. For example, one scholar, while 
acknowledging that, “the third world is not alone in failing to accord women sufficient 
protections”, nonetheless urges asylum recognition for gender-related persecution 
because “the social relations of many third-world nations are still dominated by religious, 
tribal, or societal customs which accommodate, if not sanction, the persecution of 
women”.123 The narrative strategy used to condemn, is reminiscent of anthropological 
constructions of non-white immigrant cultures as bound by regressive customs and native 
practices.124 According to Sinha, this treatment exemplifies a manifestation of Western 
discourse, directing a ‘horrified gaze' towards its colonial and postcolonial subjects, rather 
than looking at the complexities surrounding the issue of FGM.125 Ultimately the dialogue 
of FGM utilizes the ‘here versus there’126 parlance, creating the illusion that the 
persecutory act is wholly unlike for example domestic violence which is widespread 
globally. Perceiving specific forms of gender-related violence as ‘foreign’ has profound 
consequences for asylum claimants whose claims involve persecution that cannot be 
blamed on a cultural practice.127 Decision-makers, need to ensure that FGM is not merely 
regarded as a cultural practice. Like the approach adopted in the specialized domestic 
violence courts, decision-makers need to be trained to understand that FGM, like domestic 
violence, is a multifaceted form of violence and persecution, which reflects and reinforces 
                                                 
122 Asefa S, “Female Genital Mutilation: Violence in the Name of Tradition, Religion and Social 
Imperative” in French S, “Violence Against Women: Philosophical Perspectives”, Cornell University Press: 
New York, (1998), at 100. 
123 Neal D, “Women as a Social Group:  Recognizing Sex-Based Persecutions as Grounds for Asylum”, 20 
Columbia Human Rights Law Review 203, (1988), at 206-7 (taking as example women in post-revolution 
Iran). 
124 Volpp L, “Talking ‘Culture’: Gender, Race, Nation, and the Politics of Multiculturalism”, 96 Columbia 
Law Review 1573, (1996), at 1588 (“The freezing on non-European culture in such forms as ‘custom’ or 
‘practice’ emerges from colonist and imperialist discourse which opposes tradition (East) and modernity 
(West)…”). 
125 Sinha, supra note 51, at 1585. 
126 Volpp L, “Feminism versus Multiculturalism”, 101 Columbia Law Review 1181, (2001), at 1186. 
127 Sinha, supra note 51, at 1585. 
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inequities between men and women and compromises the health, dignity, security and 
autonomy of its victims. While the guidelines at face-value appear to offer the degree of 
protection sought, their impact is limited. The process in which the guidelines are 
implemented and interpreted are flawed as they allow bias to continue unabated under the 
veneer of respectability provided by the guidelines. For the guidelines to be truly effective 
in achieving their aim the refugee processes of the case-studies must be reformed. 
      Unconscious bias may affect decision-makers to varying degrees128 despite their 
intentions to apply the gender-guidelines and treat FGM claims in a gender-sensitive 
manner. Intentional biases and a lack of understanding manifested using cultural 
relativism arguments and the use of credibility determinations are used to deny FGM 
claimants protection. These denials as the following section will illustrate, stem ultimately 
from the limitations of the informal RDP and the non-binding nature of the gender-
guidelines.129 The caselaw further suggests that these limitations, permit biases and 
political considerations to influence determinations. Coupled with a lack of experience 
and training among decision-makers in gender and credibility issues many of the negative 
determinations are, “simply unsustainable”.130 Research has found that immigration 
officials make wrong decisions in early hearings which must be corrected by immigration 
judges. It has further revealed that decision-makers do not consistently consider the legal 
entitlement to protection provided to victims of gender-related persecution under the 
Refugee Convention; and that case-owners do not consistently consider issues at the heart 
of gender-related persecution.131 Thus, some case-owners and decision-makers do not 
understand the nature of the persecution from which women flee resulting in unsound 
                                                 
128 Unconscious bias is identified by psychologists as part of everyone’s social identity: we are each ‘hard-
wired’ to respond positively to people we perceive to be like us and to react against people perceived to be 
too different to ‘fit in’ or to pose a threat to us. Such bias can be the product, for example, of social 
stereotypes, family influence or experience (real or perceived – e.g. crossing the road to avoid proximity to 
a group of noisy young men, who may be perfectly harmless.)  In the same way as a pleasant memory 
automatically produces a smile, we respond in very predictable ways to internal messages that we formulate 
and send to ourselves. See, Turnbull H, “The Illusion of Inclusion: Global Inclusion, Unconscious Bias and 
the Bottom Line”, Business Expert Press: New York, (2016). 
129 Refer to Chapter Two’s discussion on the structures and processes of the asylum decision-making bodies 
of the respective case-studies. 
130 Muggeridge H & Maman C, “Unsustainable: The Quality of Initial Decision-Making in Women’s Asylum 
Claims”, Asylum Aid, (2011), at 5. This UK report produced by Asylum Aid can be accessed via the Asylum 
Aid website at http://www.asylumaid.org.uk/data/files/unsustainableweb.pdf (last accessed 1/6/17). 
131 Ibid, at 5-7. 
209 
 
credibility denials. For example, in a 2011 report by Asylum Aid, it was revealed that at 
one refugee hearing, because the decision-maker had never  heard of ‘female 
circumcision’ the claimant was found to lack credibility.132 Furthermore, this report has 
also revealed that COI and case-law have been used selectively or unrepresentatively to 
justify denials; gender-guidelines have not been enforced; and women seeking asylum 
have been affected by a lack of legal representation.133 These operational, procedural, and 
substantive issues and how they negatively affect claimants seeking refugee status based 
on an actual or perceived fear of FGM within the case-studies will now be examined. 
 
B. ‘Bad Judgment’ or Failure to Apply Gender-Guidelines? 
 
1. Procedural Issues 
 
Procedural matters can mean that gender issues may not come to light at an early stage 
within the RDP. This section reviews several procedural issues commonly experienced 
by female claimants. Specifically, it deals with the impediments of filing deadlines, poor 
legal representation and the failure to consult or apply the gender-guidelines. The issue of 
credibility will be examined in Section III because of its complex nature and the wealth 




The imposition of deadlines, where the failure to meet the time-limit extinguishes any 
form of claim, is an exceptionally unfair and arbitrary measure, particularly for those 
seeking refugee status. The US is the only one of the top five refugee-receiving countries 
that mechanically applies a time bar to asylum claimants,134 and will be the focal point of 
                                                 
132 Ibid, at 6. 
133 Ibid, at 6-7. 
134 See, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Asylum Levels and Trends in Industrialized 
Countries, 2005: Overview of Asylum Applications Lodged in Europe and Non-European Industrialized 
Countries in 2005”, March (2006), available online at 
http://www.unhcr.org/uk/statistics/country/44153f592/asylum-levels-trends-industrialized-countries-
2005.html (last accessed 28/7/17).  
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discussion here. Since 1996, Congress amended laws to bar asylum, regardless of the 
merits of the claim, for any claimant who fails to apply within one year of entering the 
US, unless the claimant qualifies for an exception.135 Since the one-year bar came into 
effect, the Department of Homeland Security has rejected on the deadline more than 5,000 
asylum applications (affecting more than 21,000 refugees) that would otherwise have 
been granted.136 Research has revealed that women tend to be more adversely affected by 
the deadline, as they are more likely to file later than men.137 Furthermore, if claimants 
know nothing about the legal system (which is likely) and as women feel like they have 
no expectation that they will receive help, many will not even be aware that they must 
apply for asylum.  
    The rationale for such procedural restrictions are murky: it appears that the US was 
attempting either to fix a problem of systematic delays that had already been resolved, or 
to “triage weak asylum claims with an instrument so blunt that it undermines the asylum 
process”.138 Anecdotal evidence has suggested that the one-year deadline imposes unfair 
denials of asylum on claimants, resulting in deportations.139 It also puts additional 
pressure on those involved in refugee determination. Evidence has found that credible 
refugees who could be granted asylum are being shifted into the immigration courts, 
wasting scare government resources.140 It has also been said that, investigating 
compliance with the filing deadline is time-consuming for decision-makers who are 
                                                 
135 Schrag P, et al, “Rejecting Refugees: Homeland Security’s Administration of the One-Year Bar to 
Asylum”, 52 William and Mary Law Review 651, (2010), at 652.  
136 Schrag et al, supra note 135, at 653.  
137 Ramji-Nogales J, “In the US, a filing deadline hinders asylum seekers”, (2010), available online at 
http://madikazemi.blogspot.com/2010/10/in-us-filing-deadline-hinders-asylum.html (last accessed 
1/7/17). 
138 Schrag  et al, supra note 135, at 655. 
139 See generally Human Rights First, “The Asylum Filing Deadline: Denying Protection to the Persecuted 
and Undermining Governmental Efficiency”, (2010), available online via the Human Rights First website 
at https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/afd.pdf (last accessed 24/6/17) (reporting 
more than two dozen case examples of refugees rejected for asylum because of the deadline); Musalo K & 
Rice M, “The Implementation of the One-Year Bar to Asylum”, 31 Hastings International and Comparative 
Law Review 693 (2008) (providing case studies that illustrate the negative impact of the one-year deadline). 
140 See, Eliminate the Arbitrary One-Year Bar to Asylum:  Co-Sponsor the Restoring  Protection to Victims 
of Persecution Act (H.R. 4800), available online at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-
content/uploads/pdf/4-20-10-support-for-HR4800.pdf (last accessed 17/7/17). (Hereafter referred to as the 
Eliminate the Arbitrary One-Year Bar to Asylum). 
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already overloaded and diverts time away from evaluating the merits of the asylum 
case.141  
     As previously noted the only exception to the one-year deadline is if a claimant can 
prove that they have a “changed” or “extraordinary” circumstance that would excuse a 
delayed filing. Whilst Congress claimed that the statutory exceptions should guard against 
the exclusion of bona fide refugees, these exceptions have not prevented refugees with 
well-founded fears of persecution from being denied asylum. In many cases, they have 
been applied narrowly or inconsistently with Congressional intent, failing to account for 
many reasons why bona fide claimants would not file within one year.142  For example, 
decision-makers have denied exceptions to refugees who suffer from psychological 
conditions such as post-traumatic stress disorder.143 It needs to be acknowledged that 
victims of FGM and other forms of gender-based violence may initially avoid applying 
for asylum out of fear of stigmatization, and/or because asylum may mean not only 
severing their ties with their country, but also with family and other community members. 
Additionally, exceptions are not usually recognized when claimants did not know about 
asylum filing deadline, or were unable to find affordable legal representation.144 The 
deadline denies protection to genuine claimants for exceptions beyond their control and 
having nothing to do with the merits of their case. For example, in one documented case, 
a claimant from Senegal who had fled a forced marriage and FGM was denied refugee 
status because the filing deadline and ordered deported.145 The claimant had been in the 
US for four years, explaining that she believed that the practice would change in Senegal 
following the prohibition of FGM and that she could return home. However, having been 
informed of her sister’s circumcision and realizing that she was still at risk, she 
                                                 
141 Ibid, at 2.  
142 Ibid. 
143 Hereafter referred to as PTSD. Such psychological conditions can make it very difficult for claimants to 
provide a detailed explanation of their past in an asylum application and may even prevent them from 
meeting deadlines etc. 
144 Eliminate the Arbitrary One-Year Bar to Asylum, supra note 140, at 2.  
145 The claimant was a member of the Djola ethnic group, which practices FGM and was, informed that she 
had to undergo FGM and enter into an arranged marriage with a man forty years her senior. She refused 
and sought protection from the police who declined to intervene. This case was reported in Eliminate the 
Arbitrary One-Year Bar to Asylum, supra note 140, at 3. See also, Tamber C, “Asylum denied in Female 
Circumcision Case”, (2009), available online at 




subsequently applied for asylum. Despite being described as “genuinely credible” with 
substantial COI supporting her account that FGM continued to be practiced despite its 
prohibition and that she would be subjected to it, she was denied protection as she had not 
filed her claim in time.146 As discussed in Chapter Two, the case-studies have 
implemented mechanisms to limit access to refugee determination and control refugee 
flows.147 Unquestionably, the use of time-limits on filing claims is one example of this 
and these mechanisms, permit politicians and decision-makers, to exercise their power 
and discretion to interpret refugee law and policies in a manner which legitimately 
restricts protection and consequently vital resources, including State benefits.  
      Applications filed after the one-year deadline will only be considered if changed or 
extraordinary circumstances related to the delay are found by the decision-maker, and if 
filing was made within a ‘reasonable time’ after the occurrence of such circumstances.148 
The ‘changed circumstances’ exception applies not only to changed COI but also to 
activities in which the claimant had become involved, outside of her own country, that 
placed her at greater risk.149 The regulations define ‘extraordinary circumstances’ as 
including (1) serious physical or mental illness; (2) legal disability, i.e. an unaccompanied 
minor; (3) improper conduct by legal advisors; (4) the claimant having other lawful status 
in the US; and (5) the death or serious illness of a family member or legal 
representative.150 The regulations do not list ignorance of the need to seek asylum, or of 
the existence of the deadline, as an extraordinary circumstance. This is arguably deliberate 
                                                 
146 In considering her eligibility for withholding, the judge noted that there might indeed be a “reasonable 
possibility” that she would be subjected to FGM on return, but concluded that she did not meet the higher 
“more likely than not” standard for withholding of removal. The BIA agreed. The U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit, in declining to overturn the denial withholding, also noted that “there is evidence in 
record that tends to support [her] claim that if she returns to Senegal, she will face a risk of FGM,” and the 
dissenting judge wrote that the woman “presents a mountain of evidence that clearly demonstrates that the 
likelihood of her being forced to undergo FGM is certainly 100%.” The claimant even filed a petition asking 
the US Supreme Court to review the decision, but the petition was not granted.  
147 In the US, these mechanisms are codified within the IIRIRA which made extensive changes to the asylum 
process: establishing expedited removal proceedings; codifying many regulatory changes; limiting judicial 
review in certain circumstances; and more importantly for the purposes of this discussion, added time limits 
on filing claims. 
148 INA Act, Section 208(a)(2)(D), 8 U.S.C. Section 1158(a). Clearly, it is critical to avoid filing beyond 
the one year deadline. Aside from being held to the higher probability standard of withholding of removal 
should asylum be precluded, an applicant found statutorily ineligible for asylum will not have the advantage 
of eligibility for humanitarian asylum based on the severity of her past FGM. See, Frydman & Seelinger, 
supra note 97, at 1085-6. 
149 8. C.F.R. section 208.4 (a) (4) (2010) 
150 Ibid, section 208.4 (a) (5). 
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to justify denials and only serves to undermine the objectives of the gender-guidelines. 
The extraordinary circumstances proscribed in the regulations are illustrative and not 
exhaustive, meaning that decision-makers may award exceptions that are not specifically 
described therein.151 In fact, one training manual specifically states that other reasons not 
listed in the regulations which may prevent a claimant from applying within a year, 
include, “severe family or spousal opposition, extreme isolation within a refugee 
community, profound language barriers, or profound difficulties in cultural 
acclimatization”.152 Decision-makers therefore have discretion in such cases and 
significant leeway for the expression of judicial preferences, which derive from political, 
social, or economic views.  
       The deadline requirement has been described as harsh, unfair153 and arbitrary.154 
Karen Musalo and Marcella Rice examined 286 cases involving the one-year deadline155 
and concluded that it, “causes the refoulement of legitimate refugees……leads to arbitrary 
and disparate outcomes, deters bona fide claims, and squanders precious administrative 
resources”.156 They claim that decision-makers apply the exceptions to the regulations 
formalistically and without regard to the manual’s instructions.157 Similar, research 
undertaken by Human Rights First158 has also found that the deadline, “is barring 
legitimate refugees with well-founded fears of persecution from receiving asylum in the 
US and is leading to the unnecessary expenditure of government resources”.159 The 
UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, states 
that technical problems should not bar consideration of a legitimate asylum claim. Yet, 
this is exactly what the US is doing. The 1967 Refugee Protocol further states that, no 
State should expel or refoul a refugee to a territory where their life or freedom would be 
                                                 
151 Ibid (stating extraordinary circumstances are not limited to the enumerated list). 
152 Schrag, supra note 135, at 673-4. 
153 Ibid, at footnote 106. 
154 See, Musalo & Rice, supra note 139, at 712. 
155 Ibid. 
156 Ibid, at 722. 
157 Ibid, at 697, 699 (stating that, “asylum officers must be flexible and inclusive in examining changed or 
extraordinary circumstances, if credible testimony or documentary evidence relating to an exception 
exists”). 
158 Human Rights First examined case files of asylum claims that were handled by lawyers to whom it had 
referred potential clients. See, Human Rights First, supra note 139, at 1. 
159 Human Rights First, supra note 139, at 1. 
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threatened on account of a persecution ground. In denying protection because of a filing 
deadline technicality160 and returning a claimant to a country where she faces 
persecution,161 the US is in breach of its obligations.162 
     The goal of matching asylum grants precisely to those individuals who have a well-
founded fear of persecution has been undercut by the enactment of the one-year filing 
deadline. The narrative and data obtained from examined case-law and reports, and 
detailed below reveal that the US is not living up to its international obligations. It further 
reveals that application of the one-year bar renders the INS gender-guidelines useless, and 
reinforces the need for a gender-sensitive RDP. The deadline fails to address the unique 
position of women fleeing gender-based forms of violence and their needs within the 
RDP. Consequently, FGM claimants face great challenges in obtaining refugee status. 
Whilst it was hoped that the deadline would reduce the volume of non-meritorious 
claimants, this is not the case and as the following discussion will reveal, many genuine 
FGM claimants have been denied protection. 
 
I. The One-Year Bar Does Not Prevent Fraud  
 
A plethora of cases exist where claimants have been found credible but denied refugee 
status because of the one-year bar. In many of these cases, a wealth of COI and other 
evidence was presented to substantiate claims. For instance, in one case the asylum 
request of an advocate for women’s rights was rejected based on the filing deadline. The 
difficulties which she endured once she reached the US were not considered as 
exceptions.163 A native of Cameroon, the claimant was an outspoken advocate for the 
rights of women, especially on issues relating to domestic violence, FGM, and 
reproductive health. She worked for the United Nations and organized events to raise 
                                                 
160 See, Musalo & Rice, supra note 139, at 711. 
161 Ibid. 
162 See, for example Matter of Anon (2005), as cited in Musalo & Rice, supra note 139, footnote 54. In that 
case a Guinean woman, who at the age of six was subjected to FGM. She then refused an arranged marriage 
to a man almost fifty years her senior. She was beaten by her uncle, who threatened to end her life. She fled 
to the US where she went on to give birth to two daughters. If returned to Guinea she risked death for 
dishonouring her family and feared that her daughters would be subjected to FGM. The immigration judge 
denied asylum because of the one-year deadline and ordered her deported. 
163 See, Human Rights First, supra note 139, at 36 (discussing case HRF case 96746). 
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awareness.164 She also spoke out against the corrupt practices of government officials. 
Because of her activism, the claimant and her family were threatened and detained by a 
local tribal ruler, and their house was set on fire. She fled to the US but was homeless for 
long periods of time, during which she slept on park benches and on church floors.  After, 
the claimant found a permanent residence, she learned about asylum and applied soon 
thereafter without an attorney. The asylum officer who interviewed the claimant told her 
that he believed her story, but he rejected her case based on the filing deadline after finding 
that she was not eligible for an exception.   
     The available data also includes numerous cases where the claimant was denied 
refugee status because of the time bar, but granted a different form of protection from 
persecution, such as relief under the Torture Convention. In the US, a claimant for 
withholding of removal or relief under the Torture Convention must demonstrate at least 
a 51% chance that she will be persecuted or tortured in her home, while a claimant for 
asylum need only show a 10% chance of persecution. This means that a decision-maker 
has not only determined that such claims are non-fraudulent, but also that these claims 
have passed an even more rigorous test than that required for asylum. Unfortunately, 
however, for claimants who receive, these alternative forms of protection, they are faced 
with strict limitations. Unlike an asylum seeker, claimants are ineligible for many societal 
benefits, lacks residency status or citizenship, and, above all, have no possibility of family 
reunification. In one case, a Tanzanian woman whose parents were involved in an 
opposition political party sough refugee status.165 A local policeman demanded that the 
applicant marry him and undergo FGM, even though she was already married. Because 
of her refusal, her parents were detained by the police and tortured. The claimant was then 
taken into custody in exchange for her parent’s release. She was raped, beaten, burned 
and left naked in her cell. She escaped and fled to the US where she was exploited for 
financial gain. She filed for asylum eighteen months after her arrival. Because of the one-
year bar, she was denied asylum but awarded protection under the Torture Convention. 
She will never be able to reunite with her children who remain in Tanzania.166  
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   In another case, a Gambian mother who was married against her will at the age of 
fifteen, subjected to FGM, suffered domestic violence and repeated rapes, witnessed the 
beating of her children, fled to the US.167 As part of her asylum application, she submitted 
evidence that she suffered from PTSD, resulting from the years of violence which she had 
endured. Despite this, the immigration judge denied asylum because of the one-year bar 
and granting withholding of removal.168  In a similar case, a woman from the Kikuyu tribe 
in Kenya had escaped being subjected to FGM because of her parents’ opposition. 
Members of the Mungiki sect attacked and raped her because she was one of a very few 
girls in her village who had not undergone the custom. She joined a woman’s group and 
educated young girls about FGM and forced marriage. While helping a girl escape a 
forced marriage, the claimant was caught, imprisoned and tortured. The immigration 
judge granted withholding of removal but denied asylum as she had failed to meet the 
filing deadline.169 In another case, an Ethiopian woman who had undergone FGM and 
other violence due to an imputed connection to an anti-government political group could 
not establish clear and convincing proof of her entry within one year of application. 
Asylum was denied, but relief under the Torture Convention and withholding of removal 
was awarded.170 These examples illustrate that it is common for a decision-maker to deny 
asylum based on the deadline and then – in the same determination - find that it is more 
likely than not that a claimant will be subjected to torture or persecution upon her return. 
Clearly, therefore, this is adversely affecting genuine claimants. More, disturbing, is the 
reality that other victims of gender-based violence barred from asylum by the filing 
deadline, are unable to meet the burden of proof for subsidiary protection and are denied 
all forms of protection. 
 
II. Regulatory Exceptions are Denied 
 
Another finding from the examined FGM case-law is that decision-makers are repeatedly 
denying cases with regulatory exceptions. It is apparent that decision-makers are ignoring 
                                                 
167 Ibid, at 700, discussing CGRS Case No. 1394. 
168 Ibid. 
169 Ibid, at 702, discussing CGRS Case No. 3154. 
170 Ibid, discussing CGRS Case No. NC0013. 
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PTSDs and replacing expert testimony with personal speculation and conjecture about the 
behavioural impacts of psychological disorders. As will be discussed in due course, 
decision-makers commonly misunderstand or ignore the phenomena of ‘avoidance 
symptoms’ typically experienced by PTSD claimants.171 According to the American 
Medical and Psychiatric Associations, individuals suffering from PTSD tend to avoid, 
“people, places, thoughts, or activities that bring back memories of the trauma”.172 Musalo 
and Rice, argue that any decision-maker who accepts that a claimant is suffering from 
PTSD, but rejects the causal connection between the disorder and the delay in filing fails 
to recognise the phenomena of avoidance symptoms173 and in the opinion of this 
researcher is not appropriately applying the gender-guidelines. Some decision-makers 
have concluded that if PTSD has not prevented a claimant from attending church, 
marrying, having children, or studying within their first year of arrival, that is cannot have 
delayed the application for asylum. This overlooks the reality that the RDP requires the 
claimant to describe in detail the events of her torture, on numerous occasions and before 
governmental officials. Studying and praying do not involve re-traumatization.  For 
instance, in the case of the Kenyan woman fearing FGM from the Mungiki sect, discussed 
above, the claimant had applied for asylum after the one-year deadline and submitted 
evidence of her diagnosis of PTSD and Depressive Disorder. The evidence documented 
her impaired ability to function, however, the decision-maker concluded that those 
disorders could not have contributed to her delay in filing as she had attended Church 
during her first year in the US.174 In another case, the claimant’s mother and grandmother 
helped her escape FGM as a child. She was later forced into a polygamist marriage and 
her husband attempted to perform FGM on her. She attempted suicide and was 
hospitalised for months. She was then repeatedly raped and subjected to violence by her 
husband. She fled Kenya and, arrived in the US on a tourist visa and applied for asylum 
after the deadline had passed. Her PTSD was accepted by the immigration judge but 
                                                 
171 Khandwala L, “The One Year Bar: Denying Protection to Bona Fide Refugees, Contrary to 
Congressional Intent and Violative of International Law”, Immigration Briefings, (2005), at 7. 
172 See PTSD Patient Page 286 JAMA 630, at 630, (2001) & Diagnostic Manual, American Psychiatric 
Association, 309.81 Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (2000), both cited in Shome S, “One Year Bar”, May 
2007 (unpublished manuscript on file with the GCRS), at 4. 
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rejected that it was directly related to her delay in filing on time. It was determined that 
the claimant had exhibited ‘entrepreneurial skills’ by caring for children to raise money 
while she was homeless and because her application was well-written and articulate. 
Asylum was denied, but she was granted withholding of removal.175 Even more alarming 
are those cases where the failure to recognise psychological trauma results in the denial 
of all relief. In those cases, claimants are sent back to the country of persecution. In the 
aforementioned case, the decision-makers disregard for expert testimony and reliance on 
personal speculation and conjecture is conspicuous.  
 
III. ‘Reasonable’ Period of Time & Changed/Extraordinary Circumstance 
 
In respect of changed/extraordinary circumstances, it is also evident from the data that 
decision-makers believe waiting longer than six months after a changed or extraordinary 
circumstance is presumptively unreasonable. This presumption is, arguably, not in 
accordance with the relevant statute which states that, the filing must be made within a 
‘reasonable time’ after the occurrence of such circumstances. When Congress enacted the 
one-year bar, it made explicit its understanding that twelve months was a reasonable time 
within which to file for asylum.176 Arguably, after the occurrence of the facts which give 
rise to the claim, claimants should be allowed one year within which to file. Both the 
Department of Justice and the Department for Homeland Security appear to have 
embraced the six-month presumption in denying asylum claims. It does not, however, 
apply the logical inverse counterpart of that presumption where it would benefit the 
claimant. For instance, a claimant from Togo filed her asylum application five months 
after her student visa reinstatement application was denied. Her application for asylum 
was denied for failure to satisfy the one-year deadline despite her fear that her parents 
would force her, like her two older sisters, to undergo FGM.177 
   In another case178 a Gambian claimant facing a clear probability of persecution was 
denied an exception because she waited eight months after her baby’s birth to file for 
                                                 
175 Ibid. 
176 Musalo & Rice, supra note 139, at 710. 
177 Ibid, discussing CGRS Case No. 4517.  
178 Musalo & Rice, supra note 139, at 710 
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asylum.  The claimant who had undergone FGM applied for asylum after her daughter 
was born in the US because she wanted to protect her daughter from the practice. The 
immigration court acknowledged that the daughter’s birth qualified as a changed 
circumstance, but did not grant an exception to the filing deadline because the claimant 
had waited eight months after the birth to file.  The court considered eight months to be 
unreasonable even though, during this time, the claimant was postpartum, and caring for 
a child who suffered from severe asthma and microcephaly. The BIA upheld the 
immigration judge’s denial of asylum, but accepted that she faced a clear probability of 
persecution, and extended her withholding of removal. 
    These cases illustrate that even claimants who can demonstrate ‘extraordinary’ or 
changed’ circumstances are still being denied protection because some decision-makers 
do not feel that they have filed within a ‘reasonable time’. The ‘reasonable time’ criteria 
is a common formulation, used particularly in judicial and quasi-judicial forums, and this 
criteria, regardless of which context it is used in will be construed differently by different 
judges and decision-makers. In fact, research pertaining to the one-year deadline has 
found that those who filed less than two years after entry to the US were rejected at a rate 
of 32%, but those who filed more than two years after entry were in every case examined, 
rejected at a rate of at least 57%.179 Thus, it seems that the longer the lapse, the more likely 
a claimant will be rejected. This is worrying considering the fact that in the research 
analysis, it was found that women had a rate of untimely filing 13% higher than men.180 
Furthermore, it was revealed that women filed very late claims at a rate more than 50% 
higher than men. Almost 10% of these women filed at least four years after entering the 
US.181 This difference, it is argued can be attributed to the nature of the persecution 
suffered, which makes women reluctant to discuss their experiences. It is further 
suggested that, FGM victims miss the deadline because they face a multitude of barriers 
to securing representation, including a lack of knowledge about the deadline and its 
expectation as well as about the legal system and procedures generally, limited financial 
resources, lack of time and resources to look for legal counsel, and language and cultural 
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barriers. This is supported by the finding that female claimants who filed late were 
represented at a higher rate than men – perhaps because women who did not have legal 
representation did not know that they were eligible for asylum.182 
     Thus, decision-makers trained in gender issues will be more aware of the issues 
affecting victims of FGM and the impediments to their ability to file within a reasonable 
time. Judges and other personnel trained within the specialised domestic violence courts 
are taught that victims of domestic violence stay with their abusers for a plethora of 
reasons and it is only when they feel empowered, unsafe or face the risk of losing their 
children that they decide to seek help. Domestic violence victims do not always seek help 
right away, in some instances it may takes years for them to do so. Should their abuse be 
dismissed because it was not brought within a ‘reasonable time’? No, the specialised 
domestic violence courts are aware of the difficulties facing such victims and the 
difficulties preventing them seeking assistance from the courts. Thus, the legal protection 
and victim support advocated within the domestic violence courts needs to be 
implemented within the RDP to ensure FGM claimants are not disadvantaged by 
restrictive immigration time limits. Arguably the “changed circumstances” and 
“extraordinary circumstances” exceptions do not remedy the problems created by filing 
deadlines. Legitimate claimants are denied asylum, sometimes because decision-makers 
inappropriately deny them exceptions, sometimes because they decide that they did not 
file timely even given the exception, and sometimes because decision-makers decide the 
exceptions do not apply to the claimant’s circumstances. As will be elaborated upon in 
the next section and more comprehensively in Chapter Four, a possible solution to this 
unlimited discretion would the rotation of decision-makers within the RDP. Rotation can 
help to identify bias and consistent denials among decision-makers, but more importantly, 
as evident from the domestic violence courts, rotation also increases interactions among 
decision-makers, legal representatives and other interested parties, expanding networks, 
and leading to cross-pollination and the sharing of ideas. This approach could help to 
improve understandings of gender violence, increase use of the gender-guidelines and 
advance interpretations of the deadline exceptions in a gender-sensitive manner.  
 




IV. The One-Year Bar Causes Numerous Other Adverse Policy Considerations 
 
With virtually unfettered discretion, arbitrariness of the one-year deadline goes 
unchecked. One-year bar determinations are dependent upon the decision-maker assigned 
to the case who, “vary widely in the weight they assign to psychological evaluations and 
differ dramatically in the degree to which they understand why an asylum seeker might 
not come forward immediately”.183 Others have reported that the level of sympathy a case 
receives determines the outcome of the case’s one-year issue.184  In one examined FGM 
case, a Kenyan woman, whom the police abused for her involvement with a political 
opposition group, feared being subjected to FGM after two of her sisters were subjected 
to it and one died from complications. She fled to the US and subsequently married a US 
citizen. Her spouse filed an immigration petition on her behalf but as the marriage 
collapsed, he withdrew his petition and alleged that the marriage had been a scam. By this 
time the claimant had been in the US over a year. The immigration judge reasoned that 
the claimant, “should have known’ that her marriage was in trouble and that she would 
need to find an alternative status to maintain a lawful presence. The judge used the one-
year bar to deny her asylum claim but granted withholding of removal and protection 
under the Torture Convention. On appeal, the BIA sustained the denial of asylum and 
reversed the grants.185 
    In another case, a Gambian woman was subjected to FGM and fled to the US in 1994, 
three years before the one-year bar came into effect. A non-lawyer helped her to fill out 
her asylum application. While in the US, she gave birth to seven children, including 
several daughters. She feared that they would be subjected to FGM. Her attorney promised 
but failed to update her application to include FGM in her claim. He later disappeared 
requiring her to make court appearances without any representation. In 2003, she obtained 
new representation and immediately filed an amended application and supporting 
documents which included the FGM claims. Neither the government attorney nor the 
immigration judge objected to the amended application. A few months later, the case was 
                                                 
183 Musalo & Rice, supra note 139, at 712. 
184 Ibid, at 713. 
185 Ibid, discussed CGRS Case No. 4244. 
222 
 
transferred to another immigration judge for the merits hearing. The judge found the 
claimant eligible for asylum but reasoned that the claimant should have filed an amended 
application within one year of the one-year bar coming into effect and found that no 
exception applied. She was also found ineligible for withholding of removal. After her 
attorneys filed an extensive brief on appeal, the BIA remanded and ordered the 
immigration judge to grant asylum.186  
    Furthermore, in addition to causing excessive referrals from the asylum office, 
deterring legitimate asylum clams, and disproportionately impacting upon detained 
persons and unaccompanied minors among others,187 the filing deadline begets covert 
settlements. In fact, some attorneys have reported that DHS counsel have sometimes 
offered withholding of removal or relief under the Torture Convention for the claimants’ 
withdrawal of their asylum claims.188  In one documented case, a claimant from Mali was 
subjected to FGM as a child. After the birth of her daughter in the US she applied for 
asylum based on her fear that her daughter would also be subjected to FGM. Terrified of 
losing her asylum claim and being forced to return to Mali, the claimant agreed to 
withholding, stranding her 7-year-old child in Mali with no prospects of reunification. 
Whilst, the settlement of cases can be a useful and appropriate means to clear crowded 
court lists, within the RDP, it is not clear that offering an asylum claimant withholding of 
removal is a good idea. The fact that a “terrified, psychologically stressed, financially 
impoverished”189 claimant accepts such a deal does not necessarily mean that the US is 
living up to its international obligations. It is, undoubtedly a mechanism used to avoid 
having to support refugees out of State resources.  
      In addition to highlighting the extent to which the RDP is flawed, the use of time-
limits further raises several additional issues affecting both the implementation and 
interpretation of the INS gender-guidelines. Whilst the guidelines were not referred to in 
any of the available decisions, the obvious lack of gender-sensitivity and understanding 
inherent throughout the judgments is worrying, particularly in respect of cases dealing 
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with forced marriages and PTSD, suggesting that even in cases where decision-makers 
may be aware of the guidelines their own biases are prevailing. Arguably, such sentiments 
highlight the extent to which decision-makers need to be continually trained to better 
understand the issues facing FGM claimants.190 Each of the examined gender-guidelines 
encourage training to a limited degree: implementation of this provision and further 
reform is essential as it will lead to better decision-making and help to eradicate the 
‘culture of disbelief’191 and the cultural and gender biases prevailing among decision-
makers.192 In many of the domestic violence courts examined for this thesis, judges, court 
personnel and other interested parties, such as victim advocates, receive training on 
domestic violence issues before commencing any assignments. Training sessions and 
written materials dispel the myths surrounding domestic violence and address special 
issues and applicable law relating to immigrants and non-English speaking parties. 
Similar mandatory training is needed for all involved within the RDP. Perhaps, if the 
gender-guidelines been applied in the cases examined by qualified and experienced 
decision-makers, a more pragmatic approach would have been taken which would 
arguably have produced more equitable outcomes. 
        The case-law and research pertaining to the one-year bar has demonstrated that 
women fleeing FGM face a multitude of hurdles and many genuine claimants are being 
rejected. In order to overcome these obstacles, reform is needed. Specifically, training 
should be rolled out to all in the RDP to enable them to take into account the unique 
challenges claimants face when deciding whether they meet the deadline or qualify for an 
exception. Furthermore, decision-makers need to be made aware that a delay of more than 
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six months might be reasonable and compulsory use of the gender-guidelines must be 
mandated. As discussed in Chapter Two, and as will be reinforced throughout this chapter, 
random factors, such as the identity of decision-makers, deeply affect the RDP. The use 
of filing deadlines by States, specifically the one-year deadline enforced in the US adds 
an additional random factor, because it is not, nor can it be, evenly applied to all claimants. 
First, various groups of claimants are deemed timely in differing degrees, probably 
reflecting not only differences in immigration support systems that advise claimants to 
file promptly, but also the extent to which different decision-makers apply strict or 
generous evidentiary standards in determining entry dates. Decision-makers grant 
exceptions to late claimants at rates that differ for different groups etc.193 Thus, even aside 
from the inherent unfairness of refusing asylum, to people for reasons beyond their 
control, some have argued that the deadline introduces irrelevant sociological factors, 
such as the existence of co-ethnic support groups in the claimant’s community, and factors 
related to the attitudes of decision-makers, into the determination of who obtains refugee 
status.194 The uses of deadlines have not been, and probably cannot be, administered in a 
manner that treats late claimants fairly and equally. The best solution to these problems is 
to repeal them.195 
 
B. Representation   
 
Problems with the quality of decision making on asylum claims are compounded by a lack 
of high quality legal advice. Without good legal representation, women struggle to get 
their protection needs recognised and will find themselves at risk of destitution or 
deportation. According to Ramji-Nogales having legal representation is “the single most 
important factor affecting the outcome of an asylum case.”196 Refugee claimants however, 
often have difficulty finding affordable, trustworthy representation to help them with 
asylum applications.  Many claimants lack information about the legal and immigration 
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systems and do not understand how to file an asylum claim, which requires a particularly 
complex legal argument. The inability to obtain representation, therefore, renders some 
genuine claimants ineligible for asylum. A 2010 study by the Transactional Records 
Access Clearinghouse at Syracuse University revealed that, “only 11 percent of those 
without legal representation were granted asylum; with legal representation, the odds rose 
to 54 percent.”197 Arguably, representation can increase a claimant’s chances of gaining 
asylum198  
      Without representation, claimants may have poorly prepared applications, possibly 
with vital information and details missing which can result in their claims being denied. 
The following case illustrates these difficulties and reinforces the superiority of binding 
regulations over the gender-guidelines and highlights the flaws of the US RDP. In the 
case of Barry, the Fourth Circuit determined that where a claimant had been subjected to 
FGM but whose lawyer had failed to present such evidence, the claimant would have been 
eligible for asylum.199 However, when Ms. Barry’s original counsel did not present 
evidence of her past FGM in Guinea, the claimant’s motion to reopen her BIA denial of 
asylum failed when the court reasoned that she had not complied with Lozada measures200 
regarding presenting an ineffective assistance of counsel motion.201 According to the 
Lozada measures, a claimant asserting ineffective assistance of counsel must (1) provide 
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an affidavit describing her agreement with counsel; (2) inform counsel of the allegation 
against her and provide her with an opportunity to respond; and (3) indicate whether a 
complaint has been filed with the appropriate disciplinary authorities, and if one has not 
been filed, explain why not. In the case at hand, it was determined that Barry did not 
substantially comply with the Lozada requirements. With respect to the first requirement, 
the court reasoned that Barry failed to submit an affidavit demonstrating the scope of her 
agreement with counsel. Thus, because Barry did not put forth any evidence regarding her 
discussions with counsel and counsel’s concomitant assurances to her, the BIA had no 
way of determining whether Barry’s prior counsel’s representation fell below the requisite 
standard.  
     As to the second requirement, it was determined that no evidence existed to show that 
Barry had notified her prior counsel of the allegations or provided counsel with an 
opportunity to respond while the motion to reopen was pending before the BIA, despite 
the fact that the court was presented with such evidence which it refused to consider as, it 
was not part of the certified administrative record.202 Finally, with respect to the third 
requirement, Barry’s filing with the BIA was deemed not to address whether or not she 
had lodged a disciplinary complaint against her prior counsel, despite the fact that she 
alleged that she had initially drawn up a complaint but ultimately decided not to file it, 
she did not notify the BIA. Thus, the court reasoned that the BIA had not abused its 
discretion with respect to refusing to consider late-offered evidence of FGM, stating that, 
although it was undisputed that Barry had been subjected to FGM, and that her daughter 
would likely be subjected to FGM if deported, the BIA correctly determined that the FGM 
evidence had been available and could have been discovered or presented during the initial 
deportation proceedings.203 
     Whilst the denial of asylum appears to be factually specific, the decision nevertheless 
indicates that where a claimant has made a timely showing of past FGM, she may be 
eligible for asylum. Whilst Barry appears to be a positive indication of the Fourth Circuit’s 
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commitment to protecting women and children fleeing FGM, it nevertheless represents a 
departure from the protection offered in Mohammed and indicates that if the Fourth 
Circuit was truly as committed to granting asylum and protecting women from 
persecution as it has indicated, it would not have denied protection, especially considering 
the fact that there has been discontentment with the use of the Lozada requirements and 
some Circuit Courts have recognized that, strict compliance with Lozada is not always 
required.204 This case highlights the need for good and efficient legal representation and 
assistance throughout the RDP. In addition to good legal representation, the RDP also 
needs to recognize that victims of violence need specialized assistance. The RDP needs 
to establish a victim services unit. Specialist advocates, trained in gender violence, would 
provide support and assistance to claimants throughout the entire refugee process. They 
may also refer claimants to appropriate agencies offering shelter, childcare and 
counselling services.205 Of importance, is the fact that, where legal representation may not 
be available, they can inform claimants of what the process involves, assist with the 
completion of legal forms and applications, attend hearings and offer advice where 
needed. This approach, employed throughout the various domestic violence courts 
examined, is grounded in the belief that victims of domestic violence should have access 
to information, education, and other necessary social and economic support to make 
informed decisions that best reflect their interests and needs. Within the RDP this 
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approach would be beneficial as it empowers women, and creates a sense continuity, 
support and ensures that claimants are assured of having their voices heard. For FGM 
claimants this is important as they need to feel confident in disclosing sensitive 
information which decision-makers will base their determinations on. 
     The continuity of representation and assistance is particularly important in cases of 
gender-based persecution because trauma, shame and stigma may affect the disclosure of 
rape and sexual violence and make disclosing these experiences very difficult. Research 
emanating from the case-study countries, as discussed above, has revealed that legal 
representation is costly and not always readily available.206 Consequently, as evident from 
this case, inexperienced and uninterested legal representatives may be proffered in such 
cases. Arguably, the fact that Barry’s counsel failed to present evidence of her past FGM, 
reinforces this theory, especially in light of the fact that Kasinga which was decided in 
1995, had opened the door for the asylum applications of women fleeing FGM. Legal 
assistance must be made readily available to such claimants, and the key elements of high 
quality legal representation should include the following (1) professionalism and 
expertise, which enables the representative to establish the full factual and evidential basis 
of the case at the earliest opportunity; and (2) the quality of the one to one relationship 
between the representative and client is viewed as vital to the overall quality of provision 
as it helps to establish the claimants trust and confidence in their representative and 
encourages early disclose of the full facts of the case.207 Evidence from interviews with 
women undertaken by Asylum Aid, further showed that claimants felt better informed 
about the RDP and better prepared if they were legally represented.208 They stressed the 
link between being legally represented and being able to present all the facts of their case. 
Some women further drew attention to the importance of the legal representative being 
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female and familiarity with gender-related claims such as FGM was valued.209 In the final 
report, women further described feelings of being ‘let down’ by their legal representatives 
when abandoned at appeal stages.210 The subsequent experience of going to an appeal 
alone was described as leaving them exposed to the whims of a Judge who may not show 
sensitivity to the gendered aspects of the claim.211 One interviewee who had her appeal 
dismissed said that she felt unable to face the next stage of the process alone.212 Barry, 
arguably, did not have such a representative.   
       Furthermore, as will be discussed in due course, it is apparent that virtually no support 
was provided to Barry from the RDP and BIA when she was going through the process 
and when it was identified that she has received ineffective assistance from her original 
counsel. It is evident that the court failed to consider the trauma endured by Barry because 
of this ineffective assistance and having to seek new representation. Furthermore, the case 
suggests that the INS gender-guidelines were not applied. Whilst, it is recognised that the 
gender-guidelines would not have made a difference in the hearing before the Immigration 
Judge as FGM was not raised as an issue, arguably had the guidelines been binding on the 
decision-makers (who addressed the motion to reopen the FGM claim) and utilized, their 
legal-statutory status would have placed them on an equal footing with the Lozada 
measures. This would have eroded the importance of the procedural deficiencies raised in 
this case, and given priority to the persecution feared, as the Fourth Circuit hinted that 
they would have done had their hands not been bound by the Lozada requirements. Like, 
the one-year deadline the Lozada measures merely represent another procedural hurdle so 
blunt that it too undermines the RDP. With no reference to the INS gender-guidelines, it 
can be argued, that whether or not gender-guidelines are implemented, due to their soft-
law character, jurisprudence and legislation will continue to take precedence and 
undermine their objectives. Thus, if the guidelines were made legally binding, the 
reasoning employed in Mohammed and other positive decisions arguably would take 







priority over (or at least place them on an equal footing with) requirements, such as the 
BIA’s Lozada requirements, used to deny protection in this case.213  
      Before proceeding, it must be noted that another major limitation of the US RDP and 
its counterparts raised by Barry pertains to the assumption among decision-makers that 
claimants are aware of the procedural and appeals mechanisms available to them if they 
seek to present an ineffective assistance of counsel motion. Many claimants have fled 
their countries of origin to escape persecution. Many cannot speak the language of their 
chosen ‘refuge’ state, and many cannot read or write. Coupled with the fact that claimants 
find themselves in an unfamiliar environment, and have a genuine fear or mistrust of 
authorities, it is not surprising that claimants, such as Barry, therefore, either fail to initiate 
vital processes or make mistakes when they attempt to remedy a situation. In fact, recent 
findings emanating from the UK have revealed that many women found it difficult to 
obtain legal representation214 and in the majority of cases claimants did not know who 
their case-worker was or how to contact them for assistance.215 They also did not know 
what the case-worker was supposed to help them with. Claimants described feeling 
uniformed and confused about the RDP.216 As exemplified in Barry, this lack of assistance 
and knowledge results in negative determinations rather than because their claim lacked 
merit. 
    The INS gender-guidelines emphasis the importance of creating a ‘customer-friendly’ 
asylum interview environment, so as to encourage claimants to freely discuss the elements 
and details of their claims.217 They further call on asylum officers to remain aware of the 
fact that most claimants come from countries where they have good reason to distrust 
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those in authority.218 Perhaps, if binding gender-guidelines were used in Barry, the 
outcome would have been different: the court would have acknowledged that the 
linguistic and cultural barriers facing the claimant, in addition to her distrust of authorizes 
where factors which prevented her from significantly complying with the Lozada 
requirements. Thus, her motion to re-open would have been successful and she would 
have been granted refugee status as stated by the court. The fact that these factors are not 
alluded to in the examined judgments is further evidence that the guidelines were not 
consulted. In fact, Asylum Aid has noted that some decision-makers have exhibited very 
poor knowledge of gender-related persecution, and that there was almost a lack of 
preparation by some, regarding objective COI. In fact, in one case, one woman described 
fearing that her daughter would be subjected to FGM if returned to the Sudan. The 
decision-maker replied: “can you clarify what you mean by circumcision? I have not heard 
of female circumcision”. This decision is surprising, because the UK gender-guidelines 
and asylum policy instructions both mentioned and described the practice of FGM.219 
Such knowledge is essential if women’s claims are to be decided appropriately.  
    Moreover, in addition to the above assumption that claimants are aware of these 
processes and remedial mechanisms, it should also be acknowledged that in some 
instances claimants will be not aware of such requirements unless informed by their legal 
counsel, and as Barry indicates, unless statutory requirements are followed their claims 
will fail regardless of whether they are genuine or not. Arguably, some representatives 
may not inform claimants of their ability to complain about the legal assistance which 
they have received, either because they feel that it is not necessary, or because they may 
not wish to be criticised for failing to adequately prepare the case, thus exposing their lack 
of knowledge in respect of the guidelines and gender-based claims in general. This issue 
needs to be addressed within the RDP and comprehensive reforms, including the use of 
experienced and specialised counsel, court aids and victim advocates, like those within 
the domestic violence courts, need to be implemented to effectively ensure that claimants 
may be assisted in obtaining and accessing essential resources, services and information 
as required. These reforms will help to deepen decision-makers and representatives 
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understanding of FGM and the types of persecution that women face and offers a useful 
model of altering institutional culture and approaches to decision-making. 
       In addition to the procedural barriers discussed above, claimants also have to endure 
as part of the RDP a credibility assessment. Negative credibility findings, as Section III 
will disclose are often the basis upon which asylum claims are refused. Investigations into 
the quality of asylum decision-making have shown that refusals based on lack of 
credibility were undertaken using unreasoned and unjustifiable assertions and were not 
supported by the analysis of the facts.220 The analysis of the examined FGM case-law has 
revealed that the credibility of claimants was at stake in most of the cases and may have 
influenced negatively the final decision. Before, exploring those findings, Section II will 
now examine some pertinent substantive legal issues emerging from the case-law and 
related research. 
 
II. Substantive Legal Issues 
 
Although all relevant legal concepts used in assessing refugee claims apply equally to 
men and women, some affect women more frequently because of the gendered nature of 
their claims. The need to show the absence of State protection is an element which is often 
found in gender-related cases. Most of these cases are based on a fear of persecution by 
non-state actors. To qualify as a refugee, a claimant must demonstrate that the state is 
either unwilling or unable to provide protection from that persecution. This is harder to 
do if the claimant fears persecution from a non-state actor. Moreover, due to the absence 
of gender as an enumerated persecution ground, it is common for women’s claims to be 
considered in relation to the PSG category, which as discussed in Chapter Two, has been 
interpreted differently by the case-studies and even their respective courts in some 
instances.  
      However, to ensure an inclusive interpretation of the Refugee Convention, all 
enumerated persecution grounds should be considered from a gendered perspective. 
Finally, from a substantive view point where a claimant can demonstrate that she has a 
well-founded fear of persecution and is unable to avail herself of protection in her country 
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of origin, she may still be refused protection, if it is determined that she can relocate to 
another area of her home country. If an IFA is found to be reasonable, refugee status and 
other forms of protection will be denied. An IFA, as the case-law will now reveal, may 
affect women claiming refugee status more significantly because women seeking 
protection may fear persecution by non-state actors more often than men and the option 
of relocating is less likely when the persecution feared emanates from the State. These 
substantive issues have affected FGM claimants and resulted in wrongful denials. In this 
section I am now going to focus on the substantial legal issues of ‘Convention Grounds’ 
and the ‘IFA’ as these issues have been misconstrued by decision-makers in FGM, as will 
now be discussed. 
      
     A. Convention Grounds - PSG 
 
Research has revealed that where the sole reason for persecution was gender-related, the 
Refugee Convention was never held to be engaged221 and that some decision-makers 
showed a marked reluctance to engage with the PSG category. In fact, when a woman 
presented a claim which included gender-related persecution, a ground such as political 
opinion or race was more adequately explored, even when membership of PSG could have 
been engaged. This approach arguably, has created a higher threshold for women to meet. 
Thus, as the following case will reveal it appears that decision-makers are prepared to 
ignore gender-guidelines and are unwilling to consider engaging with the Refugee 
Convention where no directly applicable case-law is available and where case-law and 
COI did exist, they are prepared to take a very narrow view towards applying it. 
     In 2004, a claimant claimed to have a well-founded fear of persecution if returned to 
Sierra Leone on account of her membership in the PSG: a female who is expected to 
undergo FGM.222 In dismissing both the asylum and Article 3 claims,223 the decision-
maker conceded that there would not be a sufficiency of protection for the claimant were 
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she to be removed to Sierra Leone and she was granted three years humanitarian 
protection leave.224 The decision was appealed to the IAT on the basis that the claimant’s 
claim engages the Refugee Convention by way of her membership of a PSG. The 
claimant's account was that she comes from a lineage of women who generally hold the 
rank of persons responsible for the carrying out of FGM. Her grandmother, the head 
circumciser in her village died without a descendant save for her. The claimant said that 
she was selected by a group of females in her village to replace her. They were going to 
force her to undergo FGM which she objected to and she fled.225 It was argued that the 
PSG to which the claimant belonged was that of women of the Mendi tribe. Their 
immutable characteristics are that they are young and female, with an intact body, which 
has not been interfered with by way of FGM, regardless of the fact that some of the women 
from that tribe do not oppose FGM.226 The desire to preserve their body is so fundamental 
that they should not be required to change it. Reaffirming the reasoning of the adjudicator, 
the IAT, noted that because of the widespread practice of FGM at all levels of society, 
that the claimant could not establish membership of a PSG: “The appellant is a long way 
away from the situation of women in Pakistan who, in Shah and Islam, were found to be 
fundamentally discriminated against”.227 Thus, the IAT reasoned that, being young and 
female would apply to all the young females in Sierra Leone and that this group did not 
exist independently of the fear. Her asylum claim was once again denied.   
     Arguably, had the UK gender-guidelines been applied the outcome in this case would 
have been different. According to the UK gender-guidelines a PSG will exist where “a 
group of individuals with a particular characteristic are recognised by society as being 
different from others in the society”.228 According to the guidelines, whether that will be 
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the situation will depend on the evidence and the factual situation in the particular country 
of origin.229 Thus, the society of a country of origin, the acts of persecutors as well as 
other external factors have a role in defining, identifying and even causing the creation of 
a PSG.230 The particular characteristics in this case which identify the claimant as 
belonging to a PSG include her status as a ‘potential head circumciser’ who opposes the 
practice of FGM and as an uninitiated and intact woman: in other words, her gender and 
her tribal/clan affiliation. Because the objective evidence indicated that FGM is widely 
practised among all levels of society, with prevalence rates as high as 80 to 90% and the 
fact that circumcisers are identifiable within society as they are specifically chosen among 
the tribes, the fact that the claimant is an un-initiated and intact potential circumciser, 
identifies her as belonging to a PSG which exists independently of her fear of FGM. If 
the guidelines had been properly interpreted in this manner the decision-maker would 
have identified the existence of this PSG and granted her refugee status. Instead of taking 
this ‘gendered’ initiative (which the HOL later did in Fornah), the decision-maker 
confined his examination to the proposed PSG of women of the Mendi tribe and in 
recognising that being young, and female would apply to all young female in Sierra Leone 
determined that this PSG did not exist independently of the harm feared. Moreover, had 
the UK gender-guidelines been used or properly interpreted the purported size of the 
potential PSG which was undoubtedly a deciding factor in this case should not have been 
used when determining whether a PSG existed.231 As the UK gender-guidelines note, the 
fact that the PSG consists of large numbers of the female population in the country 
concerned is irrelevant - race, religion, nationality and political opinion are also 
characteristics that are shared by large numbers of people.232 Arguably, due to the 
prevalence of FGM, the mere existence of young females who object to the custom and 
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whose bodies remain intact, reveals the existence of a PSG. Arguably, the IAT was afraid 
to make such a determination, on account of the political fear that thousands of Sierra 
Leonean women would claim refugee status on this basis in the UK. 
     The systematic failure observed in engaging with the Refugee Convention and in 
identifying the grounds of PSG (as evident from the examined FGM case) created a 
considerable gap in the adequacy of the assessment of the asylum claims of women where 
the claim is based on gender-related persecution including FGM. In such cases, not only 
do such claimants have to convince the decision-maker that their account is truthful; they 
also have to establish they form part of a PSG and that no state protection is available. 
Research produced by Asylum Aid has further revealed that, decision-makers are 
reluctant to engage with the PSG category and this in effect creates an extremely high 
threshold for women to cross to be recognised as a refugee.233 The UNHCR’S 2010 
Quality Integration Project report on decisions made in the fast-track system similarly 
identified poor consideration of whether a claim engages a Convention ground and in the 
identification of the Convention ground of membership of a PSG, particularly in women’s 
claims.234 Similar arguments could be made about the quality of decisions emanating from 
decisions emanating from the facts-track refugee system in the US and Canada. These 
findings suggest that decision-makers urgently require in-depth training on engaging with 
the Refugee Convention and their respective gender-guidelines, specifically in terms of 
the PSG ground for cases involving FGM. They also, in the opinion of this researcher 
need to update their knowledge of case-law relevant to such cases. 
 
B. IFA 
Research has revealed that the IFA matter is generally considered in a, “cursory manner, 
without any detailed engagement with the specific circumstances” of the claimant235 or 
the advice contained within the gender-guidelines.236 In the clear majority of cases, the 
underlying argument was that as the credibility of the claimant’s claim was rejected, it 
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would be safe for her to return to her country of origin and that there was no need to 
substantially consider the issue of an IFA.237 For instance, in one documented gender-
related case, the claimant stated during her asylum interview that due to her mixed 
ethnicity, the only place in the DRC where she could live would be Goma. The decision-
maker concluded that “as aspects of your claim have been rejected, internal relocation is 
not considered necessary but if you wish to internally relocate, this is a viable option for 
you”. In fact, the claimant’s mixed ethnicity was never rejected and therefore an IFA 
should have been considered, regardless of any other findings made. In a subsequent 
appeal hearing, an immigration judge made a specific finding on the issue stating that, an 
IFA was not possible within the DRC and that it would be unduly harsh to expect the 
claimant and her infant son to relocate. It was also determined that her 
Rwandan/Congolese mixed ethnicity and her Tutsi background would make it impossible 
for her relocate safely.238 In another case, the IFA was considered in the alternative. In the 
case of a gay woman from Uganda it was suggested that, “even if it were accepted that 
you a lesbian, it is considered that you could relocate to another area of Uganda”. In the 
vast majority of cases it appeared that IFA was considered only to ‘cover all bases’ in the 
event of an appeal. Thus, in my opinion, because there is no mention of the IFA within 
the 1951 Refugee Convention, it could be argued that this is a ‘judicially created notion’ 
used to justify denials in complex cases. Furthermore, consideration of the IFA has been 
found not to take into consideration objective evidence or the concept, taken from case-
law, of relocation being unduly harsh. This cursory approach is most evident in the 
following FGM claims. 
    In the first case, the claimant, a Nigerian national fled after her father tried to force her 
to undergo FGM. She had gone to the police but was refused help. The Home Office 
decision-maker accepted that she had refused the procedure and was now in fear of her 
father but stated that her claim was not one that engaged the Refugee Convention: “your 
claim is not based on a fear of prosecution in Nigeria because of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion. As such you do not qualify 
for asylum in the UK”. The Home Office also argued that she could have sought help 





from an NGO which runs a shelter for women fleeing FGM, as well as pursing protection 
from the police, and that an IFA was therefore available. These issues arose despite the 
gender-guidelines recognising FGM as a form of persecution. The guidelines also refer to 
the possibility of women who may be subjected to FGM being considered a PSG.239 
     Similarly, in NK (Cameroon)240 the claimant claimed that when she turned eighteen 
her step-father began to pressurize her to become a Muslim. A few years later he took 
steps to arrange a marriage for her and demanded that she undergo FGM. She went to the 
police, but they refused to pursue the matter and, indeed, following a complaint to them 
from her stepfather, arrested, detained and molested her. During the time, she spent in 
three separate prisons she was raped. Eventually in November 1998 she was finally 
released when her mother bribed the guards. With her mother's help, she then fled the 
country.241 Whilst her claim was accepted as credible, it was dismissed by the decision-
maker on the basis that, firstly he considered that her release on payment of a bribe 
demonstrated that the authorities no longer had an adverse interest in her. He reasoned 
that her stepfather, since she was now older would no longer have the desire to harm her: 
“It would not be in accordance with custom to force her to undergo FGM at her age”. 
Secondly, he further reasoned that she would have a viable IFA, if she relocated to another 
area within Cameroon.242 This aspect of the decision was later upheld by the IAT.  
      The assumptions in the case, that no future persecution existed and that an IFA was 
available based on the evidence presented (which will now be discussed in relation to the 
appeal before the IAT), indicates a complete disregard for the gender-guidelines and a 
lack of understanding by the decision-maker (in the initial determination) of gender-based 
violence and the situation and hardships faced by lone women who are forced to relocate 
within their countries of origin. Arguably, had the decision-maker been trained in the use 
and interpretation of the gender-guidelines, he would have addressed the case in a gender-
sensitive manner and would have realised that the claimant would indeed face serious 
harm upon her return and that the hardships which she would endure from being forced 
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to relocate would be disproportionately harsh. According to the UK gender-guidelines, 
the question to be asked in deciding whether it is reasonable to expect a claimant to 
relocate is, “would it be unduly harsh for the asylum seeker to relocate within their country 
of origin?”.243 Thus, in considering the reasonableness of relocation the decision-maker 
should have taken the claimants gender into account,244 as in the vast majority of FGM 
practicing societies women face financial, logistical, cultural, and social and other 
difficulties. Thus, the fact that FGM and discrimination against women was shown to be 
widespread in Cameroon, arguably placed the claimant in an unduly harsh position if 
forced to relocate. The documentary evidence in this case was arguably mistreated and 
misconstrued by the decision-maker in the first instance and the IAT at the appeal stage 
(as will now be discussed), so as to make the existence of an IFA appear more probable 
and to mask the evident lack of understanding of the complex gender issues presented 
before the decision-makers involved. 
      At her appeal before the IAT, it was contended that the decision-maker had been 
wrong to conclude that the claimant would not face serious harm on return to her home 
area and wrong to conclude she would in any event have a viable IFA.245 The IAT agreed 
that the decision-maker had erred in concluding that the claimant would not face further 
acts of serious harm: 
irrespective of whether FGM was or was not practiced on older women, her 
stepfather had proved capable of influencing local police and security forces to 
imprison and maltreat her for nearly eleven months. His anger at her had not been 
solely because of her refusal to undergo FGM.  It was also because she had refused 
to convert to Islam and refused to go through with the marriage he had arranged. 
Therefore, it was reasonably likely, in our view, that her act of fleeing after release 
from prison would have angered him further, in particular for having frustrated his 
plans for her marriage.246 
 
In spite of this acceptance, the IAT did not consider that the decision-maker had been 
wrong to dismiss the appeal, again reasoning that an IFA was available to her.247 They 
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determined that while the decision-maker was wrong to find that the claimant's stepfather 
would no longer have any animus against her, he was entitled to find that he would not 
have the necessary resources to pursue her or locate her in other parts of Cameroon.248 It 
was stated that there was no tangible evidence to show that: 
 
Individuals with influence locally are able to get the police and security forces 
elsewhere in the country to pursue or target individuals on their behalf, at least not 
when the matter concerned only family and domestic matters.249 
 
    In challenging the existence of an IFA, Counsel for the claimant provided ample 
evidence to highlight the widespread, systematic practice of FGM. It was alleged that the 
claimant risked being subjected again to pressure from local Muslims to convert or marry 
or undergo FGM.250 Due to the fact that the claimant identified her own religious 
persuasion as Catholic, the IAT reasoned that she could therefore easily relocate within a 
Christian area.251 Referring specifically to IRB Canadian materials and the CIPU Report 
of a Fact-finding Mission to Cameroon in January 2004, Counsel submitted that, FGM 
was a widespread and routine practice in Cameroon (throughout both Muslin and Christian 
areas);252 and that it was not only practiced on young girls but also on women prior to 
marriage, regardless of her age”.253 In its determination, the IAT concluded that while 
FGM is practiced on a significant percentage of the female population, it is only on the 
highest figures presented in the CIPU report inflicted on only one in five.254 Moreover, 
while the IAT conceded that the government of Cameroon had not passed laws to make 
FGM illegal or to repudiate the custom, it narrowly construed the CIPU Report at 
paragraph 6.70 which stated that the practice of FGM, “is normally practiced on young 
girls aged 6-8 years”,255 suggesting that the claimant was no longer at risk. Thus, it 
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concluded that, there was no suggestion in the report to suggest that the practice of FGM 
is inflicted as often on post-adolescent as on pre-adolescent females.256 
    Counsel for the claimant further submitted that, if the IAT found that the claimant would 
not be at risk of being pursued or located by her stepfather or members of his family, that 
they should find that it would be unduly harsh to expect a young woman on her own to 
relocate within Cameroon. In this regard, counsel for the claimant, drew the attention of 
the IAT to a number of passages in the background materials highlighting discrimination 
against women in a number of areas in Cameroon. The poor record of the authorities was 
also highlighted.257 The IAT determined, however, that this evidence fell short of 
establishing a consistent pattern of gross, mass or flagrant violations of the human rights 
of women.258 Furthermore, whilst the IAT determined that the claimant might face 
hardship in other parts of Cameroon outside her home, it did not consider that the evidence 
justified a conclusion that the claimant would face a real risk of serious harm. The appeal 
was dismissed, and asylum denied.259 
     This case, like others260 highlights not only the ineffectiveness of the UK gender-
guidelines, but also the lack of gender and cultural sensitivity among decision-makers at 
all levels. For instance, the fact that an IFA was deemed to exist in light of the widespread 
practice of FGM, discrimination against women (including human rights abuses) and the 
failure of the State to prohibit the practice highlight a lack of understanding of gender 
issues in the Refugee Convention, and a complete lack of regard for supporting 
documentary evidence, in respects of women’s experiences/status within their respective 
countries of origin. Arguably, had the guidelines been applied and interpreted in a gender-
sensitive manner, it would have also been apparent to the IAT that relocation would have 
been unduly harsh for the claimant. Faced with documented widespread discrimination 
against women, the fear of FGM and the possible inability to find work or marry as the 
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claimant was uncut and potentially unmarriageable; arguably the claimant would be 
unable to survive alone in any part of Cameroon. Yet, the IAT reasoned that these factors 
were not serious enough to reach the standard of being ‘unduly harsh’. 
     Moreover, according to the UK gender-guidelines failure of State protection may occur 
as a result of the following: legal provisions or the absence of such provisions; lack of 
access to justice and police protection; lack of police response to requests for assistance, 
or a reluctance, refusal, or a failure to investigate, prosecute or punish individuals; and 
encouragement or toleration of particular social, religious or customary laws, practices, 
and behavioral norms, or an unwillingness or inability to take action against them.261 As 
discussed in Chapter Two, women may also be subject to gender-related abuse resulting 
from social customs or conventions because there is no effective means of legal recourse 
to prevent, investigate or punish such acts.262 Such failure of State protection may include, 
but is not limited to, legislation (e.g. marital rape exemptions in law), lack of police 
response to pleas for assistance and/or a reluctance, refusal or failure to investigate, 
prosecute or punish individuals and encouragement or toleration of particular 
social/religious/customary laws, practices and behavioral norms or an unwillingness or 
inability to take action against them.263 The IAT as previously discussed, determined that 
a pattern of gross, mass or flagrant violations of the human rights of women was not 
apparent in this case. However, if this provision of the guidelines had been applied to the 
evidence presented, a lack of state protection would arguably have been found, thus 
rendering the existence of an IFA improbable. The widespread practice of FGM coupled 
with a lack of legal provisions prohibiting the practice indicates that meaningful national 
protection is not available in Cameroon. Secondly, documentary evidence highlighting 
discrimination against women, coupled with the testimony of the claimant that she was 
unable to obtain police protection on account of their unwillingness to protect her and the 
harm which she suffered whist in prison, arguably signifies a toleration of particular social, 
religious or customary laws, practices, and behavioral norm, or an unwillingness or 
inability to take action against them.  
                                                 
261 UK Gender Guidelines, supra note 192, Section 2B.8 & 2B.9. 
262 Ibid, Section 2B.9. See also, Asylum Policy Instruction: Gender Issues in the Asylum Claim, supra note 
63, at 5-6. 
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     The UK gender-guidelines in applying the standard of protection to be offered states 
that it is “not that which would eliminate all risk and would thus amount to a guarantee of 
protection in the home state”.264 As part of the State’s duty to protect, the guidelines further 
argue that the duty to protect also includes the duty to protect women’s human rights. FGM 
and other forms of discrimination against women are recognized human rights violations. 
Cameroon is a signatory to a plethora of international human rights conventions or 
covenants and their additional protocols, including CEDAW, CRC and the Torture 
Convention to name but a few.265 Arguably, the obligations to protect women arising from 
these instruments, at the time that this case was determined were not being complied with 
and thus again signifies a lack of State protection which would have meant that no viable 
IFA adequately existed. Arguably, had the gender-guidelines been applied, value been 
given to the documentary COI presented, and the standard of State protection correctly 
applied an IFA would not have been deemed to exist and coupled with the admission of 
the IAT that the claimant had a well-founded fear of future harm the claimant would have 
been granted asylum. 
     Moreover, the fact that FGM, forced marriage and forcible religious conversion were 
referred to as ‘domestic’ and ‘family’ matters further reinforces the notion that without 
proper gender-sensitive training, decision-makers will remain oblivious to the 
complexities facing women in their respective countries of origin and in tandem, permit 
the influence of cultural relativism and gender-biases within the decision-making process. 
A gender-sensitive interpretation and application of the UK gender-guidelines would have 
been beneficial in this case. If decision-makers were bound to apply the guidelines, the 
narrow interpretation given in this case, in respects of deliberately citing paragraphs within 
the evidence which justified their reasoning by establishing the theoretical existence of an 
IFA, could be questioned. Thus, these decisions need to be subjected to review, especially 
in appeal cases. This case, and the research emanating from the UK reveals the gender-
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guidelines were either not applied or applied incorrectly, and that the IFA was considered 
in a cursory manner with inadequate consideration being given to women’s specific 
circumstances, to access and effectiveness of state protection and to COI about the 
situation for women. Additionally, as highlighted in the NK Cameroon case, there was 
evidence that the ‘undue harshness’ test was not being appropriately applied, and COI was 
being misconstrued and selectively used to justify the existence of an IFA and to deny 
protection. 
 
C. Evidential Issues 
As is evident from the previous section the choice of COI was used selectively to justify 
the final determination. Evidence suggests that there is a significant failure to identify and 
consider information that is relevant and appropriate, especially in gender-related claims, 
and the choice of information used in refusals was also selective.266  In fact, some cases 
reveal that sections that undermined the claimant’s case were quoted and highlighted, 
while sections (often from the same report) that corroborated the claimant’s cases were 
ignored.267 
     It is vitally important for decision-makers to have before them balanced and 
representative COI from a range of credible sources when considering claims. Research 
has identified a gap in the availability of COI relevant to some aspects of gender-related 
persecution and the range of human rights violations that women may be subjected to in 
their country of origin.268 Even when such information is available, it is often ignored or 
selectively used. For instance, in the case of the female claimant from the DRC, the fact 
that she was of mixed Congolese and Rwandan nationality and was therefore perceived 
as Tutsi was a key aspect of her claim. The COIS Report for the DEC which was quoted 
extensively in her refusal letter as a basis to justify the adverse credibility finding, 
contained specific and detailed references to the risk faced by those perceived as Tutsis. 
Some of the information corroborated the claimants claim. The relevant OGN on DRC 
                                                 
266 Muggeridge, supra note 130, at 59. 
267 Ibid.  
268 Collier B, “Country of Origin Information and Women: Researching Gender and Persecution in the 
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also contained specific reference to the risks faced by Tutsis. None of this information 
was referred to in the refusal letter.269 
   Access to and appropriate use of COI is essential in assessing the effectiveness of state 
protection. This is particularly the case in FGM determinations which often involve 
persecution in the private sphere, both in determining whether state protection was 
accessible to and effective for a woman before she fled her country and to determine 
whether it would be accessible to and effective for her if she returned, either to her home 
area or to another area of her country. Failure to source relevant, reliable and balanced 
country information, or the use of such information in a selective manner and 
unrepresentative way, as was the case in NK Cameroon, can have a detrimental effect on 
the outcome of a claimant’s claim for asylum. Information about gender-related 
persecution, access to effective state protection and the treatment and conditions of 
women in home countries may be harder to access. This as the following section will 
highlight can result in unfair credibility determinations.  
      Having examined the failure of the RDPs of the case-study countries to give effect to 
the gender-guidelines and the failures of decision-makers to effectively apply and interpret 
the gender-guidelines, the following section will now examine the issue of credibility.  The 
description of credibility is necessarily lengthy, as it firstly, highlights the extent to which 
the RDP and gender-guidelines in respect of credibility assessments can be undermined, 
and secondly, reinforces my contention that in a similar manner to the historical treatment 
of domestic violence, decision-makers within the RDP are masking their biases, lack of 
understanding, and permitting governmental considerations thorough the use of credibility 
to triumph over their international obligations under a veneer of legitimacy and 
respectability. 
 
III. Credibility, FGM and Refugee Status Determination 
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Despite a greater focus on the influence of gender in refugee status determination women 
face with the RDP, women, as discussed, still face greater obstacles to the grant of refugee 
status than their male counterparts. Specifically, women confront numerous hurdles in 
establishing their credibility.270 At the core of refugee law is the humanitarian belief that 
the international community must offer protection to victims of human rights violations, 
regardless of their gender or nationality.271 Viewed in this light, “it is clear that credibility 
assessment must err on the side of protection, refrain from discrimination and maintain as 
a priority the well-being of the applicant”.272  Nevertheless, credibility-based decisions 
within the RDP are habitually based on personal judgment that are, inconsistent from one 
adjudicator to another, un-reviewable on appeal, and increasingly influenced by cultural 
misunderstandings.273 The reality, is that many claimants have great difficulty in 
convincing decision-makers of the ‘truth’ of their claims. Considering this reality, 
attempts have been made to give credibility assessments a more tangible basis.  
     Whilst each of the gender-guidelines implemented by the case-studies, address the 
issue of credibility274 their limited guidance is evidenced by the fact that, respective 
administrative agencies have in recent years articulated specific factors that decision-
makers should consider when deciding whether to accept a refugee claimant’s 
credibility.275 Like the gender-guidelines these credibility assessment guidelines are 
deficient; whilst they identify factors that should be taken into consideration by decisions-
makers, such as demeanor, cultural differences, trauma, and evidence pertaining to COI 
                                                 
270 Drudy A, “Credibility Assessments and Victims of Female Genital Mutilation: A Re-Evaluation of the 
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Determination”, 17 Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 367, (2003), at 367. 
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for example, they provide little guidance as to how these factors should be weighed 
against each other to reach a final decision.276 Importantly, like their gender counterparts, 
such administrative guidelines do not bind the relevant decision-maker, such that failure 
to consider credibility guidelines as they currently exist (indeed even acting clearly 
contrary to them) is not in itself a ground for judicial review.277  
    Assessments of credibility look for the situational and personal facts, from the point of 
view of the decision-maker, which may ultimately influence assumptions on the 
believability of an individual.278 Recent studies, have exposed several recurrent elements 
in the determination process and the problems associated with them in practice. 
Specifically, Kagan has identified the leading positive and negative factors which are 
given probative weight in this assessment.279 The positive credibility factors include 
firstly, detail and specificity; secondly, consistency; thirdly, proving all facts early;280 and 
finally, plausibility of the testimony. Negative credibility factors include, vagueness, 
contradictions, delayed revelation of key facts; and implausibility.281 Additionally, 
corroborative evidence may have a positive bearing on credibility and the general 
demeanour of the claimant may have a significant impact on the evaluation. Because the 
reality that each decision-maker comes to a claimant’s case with different backgrounds 
and biases, each will either consciously or unconsciously permit their biases and 
backgrounds to influence their determinations when addressing the above-mentioned 
factors.282 Coupled with the relatively informal RDP’s in operation throughout the case-
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study countries, the problem with disparities in decisions, particularly credibility 
decisions are that they are unregulated.283 It is difficult to regulate a decision-makers 
decision when it is based on the intangibles of a case, such as a claimant’s demeanour.284 
FGM are a uniquely vulnerable group, susceptible to bias, misinterpretation, and 
inequitable decisions.285 Credibility assessments based on demeanour, plausibility, 
consistency and prompt provision of information may be fundamentally unsound, and 
psychological difficulties resulting from traumatic experiences286 may affect the ability of 
a claimant to provide any form of coherent testimony. It is proposed in this section to 
examine these factors in respects of the available FGM jurisprudence. 
 
A. Delay and Fabrications 
 
          FGM claimants face the same general problems in credibility assessments as other 
refugees. However, in many cases their problems are augmented by several factors. 
Firstly, the assertions cast on credibility by delay in making a claim are particularly 
problematic for female claimants. Such delays are considered fabrications, merely to 
ensure success in otherwise futile claims. In the US case of Oforji v Ashcroft,287 the 
Seventh Circuit considered the application of a Nigerian woman who feared that her two 
citizen daughters would be subjected to FGM if she was forced to return to Nigeria with 
them. Oforji sought entry into the US in April 1996. The INS denied Oforji entry, detained 
her, and charged her with being an alien seeking to procure entry by fraud or wilful 
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misrepresentation, as well as an alien not in possession of a valid immigration document. 
An initial hearing before an Immigration Judge was held on August 28, 1997, wherein 
Oforji admitted that she was an alien not in possession of a valid immigration document 
at the time of her entry but denied the fraud and willful misrepresentation charges. She 
also requested asylum, withholding of deportation, and protection under the Torture 
Convention.288 At the hearing, Oforji testified that she was a member of the Ogoni Tribe 
of Nigeria and that the tribe lived without roads, schools, and potable water. She further 
stated that due to these poor living conditions, the Ogoni Tribe formed the “Movement 
for the Survival of the Ogoni People” to petition the Nigerian regime of General Sani 
Abacha for these services. She also claimed that the Abacha regime tortured and arrested, 
as well as killed members of the Movement, and that she participated in demonstrations 
against the Abacha administration. She testified that in 1995, the Abacha administration 
arrested her husband, at their house for his participation in the Movement.289 She claims 
to have fled Nigeria to avoid arrest because she was too “outspoken.” However, on cross-
examination she admitted that she fled because “the back of the house, was falling 
anyway”.290Additionally, at the hearing Oforji acknowledged that Abacha has died since 
she fled but stated in a conclusory fashion that the government was nevertheless going to 
persecute her because of “oil.” In addition, she claimed without corroboration that the 
Nigerian government would persecute her because she left the country without a visa and 
because she was a runaway Ogoni. Finally, Oforji also testified that she had undergone 
FGM as a child and the Ogoni people (to which she belonged) required this of all women, 
with refusal punishable by death. She also testified that she did not have anyone with 
whom to leave her children in the event that she was deported. She admitted on cross-
examination that she did not mention the fear that her then un-born daughters would 
undergo FGM when asked by the immigration inspector about her original asylum 
claim.291 
    After, hearing this testimony, the Immigration Judge held that the evidence did not 
establish that she sought to procure entry by fraud or willful misrepresentation, but found 
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that she was inadmissible on the separate ground of lacking a valid entry document. The 
Immigration Judge then denied Oforji's request for asylum based on an adverse credibility 
finding regarding her testimony, and due to the fact that she had already suffered FGM. 
Oforji filed a timely notice of appeal with the BIA, who affirmed the opinion of the 
Immigration Judge.292 
     In addressing the adverse credibility finding, the Seventh Circuit, noted the 
inconsistencies in Oforji’s testimony and stated that they ‘bear a legitimate nexus’293 to 
the denial of her claim. As an initial matter, Oforji did not dispute the Immigration Judge’s 
finding that she presented no evidence such as membership of the Movement for the 
Survival of the Ogoni People. Relying upon Abdulrahman v Ashcroft,294 which upheld an 
adverse credibility finding based in part on an alien’s failure to substantiate his 
generalized testimony by providing documentation of his membership or involvement in 
a politically active student union, the court used this authority to undermine her 
credibility. Furthermore, at the hearing, Oforji conceded that she told the immigration 
inspector on the date of her arrival that she was seeking political asylum solely for 
economic reasons and that she had not been persecuted in Nigeria. This is inconsistent 
with her testimony at the hearing that she fled because of her political activity and because 
the Abacha administration had arrested and killed her husband. To this date, Oforji has 
failed to explain why she told the immigration inspector that she had never been 
persecuted in Nigeria.  
    Furthermore, at the hearing, Oforji testified that she fled because the government had 
planned to arrest her because she was too “outspoken,” but she offered no support for this 
statement. On cross-examination, consistent with her response to the immigration 
inspector at the time of her entry, she admitted that she fled the same night of her 
husband's arrest because the back of her house was falling away. Further, Oforji claimed 
that the Ogoni Tribe lived in “River State,” and suffered from poor roads, schools, and 
water. However, Oforji acknowledged that her sister also lived in River State, but did not 
suffer from a lack of water, nor did she have problems with the Abacha administration. 
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Similarly, Oforji also claimed that the Abacha government was persecuting her because 
of “oil” but failed to offer any facts supporting this conclusion, other than her assertion 
that she “knew it to be true.” Importantly, despite claiming that she fled because of 
persecution from the Abacha administration, she conceded that Abacha was no longer in 
power in Nigeria due to his death.295 
    The Court further decided that, in an attempt to bolster her claim, the addition of new 
factual assertions, including the FGM claim which was not originally set forth can be 
viewed as, “inconsistencies providing substantial evidence that the applicant is not a 
reliable and truthful witness”.296 Whilst, Oforji claimed that her statements were made 
under great stress and without the benefit of counsel, the court determined that this 
admission, “not only implies an acknowledgment that her statements were not accurate, 
but also incorporates protections not required in immigration inspection questioning”.297      
     The adverse credibility finding in this case is unsound and highlights the extent to 
which the INS gender-guidelines are not being used and the extent to which the RDP is 
flawed. Firstly, in respect of Oforji’s inability to produce corroborating evidence of her 
membership in the ‘Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People’, the Court should 
have been more sensitive to the fact that some claimants flee in such a hurry that it is 
impossible for them to provide corroborating evidence. Furthermore, Oforji testified that 
the Ogoni people lived without basic facilities, therefore it is highly probably that she was 
never issued with a membership card. Secondly, according to the gender-guidelines the 
demeanor of traumatized claimants can vary. Trauma may cause memory loss or 
distortion.298 Oforji initially fled Nigeria because of her fear of the Government and the 
possibility of arrest. The judgment fails to make any provision for the fact that some of 
her inconsistencies may have been because of the trauma which she had endured, 
including the arrest of the husband, the persecution of members of her Movement, and 
her fear of arrest and subsequent persecution. Similarly, the judgment makes no reference 
to the UNHCR Handbook, which notes that some claimants will delay providing 
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information due to a mistrust of authorities299 or the phenomenon of ‘reminiscence’. 
Arguably, had the guidelines been implemented and decision-makers adequately trained 
in credibility assessment, then some of these inconsistencies would have been understood 
and accounted for. Arguably, an experienced and trained representative should have also 
submitted evidence of such trauma. 
     In respect of the FGM claim, it was submitted that this additional information was an 
attempt to bolster Oforji’s asylum claim, and as such was evidence that she was unreliable 
and untrustworthy. Again, this determination is flawed. A well-founded fear on behalf of 
the child or because of the parents own opposition to FGM can arise upon the birth of a 
daughter post-flight. According to the FGM Guidance Note, the fact that a claimant did 
not demonstrate this conviction or opinion in the country of origin, nor act upon it, does 
not itself mean that a fear of persecution is unfounded, as the issue would not have arisen 
until then. The birth of a daughter, as in the Oforji case, in these circumstances, gives rise 
to a sur place claim.300 Furthermore, the Note posits that in the event that the claim is 
found to be self-serving, but the claimant nonetheless has a well-founded fear of 
persecution, international protection is required.301 Consequently, if Oforji was indeed 
fabricating her claim so as to allow her to remain in the US, the fact that her daughters 
would be subjected to FGM, nevertheless, warrants her entitlement to international 
protection. However, instead of adopting such an approach, the Seventh Circuit preferred 
instead to characterize her claim as ‘derivative’. In its determination, the court correctly 
recognized that persecution is the, “infliction of substantial harm or suffering”, but it 
improperly rejected the possibility that Oforji could have an independent claim for refugee 
status.  
      In large part, the failure of Oforji’s application also falls on the shoulders of her 
representatives, who grounded her application on the theories of ‘derivative asylum’ and 
‘constructive deportation’ instead of her independent status as a refugee.302 Nonetheless, 
the Seventh Circuit erred in deviating from a proper analysis of persecution by labelling 
the separation of a child from its mother as ‘mere hardship’ and the abandonment of 
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Oforji’s children as an ‘unpleasant dilemma’. In considering only the potential for 
derivative asylum or relief based on constructive deportation, the court “flagrantly ignored 
the individual persecution that Oforji claimed she would suffer and declined to remand 
the matter for the Board’s consideration of these claims”.303 Judge Posner problematically 
claimed in his concurrence that, “our hands are tried”,304 thus neglecting to realize that 
nothing in the refugee definition bound the court in the way he described. Oforji 
exemplifies how the failure to implement the gender-guidelines, poor advocacy, and 
judicial short-sightedness, can result in the denial of protection to FGM claimants who 
delay in providing information, on account of the poor articulation of their claims. 
     In keeping with the theme of fraudulent activity and credibility, the Seventh Circuit 
applied the logic of Oforji in Olowo v Ashcroft305 where a mother applied for asylum 
based on her fear that a return to Nigeria with the two US citizen daughters would result 
in them being subjected to FGM.306 The Immigration Judge, BIA and Circuit Court denied 
Olowo’s claim for asylum on the basis that she herself did not fear future FGM.307 The 
Circuit court summarily overlooked the possibility that Olowo would be subject to 
personal persecution in the form of extreme psychological harm and automatically 
assumed that hers was a ‘derivate asylum’ claim based on ‘constructive deportation’.308 
The court focused only on the potential harms to the children, completely disregarding 
any independent claims by the mother. Arguably, one of the deciding factors in this case 
was the diminished credibility of Olowo. In 2002, Ester who was a permanent US resident 
agreed to go to the Bahamas to help her friend illegally bring his daughter into the US. 
Thus, on account of this fraudulent act, Olowo was in bad standing with the court who 
determined that, “Mrs Olowo’s testimony was not credible because it was inconsistent, 
self-serving, vague, and implausible” and that she tried to misinform the court with her 
untruthful testimony.309  The court, thus determined that Olowo had been an integral part 
of the scheme rather than an, “ignorant helper”.310 In light of this act, arguably the Court 
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refused to believe that she had a well-founded fear of persecution in the form of FGM. 
This is supported in the first instance by the fact that the INS gender-guidelines are not 
referred to in the judgment; nor did the court elaborate on the PSG which the claimant 
claimed she and her daughters belonged to. In fact, the Immigration Judge commented 
that Olowo could not “bootstrap a claim for asylum based upon fear of harm to her 
children”.311 Arguably, whilst Olowo’s claim may have been to a degree self-serving, she 
nonetheless had a well-founded fear of persecution in the form of her daughters 
undergoing FGM, and as such should have been entitled to protection.  
     Arguably, if the guidelines were binding and decision-makers were legally obliged to 
state why they did not refer to the guidelines or elaborate on gender-specific areas of 
concern, the real reasoning behind this decision would have been revealed. Thus, the fear 
arising from FGM, which the court referred to as “a horrifically brutal procedure” with 
life-long consequences, and the persecution Ms Olowo would suffer on account of her 
daughter’s subjection to the practice was not arguably the real issue of concern in this 
case.   
     In an era of strict immigration policies and the desire to choose who can and who 
cannot enter their borders, the court influenced by the fall-out of 9/11 and their own 
personal choices to focus on the fraudulent act which she had committed and used that act 
to undermine her FGM claim. In other words, by construing her claim as ‘derivate’, the 
court sought to ensure that her claim would fail. As stipulated within the INA, an 
individual granted asylum can confer derivative status on a spouse or child,312 but the 
statute does not provide for a child to confer derivative status on a parent. According to 
Frydman and Seelinger this categorization is based, “on an erroneous conception that the 
parent does not suffer harm that is personal to herself, but rather, tries to derive relief 
through her daughter’s claim”.313 A more precise analysis focuses on the parent’s own 
experience of opposing FGM while facing the prospects of either being unable to prevent 
its infliction – causing the parent grave distress, or being shunned by society for his/her 
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attempts to do so.314 Both consequences may rise to the level of persecution, thereby 
entitling a parent to asylum in his or her own right.315 This reasoning has been adopted in 
the FGM Guidance Note,316 and should equally be implemented at the domestic level, 
thus bringing existing guidelines into line with international principles.317 However, in 
this case the court refused to expand their analysis, instead using credibility and domestic 
legislative provisions to deny protection.   
    Furthermore, in making its final determination, the Olowo court, further assumed that 
if the whole family were to relocate to Nigeria, Mr Olowo would be able to protect his 
daughters from FGM, by rejecting the custom, and in doing so would shield his wife from 
having to watch her daughters undergo the practice.318 The court based this determination 
on a dated State Department report that discussed the father’s traditional role in the 
practice of FGM in Nigeria: “Under Nigerian Tradition, the father has control over the 
children. If the father opposes FGM, therefore, the children would almost certainly be 
safe”.319 It is, an over simplification of the court to declare Mr Olowo the ultimate 
decision-maker and protectors of his daughters from FGM.320 The court neglected to 
consider important cultural factors in its analysis and by applying the cultural norms of 
the US, rather than those of Nigeria, “it failed to comprehend the fear of Mrs Olowo and 
her daughters”.321 Thus, by failing to take into account the cultural norms underpinning 
FGM within Nigerian societies, not only does this case illustrate the extent to which COI 
is overlooked, it highlights a complete lack of regard for the INS gender-guidelines, and 
reinforces how its non-binding nature permits the influence of credibility, biases and 
political considerations (namely the desire to reduce immigrants) among decision-makers 
to prevail. As will be discussed in due course, detailed and contemporary COI is vital in 
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determining gender-related refugee claims and when properly consulted, can aid decision-
makers in understating the experience and status of women in countries of origin. 
     In Nigeria, societal notions of virginity are promoted.322 Thus, considerations of a 
native country’s traditions and cultures should be an important factor in helping the court 
to determine the claimant’s credibility, as provided for under the INS gender guidelines.323 
The Olowo court, recognized the concept of ‘extreme hardship’ on the children, however, 
it refused to expand that notion of compassion to the present facts, when one parent was 
able to remain in the US with the children.324 What is considered an absurd act by parents 
in the US is respected in other countries. Thus, “parents who resist FGM also frequently 
face ostracism and can be subjected to bodily harm for their opposition”.325 Therefore, 
even though Mr Olowo may have been personally opposed to the practice, societal 
influences and the threat of retaliation once in Nigeria, may result in him relenting and 
subjecting his daughters to FGM. 
     Before moving on to examine the other obstacles faced by FGM claimants in 
determining their credibility, it is also important to note that the explanations accepted as 
reasonable for such delays often do not consider gender-specific problems like sexual 
violence.326 For example, omissions of events like sexual violence from their application 
forms are commonly considered evidence that it probably did not happen.327 It is 
submitted that this constitutes discrimination against victims of FGM, in refugee status 
applications. FGM victims find themselves in an unfamiliar culture after fleeing their 
homes. Many will feel anxious about what will happen to them and in the vast majority 
of instances they will not know the correct procedures to follow and feel that it is safer to 
enter as a visitor.328 Furthermore, one interview may not be sufficient to obtain the 
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necessary information about sensitive sexual issues such as FGM; trust needs to be 
established before claimants may disclose information.329 As discussed in the previous 
section, victim advocates and good legal representation can help to empower claimants 
and overcome many of these issues. Moreover, despite the UNHCR and domestic gender-
guidelines, women are still interviewed by male asylum officers/personnel, sometimes 
with the assistance of male interpreters.330 Victims of sexual violence as discussed in 
Chapter Two are reluctant to discuss their experiences in the presence of males, due to 
shame or fear that information may be passed on to her community, or due to the fact that, 
in many cases, FGM has been perpetrated by or on behalf of men.331 Combined with a 
fear and distrust of authorities, these circumstances are likely to seriously hinder the 
capacity of a claimant to disclose details of her experience to a male interviewer or 
interpreter,332 especially those from their locality or tribe. Accordingly, information 
disclosed at a later stage by the claimant should not be automatically disregarded or 
considered to reflect negatively on the credibility of the FGM claimant. As discussed 
above there are many reasons why women are not initially forthcoming with information 
about their experiences, and such delays will be further exacerbated if gender-sensitive 
interviewing procedures are not followed.333 As such, special care must be taken in 
relation to evidence pertaining to FGM and how that evidence is obtained. As will be 
discussed in my recommendations chapter, refugee determination hearings need to be 
gender-sensitive. Claimants should be assured that their hearing is private and that they 
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are safe. A safe-environment coupled with representation or support will promote trust 
and possibly encourage women to be more open about their experiences. Following the 
approach of the specialised domestic violence courts, vulnerable and intimidated 
witnesses should be offered the use of special measures to give evidence. These 
provisions, including the use of video-taped evidence for example, would allow claimants 
to give their best evidence and help to relieve some of the stress associated with giving 
sensitive testimony.  
       As the following section will discuss, without such reforms and the continuation of 
the RDP in its current form, decision-makers will continue to ignore or pay lip service to 
the gender-guidelines. Without appropriate training and the enforcement of accountability 
measures, the discretion afforded to decision-makers allows them to continually assess 
credibility in a non-gendered manner to the detriment of claimants. 
 
B. Cultural Differences 
 
Cultural differences may be a particularly compelling problem for FGM claimants. To be 
considered credible, a claimant must show appropriate emotions at the appropriate 
moments. A study by Spijkerboer demonstrates that female claimants are more likely to 
be found incredible if they display too much or too little emotion. The study found that 
within the RDP, women are normatively associated with emotion rather than rationality, 
which is a male trait.334 Further, claimants who display inappropriate behaviour towards 
their families, such as leaving their husbands behind, are considered to lack credibility.335 
This gender-specific difficulty is compounded for victims of FGM, whose deeply rooted 
traditions are the subject of the claim rather than a peripheral issue. An FGM claimant is 
in effect demonstrating her rejection of the social mores of her culture and in doing so 
dishonours her family and ruins her chances of marriage if deported.336 The moral 
dilemma of divided loyalties between her desire not to undergo FGM and the betrayal of 
her family and community can generate emotional difficulties for the claimant. The above 
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problems may give rise to vagueness, evasiveness or inconsistency, culminating in a 
finding of lack of credibility. This is evident in the following two FGM cases. 
    In the Canadian case of P.O.G.337 the claimant a thirty-five-year-old woman alleged a 
fear that her father, a devout Muslim would forcibly subject to her to FGM.338 She testified 
that on two separate occasions she was physically attacked during the night by her father 
and his siblings, who attempted to perform FGM on her.339 At the claimant’s hearing, her 
evasive and histrionic demeanour undermined her credibility. The claimant was a 
statuesque woman, and it was determined implausible by the court that her elderly father 
would have attempted to abduct her. Whilst other factors, including discrepancies in her 
testimony, and the fact that the Ivory Coast had prohibited FGM also resulted in the court 
determining that she was not to be granted refugee status, her demeanour was nevertheless 
used by the court as a means of determining credibility. Whilst several other factors were 
used to justify dismissal in this case, the mere fact that this woman’s age and appearance 
was used to undermine her credibility is erroneous. Appearances can be deceitful; at the 
time of the alleged attacks the claimant who was pregnant suffered a miscarriage, arguably 
therefore she was in a much more vulnerable state, both physically and mentally following 
her ordeal. Coupled with the emotional ramifications of having been attacked by family 
members, and having to flee her home and support networks, this claimant was arguably 
experiencing severe emotional difficulties which the court chose to ignore. Furthermore, 
whilst the claimant’s father may have been elderly this does not necessarily mean that he 
was lacking in strength. The claimant also claimed that her father was aided in these 
attacks by family members. Furthermore, the evasive demeanour of the claimant could 
also be attributed to cultural and religious factors. Therefore, whilst not the sole factor for 
dismissal, demeanor in this case was used to establish a negative credibility finding which 
undoubtedly impacted on the case and its final determination. 
      Similarly, in X (Re),340 the claimant alleged that she has been informed by her uncle 
that she had to be excised so that her blood could be used in a ritual sacrifice, of which 
her father was the cult leader. She fled to a neighboring village and was assisted in leaving 
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for Canada. The panel denied her claim for protection on credibility grounds.341 Ms. X 
testified that she had attended university from 1993 to 1997, and worked in Douala, a 
large city, for two years following her graduation. From 1999 to 2001 she further testified 
that she had traveled back and forth between Douala and her village for the purposes of 
her own business. The panel refused to accept her fear or the fact that she sought refuge 
as far away as Canada to escape from “a few villagers participating in a secret cult”.342 
     Ms. X, further claimed that while her father had been promoted to ‘head’ of this secret 
cult, she knew very little about it. She also testified that while she was to be subjected to 
FGM, the practice was not routinely practiced within the cult.343 She further testified that 
she had escaped from her village and had remained hidden for three days at a woman’s 
home in a village located three kilometers from her home. She then claimed that she went 
to seek refuge with some nuns for ten days. Once there, she claimed that she left there one 
night and arrived in Douala the following day, assuring the panel that she had flown that 
same day. The panel questioned these sequence of events, determining that the dates in 
questions did not add up and she was subsequently denied protection.  
     This decision is disappointing; protection was denied merely because Ms. X could not 
account for her knowledge of the cult and secondly the error in dates. As there is no 
reference to the guidelines in the determination, it is fair to assume that they were either 
ignored or, in the instance that they may have been consulted, they were not properly 
interpreted. Firstly, if the guidelines had been consulted/properly interpreted, the 
claimant’s lack of knowledge concerning the cult would have been explained on account 
of the fact that in certain cultures, men do not share details of their political, military or 
even social activities with females.344 Secondly, a young woman fleeing FGM at the hands 
of her family, having to escape and find shelter with strangers in unfamiliar surrounding 
is an extremely daunting experience. Her psychological state coupled with the trauma of 
escape may also account for the discrepancy in dates. Arguably, the trauma which the 
clamant has endured was not considered when determining her credibility. Furthermore, 
the fact that the panel reasoned that the claimant was trying to escape a ‘few villagers 




344 CIRB Gender Guidelines, supra note 192, at D. 
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participating in a secret cult’345 is evidence of their own gender and racial biases which 
resulted in a negative credibility finding.  By trivializing the claimants fear and justifying 
denial in terms of social and/or religious custom (in this case FGM as practiced by a secret 
cult), the panel could make a determination on FGM which, from their comments, they 
did not understand and found difficult to comprehend. 
    Certainly, the lack of contextual and cultural understanding/sensitivity resulted in the 
panel focusing on insignificant details, which ultimately resulted in the denial of Ms X’s 
claim. In other words, her credibility was used to refuse protection, instead of focusing on 
the objective evidence and applying the CIRB gender-guidelines in the appropriate 
manner. This case highlights not only the need for further clarification on credibility 
assessments within the CIRB gender-guidelines, it also lends support to the contention 
that there is a need for specific training (in gender and credibility issues) among decision-
makers and their selection to panels based on their experience and expertise, including 
legal knowledge, psychological abilities, and experience in the field. Such expertise and 
training will effectively eliminate the risk of vicarious traumatization and make decision-
makers more aware of how cultural differences may be a particularly compelling problem 
in FGM-related cases. 
 
C. COI and Other Relevant Evidence 
 
FGM claimants may face difficulties relating to the consistency of their account with COI. 
Whilst available COI may indicate that FGM is illegal and prohibited by the State, this 
does not necessarily mean that such laws are consistently enforced or that State protection 
is available.346 However, decision-makers may make an adverse credibility finding based 
on such inconsistencies. For instance, in a 2002 decision by the UK IAT, a negative 
finding was reached on credibility based on information on the prevalence and age at 
which FGM is performed.347 The claimant’s entitlement to asylum was that she came from 
the village of Yopougon in Ivory Coast.  She had a young son who lived with her partner 
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in Abidjan. She stated that it was the custom in her village for women between the ages 
of 18 and 30 to undergo FGM.  Her mother is the head of the group of village women who 
perform the procedure. It was claimed that parents would force their daughters to be 
excised on reaching 18. It was the custom for excisions to be performed between August 
and December each year. The claimant said that she and her elder sister were due to be 
excised in August 2000.  They had both avoided it for several years by going to live 
elsewhere in the Ivory Coast for months at a time. In August 2000, it was claimed that her 
sister returned to the village to attend the village feast and was forcibly subjected to FGM 
and consequently died. 
     The IAT in its determined reasoned that because a 1998 Ivory Coast law concerning 
crimes against women specifically forbids FGM, and imposes criminal sanctions on those 
who perform it, that State protection was available. This reasoning was based on objective 
evidence, which indicated that in 2000 two Ivorian women were arrested for practicing 
FGM on girls aged between 10 and 14.348 The court noted that, “although eradicating 
FGM is proving an uphill struggle, the objective evidence does indicate that the authorities 
will use the law to prosecute practitioners if they are brought to their attention”.349 The 
arrest of only two women within a period of four years of the law coming into force does 
not indicate that these laws are consistently enforced or that State protection is readily 
available. In fact, the FGM Guidance Note posits that: 
 
For protection to be considered available, States must display active and genuine 
efforts to eliminate FGM, including appropriate prevention activities as well as 
systematic and actual (not merely threatened) prosecutions and punishment for 
FGM-related crimes. Factors indicating an absence of protection include a lack of 
effective legislative protection, lack of universal State control, and pervasive 
influence of customary practices.350 
 
In actual fact, evidence submitted before the court, stated that, despite the enactment of 
the 1998 law and the two subsequent arrests, there is no national plan to assist in the 
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eradication of FGM, and it is still highly regarded as a severe problem.351 Such evidence 
does not constitute a systematic and effective system of legislative protection, in fact it 
indicates the influence and prevalence of FGM within the Ivory Coast. Whilst FGM may 
have been legally designated a crime within the Ivory Coast, in practice it is not treated 
as such, with the result that there is little or no law enforcement to stop it.352 
     This case, as discussed in Chapter Two, further highlights the difficulties associated 
with the absence of any solid standard against which to assess the ability/willingness of 
the State to protect women. Arguably, in addressing FGM claims as will be discussed in 
Chapter Five, decision-makers should supplement their existing standards within their 
respective gender-guidelines with existing international standards, including that of the 
FGM Guidance Note, issued by the UNHCR, when required in such cases. 
    Returning to the issue at hand, a distinction may also be made between a claimant who 
fears the future performance of FGM and one on whom FGM has already been performed. 
Naturally, claimants who fear future FGM will have no physical evidence on which to 
base their claim, so their credibility will be of paramount importance. However, such 
accounts are often rejected as not-credible considering the age of the claimant or the level 
of State protection available, without sufficient consideration of the substantive practice 
of FGM or an examination of independent information concerning COI being 
undertaken.353 In DI (IFA - FGM) Ivory Coast CG, for example, the claimant testified that 
it was the custom in her village for women between the ages of 18 and 30 to undergo 
FGM. The court in dismissing her claim “found it incredible that the age range is so 
high”.354 This determination was made even though objective evidence was submitted 
which stated that: 
 
the age at which mutilation is carried out varies from area to area. FGM is 
performed on infants a few days old, on children from 7 to 10 years old and on 
adolescents. Adult women also undergo operations at the time of marriage.355 
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Further, evidence was also submitted which revealed that some women undergo FGM 
during early adulthood when marrying into a community that practices FGM or just before 
or after the birth of the first child and that, “the procedure is carried out at a variety of 
ages ranging shortly after birth to sometime during the first pregnancy, but most 
commonly occurs between the ages of 4 and 8”.356 Arguably, a sufficient consideration of 
the practice of FGM and the accompanying COI was not undertaken, which had it of been 
a negative credibility determination arguably would not have been reached.  
     According to Drudy, the inherent difficulty for a claimant of producing documentary 
evidence to support her claim may require the decision-maker to pro-actively seek 
independent information.357 Whilst the respective gender-guidelines encourage decision-
makers to gather information concerning the condition of women in many countries and 
to synthesise information from a range of sources,358 due to the non-binding nature of 
these guidelines, decision-makers do-not have to pro-actively seek such independent 
information. Such activism can be time-consuming and laborious, and decision-makers 
often do not engage in it, instead, “basing their decision on dubious assessments of 
plausibility of the account and general impression of the applicant’s credibility”.359 
Coupled with the fact that reliable statistics are hard to come by, as sexual and physical 
violence against women is underreported at all levels because of shame, stigma and fear 
of retribution, the credibility of many claimants is undermined erroneously. Furthermore, 
in some cases there is the possibility that information on specific countries may not 
include information on FGM, leading decision-makers to believe that there are no specific 
problems in that country. Consequently, where this is the case decision-makers should not 
automatically deem the claimant to lack credibility, rather they should seek to obtain 
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further evidence. Thus, if the guidelines were made legally binding and decision-makers 
were subsequently held accountable for their decisions, they would have to undertake 
such research and rely on objective evidence instead of dubious assessments of 
plausibility and credibility. Moreover, in some cases, where the COI relating to FGM 
contradicts the claimant’s testimony, such information may not be put to the claimant, 
depriving them of the opportunity of providing more specific information.360 To ensure a 
fair hearing, claimants should be made aware of such contradictions, and be given the 
opportunity to provide further evidence instead of having their credibility undermined.  
     A claimant who has already been subjected to FGM will have physical evidence on 
which to base her claim, but may have difficulty in showing that she is at risk of further 
persecution. It is commonly believed that once FGM has been performed there ceases to 
be a credible fear of future persecution.361 FGM as discussed has further implications 
beyond the initial procedure and decision-makers should be made aware of the fact that 
further cutting is required in the case of infibulation on a women’s wedding night to allow 
sexual intercourse; infibulation may be performed again if a husband leaves for a long 
period of time, and after childbirth; cutting may also be required to allow a baby to emerge 
from the birth canal. This constant cutting and re-stitching is extremely painful and 
dangerous for women. Due to this fear and the psychological difficulties associated with 
it, claimants may be unable to communicate her story coherently, which can have a 
negative effect on the assessment of her credibility.362 PTSD can have a particularly 
significant effect on the ability of a claimant to give a coherent account, thereby damaging 
her credibility. This difficulty will be, especially pertinent where the claimant fears a 
repeat of the procedure or where the claimant was herself a victim but now fears that her 
daughters will be subjected to the practice.363 
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    The FGM Guidance Note posits that the ‘permanent and irreversible’ nature of FGM, 
supports a finding that a woman or girl who has already undergone FGM, may still have 
a well-founded fear of future persecution.364 It further notes that she may fear that she 
may be subject to another form of FGM and/or suffer particularly serious long-term 
consequences of the procedure.365 In other words, decision-makers should be made aware 
of the fact that, there is no requirement that the future persecution feared should be 
identical to the one previously endured, if it can be linked to a Convention ground.366 The 
note further asserts that, even if FGM is considered to be a one-off past experience, there 
may still be compelling reasons arising from that past persecution to grant the claimant 
refugee status. This may be the case where the persecution suffered is considered 
particularly egregious, and the woman or girl is experiencing ongoing and traumatic 
psychological effects, rendering a return to the country of origin intolerable.367 The note 
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3: Cessation of refugee status under Article 1C(5) and (6) of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees (‘ceased circumstances’ clauses’), HCR/GIP/03/03, 10 February 2003, paras. 20–21, available 
online at http://www.unhcr.org/uk/publications/legal/3e637a202/guidelines-international-protection-3-
cessation-refugee-status-under-article.html (last accessed 28/7/17). See also CRDD A96-00453 et al, 
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also recognises that parents may have a well-founded fear of their daughter(s) being 
subjected to FGM.368 Thus, existing gender-guidelines need to be amended to correspond 
with international developments on issues pertaining to gender-based forms of violence, 
including FGM. Arguably, if decision-makers were made aware of additional 
international guidance and developments in respect of FGM, provided with effective staff 
and properly trained in credibility issues, then the difficulties facing claimants who have 
a continuing fear of FGM would no longer be deemed an indication of untrustworthiness.  
     Claimants seeking protection based on FGM face considerable difficulties in proving 
their credibility. This difficulty is compounded by the non-binding nature of the UNHCR 
and domestic gender-guidelines. To avoid discriminating against FGM claimants (and 
indeed gender-based claimants in general) reforms, such as those stated, throughout this 
chapter are required and there must be some viable alternatives to the current approach 
adopted by decision-makers in respects of their adherence to and interpretation of their 
gender guidelines, and their approach to credibility assessments within RDP. This is 
evidently important in light of a 2013 report published by Amnesty International which 
found that decision-makers were misusing COI to undermine the credibility of applicants, 
and refuse their asylum claims, and the many commentaries on COI published by Still 
Human Still Here.369 Furthermore, in 2015 an independent inspector’s report criticizing 
the use of COI by the UK Home Office in asylum applications was released.370 This report 
which found the Home Office to be using misleading and biased information, and 
distorting evidence to make it easier to reject claimants, concurs with many of the 
arguments discussed above not just in respects of credibility. Whilst, the 2015 report is a 
damning review of the COI used to make decisions on Eritrean asylum applications, it has 
been said that its findings are of concern for asylum claimants generally. The report 
                                                 
Canadian Refugee and Immigration Board, 8 December 1997, in which one of the applicants who had 
already undergone FGM was granted refugee status inter alia due to the atrocity of the persecution suffered 
and the psychological trauma that a return to such a society would entail. 
368 FGM Guidance Note, supra note 9, at 7-8. 
369 Amnesty International, “A Question of Credibility? Who So Many Initial Asylum Decisions are 
Overturned on Appeal in the UK”, Still Human Still Here: UK, (2013). 
370 Campbell J, “Review of UK Home Office Country Information and Guidance – ‗Eritrea: National 
(incl.Military) Service‘ (version 2.0e, September 2015) and ‗Eritrea: Illegal Exit‘ (Version 2.0e, September 
2015: Prepared for the Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration and the Independent Advisory Group 
on Country Information (IAGCI)”, (2015). This report is available online via the Right to Remain website 
at http://www.righttoremain.org.uk/blog/country-information-unreliable-evidence/ (last accessed 16/7/17). 
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supports my view that decision-makers do not always conform to the professional 
standards expected of them in refugee determinations and in interpreting the standards 
which country information reports are expected to meet. Instead they make determinations 
based on a highly selective use of information and some deliberately distort information 
to support their own assumptions.371 This report raises the question of the problem of the 
systemic misuse of country information and guidance within the RDP.372 According to 
the UK-based human rights organization Right to Remain, the current system is, “rotten, 
and needs to be completely overhauled if we are to have neutrality and objectivity, 
usability, validity, transparency and publicity, and quality control”.373 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has found that the major decisions emanating from the chosen case-studies 
all recognize FGM as a basis for obtaining refugee status, and whilst later decisions 
reinforce these authorities to varying degrees, other decisions have departed from them. 
Arguably, Kasinga, Farah and Fornah, which were all decided during the implementation 
of the respective gender-guidelines were positively decided so that the case-study 
countries could be seen to be implementing these guidelines effectively. The reality as is 
evident from the case-law, is that the guidelines which are not binding and have no real 
legal force are rarely used and in instances where they are, gender-sensitive interpretations 
are lacking. These limitations allow gender, racial and cultural biases to prevail and deny 
FGM claimants protection.  
    Refugee determination and its associated processes, if viewed appropriately as an 
international obligation to protect against serious human rights violations, must offer 
protection to vulnerable individuals. Failure by a State to provide a fair and gender-
sensitive mechanism in which claimants can present and have their claims heard is a, 
“legal injustice and a failure of the State and the international community to live up to 
                                                 
371 Ibid. 
372 Ibid. 
373 See, Right to Remain, “Country Information: Unreliable Evidence”, February (2016), available online 
via the Right to Remain website at http://www.righttoremain.org.uk/blog/country-information-unreliable-
evidence/ (last accessed 16/7/17). 
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their international obligations”.374 Arguably, by not consistently enforcing gender-
guidelines, coupled with the use of single-panel members, deadlines and fast-track 
hearings (in some instances), the case-studies are permitting biases among decision-
makers to prevail and in tandem are guilty of not providing a through, fair and gender-
sensitive process for refugee determination. Whilst notable within each of the case-
studies, this is perhaps more evident and at the same time erroneously justified within the 
US, in respects of the current BIA structure, discussed in Chapter Two. From the 
examined and referenced US FGM and other gender-related jurisprudence, whilst the vast 
majority of these decisions were decided in the affirmative and refugee status or 
subsidiary protection was awarded in some cases, and would appear to be an indication 
of the successful application of the INS gender-guidelines, they also inadvertently 
highlight procedural difficulties inherent within the US RDP, particularly the BIA. The 
fact that the majority of the US FGM case-law examined (both those indicating positive 
as well as and negative outcomes for applicants) was determined by the Circuit Courts 
(post 2002, which almost always hears cases in a “panel” of three judges) highlights the 
discontentment of claimants and their legal representatives with the current format of the 
BIA, and the quality of the decisions being delivered by single judges, who currently only 
provide one-sentence summary orders.  
     Arguably, in such complex cases, appeals to the Circuit Courts and unfair denials by 
the BIA could be avoided if the process before the BIA was reformed. This could be 
achieved by ensuring that at least two judges sit on refugee determination panels, or in 
instances where this is not possible make written opinions compulsory. These measures, 
as evident in cases such as Kasinga, highlight the importance and value of written 
decisions and the opinions of different decision-makers in reaching their decisions. Such 
measures would help to prevent bias, hostility and abusive conduct by decision-makers, 
and in doing so would ensure due process by making the RDP procedurally fair, improve 
the quality of decisions, and reduce the propensity of decision-makers to allow their 
ideological predilections and political allegiances to determine the outcomes in such 
highly sensitive cases. Similar arguments may also be levelled against the Canadian IRB 
                                                 
374 Drudy, supra note 270, at 115. 
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where single-member panels are the norm within the Refugee Protection Division375 and 
within the UK Immigration and Asylum Chambers, where similar panels may also be 
used.376 However, unlike its US counterpart, these appeals bodies do not endorse or 
instruct the use of one-sentence summary orders. Within the Canadian context, an IRB 
member can render his/her decision orally at the end of the hearing or send it in writing 
later. If the decision is negative, it must include the reasons in writing. If the decision is 
positive, written reasons are not given and the refugee claimant is given the status of 
“protected person”.377 Within the UK, determinations of the immigration judge, or panel, 
are always given in writing.378 Significantly, unlike its American appeals counterpart the 
ability to issue both oral and more importantly written opinions to refugee claimants 
ensures that IRB and UK decision-makers provide claimants with reasons which may, if 
needs be, be used to appeal to a higher authority on legal grounds. Nevertheless, despite 
these ‘good practices’, the failure of these bodies to effectively and efficiently implement 
their respective gender-guidelines, undermines their effectiveness and calls into question 
their commitment to protect victims of gender-based violence and uphold the tenents of 
due process within the RDP.  
     In sum, the key findings from this chapter are that some genuine FGM claimants are 
simply disbelieved by decision-makers. The fact that inconsistencies in evidence 
presented may have been due to trauma did not inform their assessment of credibility. 
Some of the case-law examined identified where late disclosure of sensitive information 
led to adverse credibility findings despite the existence of guidance that seeks to prevent 
this, namely the gender-guidelines. As some decision-makers were reluctant to recognise 
claimants as refugees on the basis of gender-related persecution, this created a higher 
threshold which was hard to meet. They also appeared reluctant to engage with the PSG 
ground. Even when COI was available, it was used selectively and sometimes 
                                                 
375 For further information on the Canadian RDP please refer to the Canadian Council for Refugees Website 
at http://ccrweb.ca/en/refugee-reform (last accessed 28/7/17). 
376 This information has been obtained from the Tribunals Service: Immigration and Asylum Website 
available online at http://www.tribunals.gov.uk/ImmigrationAsylum/ (last accessed 8/7/17). 
377 Amnesty International, “Refugee Protection in Canada”, (2010), available online via the Amnesty 
International website at http://www.amnesty.ca/our-work/issues/refugees-and-migrants/refugee-protection-
canada (last accessed 28/7/17).  
378 For further information on the UK asylum system please refer to the Gov,UK Website at 
http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/asylum/outcomes/unsuccessfulapplications/appeals/system/ (last  
accessed 17/7/17).  
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unrepresentatively in support of negative determinations. In addition, the concept of IFA 
was generally considered in a cursory manner without any detailed engagement with the 
specific circumstances of the claimant. Finally, the gender-guidelines were either 
completely ignored or wrongly interpreted.  Women have been negatively affected by the 
RDP. Research describes them feeling uninformed and finding the process distressing.379 
Given the need to consider gender-based claims for asylum in a gender-sensitive manner, 
the poor quality of decision-making evidence in this chapter through the reference reports 
and FGM case-law is “unsustainable and must be addressed through systematic action 
and reform”.380 
      Whilst the findings in this chapter, highlight the weaknesses and ineffectiveness of 
the RDP’s of the case-studies and their respective gender-guidelines, innovative and 
progressive procedural reforms have happened at both the international and domestic 
levels which clearly highlight that, despite the haphazard application of human rights 
norms within the refugee context, there is a clear movement at the domestic level towards 
a zero-tolerance of violence against women. Domestic violence is no longer tolerated and 
in response to the international recognition of domestic violence as a societal problem, 
the court systems in many Western jurisdictions have begun to re-examine their 
approaches to this immensely complex issue more closely. Traditionally, the domestic 
criminal justice systems, like the RDP, involved little or no special attention or resources 
in respect of domestic violence cases. This approach has been challenged by the 
emergence of Specialised Domestic Violence Courts. Before proposing solutions and 
elaborating upon some recommendations mentioned throughout this chapter to remedy 
the inconsistent and inadequate treatment of FGM within the RDP, the protective 
functions of specialised domestic violence courts and programmes for victims will now 
be examined. Chapter Four will examine how the shift in attitudes and practices towards 
the equally multi-faceted problem of domestic violence might be replicated or mirrored 
in some shape or form within the RDP.  
 
 
                                                 
379 Muggeridge, supra note 130, at 67. 





The Violence We Ignore No More: 




Despite decades of reform, fundamental failures have persisted in undermining the 
criminal justice’s systems response to domestic violence. Public awareness, the 
perception that it is unacceptable, and the political will to effect reform, have increased, 
resulting in substantial improvements on the legislative front.1 Like the criminal response 
to FGM,2 the case-studies have civil and criminal laws to protect victims, and 
governments have appropriated considerable funding of further efforts to combat the 
problem.3 Nevertheless, in contrast to the progress made by legislators, those responsible 
for applying and enforcing the law and its associated processes traditionally remained 
                                                 
1 See, Buzawa E & Buzawa C, “Global Response to Domestic Violence”, Springer International Publishing: 
United States, (2017), Chapter One.  
2 FGM has been a criminal offence in the UK since 1985. In 2003, it also became a criminal offence for UK 
nationals or permanent UK residents to take their child abroad to have FGM. See, Serious Crime Act 2015 
& Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003. In 1997, the Parliament of Canada passed an amendment to the 
Criminal Code of Canada expressly prohibiting all forms of FGM in Canada. Under the code, it is prohibited 
to aid, abet or counsel such assault and to interfere with genitalia for nonmedical reasons. Moreover, the 
amendment expressly prohibits the transport of a child outside of Canada for the purpose of obtaining FGM. 
See, Bill C-27: An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (child prostitution, child sex tourism, criminal 
harassment and female genital mutilation), 2nd Sess, 35th Parl, 1997. Similarly, performing FGM on 
anyone under the age of 18 became illegal in the U.S. in 1997 with the Federal Prohibition of Female 
Genital Mutilation Act. By 2015, 24 States have specific laws against FGM. See, Federal Prohibition of 
Female Genital Mutilation Act of 1995 
3 Epstein D, “Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases: Rethinking the Roles of Prosecutors, 
Judges, and the Court System”, 11 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 3, (1999), at 4. For legislation, policy 
and guidance on the criminalisation of domestic violence in the UK please refer to the NSPCC website at  
https://www.nspcc.org.uk/preventing-abuse/child-abuse-and-neglect/domestic-abuse/legislation-policy-
and-guidance/ (last accessed 29/7/17). In the US, federal legislation has been enacted making domestic 
violence a crime, most notably the Violence Against Women Act 1994. However, the vast majority of 
domestic violence offenses are prosecuted under state law. Similarly, in Canada, whilst there is no specific 
offence of family violence in the Criminal Code, most acts of family violence are crimes in Canada and 
threated accordingly. As of 2017, six provinces (Alberta, Manitoba, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, 
Newfoundland and Labrador and Saskatchewan) and three territories (Northwest Territories, Yukon and 
Nunavut) have proclaimed specific legislation on family violence. For further information on domestic 
violence laws in Canada, please refer to the Department of Justice website at 
http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/cj-jp/fv-vf/laws-lois.html (last accessed 29/7/17). 
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stagnate. The system remained largely, unresponsive and orientated towards non-
enforcement. 4 
       Like the examined gender-guidelines, laws and guidelines are only as good as the 
system which delivers on its promises, and the failure of the courts and related institutions 
to keep up with legislative progress had a detrimental impact on efforts to combat 
domestic violence. This gap, between the ‘responsive’ legislative branch and the 
‘unresponsive’ judicial and executive branches, evidentially identified where the next 
generation of reforms had to be focused: a fundamental restructuring of the traditional 
justice system’s approach and processes to domestic violence and its attitudes towards 
victims of domestic violence. The solution was the establishment of specialised domestic 
violence courts to address growing concerns throughout the social and criminal justice 
systems. These concerns relate to both the nature and extent of domestic violence and 
were developed to provide a comprehensive, substantive, and long-term solution to the 
problems related to domestic violence.5 These unique courts are pioneering in that whilst 
they hold perpetrators accountable, they focus on victim support and safety.6 
Meaningfully, for the purposes of this thesis, these courts convey the idea that specific 
forms of violence merit special attention by separating the domestic violence court 
process from the traditional criminal court process.7 
     Considering the inherent limitations of the existing RDPs and gender-guidelines, 
coupled with the apparent reluctance of decision-makers to leave their 
biases/preconceptions outside of the RDP, this chapter aims to examine how the shift in 
attitudes and practices towards domestic violence within the domestic criminal justice 
                                                 
4 It was customary practice for police to refuse to arrest perpetrators, prosecutors to decline to press charges, 
and for judges to be reluctant to issue civil protection orders or impose significant sentences on perpetrators. 
For further discussion on this reluctance see Epstein, supra note 3, at 4. See also, Tsai B, “The Trend Toward 
Specialized Domestic Violence Courts: Improvements on an Effective Innovation”, 68 Fordham Law 
Review 1285, (2000), at 1286 (noting the frustration and embarrassment of those who work within the 
criminal justice system at their inability to protect victims of domestic violence, even after the arrest and 
prosecution of perpetrators and despite the issuance of protection orders). 
5 See, Grossi E, “Domestic Violence Courts”, 2 The Encyclopaedia of Crime and Punishment 510 (2016). 
6 Centre for Justice Innovation, “The Case for Dedicated Domestic Violence Courts”, (2014), available 
online via the Centre for Justice Innovation website at 
http://justiceinnovation.org/portfolio/the-case-for-dedicated-domestic-violence-courts/ (last accessed 
18/6/17). 
7 Karan A et al, “Domestic Violence Courts: What are they? And How Should We Manage Them?”, 1 
Juvenile and Family Court Journal 75, (1999), at 75. 
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systems of the case-studies may be replicated in some shape or form within the RDP. This 
innovative shift is important for two reasons. Firstly, it would ensure that States give 
credence to their respective gender-guidelines by singling gender-based forms of 
violence, in this case FGM out for special attention in specialized courts/hearings. 
Secondly, this transposition will arguably establish a thorough, fair and effective 
mechanism through which genuine FGM claimants can present and have their claims 
heard in a gender-sensitive manner.  
       Part One outlines the traditional court system’s response to domestic violence and its 
failings. It further introduces the concept of therapeutic jurisprudence as a basis for 
creating a practical alternative approach. Part Two examines several model domestic 
violence courts which incorporate therapeutic jurisprudence theories into their approaches 
to combating domestic violence. The case studies were chosen firstly due to accessibility 
of information. Despite the admiration of these courts there is a paucity of literature on 
the subject.8 The limited research that does exist appears to have been conducted largely 
by government agencies and special interest groups.9 Secondly, the chosen case studies 
exemplify a comprehensive interdisciplinary system of handling and addressing domestic 
violence cases, which the RDP can learn from. Whilst adhering to the fundamental values 
that must guide all domestic violence case processing and addressing their objectives, 
each court should reflect the culture of the jurisdiction in which it operates and the needs 
of the population it serves. The development and implementation of a specialized 
domestic violence court involves concrete decisions by court personnel and multiple 
partner agencies on many detailed issues, and no two courts will be exactly alike. This 
section provides ten case studies, to provide tangible examples of existing domestic 
violence courts. While each is quite different in structure, they all share the principles and 
core components of effective domestic violence courts. They bring to life some of the 
strengths of various court models, and demonstrate how issues and challenges faced by 
any court can be addressed productively.  These studies are designed to illustrate the 
                                                 
8 Graham C, “The Ottawa Specialized Domestic Violence Court: A Case Study”, MA. Thesis, Canada, 
(2004), available at 
file:///C:/Users/user/AppData/Local/Microsoft/Windows/INetCache/IE/G3VTB041/graham-




different kinds of court models, and provide valuable lessons which may be transposed 
into the RDP to remedy the inconsistent and in some instances the inadequate treatment 
of FGM refugee claims. Finally, this chapter offers a number of conclusions and posits 
that like the criminal justice response to domestic violence, the RDP of the case-studies 
need to improve their responses to FGM and gender-based violence. A coordinated 
partnership approach to FGM and specialist support services for claimants within a 
specialist setting would ensure that women have access to a fair, accommodating and 
gendered process, one well removed from the current lottery system. 
 
I. The Traditional Legal Response to Domestic Violence and the Development of 
Therapeutic Domestic Violence Courts 
 
A. Historical Perspective: Domestic Violence within the Criminal Justice 
System 
 
Domestic violence is physical, psychological, sexual or financial violence which occurs 
within intimate or family-type relationships and forms a pattern of coercive and 
controlling behavior. Traditionally the private nature of domestic violence resulted in 
societal reluctance to acknowledge its existence and pervasiveness, or to criminalize 
perpetrators actions. The legal systems of the case-studies have a long history of 
complicity in and approval of intimate violence, particularly when perpetrated by 
husbands against their wives and children.10 Such violence was accepted by society and 
the legal system as a private family matter in which a husband could use force to discipline 
the members of his household.11 Consequently, husbands were immune to criminal 
                                                 
10 Epstein, supra note 3, at 9. 
11 State v Rhodes, 61 N.C. 349, 351 (1968) (describing the family as an entity unto itself which the 
government should not disturb); Skinner v.  Skinner, 5 Wis. 449, 451 (1856) (refusing a wife a divorce on 
the grounds of cruel or inhuman treatment, stating that "when the wife is ill-treated on account of her own 
misconduct, her remedy is a reform of her own manners"); Buzawa E & Buzawa C, “Domestic Violence: 
The Criminal Justice Response” Sage Publication: London (1996), at 26. But see, Commonwealth v McAfee, 
108 Mass.  458, 461 (1871) (stating that it was unlawful for the defendant to beat his wife); State v. Buckley, 
2 Del. 552, 552 (1838) ("We know of no law that will authorize a husband to strike his pregnant wife a blow 
with his fist ....  "); Taub N, “Adult Domestic Violence: The Law's Response”, 8 Victimology 152, (1983), 




sanctions.12 Fortunately, as society has progressively evolved so too has the role which 
legal institutions play in the eradication and treatment of domestic violence.13 
      The historical reluctance of the courts to interfere in family matters emphasizes the 
widely held belief that the family was its own private entity.  Until the late 1800s, the 
criminal justice systems of the case-studies were a ‘legislative vacuum’ when it came to 
policies against domestic violence.14 It was only with the advent of the Modern Period15 
and the American Civil War, that Western governments began to exert more authority 
over families through greater regulation and legislation.16 By the end of the 19th century, 
numerous countries had adopted laws prohibiting wife-beating.17 Evidence, however, 
suggests that laws were rarely enforced, and sanctions applied only in extreme 
circumstances of unequivocal and severe injury.18 
                                                 
12 State v Rhodes, supra note 11, at 351. In this particular case, the Supreme Court of North Carolina 
addressed the question of whether a husband could be punished for unprovoked and moderate correction of 
his wife, and stated that "we will not interfere with family government in trifling cases” where  "personal  
conflicts inflicting  only  temporary  pain  ...  are not comparable with the evils which would result from 
raising the curtain, and exposing to public curiosity and criticism, the nursery and the bed chamber”. Ibid, 
at 352-3. See also, Schechter S, “Women and male violence”, Boston, MA: South End Press, (1982) (noting 
that until 1829, in England, a husband had absolute power of chastisement without the threat of sanction). 
13 Tsai, supra note 4, at 1288. See also, Fagan J, National Institute of Justice Research Report, The 
Criminalization of Domestic Violence: Promises and Limits, National Institute of Justice Research Report, 
(1996), at 6-9. This Report is available online at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/crimdom.pdf (last accessed 
4/7/17).  
14 Buzawa & Buzawa, “Domestic Violence: The Criminal Justice Response”, supra note 11, at 30-31. 
15 Dobash R & Dobash R, “Violence Against Wives” Free-Press: New York, (1979), at 48 (discussing 
changes in political, economic, and religious institutions of society in the modern era). 
16 For instance, in the US the Supreme Court of Alabama in Fulgham v State, determined for the first time 
that a husband did not have the right to beat his wife, and that a "wife is entitled to the same protection of 
the law that the husband can invoke for himself”. 46 Ala.  143 (1871), at 147. See also, Tsai, supra note 4, 
at 1289: Buzawa & Buzawa, “Domestic Violence: The Criminal Justice Response”, supra note 11, at 31 
(“The second half of the nineteenth century involved major societal upheavals," including the Civil War, 
the emergence of the  women's movement, and landmark court decisions limiting the legality of domestic 
abuse). 
17 Buzawa & Buzawa, “Domestic Violence: The Criminal Justice Response”, supra note 11, at 32 
(discussing US States responses); Foyster E, “Marital Violence: An English Family History 1669-1857”, 
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, (2005) (highlighting that courts expressed concern for the 
emotional consequences of marital violence, predating the change in judicial attitudes in the nineteenth 
century); Dobash & Dobash, “Violence Against Wives”, supra note 15, at 56 (discussing community limits 
and controls upon a husband’s chastisement powers). 
18 Buzawa & Buzawa, “Domestic Violence: The Criminal Justice Response”, supra note 11, at 32. See also, 
Dobash & Dobash, “Violence Against Wives”, supra note 15, at 58-9 (noting that when a husband 
transgressed the boundaries of allowable punishment, he would often become the subject of ridicule of his 
family, friends and neighbours. Although rare, such an event remained relatively light-hearted in 
comparison with community condemnation of recalcitrant wives). 
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   In the early 1900s, issues pertaining to temperance and suffrage emerged19 and attention 
to domestic violence waned. Judicial trends reflected a move away from, “concern over 
domestic violence by de-emphasizing the criminal nature of domestic abuse and focusing 
once again on compromise and reconciliation of the family”.20 Family courts were 
established to help dispense with family cases by helping couples work out their 
‘differences’.21 Renewed attention to family violence arose in the 1960s through the work 
of members of the feminist movement in establishing rape crisis centers and battered 
women’s shelters.22 The establishment of victim assistance programmes followed closely 
thereafter.23 
    By the 1970s, the subject of domestic violence was further thrust into public 
consciousness with the establishment of programs, shelters, specialized prosecutions, and 
studies on the incidence of domestic violence.24 Inopportunely, legal institutions 
responded with uncertainty and continued to view domestic violence as personal matters 
not suitable for prosecution.25 With continue focus and changing attitudes the 1980s and 
1990s witnessed changes in the handling of domestic violence cases. Reforms brought the 
establishment of domestic violence prosecution units, the emergence of perpetrator 
treatment programmes, arrest strategies and the adoption of protection order reforms to 
improve emergency access and widen the options available to victims for legal relief.26 
The theory that criminal accountability would reduce violence drove much of the 
domestic violence legislation enacted in the 1990s throughout the respective case-studies 
and resulted in more stringent policies on prosecution, arrest and incarceration of 
perpetrators. These reforms helped shape society’s perception of domestic violence as a 
                                                 
19 Buzawa & Buzawa, “Domestic Violence: The Criminal Justice Response”, supra note 11, at 32-3. 
20 Tsai, supra note 4, at 1290. 
21 Buzawa & Buzawa, “Domestic Violence: The Criminal Justice Response”, supra note 11, at 33; See also, 
Pleck E, “Domestic Tyranny: The Making of Social Policy Against Family Violence from Colonial Times 
to the Present” Oxford University Press: New York, (1989), at 137 (“The official policy of courts of 
domestic relations was to urge reconciliation ('home mending') whenever possible."). The city of Buffalo, 
New York, is the home of the US first domestic relations court, founded in 1910 to handle all family-related 
criminal matters. Pleck, ibid, at 136.  
22 Fagan, supra note 13, at 7.  
23 Ibid. See also, Tsai, supra note 4, at 1290. 
24 Ibid. See also, Shaffer C, “Therapeutic Domestic Violence Courts: An Efficient Approach to 
Adjudication?”, 27 Seattle University Law Review 981, (2004), at 982. 
25 Fagan, supra note 13, at 8. 
26 Ibid, at 9-11. See also, Tsai, supra note 4 at 1290-1. 
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crime.27 Society has moved from an era where no term for intimate or domestic violence 
existed in the national lexicon to one of substantial public awareness of the problem, a 
growing perception that it is unacceptable, and increasing political will to intervene.28  
    Defining domestic violence is difficult and definitions vary depending on the context 
is used.29 Niamh Reilly suggests that women and girls are more likely to be subjected to 
human rights abuses in the private contexts of family, intimate relationships, informal 
economic activity, culture, or religion.30 In support of that assertion this thesis posits that 
the term domestic violence is an umbrella term that is inclusive of violence amongst any 
family members but can also include violence between individuals who are not family 
members.31 With the recognition of forced marriage, gender violence and honor-based 
violence as forms of domestic violence,32 it is argued that definitions of domestic violence 
continue to change as we learn more about the nature of the issue. Definitions thus develop 
to accommodate innovative ways of seeing or contextualizing, for example FGM as a 
form of domestic violence. It is this recognition, that enables us to borrow ideas and learn 
from the domestic violence courts. Although definitions and legislation vary from country 
to country and State to State and some gaps in cover certainly remain, legislation and 
enforcement, are no longer an obstacle, but a source of hope for domestic violence 
victims. Enormous legal strides have been made in a relatively brief period, contributing 
to current processes to aid and protect victims within these courts from this complex form 
of gendered violence. Unfortunately, similar proactive strides have yet to permeate the 
RDP, despite the implementation of gender-guidelines and their calls for the adjudication 
of gender-based claims in a gender-sensitive manner, with any real efficiency. The 
following section will now look at some of the flaws inherent within the criminal justice 
system to identify any similarities with the current position of the RDP. 
 
B. Criticisms of the Traditional Legal Systems Approach to Domestic Violence 
                                                 
27 Taub, supra note 11, at 158. 
28 Epstein, supra note 3, at 11. 
29 Groves N &Thomas T, “Domestic Violence and Criminal Justice”, Routledge: London, (2014), at 11. 
30 See, Reilly N, “State Accountability for Women’s Human Rights in Ireland”, University College Dublin: 
Women’s Education Research and Resource Centre, (1997). 
31 Groves & Thomas, supra note 29, at 6. 




The ‘criminalization’ of domestic violence has sought to correct the historical, legal, and 
moral disparities in the legal protections afforded to victims.33 With statistics estimating, 
worldwide, 35% of women have experienced either physical and/or sexual intimate 
partner violence or non-partner sexual violence,34 the modern legal system has responded 
to this crisis and adapted itself to changing social needs.35 Arguably, if the RDP remains 
static and not gender sensitive, procedural and evidentiary injustices will continue and the 
risk of genuine FGM claimants being denied protection remains considerable.36  
      One criticism of the traditional legal system’s handling of domestic violence cases is 
its inability to ‘stem the tide of domestic violence’37 as evidenced by the sheer numbers 
of victims. Available statistics estimate that millions of victims from all forms of 
relationships, backgrounds and orientations annually experience violence at the hands of 
intimate partners or family members.38 These statistics indicate that the legal system’s 
approach requires further improvements and that stringent policies on arrest, prosecution 
and imprisonment are not wholly effective deterrent mechanisms. 
      A second criticism concerns the inadequacy of protection orders to prevent further or 
future abuse.39 An order of protection can prohibit a person from harassment, physical 
                                                 
33 Zorza J, “The Criminal Law of Misdemeanour Domestic Violence, 1970-1990”, 83 Journal of Criminal 
Law and Criminology 240, (1992), at 240-279.  
34 García-Moreno C & Pallitto C, “Global and Regional Estimates of Violence against Women: Prelevance 
and Health Effects of Intimate Partner Violence and Non-Partner Sexual Violence”, World Health 
Organisation: Italy, (2013), at 2. This report is available online via the WHO Website at 
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/85239/1/9789241564625_eng.pdf (last accessed 28/6/17). 
35 Kaye J, “Changing Courts in Changing Times: The Need for a Fresh Look at How Courts are Run” 48 
Hastings Law Journal 851, (1997), at 853 (arguing that a legal system remains viable only if it responds to 
the present-day needs and concerns of the public). 
36 See generally, Ceneda S & Palmer C, “Lip Service or Implementation? The Home Office Gender 
Guidance and Women’s Asylum Claims in the UK”, Asylum Aid: London, (2006), at 11-12. 
37 Tsai, supra note 4, at 1292. 
38 See, National Coalition Against Domestic Violence, “Domestic Violence: National Statistics”, (2015), 
available online at 
https://ncadv.org/files/National%20Statistics%20Domestic%20Violence%20NCADV.pdf (last  
accessed 29/7/17) (referring to the US). See also, Burczycka M & Conroy S, “Family violence in Canada: 
A statistical profile, 2015”, Canadian Centre for Justis Statistics, (2017), available online at 
http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/85-002-x/2017001/article/14698-eng.pdf (last accessed 29/7/17) (referring to 
Canada); Office for National Statistics, “Compendium: Domestic abuse, sexual assault and stalking”, 
February (2017), available at 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/compendium/focusonviolentcri
meandsexualoffences/yearendingmarch2016/domesticabusesexualassaultandstalking (referring to the UK).  
39 Canada and the US tend to refer more to Orders of Protection, whereas such domestic violence remedies 
are more commonly referred to as restraining or non-molestation orders in the UK. To maintain 
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and verbal abuse, intimidation, or interference with personal liberty and also provides for 
a ‘stay away order’.40 Regrettably, research suggests that such orders alone are ineffective 
and do not deter future violence.41 
      A third criticism is the systems inability to identify which perpetrators are lethal and 
which ones are not. Whilst, domestic violence deaths are unpredictable, Tsai argues that 
the legal system is unable to accurately prioritize and target lethal cases.42  
      A fourth criticism is the often-cursory treatment of domestic violence cases in court. 
Domestic violence is a multifaceted problem, involving issues of family dynamics and 
emotional relationships that are uncharacteristic of other crimes. Its uniqueness requires 
additional time and attention, as they often complicate otherwise straightforward 
situations.43 Perfunctory treatment fails to adequately address the particulars of the 
underlying problems inherent in such cases. Accordingly, this may result in a lack of 
support and resources for victims as well as accountability mechanisms for perpetrators 
“ultimately culminating in insufficient methods of confronting the incidence of domestic 
violence”.44 
     Finally, organizational bias and attitudes reflected by officials working in the legal 
system may contribute to the system’s ineffectiveness. Like FGM, domestic violence has 
long been regarded as a cultural or private matter.45 Legislation can only go so far without 
effective enforcement. For instance, Cheryl Hanna posits that prosecutors may give 
                                                 
cohesiveness and reinforce the importance of such remedies, the use of the term ‘Orders of Protection’ will 
be used throughout this chapter. 
40 See, Tsai, supra note 4, at 1292. 
41 See Gunnison E et al, “Women, Crime and Justice: Balancing the Scales”, Wiley-Blackwell: London, 
(2016), at 171. See also, Buzawa E & Buzawa C, “Do Arrests and Restraining Orders Work?” Sage 
Publications: London, (1996), at 240; Buzawa& Buzawa, “Domestic Violence: The Criminal Justice 
Response”, supra note 11, at 200-3 (discussing the general ineffectiveness of protection orders in deterring 
future violence).  
42 Tsai, supra note 4, at 1293. If the legal system accordingly had a method for predicting the lethality of 
perpetrators, such cases it is argued may have been subject to more stringent monitoring and enforcement, 
potentially averting the deaths of some victims. Ibid, at note 67. 
43 For example, a simple assault by a stranger may be a more straightforward case than a domestic violence 
assault by a husband on his wife.  In a domestic violence case, the wife may depend on the husband for 
financial support and object to his arrest.  She may fear for her safety and refuse to go forward with the 
prosecution. There may also be children involved, requiring considerations of custody, visitation, or 
support. 
44 Tsai, supra note 4, at 1294. 
45 See, Buzawa & Buzawa, “Domestic Violence: The Criminal Justice Response”, supra note 11, at 33 
(suggesting that, “despite official policies to the contrary, many police officers and prosecutors still strongly 
believe that society should not intervene in domestic disputes except in cases of extraordinary violence”). 
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domestic violence cases low priority, because victims frequently withdraw from the 
prosecution, and cases are largely unsuccessful without victim support and participation.46 
Similarly, police officers may also contribute to this organizational attitude by 
disproportionately failing to arrest perpetrators in domestic violence cases47  
       The traditional court response to domestic violence is erroneous, but not unique and 
many of the criticisms levelled against the system can, similarly, be levelled against the 
RDPs treatment of FGM claims. Firstly, decision-makers within the RDP do not have the 
legislative authority to thwart criminal and human rights violations. Whilst the criminal 
justice system aims to protect victims and hold perpetrators accountable, the RDP offers 
protection to those individuals fleeing persecution from further or future persecution. 
Although the two systems perform different functions, they both offer protection. Whilst 
the criminal justice system can be criticised for failing to prevent domestic violence, the 
RDP is also failing to recognise that FGM is a prohibited form of domestic violence. By 
failing to expand existing domestic violence definitions, which incorporates forms of 
violence committed exclusively against women such as FGM, the RDP is implicitly 
undermining the progress of the criminal justice system in combating violence against 
women.  
         Arguably, it is not the job or responsibility of the RDP to combat violence against 
women, however, it is submitted that refugee protection is analogous to the protection 
afforded to victims of domestic violence within the domestic courts. Refugee protection, 
like the criminal justice stance, conveys the  message that violence against women, in all 
its forms, is unacceptable. Intrinsically, by prohibiting domestic violence, recognising it 
as a form of violence against women and eliminating its social and cultural underpinnings, 
all legal and quasi-judicial forums (including the RDP) must follow this reasoning and 
accept FGM as a form of violence against women, prohibited by statute. In other words, 
by setting a standard at one level means that in order for it to be effective it must be 
consistently followed throughout the entire legal and administrative system. Failure to do 
                                                 
46 Hanna C, “No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions” 109 
Harvard Law Review 1849, (1996), at 1860. 
47 Tsai, supra note 4, at 1294. Research has shown that in domestic violence situations, there is, still 
persistent bias against the use of arrest”, and the more closely related the parties involved are, the less likely 
officers are to arrest. See, Buzawa & Buzawa, “Domestic Violence: The Criminal Justice Response”, supra 
note 11, at 51. 
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so undermines the progress of the criminal justice system in combating violence against 
women and calls into question the commitment and obligation of the RDP to offer 
protection to women. Arguably, this inconsistent approach, and the failure to recognise 
FGM as a human rights violation is contributing to the disparities in existing 
determinations. Possibly, training in issues pertaining to violence against women, 
including domestic violence is one progressive way of improving and engendering the 
RDP. Such recognition may make FGM a more fathomable and approachable form of 
violence, which decision-makers may feel more comfortable when addressing, as the 
cultural element of the practice will be eliminated. 
      Secondly, like orders of protection, within the RDP, an IFA conveys the message that 
further or future violence is preventable if a claimant relocates. The ability to relocate 
does not necessarily mean that future violence will not occur. In fact, as the FGM case-
law has highlighted, an IFA in some cases is unreasonable as it may actually place the 
claimant in an unduly harsh situation and subject her to the risk of future harm and 
additional difficulties.48  Unless the gender-guidelines are interpreted in a gender-
sensitive manner and sufficient attention given to COI in respects of FGM, claimants, like 
victims of domestic violence will remain at risk of harm, despite the existence of 
‘supposedly’ protective remedies. 
      Thirdly, like the inability of the legal system to identify which perpetrators are lethal, 
the RDP is similarly faced with the inability to consistently identity which States pose a 
threat to FGM claimants. Primarily, due to the non-binding nature of the gender-
guidelines, coupled with human and financial constraints, decision-makers do not have to 
proactively seek comprehensive information.49 Such activism, can be time-consuming 
                                                 
48 See specifically, CRDD T97-03141, May 27, 1998. For a case summary see, IRB, “Compendium of 
Decisions, Guideline 4: Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution: Update”, 
February (2003), at 32. This compendium is available online via the IRB Website at 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4713831e2.html (last accessed 7/7/17). Refer also to the discussion of NK 
(Cameroon) v SSHD, [2004] UKIAT 00247 in Chapter Two (noting the problems associated with wrongly 
construing the existence of an IFA for FGM victims). 
49 Macklin A, “Cross-Border Shopping for Ideas: A Critical Review of United States, Canadian and 
Australian Approaches to Gender-Related Asylum Claims” 13 Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 25, 
(1999), at 47 (discussing the Canadian IRB Documentation Centres); See also, Asylum Gender Guidelines, 
Immigration Appellate Authority, UK, Nov. 2000, (hereafter referred to as the UK Gender guidelines), 
Section 5.50-51. Compare with, Asylum Policy Instruction: Gender Issues in the Asylum Claim, Home 
Office, October 2006, at 13-14 (which merely states that decision-makers should use information supplied 
by the COI Service when assessing objectively where there are reasonable grounds for believing that the 
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and laborious and decision-makers often do not engage in it, instead, “basing their 
decisions on dubious assessments of plausibility of the account and general impression of 
the applicant’s credibility”.50 Coupled with the fact that reliable statistics are hard to come 
by, as sexual and physical violence against women is underreported at all levels, the 
credibility of many claimants as discussed in Chapter Three is erroneously undermined. 
Refugee decision-makers, like judges are perceived as impartial fact-finders51 in the 
pursuit of justice. Whilst it may be argued that they do not have the time or resources to 
undertake COI research, 52 their position places a responsibility on them to undertake this 
task and be trained in how to do it correctly, or have in place a research team to help them 
undertake this vitally important task, as is the case in some of the specialised domestic 
violence courts.53  
     Fourthly, the criminal justice and refugee systems within the case-studies are stretched 
to capacity with heavy caseloads. Consequently, FGM claims can be treated in a cursory 
manner and placed within fast-track systems. FGM is a complex form of gender-violence 
and claimants have special procedural and reception needs. Fast-track procedures lack the 
rigor, sensitivity and multi-agency coherence needed in such cases. The UNHCR has, 
                                                 
applicant would, if returned to their country of origin, face persecution for a Convention reason); 
Considerations for Asylum Officers Adjudicating Asylum Claims From Women, 26 May 1995, Phyllis 
Coven, Office of International Affairs, Immigration and Naturalization Service, USA, p. 1 (hereafter INS 
Gender Guidelines), at 8. 
50 This was the main basis for the decision of the tribunal of first appeal in the Austrian case of Re 
Cameroonian Citizen, Independent Federal Asylum Senate (Austria), Decision of 21st March 2002, as cited 
in Drudy A, “Credibility Assessments and Victims of Female Genital Mutilation: A Re-Evaluation of the 
Refugee Determination Process”, 14 Irish Student Law Review 84, (2006), at 111, note 154. 
51 Hart W & Blanchard R, “Litigation & Trial Practice”, (6th ED), New York: Thomson Delmar Learning, 
(2007), at 70. 
52 See, Immigration Advisory Service, “The Refugee Roulette: The Role of Country Information in Refugee 
Status Determination”, (2010), available online at http://www.refworld.org/docid/4b62a6182.html (last 
accessed 1/7/17) (hereafter referred to as the COI Report). An Executive Summary of the COI Report is 
also available online at (last accessed 1/7/17) (hereafter referred to as the COI Executive Summary) 
(alluding to the financial and time constraints associated with accessing and examining COI among legal 
representatives).  
53 Arguably, if legally-binding gender-guidelines were enforced and decision-makers were held to account 
for their decisions, COI supplied by the various agencies already used by case-studies and supported with 
further independent and up-to-date research undertaken by decision-makers would potentially make it easier 
to accurately determine whether claimants face further risk of harm, or whether a viable IFA and State 
protection exists. Collaboration among the case-studies in respect of accessing information may also be a 
particularly useful tool in respects of ensuring that comprehensive and reliable information is obtained and 
presented in FGM determinations. 
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equally, noted its concern that fast-track procedures are not gender-sensitive54 and others 
have documented how gender-related claims require additional time and attention.55 
    Lastly, like domestic violence, FGM, is largely regarded by some decision-makers as 
a cultural and religious matter which does not merit State intervention. Cultural practices 
do not lose their criminal label simply because some demand that they be labelled as such. 
This predisposition needs to be eliminated and the criminal prohibitions of FGM and 
domestic violence implemented by the respective case-studies need to be reinforced 
throughout the RDP to ensure that decision-makers are aware of the fact that FGM is a 
domestically criminally prohibited practice and not a legally condoned practice. Even 
though decision-makers may assume that because laws prohibiting FGM exist within the 
country of origin, State protection exists; determining State protection as discussed 
throughout this thesis is difficult in light of the fact that no universally recognised standard 
exists. Arguably, refugee determinations should be made with the laws of the host state 
and their standards of State protection in mind. This would give decision-makers a 
benchmark against which to compare the standards of protection within the country of 
origin against the standards afforded to women within their own borders. 
        Therefore, while their functions are different the criticisms levelled against the 
criminal justice systems’ traditional approach to domestic violence can similarly be 
levelled against the refugee determination systems’ treatment of FGM. Arguably, the 
current approach taken in respects of gender-based claims, including FGM, is failing to 
address the needs of claimants. Protection for victims, in both forums will continue to be 
undermined if reforms are not forthcoming. Whilst, the conventional court system’s 
response to domestic violence cases can be woefully inadequate, an alternative, more 
innovative approach to domestic violence has been implemented by the legal systems of 
the case-studies. Therefore, in order to learn from this new approach, so that similar 
innovations may potentially be transposed into the RDP in an attempt to correct and more 
                                                 
54 UNHCR, Quality Initiative Report, Second Report to the Minister, (2010), at 13. This Report is available 
online at http://www.refworld.org/docid/56a9c4294.html (last accessed 1/7/17). 
55 See generally, Ceneda & Palmer, supra note 36; Van Gulik G, “Women, Asylum and the UK Border 
Agency”, Human Rights Watch, 23 February, (2010) (noting that, “The system is too fast to be fair. There 
is a general lack of information on women’s rights in the countries they come from, women’s credibility is 
sometimes wrongly assessed, and not enough time is allowed to talk about sensitive issues such as rape and 




adequately address FGM claims, the following section will now briefly address the theory 
of therapeutic jurisprudence underpinning the specialised domestic violence courts. 
 
C. An Alternative Approach: Therapeutic Jurisprudence 
 
Therapeutic jurisprudence has been described as being that philosophy of law which 
highlights the healing power of law as a social force rather than its harsh retributive 
power.56 It asks us to envision law as an instrument of healing and rehabilitation, and to 
examine on this dimension rules of law, legal processes, and the roles played by those 
who apply the law.  It focuses on the law’s impact on emotional life and psychological 
well-being of individuals who are to be governed by any law(s).57 Violence against 
women is prevalent and despite the existence of international, regional and domestic laws 
protecting women, laws inherent positive aims have failed due to a failure in proper 
understanding of the same by legal actors including the courts. In many occasions, female 
victims may face discrimination due to the bad drafting of laws. In such cases, the law as 
a social force, becomes a tool for social and legal oppression and becomes anti-
therapeutic. However, according to Halder & Jaishankar, in many cases laws positive 
values were highlighted by the courts and legal representatives, and became a therapeutic 
                                                 
56 Halder D & Jaishankar K, “Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Overcoming Violence against Women”, IGI 
Global: United States, (2017), at xviii. See also, Kaye, supra note 35, at 854; Tsai, supra note 4, at 1294. 
See also, Stolle et al, “Integrating Preventive Law and Therapeutic Jurisprudence: A Law and Psychology 
Based Approach to Lawyering” 34 California Western Law Review 15, (1997), at 17. The therapeutic 
jurisprudence perspective has recently been applied in the contexts of criminal law, family law, juvenile 
law, disability law, discrimination law, health law, evidence law, tort law, contracts and commercial law, 
labor arbitration, worker’s compensation law, probate law and legal profession. And, most recently, there 
is growing interest in a dimension of therapeutic jurisprudence that takes the law as given and explores ways 
in which existing law might be most therapeutically applied). See, Winick B, “The Jurisprudence of 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence” 3 Psychology Public Policy and Law 184, (1997), at 201-3; Finkelman D & 
Grisso T, “Therapeutic Jurisprudence: From Idea to Application”, 20 New England Journal on Criminal 
and Civil Confinement 243, (1994). See further, Winick B, “Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Problem 
Solving Courts”, 30 Fordham Urban Law Journal 1055, (2003), at 1064-6 (noting that therapeutic 
jurisprudence utilizes insights from psychology and behavioural sciences to critique legal and judicial 
practices. It is an approached aimed at integrating treatment services with judicial case processing; 
providing ongoing judicial intervention; and facilitating collaboration with community-based and 
governmental organisations). See also, Shaffer, supra note 24, at 989. 
57 Halder & Jaishankar, supra note 56, at xviii.  
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tool for healing the harms suffered by women.58 Domestic violence laws and the 
specialised courts are a prime example of this. 59 
      The therapeutic approach taken by the specialised domestic violence courts focuses 
on perpetrator treatment and rehabilitation,60 and more importantly for the purposes of the 
thesis, victim safety and support.61 It has been recognised that violence disrupts the 
emotional equilibrium of the victim producing feelings of anxiety, fear, depression, 
humiliation, anger, powerlessness, and betrayal. Intimate violence, like domestic violence 
and FGM, when perpetrated/ commissioned by a family member or partner, can heighten 
these feelings and shatter a victim’s sense of trust and willingness to have close relations 
in the future.62 Some victims of crime, especially if of a repetitive nature, develop a form 
of learned helplessness and many suffer from a PTSD.63 
     The specialised domestic violence courts focus on providing information and 
reassurances that can help to restore a sense of security within the victim. Victims need 
to have the opportunity to tell their story to an impartial and informed decision-maker. All 
of those within the criminal justice process, with whom the victim will encounter, receive 
training to sensitize them to these needs and how to meet them.64 Consequently the 
specialised domestic violence courts, as the following section will examine, offer a 
gender-sensitive and victim-orientated approach to domestic violence from start to finish, 
which the RDP can learn from.   
 
II. Domestic Violence Court Programmes 
                                                 
58 Ibid. 
59 For information on therapeutic courts, including drug, mental health courts see generally, Strauss L, “US 
Drug Court: A Building Block for Canada” 8 ILSA Journal of International and Comparative Law 685, 
(2002); Kondo L, “Advocacy of the Establishment of Mental Health Specialty Courts in the Provision of 
Therapeutic Justice for Mentally Ill Offenders”, 24 Seattle University Law Review 373, (2000); & Yates R, 
“A brief moment of glory: the impact of the therapeutic community movement on the drug treatment systems 
in the UK”, 12 International Journal of Social Welfare 239, (2003). 
60 Tsai, supra note 4, at 1295-6. See also, Gould P & Murrell P, “Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Cognitive 
Complexity: An Overview”, 29 Fordham Urban Law Journal 2117, (2002), at 2120-22. 
61 Winick B, “Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Victims of Crime” (2008), at 2. This article is available online 
at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1102350 (last accessed 29/7/17).  
62 Ibid, at 3. 
63 Herman J.L., “Trauma and recovery”, Basic Books: New York, (1997); McGruder-Johnson et al, 
“Interpersonal violence and post-traumatic symptomatology: The effects of ethnicity, gender and exposure 
to violent events” 15 Journal of Interpersonal Violence 206, (2000), at 206-16. 




The existing specialised domestic violence courts and model programmes single out 
domestic violence cases for specialised attention with numerous parties, dedicated to 
addressing the plethora of social, legal and psychological aspects of domestic violence.65 
This response by deviating from the traditional approach reinforces the prevailing belief 
that an interdisciplinary response is critical to addressing the various social and health 
issues, such as the effects on children, family, finances and psychological functioning, 
which are integral aspects of domestic violence.66 In order to highlight the successful 
aspects of these specialised courts and potential elements, which may enhance the RDP 
by prioritizing and adequately addressing gender-based claims, including FGM, a number 
of courts and programmes implemented within the respective case-studies will now be 
examined. Whilst the criminal justice system ultimately aims to hold perpetrators 
accountable, and the RDP, focuses primarily on the protection of the victim from further 
persecution, the perpetrates of FGM are therefore beyond the scope of the refugee process. 
For this reason, the focus of the following section as stated in Section I will be on the 
protective functions of these courts for the victim and how that shift in attitudes and 
practices might be replicated or mirrored in some shape or form within the RDP. Where 
appropriate, however, reference (albeit succinct) will be made to perpetrator programmes 





1. Quincy, Massachusetts67 
 
                                                 
65 Tsai, supra note 4, at 1296-7. 
66 Ibid, at 1927. 
67 Director and Special Prosecutor Sarah Buel, a formerly battered woman, was instrumental in developing 
the Qunicy court-based domestic violence programme. See, Fechter M, “Zero Tolerance; Stop Domestic 




The Quincy programme, which began in 197668 and remains one of the US’s most 
successful domestic violence intervention models,69 rests on three fundamental concepts: 
integration, communication, and prioritization of domestic violence issues.70 The 
continued success of Quincy’s coordinated response is based on cooperation among 
interested parties to provide, a powerful and coordinated judicial response to domestic 
violence. 71 The programme further prioritises domestic violence by using an approach 
which accomplishes the goals of controlling the perpetrator and empowering the victim.72 
Whilst perpetrators are subject to a number of sanctions,73 victims enjoy a ‘user friendly’ 
process made easier by the witness/victim advocates available and greater availability of 
support resources.74 
     The programme is thus designed to afford victims a speedy and supportive procedural 
response to their cases. When a victim seeks protection, usually in the form of a Protection 
Order, her initial contact at the Quincy District Court will be with a domestic abuse clerk 
in the Restraining Orders Office.75 The Quincy Court provides full-time, specialised 
advocacy to women seeking protection orders.76 The importance of the domestic abuse 
clerks cannot be overemphasized. A victim entering the court is often confused, scared, 
                                                 
68 “Although the various components of the Quincy programme developed over time, the first domestic 
violence training sessions were conducted in 1976”. Tsai, supra note 4, at 1297, note 93. See also, Salzman 
E, “The Quincy District Court Domestic Violence Prevention Program: A Model Legal Framework for 
Domestic Violence Intervention”, 74 Boston University Law Review 329, (1994), at 338-9 & note 57 
(analysing the Quincy programme and citing it as a strong foundation for future domestic violence 
programmes). 
69 See, Fechter, supra note 67 (describing a Tampa campaign against domestic violence that borrows ideas 
from the Quincy programme); Report on Domestic Violence: A Commitment to Action, 28 New England 
Law Review 313, (1993), at 336-7. (Hereafter referred to as the Domestic Violence Report). The Domestic 
Violence Advisory Committee of the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges rated the 
Quincy programme among the top fifteen of its kind in the US. See, Domestic Violence Report, ibid, at 358. 
70 See, Domestic Violence Report, supra note 69, at 317 & 320. “The importance of the implementation of 
an integrated response to combat domestic violence cannot be overstated.... What is needed is the political 
and institutional will and commitment to make domestic violence a priority, and to send a strong and 
consistent message to all citizens that domestic violence is a crime and that no one deserves to be abused”. 
Negri G, “Commission Is Formed to Develop Policies on Domestic Violence”, Boston Globe, Aug. 20, 
1993, at 25 (stating that Lieutenant Governor Paul Cellucci called for an "'integrated, inclusive approach to 
the problem"'). 
71 See, Domestic Violence Report, supra note 69, at 337 & 359. See also, Salzman, supra note 68, at 339. 
72 Tsai, supra note 4, at 1298.  
73 Including aggressive prosecutorial tactics, greater monitoring of behaviour and a general emphasis on 
improved enforcement strategies. Ibid. 
74 Ibid. 




and uncertain.77 The clerks within the confines of a private office, help to provide the 
security a woman needs to embark on the intimidating process of requesting a restraining 
order.78 No such advice or support exists within the RDP. 
    After the initial intake procedure, clerks refer the victim to the daily briefing sessions 
hosted by the District Attorney's Office79 where they then receive information about 
referral services and their legal rights, but they also receive emotional support. After the 
briefing, a clerk accompanies the victim to the courtroom for their emergency hearing, 
which is usually conducted ex parte, without the perpetrator or his counsel present. Often 
the clerk will stand with the woman before the bench to provide moral support.80 Clerks 
are able to dispel a woman's misconceptions about the order's efficacy and provide her 
with information that can increase her safety. The clerks can also assure the woman that 
the abuse was not her fault.81 As the programme has established ‘fast track’ procedures 
for judges to expedite domestic violence hearings82, Quincy has established daily morning 
and afternoon sessions to handle Protective Order requests exclusively.83 This contrasts 
sharply with many area courts in which women must wait hours for an available judge.84  
     The District Attorney's Office also utilizes victim/witness advocates as part of their 
domestic violence staff in both civil and criminal matters. The Office has full-time 
domestic violence staff, victim/witness advocates, two special domestic violence 
prosecutors, and numerous volunteer interns who assist in the functioning of the 
                                                 
77 Domestic Violence Report, supra note 69, at 333 (stating that going through the criminal justice system 
may be a confusing and overwhelming experience, especially for victims of abuse who must face their 
abusers in court). 
78 Ibid, “The Attorney General's report notes that "without the assistance of qualified, trained, and 
supervised domestic violence advocates, many victims will not go through the process of filing petitions in 
court, and they and their children will remain in dangerous situations." Ibid. 
79 Salzman, supra note 68, at 341. 
80 Ibid, at 341-2. Many of the domestic abuse clerks in Quincy are volunteer interns from law schools and 
social work programmes at local universities. Their duties include disseminating: a sheet listing the critical 
information the woman should provide to the assisting clerk; a sheet detailing procedures on how to file a 
drug/alcohol petition; and an informational brochure entitled “Help and Protection for Families 
Experiencing Violence in the Home”, which includes a list of emergency resources. Ibid, at 341, notes 65-
67. 
81 Salzman, supra note 68, notes 6-11 (discussing battered women’s syndrome). 
82 The Massachusetts Attorney General reiterates that criminal justice systems should make all efforts to 
expedite the processing of domestic violence cases, including the prompt issuance of restraining orders and 
warrants. Domestic Violence Report, supra note 69, at 315-6. 




programmes operation.85 Significantly, domestic violence staff provide twenty hours of 
training to the Quincy Police Department each year.86 The Office trains officers on the 
correct procedures for incident report writing, disturbance investigation, and evidence 
collection.87 This is especially important as it means that when the police record 
incriminating evidence, the District Attorney's Office can prosecute, or ‘go forward,’ 
without the victim's participation.88 The Quincy programme also uses an innovative 
‘tracking system’ in which they report domestic violence to the District Attorney’s 
office.89 This information according to Tsai, allows victim/witness advocates to become 
aware of the situation in advance and adopt a proactive approach by contacting victims to 
invite them to briefing sessions about protective orders, even before there is any court 
involvement.90 
    The Quincy Probation Department’s role in domestic violence cases involves 
monitoring perpetrator behaviour. Non-attendance at intervention programmes91 or 
indications of future violence against a spouse or partner result in warnings to both the 
victim and the police.92 Unsurprisingly, perpetrator programmes cannot be directly 
transposed into the RDP, as the aim of the process is not to hold States to account but 
rather to internationalize human rights norms by providing international protection when 
a country does not adequately protect the human rights of its citizens.93 Rather, the ethos 
of accountability can be transposed. If reliable and current COI was available and utilised 
in a gender-sensitive manner, arguably, the ability to identify which countries either 
condone or cannot protect women from FGM and other forms of discrimination would in 
a similar fashion to police domestic violence warnings, caution refugee decision-makers 
                                                 
85 Ibid, at 344. 
86 Some of the topics of these training sessions include: police responsibility, the battered women's 
syndrome and obstacles to leaving an abusive relationship, the role of alcohol, information on shelters and 
perpetrator counselling, and instruction on properly completing incidents reports. 
87 Salzman, supra note 68, at 345. 
88 Ibid. 
89 This tracking system includes computerized records that provide police officers with information about 
prior arrests, protective orders, and potential weapons, thus preparing them before they arrive on the scene. 
Salzman, supra note 68, at 350. 
90 Ibid, at 345-6. See also, Tsai, supra note 4, at 1300. 
91 Salzman, supra note 68, at 348-9. 
92 Ibid, at 349. 
93 McCabe E, “The Inadequacy of International Human Rights Law to Protect the Rights of Women as 
Illustrated by the Crisis in Afghanistan”, 5 UCLA Journal of International Law & Foreign Affairs 422, 
(2001), at 446. 
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to be more aware of the situation of women within their countries of origin, the likelihood 
of future or further violence and the resulting complications of FGM which may affect 
their testimony during the RDP. 
 
2. Dade County, Florida 
 
The Dade County Domestic Violence Court94 subscribes to the therapeutic jurisprudence 
model95 and exemplifies a comprehensive interdisciplinary system of handling and 
addressing domestic violence cases.96 The court utilises a comprehensive integrated 
approach97 which contributes to the, “comprehensive provision of services by supplying 
a single forum within which both criminal and civil matters can be addressed”.98 To 
establish an effective response to domestic violence, the DCDVC was designed around 
three central principles: (1) judicial activism in the community, (2) perpetrator treatment; 
and (3) victim services.99 
  Members of the DCDVC led by the judiciary, work together as a team toward a shared 
goal of reducing domestic violence. Family violence training within the DCDVC is 
mandatory for judges, prosecutors and public defenders.100 Fagan argues that the role of 
“judge as teacher” in the courtroom is tested, and judges have a responsibility to make 
public appearances at community meetings and in the popular media and to educate the 
public about the court and about domestic violence.101 
                                                 
94 Hereafter referred to as DCDVC. 
95 See, Part I. C for a discussion of therapeutic jurisprudence. 
96 Tsai, supra note 4, at 1302. See also, Fagan, supra note 13, at 21 (stating that DCDVC represents an 
innovative, interdisciplinary, and integrated system-wide approach of a team of criminal justice system 
professionals to the treatment of domestic violence misdemeanour cases, civil protection orders, and 
violation of civil protection order cases). 
97 Dade County was the first of three jurisdictions, including the District of Columbia and Hawaii, to 
integrate both civil and criminal domestic violence proceedings into a single unified court. See, Epstein, 
supra note 3, at 28 (describing new domestic violence programmes in the context of showing the disparity 
between recent domestic violence legislation and the enforcement responses of the prosecutors, judges, and 
courts). 
98 Tsai, supra note 4, at 1302. 
99 Ibid. See also, Fagan, supra note 13, at 21-3. 
100 Ibid, at 22-3. 
101 Ibid, at 22. 
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      Treatment of perpetrators is emphasized over punishment in the DCDVC102 and 
perpetrators are required to participate in counselling and other intervention 
programmes.103 Notably, within the DCDVC there is also an emphasis on the needs of 
children and a mandated treatment programme which does not focus on the defendant or 
the victim, has been established which specifically focuses on the children who are living 
with and witnessing domestic violence.104 Group counselling for these children is required 
as part of the perpetrators probation.105 
      In a similar manner to Quincy, victim advocates within the DCDVC also address the 
needs of victims by assisting them in obtaining accessibility to resources and services.106 
Their role includes “encouraging and facilitating participation by the victim in the entire 
process whether by pursing prosecution of the perpetrator or obtaining an order of 
protection”.107 The remedies available to domestic violence victims, like FGM claimants 
are meaningless if they cannot access the legal system. Victim advocates trained in the 
law and sensitive to the needs of victims, can help to assist victims. They can prepare 
victims for court and provide emotional support throughout the process.108 This support 
as will be discussed further in Chapter Five would be instrumental to victims of FGM. 
Advocates within the RDP, could similarly promote engagement with the RDP by 
tailoring their services to respond to the needs of claimants, including overcoming 
cultural, language and social barriers.  
 
                                                 
102 Ibid. 
103 In keeping with the therapeutic jurisprudence philosophy underpinning this court, all cases are monitored 
by the court after imposition of the sentence, and the defendant is required to return to court periodically 
during probation to discuss progress in counselling and compliance with the sentence. Ibid. 
104 Ibid. See also, Davidson H, “The Impact of Domestic Violence on Children: A Report to the President 
of the American Bar Association”, American Bar Association, (1994), available online at 
http://library.niwap.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/FAM-Tool-ImpactDVChildren-8.94.pdf (last 
 accessed 29/7/17). (Between 3.3 and 10 million children witness domestic abuse in their own homes each 
year).  
105 Fagan, supra note 13, at 22. See also, Tsai, supra note 4, at 1304. Children who witness domestic 
violence may experience ‘serious behavioural, cognitive, and affective problems’, thereby making 
counselling programmes particularly critical for the mental health of such children. The Impact of Domestic 
Violence on Children: A Report to the President of the American Bar Association, supra note 104, at 6. 
106 Fagan, supra note 13, at 23. 
107 Ibid. See also, Tsai, supra note 4, at 1304. 
108 See, Schmitz S, “What’s the Harm?: Rethinking the Role of Domestic Violence Advocates and the 
Unauthorized Practice of Law”, 10 William & Mary Journal of Women and the Law 295, (2004), at 299 




3. New York City 
 
The first Domestic Violence Court in New York State opened in Brooklyn in 1996, 
handling felony-level domestic violence cases.109 Like the Quincy and Dade models, New 
York’s domestic violence programme provides a comprehensive multidisciplinary 
approach110 which includes:  
 
Specialized domestic violence courtrooms dedicated to handling only domestic 
violence cases. These courtrooms are staffed by specially trained judges, 
prosecution teams, and a team of domestic violence personnel consisting of a 
Resource Coordinator, a Victim Advocate, and a Defendant Monitor.111 
 
Victim Advocate provides support and assistance to victims throughout the court 
proceedings and encourages victim participation.112 Services provided include the 
provision of information concerning court proceedings and orders of protection, and other 
information relating to services including counselling and social services agency 
referrals.113 In essence Tsai argues that the “Victim Advocate maintains up-to-date 
information on the status of the victim, including any violations of orders of protection 
that the victim reports”.114 
       On the other hand, the Defendant Monitor is responsible for perpetrator status and 
assists in overseeing defendant compliance with court-ordered conditions, such as orders 
of protection and participation in counselling and substance-abuse programmes.115 The 
                                                 
109 Domestic Violence Courts are currently operating in Manhattan, Brooklyn, Albany, Troy, Glens Falls, 
Saratoga Springs, Syracuse, Binghamton, Auburn, Buffalo, Clarkstown, Spring Valley, Westchester, 
Queens, Bronx, and Erie, Nassau, and Suffolk Counties. Courts are also being planned in several other 
jurisdictions in New York State. See, New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, “New York 
State Domestic Violence Courts Programme Fact Sheet” (2001), available online at 
http://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/ofpa/domviolcrtfactsheet.htm (last accessed 24/6/17). For a detail 
discussion of the New York Domestic Violence Court see, Koshan J, “Investigating Integrated Domestic 
Violence Courts: Lessons from New York”, 51 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 989, (2014). 
110 Tsai, supra note 4, at 1300. 
111 Ibid, (citing The Criminal Court of the City of New York, Domestic Violence Intervention Plan, (1997), 
at 5-9). 
112 Ibid, at 8-9.  
113 The Criminal Court of the City of New York, Domestic Violence Intervention Plan, supra note 111 at 8. 
See also, Tsai, supra note 4, at 1300. 
114 Ibid. 
115 The Criminal Court of the City of New York, Domestic Violence Intervention Plan, supra note 111, at 9. 
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Resource Coordinator, acting as a conduit of information for the judge, obtains victim 
status and defendant compliance information directly from both the Victim Advocates 
and the Defendant Monitors.116 Such cooperation is imperative for if an emergency 
situation arose, this network of information ensures that judges are fully aware of the 
situation as quickly as possible, thus ensuring a rapid response and more stringent 
enforcement of sanctions.117 
     The court has also developed a Domestic Violence Intervention Plan which provides 
for three types of dedicated parts in each county: Domestic Violence All-Purpose Parts to 
handle all post-arraignment proceedings, Domestic Violence Trial Parts to expedite the 
hearing of trial ready cases, and Domestic Violence Compliance Parts to monitor 
defendants’ compliance with court-ordered conditions of sentence.118 The use of such 
plans are critical as they reinforce the idea that interested parties understand how to 
respond to and deal with the complexities associated with domestic violence. It further 
reinforces the need for effective assessment, intervention, documentation and referral 
where necessary. Similar plans could arguably work within the RDP. Effective 
assessment could help to assess the needs of FGM claimants and determine early what 
resources (if any), are required which could make the RDP more accommodating. 
Equally, the identification of needs would afford decision-makers time and resources to 
implement the gender guidelines, make claimants aware of the process, and source 
necessary COI and other required evidence. By supporting claimants and providing 
information about resources and options, decision-makers would give claimants the 
opportunity to have their claims heard in a gender-sensitive process.  
    Another important aspect of New York City’s coordinated community response to 
domestic violence is the role and use of Information Technology. New York State has 
                                                 
116 Ibid, at 7. 
117 Tsai, supra note 4, at 1301. 
118See, “Criminal Justice” (2000), available online at 
http://www.nycourts.gov/admin/stateofjudiciary/stofjud9/4%20criminal.pdf (last accessed 5/7/17). Once a 
case has been seen by a judge in the All-Purpose Part, it can either go to trial or it may be disposed of 
through a plea. The case then goes to either the Domestic Violence Trial Part or the Domestic Violence 
Compliance Part. The dedicated Trial Part ensures that the system will give priority to domestic violence 
cases which are ready for trial in order to dispose of them quickly. See, Tsai, supra note 4, at 1301. The 
Compliance Part also monitors attendance in court-mandated intervention programmes. Non-compliance 
with these programmes may result in a referral to the All-Purpose part for more stern sanctions, such as the 
imposition of a custodial sentence. Ibid, at 1301, note 124. 
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developed the Domestic Violence Court Technology Application and Resource Link,119 a 
software application that uses internet technology to connect domestic violence courts 
with law enforcement and social service providers. This innovative technology facilitates 
the transfer of critical information between the court and a variety of other agencies 
involved in domestic violence cases. Similar software and innovations would be 
instrumental within the refugee process in respects of obtaining COI.  
 
4. District of Columbia 
 
Like the DCDVC, the District of Columbia, incorporates both criminal and civil domestic 
violence cases into a unified/integrated court system.120 The system comprises of a 
Domestic Violence Intake Centre, a Domestic Violence Coordination Unit, and a 
Domestic Violence Court.121 
      The Domestic Violence Intake Centre is the initial point of contact for victims. Here 
they meet with a Civil Intake Counsellor to discuss the protection order process and obtain 
assistance with paperwork and additional advocacy services as required.122 Additional 
services provided by the Civil Intake Counsellor, includes; child support, custody, or 
visitation issues as part of an order of protection.123 At this stage in the process, a victim 
may speak with a Victims Advocate from the Attorney’s Office regarding pending, or 
potential criminal matters.124 
                                                 
119 See, Young P, An Informed Response: An Overview of the Domestic Violence Court Technology and 
Resource Link”, Centre for Court Innovation, (2001), available online at 
http://www.courtinnovation.org/pdf/info_response.pdf (last accessed 5/7/17). This new link, “Allows users, 
which include judges, attorneys, victim advocates and batterers’ intervention programs—to share 
information instantaneously. The application immediately notifies courtroom staff when an order for 
protection has been formally violated. Attorneys and victim advocates are able to provide court players 
with up-to-date information about their clients. The goal is to promote greater coordination and to help 
improve the criminal justice system’s response to domestic violence crime”. Ibid. 
120 See, Epstein, supra note 3, at 28. Although Dade County was the first jurisdiction to combine civil and 
criminal domestic violence cases, its court does not have the capacity to handle issues of child custody, 
visitation, and support. Ibid, note 140. The District of Columbia is able to handle such issues. Ibid, at 28, 
note 140. 
121 Ibid, at 29-33. 
122 Ibid, at 30. See also, Tsai, supra note 4, at 1305. 
123 Ibid. See also, Epstein, supra note 3, at 30. The Intake Centre also houses advocates from the D.C. 
Coalition Against Domestic Violence who are available to provide women with referrals to counselling 
programmes, shelters, or other social service agencies. Ibid. 
124 Tsai, supra note 4, at 1305. 
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       Next, a victim will go to the Domestic Violence Coordination Unit where specially 
trained domestic violence clerk’s performs the administrative role of scheduling necessary 
hearings and compiling case histories.125 This step is crucial as the clerks ensure a 
comprehensive response by searching the computer database for any prior or additional 
cases involving the same parties. In this way, judges are made aware of the history of the 
case enabling them to make a more informed decision.126 
    The Domestic Violence Court only hears domestic violence cases and is staffed by 
specially trained judges assigned to serve a full year in the Court before rotating out.127 
Judges, their officers and clerks receive training on domestic violence issues before 
commencing any assignments. Training sessions and written materials dispel the myths 
surrounding domestic violence and address special issues and applicable law relating to 
immigrants and non-English speaking parties.128 Furthermore, as part of the coordinated 
community response, judges participate in biweekly interdisciplinary meetings with other 
organisations to discuss problems that arise and to identify methods for improving the 
programme.129 As discussed in Chapter Three many decision-makers who listen to 
horrific stories of violence suffer from vicarious traumatization, and whilst they may 
empathize with the claimant they cannot use the defences of avoidance or denial to protect 
themselves against the images associated with the claim which has been made. 
Overexposure to these types of accounts often triggers defensive reactions that lead to 
trivialization of horror, cynicism, and a lack of empathy130 among decision-makers. 
Studies have indicated that in such instances decision-makers have displayed direct 
avoidance and denial, through refusal to hear the claim or a focus on peripheral 
events/neutral information while ignoring the traumatic event, followed by a rejection of 
the claimants testimony based on a lack of credibility.131 If decision-makers, like the 
judges in the District of Columbia domestic violence court were trained prior to taking up 
                                                 
125 Epstein, supra note 3, at 31-2. 
126 Tsai, supra note 4, at 1305. 
127 Epstein, supra note 3, at 33. 
128 Ibid. 
129 Ibid. 
130 Rousseau C et al, “The Complexity of Determining Refugeehood: A Multidisciplinary Analysis of the 
Decision-making Process of the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board” 15 Journal of Refugee Studies 
43, (2002), at 49. 
131 Ibid, at 55 & 59. 
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FGM and other gender-based claims and were rotated on a regular basis then the 
possibility of vicarious traumatization and the denials associated with this disorder 
developing would be potentially reduced and possibly go some way in helping to reduce 
disparate decision-making. 
       The District of Columbia court system, like its counterparts utilises extensive 
advocacy and support services for victims of domestic violence, but focuses less on 
defendant monitoring and services to children. All four however promote a 
comprehensive community response to domestic violence which “integrates multiple 
services into a single court-based system”.132 The examination of these innovative courts 
thus far has identified a number of elements which could easily be transposed into the 
RDP. However, before exploring these best practices/potential reforms in any detail, the 
specialised domestic violence courts and programmes implemented throughout the UK 
and Canada will now be examined to see what other (if any) positive elements can be 




Canada has several well-established specialised domestic violence courts133 which are 
almost exclusively criminal law courts.134 Dedicated domestic violence courts have been 
established in many provinces including: Manitoba, Ontario, Yukon, Alberta, 
Saskatchewan and New Brunswick.135 Although these courts all vary the goals are 
generally to expedite court process, increase victim cooperation and hold perpetrators 
accountable. Significantly, theses courts all have designated and specially trained Crown 
prosecutors and victim/witness assistance staff. 
                                                 
132 Tsai, supra note 4, at 1306. 
133 For an overview see, Tutty L, Ursel J & Douglas F, “Specialized Domestic Violence Courts: A 
Comparison of Models’ What’s Law Got to Do With It? The Law, Specialized Courts and Domestic Violence 
in Canada”, Cormorant Books: Toronto (2008). 
134 Koshan, supra note 109, at 1000. 
135 See, Tompson E, “What’s the holdup?”, Legal Report: Family Law (2012), available online via the 
Canadian Lawyer website at http://www.canadianlawyermag.com/4259/What-s-the-holdup.html (last 
accessed 2/7/17) & Response of the Government of Canada to the questionnaire on violence against women, 
2008, available online at 
http://evaw-global-database.unwomen.org/en/countries/americas/canada/1990/dedicated-domestic-




1. The Family Violence Court of Winnipeg, Manitoba. 
 
In 1990 Manitoba established the first specialised family violence court in Winnipeg.136 
The five components of the court are: (1) a “zero-tolerance” pro-arrest policy; (2) a 
women’s advocacy and child victim/witness programmes for victims of family violence; 
(3) a specialised prosecutorial unit of Crown Prosecutors; (4) specially designed 
courtrooms and dockets for intake, screening court and trials; and (5) a special probation 
unit to deliver court/mandated treatment programmes.137 The three goals of the court are 
to expedite court processing, to increase victim co-operation and reduce case attrition, and 
to provide appropriate sentencing that would protect victims, such as treatment for abusers 
and offender monitoring through probation supervision.138 
      This new court process required a cultural and social change in participants and 
workers involved with the Court in an environment of a creative response to challenges. 
Whilst some may argue that such changes have already occurred within the RDP with the 
gender-guidelines being a direct product, such arguments are redundant. Whilst the 
guidelines represent a step in the right direction, their limitations coupled with the evident 
biases of decision-makers render them ineffective. Thus, a cultural and social change in 
participants is also required within the RDP to ensure that FGM claimants are no longer 
discriminated against and incorrectly denied protection because the non-binding nature of 
the guidelines and the social and cultural insensitivity of decision-makers. 
    The court process operates a mandatory arrest policy where there was evidence of a 
crime irrespective of whether the victim wanted to press charges with a specialised 
prosecution team which, “attains a higher conviction rate than similar offences prosecuted 
                                                 
136 Hereafter referred to as the Winnipeg Court. The Court handles first appearances, remands, guilty pleas 
and trials for spousal abuse, child abuse and elder abuse cases.  For a comprehensive overview of the 
Winnipeg Court please refer to the following: Justice Lea Duval, “A Judicial Perspective on Manitoba’s 
Specialized Family Violence Court”, June (2005), available online at  
http://domesticpeace.ca/images/uploads/documents/ManitobaDVCJudicialPerspective2005.pdf (last 
accessed 24/6/17); Ursel J, “The Family Violence Court of Winnipeg” 21 university of Manitoba Law 
Journal 100, (1992). 
137 See, Final Report of the ad hoc Federal-Provincial-Territorial Working Group Reviewing Spousal Abuse 
Policies and Legislation”, Department of Justice Canada, (2009), at 40. This report is available online at 
http://justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/cj-jp/fv-vf/pol/spo_e-con_a.pdf (last accessed 29/7/17). 
138 Ibid, at 40-41. 
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in other settings in Canada”.139 Protection Orders also seek to achieve the immediate 
safety of victims which remains the primary focus of the Winnipeg court throughout the 
process. Within the Winnipeg Court there is also a policy of rigorous prosecution of 
perpetrators without re-victimising the victim.140 This is achieved primarily by the 
“accompanying massive increase in funding of victim support services”.141 Orders for 
criminal offenders focus on treatment and Corrections has developed specialised 
programmes in the community and prison system.142 
      The Winnipeg Court was and continues to be an innovative experiment in securing 
justice for victims of domestic violence.143 It emphasised prosecutorial and law 
enforcement interventions, including mandatory arrest policies. It also focused on victim 
safety and the accountability of perpetrators. Thus, it has laid the foundations for the 
establishment of other such courts and programmes throughout Canada, which 
considering modern research have given further priority to the needs of victims by 
promoting victim advocacy and protection.  
 
2. K Court: Ontario’s Domestic Violence Justice Strategy144 
 
The DVJS aimed to “establish a more coordinated and integrated response to domestic 
violence by the justice system”.145 The DVJS is led by the Ministry of the Solicitor 
General and the Ministry of the Attorney General and involves the Ministry of 
Community Safety and Correctional Services, the Ministry of Citizenship and 
                                                 
139 Hennessy A.M., “Specialist Domestic and Family Violence Courts: The Rockhampton Experiment” 





143 Domestic homicide rates reduced significantly as a result of the court initiative, there has also been a 
reduction in recidivism and earlier and more frequent reporting of violent offenders to Police (twice the 
national average), leading to more arrests. See, Ursel J, “Winnipeg Family Violence Court”, presentation as 
AIJI Family Violence Conference in Adelaide in February 2006, as cited in Hennessy, supra note 139, at 
15. 
144 Hereafter referred to as the DVJS. 
145 Ministry of the Attorney General, “Implementing the Specialized Domestic Violence Court Process”, 
Ontario, Canada: Ministry of the Attorney General, (2000), at 1-4. 
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Immigration and the Ontario Women’s Directorate.146 The objectives of the of the DVJS 
are: (1) to intervene early in domestic violence situations; (2) effectively prosecute 
domestic violence cases; (3) provide support to victims; and (4) hold offenders 
accountable.147 To meet those objectives the elements of the DVJS include: local justice 
community co-ordination; enhanced investigation by trained police officers; co-ordinated 
prosecution led by trained Crown attorneys; fast tracking of cases; victim support; and 
Partner Assault Response Programmes.148 The overriding goal is to send out a consistent 
message that domestic violence will not be tolerated by the courts or the community at 
large.  
      Significantly, Ontario has committed to all its fifty-four court jurisdictions having 
either a specialised domestic violence court with dedicated staff or a specialised process 
for handling such cases. The key to achieving this objective is collaboration and a 
commitment to making the process work. Depending on each jurisdiction, an early 
intervention model and/or a co-ordinated prosecution will be implemented across Ontario. 
These two distinct models were piloted in Ontario in early 1997: the early intervention 
model in North York and the co-ordinated prosecution model in Toronto. Approximately 
twenty courts have implemented a specialised domestic violence court process.149 In 
general, combinations of both models have been used throughout Ontario, with the 
volume of cases and the size of the jurisdiction steering the approach implemented.150 One 
of the most successful Ontario courts to date is K Court.151 
                                                 
146 Ontario introduced this strategy in response to the May-Iles Inquest and the 1999 Joint Committee on 
Domestic Violence recommendations, the Spring 1999 Throne speech that made a commitment to prosecute 
crime and support victims and the Blueprint commitment for action on Domestic Violence. See, Eley S, 
“Changing Practices: The Specialized Domestic Violence Court Process”, 44 The Howard Journal 113, 
(2005), at 115. 
147 Ministry of the Attorney General, “Implementing the Specialized Domestic Violence Court Process”, 
supra note 145, at 4-1. 
148 Eley, supra note 146, at 115. 
149 Eley, supra note 146, at 116. 
150 It is important to note that within the Canadian context, there are two types of specialised courts. One is 
a plea court which does not handle any criminal trials, but deals only with cases where the offender is 
prepared to plead guilty to the offence. The other, such as K Court handles domestic violence cases which 
involves a full criminal trial. For further information on both these types of courts see, Hubbard D, 
“Domestic Violence Courts in Canada: A Special Solution”, Legal Assistance Centre (2000), at 1. This 
document is available online at http://www.lac.org.na/news/inthenews/pdf/dvincanada.pdf (last accessed 
30/6/17).  
151 The court is named after the letter which is marked on the dockets of all domestic violence cases to 
distinguish them from other forms of violence. 
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      K-Court which began operation in 1997 aims to provide a, “vigorous prosecution of 
domestic violence cases, compared to other courts across Ontario”.152 The court is 
presided over by judges assigned in rotation for one week each month for a period of 
approximately three months. The benefits of the rotation of judges include: 
 
preventing the association of a specific judicial leader in the prosecution of 
domestic violence cases, engaging the same K Court judge for the length of any 
one case and ensuring the case is confined to K Court, and allowing K Court judges 
to deal with cases other than domestic violence during each month.153 
 
Rotation as already discussed can reduce the likelihood of vicarious traumatization among 
decision-makers occurring. It can also ensure that wrongful denials will be easier to detect 
and remedy, especially in instances where the same decision-maker is continually making 
such determinations. Furthermore, the regular rotation of judges also allows them to gain 
experience of dealing with complex domestic violence cases. Situated within the 
Provincial Court in Ontario, all trials are heard by a judge. The main stakeholders of K-
Court include Crown attorneys, victim/witness Assistance Programme, Cultural 
Interpreter Services, the police, Partner Assault Response Programmes, and the parole 
and probation services.154 
       The co-ordinated prosecution stream in K-Court emphasises, the gathering of solid 
evidence to support a vigorous prosecution.155 Compared to the practices associated with 
domestic violence cases in other criminal courts, key actors felt that the police response 
with practices relating to the collection of corroborating evidence, was vital in ‘front end 
loading’ towards ‘successful’ prosecution. According to one police representative, “K 
Court is the aggressive prosecution model, where the police are specially trained to go 
beyond what they were doing previously in these matters”.156  
      An important backdrop to the establishment of the specialised court was a new police 
policy adopted because so many cases of domestic violence where being withdrawn by 
                                                 
152 Eley, supra note 146, at 116. 
153 Ibid. 
154 Ibid. 
155 See, Brown T, “Charging and Prosecution Policies in Cases of Spousal Assault: A Synthesis of Research, 
Academic, and Judicial Response”, Canada: Department of Justice Canada, (2000). 
156 Comment made by a police representative, as cited in Eley, supra note 146, at 117. 
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victims. In terms of the new police approach, the responsibility for laying charges rests 
entirely with the police, who are not even supposed to ask the victim if she wishes to press 
charges. And the police must lay charges in the case whenever there are reasonable 
grounds for believing that a violent offence has been committed.157 Once a charge is laid 
only a Crown attorney can withdraw it and only in limited circumstances. In cases where 
police officers are called, and a charge is laid, the Detective Sergeant will act as a liaison 
officer for K-Court and lead the investigation unit. In addition, K-Court also uses a 
Specialised Police Reporting Form for domestic violence cases. This form includes more 
detail than ordinary police reporting forms and was designed to guide the investigating 
officer in carefully collecting all available evidence.158 This evidence is supplemented by 
medical records, police photographs of the crime scene and the victim’s injuries, and 
statements taken from any witnesses to the crime. The investigation unit then checks for 
prior charges and a conviction history of the accused. The result of this has been that 
“more evidence has been gathered by the police, the quality of police investigations has 
improved, and case processing times have decreased significantly”.159 Whilst this aspect 
of the domestic violence court is not pertinent in the sense that we are not concerned with 
perpetrator accountability, the RDP can nevertheless learn from how the court collects 
and utilises evidence.  
        In K-Court, four full-time Crown attorneys are assigned at any one time and make 
case screening decisions for the court. Crown attorneys are all specially trained in the 
issue of domestic violence and they have chosen to specifically do this work.160 
Consequently, cases are handled from start to finish by the same prosecutor who is 
assigned to the case early in the process and offers the victim greater continuity.161 A 
                                                 
157 Hubbard, supra note 150, at 2. 
158 For example, police are required to produce tape recordings of the telephone call from the victim to the 
police where possible. They are also expected to make a video or audio tape-recording of their interview 
with the victim immediately after the incident, which could later be used as evidence in the court cases. 
159 See, Eley, supra note 146, at 118. See also, Moyer S et al, “The Evaluation of the Domestic Violence 
Courts: Their Functioning and Effects in the First Eighteen Months of Operation 1998-1999”, Ontario 
Canada: Ministry of the Attorney General, (2000). 
160 As cited in Eley, supra note 146, at 118. 
161 In fact, it has been suggested that: “They don’t do any other cases, so they have the time to properly 
prepare. They all do the assessment. They can’t meet with all the victim witnesses ahead of time and one 
Crown has carriage of the file so if there’s disclosure problems, then they’ve identified matters for 
discussion with defence ahead of time and what the outstanding issues are going to be at trial”. K-Court 
Representative as cited in Eley, supra note 146, at 118. 
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similar approach within the RDP would arguably, minimize intimidation and reassure 
FGM claimants that they are in a safe environment where they can speak freely. Such 
continuity increases the quality of the prosecutions, increases the likelihood that a victim 
will cooperate with the prosecution and improves service to the victims”.162 Confined 
within specialist courts, domestic violence cases are seen as higher status and of top 
priority requiring skilled legal advocates. 
     K-Court is also renowned for its victim/witness assistance programme.163 The VWAP 
is funded to provide support to victims of crime, by the Ministry of the Attorney General 
and is separate and independent of the prosecutor’s office. As one worker at the VWAP 
expressed “as far as we are concerned we are crisis intervention around the court 
process”.164 Research suggests that victims are most receptive to guidance about risk 
management immediately or soon after the crime.165 Accordingly, to prevent withdrawal 
of the case at the prosecution stage and to make the victim as comfortable as possible, the 
victim is contacted by the VWAP and encouraged to come in for an interview where they 
will be given a friendly orientation to the court and the criminal justice system and referred 
to appropriate community agencies or services if they so wish.166 Their goal is to build a 
strong relationship with the victim, and address their needs. According to Alderson-Gill, 
the VWAP can also contribute to the successful prosecution of cases by providing 
complainants with sufficient support so that they may be prepared to testify at trial, where 
they might not otherwise have been.167 As previously discussed, the use of advocates 
                                                 
162 Dawson M & Dinovitzer R, “Victim cooperation and the prosecution of domestic violence in a 
specialized court”, 18 Justice Quarterly 593, (2001), at 603. 
163 Hereafter referred to as the VWAP. 
164 VWAP worker as cited in Eley, supra note 146, at 119.  
165 See, Friedman L.N. & Tucker S.B., “Violence Prevention through Victim Assistance: Helping People 
Escape the Web of Violence” in Davis et al, “Victims of Crime”, (2nd ED), Sage: Thousand Oaks, California, 
(1997). 
166 VWAP worker as cited in Eley, supra note 146, at 120 (noting “We contact our clients whom we know 
are going to be testifying and try and get a hold of them really early…..and connect up with them and talk 
to them about what kind of ongoing needs are going to be in order to kind of go through this 
system…basically it’s giving general information. We also do safety planning with women, draw up safety 
plans for them and we assess what their immediate needs are, if they need counselling, if they need their 
own lawyer if they have family court issues that they are worried about – custody and access, their property 
rights, we will certainly give them a referral, we also write letters on their behalf to housing so that they can 
get a priority move into a safe place, help them out with social assistance if they need that”). Ibid. See also, 
Hubbard, supra note 150, at 2.  
167 See, Alderson-Gill & Associates Consulting Inc, “Domestic Assault Court Projects Old City Hall and 
North York, Evaluation Report”, Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney General of Ontario, (1998), at 9. As in 
the case of the plea court, an offender who is found guilty can be sent to a 16-week perpetrator intervention 
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within the RDP would help FGM claimants access the resources they need to ensure that 
their claims are heard in a confidential and sensitive manner. They can also signpost to 




Domestic Violence Courts have emerged in three Saskatchewan cities: the Battlefords 
Domestic Violence Treatment Options Court in North Battleford, the Saskatoon Domestic 
Violence Court and the Regina Domestic Violence Court in Saskatoon.168 Generally the 
goals of the courts are to: increase safety for victims of domestic violence and decrease 
violent behaviour by their partners; provide support for victims and programming for 
children who witness domestic violence; increase compliance with treatment and 
rehabilitation programmes; increase alternatives to incarceration, particularly for 
Aboriginal people; develop partnerships with treatment, social service and community 
agencies to address the underlying causes of criminal behaviour; and, reduce 
recidivism.169  
     The Battlefords Court established in April 2003, is a sentencing court.  It provides 
intensive support and services for victims and their families and supports offender’s 
participation in violence prevention programming. Auxiliary to the Court are community-
based programmes for children who witness domestic violence and support programmes 
for female victims of violence. A Steering Committee made up of representatives from 
government departments and community-based organizations meets regularly to provide 
advice and discuss issues.  
                                                 
programme as one component of the sentence. However, domestic violence is treated as a serious offence 
in this court. This fact is part of what makes the system work. Offenders must know that a string of domestic 
violence offences will land them in increasingly serious trouble. In this way, society sends out a message 
that domestic violence and abuse will simply not be tolerated. See, Hubbard, supra note 150, at 3. See also, 
Eley, supra note 146, at 120-21 (discussing probation and parole services in relation to K-Court). 
168 For an overview of the Saskatchewan Domestic Violence Courts please refer to the courts website at 
http://www.sasklawcourts.ca/home/provincial-court/adult-criminal-court/domestic-court 
(last accessed 30/6/17). 
169 See, Johnson H, “Measuring Violence Against Women: Statistical Trends 2006”. Statistics Canada: 
Ottawa, (2006), at 47. This report is available online at http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/85-570-x/85-570-
x2006001-eng.pdf (last accessed 29/7/17). 
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     Throughout the court case dedicated legal aid and aboriginal court workers and crown 
counsel are available in court for victims.170 Furthermore, victims are referred to Victim 
Services by the court and Victim Services in turn prepares the victim for the risk 
assessment interview with a representative from the probation services. Preparation for 
victims is of the uttermost importance, as it makes the process less daunting and prepares 
them for the unexpected. FGM claimants, as discussed in Chapter Three, who in an 
unaccustomed environment, faced with cultural, societal and linguistic barriers, would 
benefit from the use of assistance and preparation for determination hearings. Legal 
representatives may not have the time to do this, so the use of victim’s advocates is of 
vital importance in this respect. Many FGM victims have a fear of authorities171 and for 
many being questioned by a male in respects of FGM will be an extremely daunting 
task.172 Only through preparation, guidance and reassurances of safety and confidentially 
will FGM claimants be as prepared as they can be for the process ahead. 
    Victim Services is funded by the Department of Justice from victim surcharges imposed 
by the court on all perpetrators. Contact information for the service is provided to victims 
by investigating officers. As Victim Services operates out of the RCMP detachment 
building in North Battleford it is “assessable at the time the victim attends to complete his 
or her statement”.173 Representatives from Victim Services provide safety planning, crisis 
intervention, support and court assistance to victims. Moreover the victim may be assisted 
with an application for an Emergency Intervention Order, or referred to appropriate 
agencies offering shelter and counselling services.174 Of particular importance is the fact 
that with the permission of the victim, Victim Services maintains regular contact with the 
victim, “regarding file updates; assists with the completion of a victim impact statement; 
                                                 
170 Meekma V, “Partnership Between Court and Community: The North Battleford Domestic Violence 
Treatment Option Court” (2006), at 5. This document is available online at 
http://www.erabc.ca/vm_partnership.pdf (last accessed14/9/09).  
171 See for instance, INS Gender Guidelines, supra note 49, at 4. 
172 See, INS Gender Guidelines, supra note 49, at 5. See also, UK Gender Guidelines, supra note 49, section 
5.30 & 5.31. The UK Asylum Policy Instruction: Gender Issues in the Asylum Claim, whilst acknowledging 
that, “Victims of sexual abuse may not feel comfortable recounting their experiences in front of relatives”, 
do not explicitly acknowledge that such victims may equally be inhibited about disclosing details of a sexual 
nature to men or male interpreters. Asylum Policy Instruction: Gender Issues in the Asylum Claim, supra 
note 49, at 12. 




accompanies the victim to court; and will represent the victim in court and at the working 
committee meetings”.175 Yet again, such an approach within the RDP would be 
advantageous as it fosters a sense continuity, support and ensures that claimants are 
assured of having their voices heard. For FGM claimants this is important as they need to 
feel confident in disclosing sensitive information which decision-makers will base their 
determinations on. 
      The Saskatoon Domestic Violence Court is a trial court which deals with domestic 
violence matters set for sentencing as well as those set for trial or preliminary 
hearing.  Community components that support the Court include a victim case worker 
who provides services to all victims of offences and offender treatment programmes.  A 
Steering Committee, like that used in the Battleford Court meets three times a year in an 
oversight role. In conjunction, the Battleford and Saskatoon Domestic Violence Court 
bring together social service agencies, the criminal justice system, and community 
agencies to provide an immediate, seamless and effective response.176 A critical 
component of the Saskatoon Domestic Violence Court, like the Battleford Court, is the 
intensive support provided to victims and families through the police-based victim’s 
services programmes. There are approximately seventeen victim’s services programmes 
and six Aboriginal Resource Officer programmes serving 15,000 victims annually in 
Saskatoon. Through an Aboriginal Family Violence Initiative, funding is also provided to 
eight community-based programmes that assist urban Aboriginal families.177  
      The commitment of Saskatoon to addressing domestic violence is further evident 
through the establishment of the Regina Domestic Violence Court. The Regina Court 
began sitting in March 2008. It strives to increase the safety of victims and provides 
services including referrals to counselling, crisis intervention, ongoing information about 
the case, and the opportunity for the victim to participate in the decisions affecting the 
perpetrator.178 Domestic violence court case-workers also play a critical role in the Regina 
                                                 
175 Ibid. 
176 See, Response of the Government of Canada to the questionnaire on violence against women, 2008, 
supra note 135.  
177 Ibid. 
178 Ministry of Justice and Attorney General, “Saskatchewan: Fact Sheet Regina Domestic Violence Court”, 
(2008), at 1, available online at 
http://www.gov.sk.ca/adx/aspx/adxGetMedia.aspx?mediaId=448&PN=Shared (last accessed 
 29/7/17).  
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Court process “by ensuring that each victim is supported by the same case-worker from 
the time of first contact with the legal system to the complete resolution of the case”.179 
All cases appearing before the court are reviewed by a working group consisting of 
representatives from Public Prosecutions, the defense bar, probation services and other 
agencies providing treatment programmes and victim services. The working group then 
recommends a course of action for each case before the court.180 Approximately twenty-
five partners181 have worked together to develop an appropriate model to meet Regina's 
needs. With extensive funding allocated to the courts182 for the provision of specialised 
court staff and Aboriginal court workers among other things, this assurance highlights not 
only the commitment to combat domestic violence, but more importantly for the purposes 
of this thesis, shows the commitment of the Saskatoon Government to make the process 
more accommodating for victims. Like their US counterparts, the Canadian domestic 
violence courts demonstrate that a strong system of services and supports to empower 
victims is a foundational component of societal response to domestic violence and its 
treatment within the court system.183 
 
C. UK 
                                                 
179 Ibid. 
180 The following options are presented to the accused: (1) enter a not guilty plea and have the case set for 
trial in another court; (2) enter a guilty plea and receive a sentence; (3) enter a guilty plea and, if further 
suitability criteria is met through assessment at probation services, participate in the domestic violence court 
treatment option; those deemed not suitable for the treatment option will be sentenced in the regular way. 
Ibid. 
181 These partners include: The Provincial Court, the Ministries of Justice and Attorney General, 
Corrections, Public Safety and Policing, and Health, the Regina Qu'Appelle Health Region, Regina Police 
Service, RCMP, defence bar, victim's services, Aboriginal groups and community-based organizations. 
182 For instance, in the 2008/9 budget, the Government of Saskatchewan provided $430,000 to support the 
implementation of the Regina Domestic Violence Court and the existing courts in North Battleford and 
Saskatoon. This funding provided dedicated Legal Aid and Crown counsel positions for the Regina Court 
and ensured that court staff and Aboriginal court workers were also available. In addition, it funded a co-
ordinator to assist the work of all three courts. Additional funding to support the Regina Domestic Violence 
Court was provided by Justice Canada's Victims Fund, Regina United Way and the Ministries of Health 
and Corrections, Public Safety and Policing. See, Cook C, “Domestic Violence Court Opens in Regina” 
(2008), available online at http://www.gov.sk.ca/news?newsId=93f36771-ef37-4ded-9c08-e193220e6353 
(last accessed 29/7/17). 
183 Augusta-Scott T, Scott K & Tutty L, “Innovations in Interventions to Address Intimate Partner Violence: 
Research and Practice”, Routledge: London, (2017), at xvi. 
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With as many as one in ten women being the victims of domestic violence annually,184 
domestic violence courts are a pivotal tool in increasing the victim’s sense of security and 
safety. Successive UK governments from 2005 to present day, have established and 
supported specialist domestic violence courts in England and Wales.185 Inspired by the 
development of domestic violence courts in the US186 and elsewhere,187 an SDVC 
programme was established in 2005188 based on eleven core components in England and 
Wales. SDVCs set out to increase the number and speed of convictions of domestic 
violence, and to increase victim satisfaction and their feelings of safety. By December 
2013, there were 138 officially accredited SDVCs189 across the country, (with other courts 
operating SDVC-like processes but without official accreditation).190 These courts, like 
their American and Canadian counterparts, represent a partnership approach to domestic 
violence by the police, prosecutors, court staff, the probation service and specialist support 
services for victims. Magistrates sitting in these courts are fully aware of this approach 
and have received additional training. These court systems provide a specialised way of 
dealing with domestic violence cases in magistrates' courts. They refer to the approach of 
an entire system, rather than simply a court building or jurisdiction. Agencies work 
together to identify, track and risk assess domestic violence cases, support victims and 
share information so that offenders are brought to justice. The following discussion 
highlights these innovative court responses to the continuing problem of domestic 
violence in the UK. It should be noted that whilst many of the courts discussed below 
                                                 
184 See, Bowen P, Qasim A, & Tetenbaum L,“Better Courts: A Snapshot of Domestic Violence Courts in 
2013”, Centre for Justice Innovation: London, (2014). This report is available online at 
http://b.3cdn.net/nefoundation/667bd380bdc5bac599_e4m6b0z7o.pdf (last accessed 29/7/17). 
185 The Specialised Domestic Violence Courts examined in this section, pertain only to those within Britain 
and not the devolved regions of Northern Ireland, Scotland or Wales. 
186 For a fuller account on the history of domestic violence courts in the US please refer to, Mazur, R. & 
Aldrich, L. “What makes a domestic violence court work? Lessons from New York”, 5 American Bar 
Association’s Judges’ Journal 42, (2003). 
187 Cook, D., Burton, M. & Robinson, A, “Enhancing “Safety and Justice”: The role of specialist domestic 
violence courts in England and Wales”, 7 British Society of Criminology 1 (2006). 
188 For further information please refer to the Crown Prosecution Service website at 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/equality/vaw/SDVC.html (last accessed 29/7/17). 
189 Ibid. 
190 See, “Better Courts: A Snapshot of Domestic Violence Courts in 2013”, supra note 184. 
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were implemented prior to 2006, they have been identified by the UK government as 
specialised domestic violence courts under the 2006 SDVC Programme.191 
 
1. Derby Dedicated Domestic Violence Court192 
The DDDVC is the newest of the three UK courts being examined in this section. Derby 
City Partnership193 in conjunction with the Crown Prosecution Service,194 Police and 
Magistrates’ Courts agreed to trial the introduction of a dedicated domestic violence court 
for twelve weeks in 2003. Due to its success, it became a permanent fixture. Its primary 
objectives were, firstly the need for speed in bringing cases to court. Secondly it intended 
to bring together those agencies whose combined weight were influential in securing the 
safety of victims and witnesses (particularly children).195 The DDDVC, effectively aimed, 
to provide an increased level of support to victims to address the issue of victims 
withdrawing from the criminal justice system.196  
     The court is supported by a partnership of the courts, the CPS, the Domestic and Sexual 
Violence Strategy Group and several voluntary sector groups. The Domestic and Sexual 
Violence Strategy Group co-ordinates delivery of support services across Derbyshire. It 
reports to the Safer Strategy Group and into the Safer and Stronger Executive Board. The 
group played a major role in setting up the SDVC, providing a forum for local agencies 
to discuss the kind of support victims should receive as part of the process.197 Derbyshire 
                                                 
191 Home Office, “Specialist Domestic Violence Courts Review 2007-08”, (2008), Annex A. This Review 
is available online at http://www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk/dv/dv018a.pdf (last accessed 28/7/17). 
192 Hereafter referred to as the DDDVC. 
193 The Derby City Partnership comprises of statutory and voluntary agencies, L.A., Probation Service, 
Social Services etc. 
194 Hereafter referred to as the CPS. 
195 Cook et al, “Evaluation of Specialist Domestic Violence Courts/Fast Track Systems” Crown Prosecution 
Service, (2004), at 59, available online at https://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/docs/specialistdvcourts.pdf 
(last accessed 29/7/17). 
196 See, Crown Prosecution Service, “Derbyshire Annual Report 2003-2004”, (2004), at 8 (discussing the 
Derby Domestic Violence Court). This report is available online at 





Criminal Justice Board198 similarly plays a key role in supporting the DDDVC.199  It 
provides strategic guidance to the DDDVC through performance monitoring and 
coordinating review meetings. Such review meetings provide an opportunity for those 
involved with the court to discuss ideas and any matters arising.200 This approach 
highlights the extent to which a coordinated multiagency response to domestic violence 
is preferable to the traditional handling of such cases. Like its American and Canadian 
counterparts, the DDDVC has also utilised an integrated community approach that 
comprises support and advocacy services for victims. In fact, Neil Hoodless, CPS 
Prosecutor, and domestic violence coordinator has stated that supporting victims of 
domestic violence is a priority within the criminal justice system in Derbyshire.201 He has 
argued that the establishment of a specialised court highlights that domestic violence is 
being taken extremely seriously by all interested parties.202 Whilst a number of possible 
elements have been identified which may potentially aid and improve the determination 
of FGM and other gender-based claims within the RDP, the words of Neil Hoodless ring 
true. Whilst specialised courts are a good approach to addressing complex cases and a 
coordinated response has been effective, unless decision-makers are adequately trained 
and committed to addressing such cases and supporting claimants, then the system will 
remain weak. As such, as the specialised domestic violence courts have shown, training, 
specialization and qualified decision-makers, advocates and associated personnel are 
required to ensure effective adjudication.   
    The core principles of the DDDVC include providing: (1) access to support for victim’s 
in particular providing a ‘go-between’ between the courts, police and CPS; (2) the co-
ordination of partner agencies; (3) a victim and child friendly court; (4) specialist 
                                                 
198 Hereafter referred to as the DCJB. 
199 Its membership is extensive and consists of the following key players: Derbyshire Constabulary, 
Derbyshire CPS, Her Majesty’s Court Service, Her Majesty’s Prison Service, Derbyshire Probation Area, 
and Derby Community Safety Partnership. The Legal Services Commission and Victim Support are also 
members of the Board. 
200See, Cook et al, supra note 195. 
201 The comments of Neil Hoodles, CPS Prosecutor, and domestic violence coordinator are available online 
via the Crown Prosecution Service Derbyshire website at 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/derbyshire/cps_derbyshire_news/press_releases/success_of_domestic_violence_co




personnel, including CPS prosecutors, legal advisors and magistrates who have all been 
trained in domestic violence awareness and procedures.203 These principles are reflected 
not only in the process itself but also in the layout of the actual court. The DDDVC which 
runs from the Southern Derbyshire Magistrates Court is centrally located so as to facilitate 
easy access to the court. Whilst there are no separate entrances for victims and 
perpetrators, security at the entrance to the court is provided by staff with body scanners. 
Furthermore, the Southern Derbyshire Magistrates’ Court has provision for special 
measures, including TV and video-link equipment and screens, as well as a separate 
waiting area (with secured entry) for victims and witnesses who do not wish to have 
contact with the perpetrator. Victims can also choose to enter and exit the court via a rear 
entrance to avoid contact with the perpetrator if they so wish.204 
      The Magistrates’ Court deals only with pre-trial hearings, including bail variations, 
pleas, pre-trial reviews, pre-sentencing reports, and sentencing. All cases falling within 
the agreed CPS definition of domestic violence will be charged and bailed to the domestic 
violence court. Derby runs one court for a half day a week, usually on a Wednesday and 
during this time there are normally about 15 to 18 cases heard.205 Some cases fall outside 
the DDDVC, for instance, those not processed within the time constraint. However, if 
such a case is adjourned they will re-enter the specialist court at the next hearing.206 
     According to Cook et al, the DDDVC court set-up “reflects a multi-agency, partnership 
approach”.207 Several agencies attend at court. The police domestic violence officer 
attends so as to provide up-to-date information on the case at hand or to answer any 
queries which the court may have. An independent domestic violence advisor is also 
available to take details of adjournments and changes in pleas and bail conditions, in order 
to communicate the information back to the victim as quickly as possible. This advisor 
also assists victims who attend court at any of the pre-trial hearings. Similar initiatives 
would aid FGM claimants, firstly by keeping them informed of what decision-makers 
have decided and helping them begin the appeals procedure if need be; and secondly, the 
                                                 
203 See, Cook et al, supra note 195. 
204 Ibid. 





attendance of experts and trained researchers can further help to provide up-to-date 
information on presented evidence and answer any questions which decision-makers may 
have in respects of the evidence presented. Furthermore, within the domestic violence 
court a representative from the probation services and from the housing department should 
also be present in court.208 The CPS prosecutor is a specialist in domestic violence and 
magistrates sitting in the court have also received additional training on domestic 
violence. Since its inception the DDDVC has witnessed an increase in the effectiveness 
of court and support services for victims of domestic violence, greater accountability of 
perpetrators, improved risk management of victims and children, and improved victim 
participation and satisfaction.209 
 
2. Leeds Domestic Violence Cluster Court210 
 
The longest-established of the specialised domestic violence courts in Britain, the 
LDVCC has been in operation since 1999. It was also the first court to adopt the cluster 
model in England and Wales. Within the LDVCC, there are three courtrooms in operation 
which house domestic violence hearings. Provisions are also available for the use of 
special measures. The Leeds court is magistrates only and deals with only pre-trial 
hearings, including pleas, bail variations, pre-sentence reports, sentencing and pre-trial 
reviews.211 Accordingly, the court does not deal with trials. Like the DDDVC, all cases 
falling within the agreed definition of domestic violence will be charged and bailed to the 
LDVCC. 
    The aims of the LDVCC are: (1) to increase the effectiveness of court systems in 
providing protection and support to women and appropriate sanctions to perpetrators; and 
(2) to increase the coordination of professional bodies involved in processing 
perpetrators.212 Thus, its objectives are to: (1) develop and coordinate a domestic violence 
court; (2) identify methods to monitor cases and outcomes; (3) rationalise training for 
                                                 
208 Ibid.  
209 Ibid. 
210 Hereafter referred to as the LDVCC. 
211 Cook et al, supra note 195, at 60. 
212 Ibid, at 53. 
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involved professionals; (4) promote the schemes with government offices and other 
potential funders; and finally (5) develop a set of principles for the scheme which clearly 
address women’s safety and hold perpetrators accountable.213  
      Like the courts previously discussed, a multi-agency partnership approach has been 
adopted in developing this court.214 Specifically, advocacy support is provided for victims 
by HALT and a representative of this body and a specially trained domestic violence 
police officer is always available at the Court(s).215 CPS prosecutors and a designated 
case-worker prosecute the hearings and agents carry out the trials.  
     A Steering Group which comprises of representatives from HALT, the CPS, police, 
witness services, probation services, the court and Leeds Inter-Agency Partnership, meets 
monthly to review any matters arising from the LDVCC.216 Furthermore, HALT monitors 
its own project, which is not primarily focused on the court but rather on the services it 
provides to victims of domestic violence.217 HALT is a pioneering and innovative charity, 
working with women to reduce further risk of abuse and improve their safety. The work 
of HALT in the LDVCC is exceptional, offering legal advice, support and advocacy to 
victims of domestic and sexual violence. HALT case-workers, offer independent support 
around domestic and sexual abuse. These case-workers become the primary point of 
contact for victims who have reported a domestic violence incident to the police, and 
where a court case may happen.218 Case-workers work with victims to assess the level of 
risk which they may face and in turn discuss suitable options and develop a joint safety 
plan.219 In sum, HALT works with victims to address their immediate safety and takes 
practical steps to help victims protect themselves and their children. HALT case-workers 
also look at longer term solutions such as housing options and remedies available from 
                                                 
213 Ibid. 
214 Partners involved with the court include: the police, CPS, the Help Advice and the Law Team (HALT), 
and the Magistrates Court Service, particularly instigated and driven at first and with strong support from 
Leeds Inter-Agency Partnership and HALT. See, Cook et al, supra note 195, at 60. 
215 Ibid. Though these representatives cannot be in the three courts at once, they are always in the building. 
This was a problem addressed at the multi-agency monthly meeting, where a solution was proposed – that 
ushers be notified of the location of these representatives, so that if they were needed in a particular court, 
everyone would know where to find them. 
216 Ibid. 
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the criminal and criminal courts.220 More importantly, HALT case-workers also prepare 
victims for their day in court. They will: (1) attend court hearings or other appointments 
as appropriate with victims; (2) provide support before, during and after court hearings; 
(3) organise a look around an empty court room prior to the case being heard in court; (4) 
explain the terminology and procedures of the court which is very often uncommon to 
most victims; and (5) introduce victims to relevant key personnel and explain their 
roles.221 
       According to Cook et al, key informants believe that the establishment of the LDVCC 
has improved the recognition of the seriousness of domestic violence.222 They further 
argue that the LDVCC has also identified training needs for all members involved in its 
operation and consequently this has significantly improved the level of information flow 
through different agencies.223 Not only has the processing of domestic violence cases been 
speeded up by the introduction of the LDVCC, but the proactive partnership of all those 
involved with the court means that the needs and concerns of victims, in addition to 
holding perpetrators accountable, are given immediate legal advice, support and advocacy 
options.  
    Like the approach adopted in this and others, the complexity of FGM also requires a 
gendered partnership approach within the RDP. Decision-makers, agencies, legal 
representatives and other interested parties, need to work together to determine refugee 
status in a robust system of services which is gender-sensitive, promotes the sharing of 
information and supports claimants.  
 
3. West London Specialised Domestic Violence Court224 
 
The WLSDVC which began operation in October 2002 aims to increase the effectiveness 
of the judicial system by: (1) providing protection and support to victims and witnesses 
of domestic violence; (2) providing appropriate sanctions to perpetrators; (3) reducing 
                                                 
220 Ibid. 
221 Ibid.  
222 Cook et al, supra note 195, at 61. 
223 Ibid. 
224 Hereafter referred to as the WLSDVC. 
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delay through effective case management; (4) to further increase coordination of agencies, 
including the Crown Court, involved in supporting victims and witnesses and dealing with 
perpetrators; (5) to explore the potential for linking civil courts into the criminal justice 
process at WLMC; (6) reduce repeat victimisation; (7) increase charging; and (8) increase 
the number of perpetrators sent to violence prevention programmes.225 
       The court is co-ordinated by Standing Together against domestic violence multi-
agency partnership. The court is the first specialised domestic violence court in Britain 
and Wales to hear pre-trial reports and trials.226 Significantly, the court has established a 
written protocol, a component of best practice in developing a specialised domestic 
violence court.227 It aims to increase the effectiveness of the judicial system in providing 
protection and support to victims and witnesses of domestic violence and appropriate 
sanctions to perpetrators and by reducing delay through effective case management. 
Secondly, it aims to increase co-ordination of agencies, including the Crown Court, 
involved in supporting victims and witnesses and dealing with perpetrators. Thirdly, it 
aims to explore the potential for linking civil courts into the criminal justice process at the 
West London Magistrates Court.228 
      Several key features underpin the successful workings and arrangements of the 
WLSDVC. A key strength of the court stems from the commitment of Hammersmith and 
Fulham police to ensure the attendance of a community safety unit officer at court. This 
is further strengthened with the agreement of the Kensington and Chelsea police to 
provide an officer who will attend bail hearings and trials as well as deal with matters 
over the telephone.229 In a similar vein to the other domestic violence courts discussed 
throughout this chapter, the WLSDVC also provides advocacy support for domestic 
violence victims. The court has secured a commitment from ADVANCE Advocates and 
Eaves Women’s Aid to attend the court to offer support to victims/witnesses and to collect 
results in their relevant cases.230 Both ADVANCE and Eaves take referrals from the 
                                                 
225 Cook et al, supra note 195, at 53-4. 
226 Ibid, at 62. 
227 Ibid. 
228 Ibid. 
229 Cook et al, supra note 195, at 62. 
230 Ibid, at 63. It should also be noted that a pre-court support/information gathering role is also played by 
Kensington and Chelsea Victim Support. While they can attend the court in exceptional circumstances, the 
normal procedure is to refer to Witness Services (Hereafter referred to as the WS). Ibid. 
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police, on a consent basis, and both offer pre-court support to victims, including pre-court 
visits if requested by victims.231 More importantly, these two bodies also act as a “conduit 
of information between the victim/witness and the police, for example passing details of 
civil orders to the police and informing them of any harassment of the witness”.232 In 
addition to the support provided by both ADVANCE and Eaves, the WS at the WLSDVC 
is also committed to providing support to all witnesses and can provide pre-court 
orientations. The WS also meets victim/witnesses when they attend court and by prior 
arrangement, to arrange separate entrances. Additional services include keeping the police 
and victim advocates informed of any changes in bail conditions and informing interested 
parties of the outcomes of completed cases.233 
     As a co-ordinated response and to ensure that all those involved with the court are 
aware of the complexities of domestic violence, the police, ADVANCE and the CPS train 
all agencies involved together. Consequently, the WLSDVC ensures that district judges, 
magistrates, legal advisers and other court staff have received domestic violence training. 
In order to maintain cohesiveness, the CPS also assigns appropriately trained and 
experienced prosecutors in domestic violence cases to the court.234 
        According to Cook et al another significant feature of the West London Court is the 
arrangement that they have with the Inner London and City Family Proceedings Court to 
obtain information concerning civil orders.235 A running log of civil orders is maintained 
and available in the court for cross checking against defendants who appear in the 
WLSDVC.236 Such agreement and co-operation is imperative as this network of 
information ensures that judges are fully aware of the situation as quickly as possible, thus 
ensuring a rapid response and more stringent enforcement of sanctions. 
 
4. Perpetrator Programmes and Pilot on Forced Marriage and so-called Honour 
Crimes 
 
                                                 








As well as providing support to victims and challenging domestic violence, like their 
American and Canadian counterparts, the UK specialist domestic violence courts/ 
programmes, also seek to hold perpetrators accountable and address the behaviour of 
offending. The Sentencing Guidelines Council issued principles for domestic violence 
cases in 2006. These guidelines make clear that offences committed in a domestic context 
should not be regarded as less serious than offences committed in a non-domestic 
context.237 In addition to the imposition of fines and custodial and community 
sentences,238 referrals and participation programmes are also commonly used.239 These 
programmes highlight the therapeutic underpinnings of these courts. 
     In addition to perpetrator programmes another innovative development within the UK 
context concerns the use of programmes to address unique cases of domestic violence. In 
2007-8, the CPS ran four pilots in London, Lancashire, West Yorkshire and the West 
Midlands, to identify and monitor forced marriages and so-called Honour cases for the 
first time.240 Specialist prosecutors, who were selected, trained and given guidance, led 
on the prosecution of cases.241 They also provided advice about these cases and shared 
best practice with colleagues.242 According to the National Delivery Plan, the pilot which 
concluded in March 2008 determined that the specific needs of such victims and witnesses 
                                                 
237 Sentencing Guidelines Council, “Overarching Principles: Domestic Violence- Definitive Guideline”, 
(2006), Foreword. This document is available online at 
https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/web_domestic_violence.pdf (last accessed 
25/6/17). 
238 See generally, Cook et al, supra note 195, at 78-80.  
239 See, HMCS, “Domestic Violence: A Guide to Civil Remedies and Criminal Sanctions” (2007), at 29. 
This guide is available online at 
https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/JCO/Documents/FJC/domestic-violence-guide-
march07.pdf (last accessed 29/7/17). During the beginning of 2006/07, all accredited Domestic Abuse 
Perpetrator Programmes within the Criminal Justice System satisfied the Correctional Services 
Accreditation Panel (CSAP) quality standards and for the first time, targets were set by the National 
Offender Management Service (NOMS) for programme completions. Ibid. 
240 See, HM Government, “National Domestic Violence Delivery Plan: Annual Progress Report 2008-09”, 
Home Office, (2009), at 25. This report is available online at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100408132345/http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/do
m-violence-delivery-plan-08-092835.pdf?view=Binary (last accessed 17/6/17). 
241 Ibid. 
242 For a complete review of the recommendation made please see,  Crown Prosecution Service, “CPS Pilot 
on Forced Marriage and so-called ‘Honor’ Crime Findings”, (2008), available online at 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/docs/findings_from_cps_pilot_on_forced_marriage.pdf (last accessed 
26/6/17). See also, Crown Prosecution Service, “Recommendations on Future Work on Forced Marriage 
and so-called ‘Honor’ Crime”, (2008), available online at 
https://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/docs/forced_marriage_and_honour_crime_recommendations.pdf 
(last accessed 26/6/17). 
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needs to be addressed. It was also recommended that specific actions, including the 
importance of correctly identifying and flagging these cases and the training of selected 
prosecutors within the CPS, needs to be taken. These recommendations it was hoped 
would be in operation before 2010. 243 However, there has been no consistent approach 
and it was not until 2016, that any real materialisation of those recommendations 
happened.  In December 2016, the CPS and the police published the first ever joint 
honour-based violence/abuse and forced marriage protocol244 outlining their commitment 
to the successful investigation and prosecution of these crimes. The protocol recognises 
the importance of strong partnership working between these two agencies. The protocol 
highlights the unique complexities of these cases and the barriers victims face in coming 
forward to report.  For example, the potential that these crimes may not only be committed 
by family members but also by those who are part of the wider community.  Rather than 
families and communities protecting the victim, they will often protect the 
perpetrator.  The protocol emphasises the importance for multiagency working and 
engagement with specialist third sector organisations. The CPS has led the development 
of this protocol, as part of a wider commitment to improve performance in this area. The 
protocol enables police and prosecutors to quickly understand the action they must take 
when a crime is reported to the police and referred to the CPS for a charging decision, 
ensuring the safety of the victim is at the heart of the process.  
      These innovative pilots and subsequent outcomes support the objectives of the thesis 
in calling for the reform of the RDP and reaffirm my conviction that like domestic 
violence, acts of violence, particularly those committed by and within minority 
communities within the UK cannot be categorised as ‘cultural’ or legitimate. This 
expansive and protectionist approach has been reaffirmed with the introduction of The 
Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act 2007.245 The aim of that Act is to provide civil 
remedies for those faced with forced marriage and victims of forced marriage. Under the 
                                                 
243 See, “National Domestic Violence Delivery Plan: Annual Progress Report 2008-09”, supra note 240, at 
25-6. 
244 For a complete overview of the Protocol see, Crown Prosecution Service, “Protocol on the Handling of 
‘so-called’ Honour Based Violence/Abuse and Forced Marriage Offences between the National Police 
Chief’s Council and the Crown Prosecution Service”, (2016). This document is available online at 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/agencies/index.html (last accessed 1/7/17). 
245 Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act 2007. This Act can be accessed online at 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2007/pdf/ukpga_20070020_en.pdf (last accessed 7/7/17).  
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Act, victims may apply to the court for a Forced Marriage Protection Order (FMPO). A 
relevant third party, such as a local authority, may also apply on behalf of the victim for 
an FMPO. Breach of an order is treated as a contempt of court.246 On 16th June 2014, the 
Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 came into force criminalizing forced 
marriage.247 This makes forced marriage and the breach of a Forced Marriage Protection 
Order criminal offences. This legislation sends a clear message that forced marriage will 
not be tolerated and perpetrators will be held accountable. This supports the thesis position 
that culturally recognized practices, including FGM, do not lose their criminal label just 
because some people demand that they be labelled as such. 
     Consequently, harmful cultural practices and traditions, such as forced marriage can 
now also be classified as forms of domestic violence, which the UK government is now 
recognising and addressing. Similar, specialised projects now need to be implemented 
within the refugee determination system so as to ensure that those women and young girls 
fleeing FGM (who are deemed to be credible and who meet the requirements of refugee 
status) are adequately protected, and not rejected on account of the practices’ cultural and 
religious underpinnings. 
      All of the model domestic violence courts examined throughout this chapter “reflect 
a growing trend toward greater recognition of the seriousness of domestic violence, and 
seek to increase the resources and programmes available to address this issue”.248 Positive 
lessons can be learnt from the establishment of these courts, particularly the innovative 
pilot programmes established in the UK to address unique cases of domestic violence. 
Such innovative trends reveal a greater integration of services within the legal system, 
from the earlier programmes which focused entirely on law enforcement and prosecutorial 
policies, to the more recent programmes which also incorporate additional services for 
perpetrators and more importantly for children and victims.249 Aside from the basic legal 
claims in a complex domestic violence case, issues of victim support and advocacy, 
                                                 
246 Gay O, “Forced Marriage – Consultation Paper”, House of Commons: Home Affairs Section, (2015), 
at 1. This document is available online at 
http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN01003/SN01003.pdf (last accessed 6/7/17). 
247 See, Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, 2014 c. 12. This Act can be accessed online 
at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2014/12/contents (last accessed 6/7/17). 




perpetrator accountability and monitoring, and the mental health concerns of all parties 
involved are emerging as important considerations.250 The incorporation of several of 
these elements within the RDP can help to establish a fair, open and gender-sensitive 
process for FGM claimants. Reform, as will be discussed in the next chapter will help to 





Over the past decade, hundreds of additional experimental courts have emerged, all testing 
innovative solutions to complex issues such as domestic violence. While each of these 
initiatives targets a different problem, they all use the authority of courts in innovative 
ways to improve outcomes for victims, communities and defendants. And in the process, 
they all seek to shift the focus of courts from simply processing cases to achieving tangible 
results such as victim support and advocacy. These innovations, as elaborated upon 
throughout this chapter, challenge the nature of courts and represent something of a 
revolution in the way in which courts and legal forums operate in modern, democratic 
societies, particularly in respect of affording protection to women, from all backgrounds 
and cultures. These courts are examples of legal institutions working in partnership with 
other agencies, both inside and outside of the conventional justice fields, to produce more 
favourable outcomes. Arguably, a strong system of services and support to empower 
victims is a foundational component of societal response to domestic violence. To 
effectively implement reform within the RDP a coordinated gendered system which 
responds to the absence of a gendered lens and the exclusion of women’s needs is needed. 
Interagency, co-ordinated approaches to safeguarding and promoting the rights of women 
are positive. A prime example being the 2015 Gender Principles for Dealing with the 
Legacy of the Past.251 These guidelines, which were developed by Dr Catherine O’Rourke 
                                                 
250 Ibid. 
251 For an overview of the Guidelines and their development, see, Schulz P & O’Rourke C, “Workshops 
Report: Developing Gender Principles For Dealing with the Legacy of the Past”, Legacy Gender 
Integration Group: Belfast, (2015). This report is available online at 
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from Ulster University and her colleagues within the Legacy Gender Integration Group252 
were designed to ensure that the gendered impact of the conflict and post-conflict legacy 
needs of women will be adequately addressed in processes emerging from the Stormont 
House Agreement.253 Whilst, these guidelines are not directly relevant to the thesis, the 
manner in which they have been developed is of central importance. They highlight that 
a co-ordinated response to a problem can be the solution. This stance needs to be 
employed within the RDP. If the legislative improvements of the past forty years are to 
have a real and continuing impact, they need to be transposed into the RDP to convey the 
message that violence against women at all levels of the judicial system will not be 
tolerated. Thus, the existing gender-guidelines, current procedures and attitudes of 
decision-makers within the RDP process must undergo substantial self-reflection and 
corresponding reforms. Having examined the criminal justice systems shift in attitudes 
and practises towards domestic violence, a number of reforms which may be transposed 
within the RDP have been identified. These potential reforms may aid decisions-makers 
in their determinations of FGM and ensure that claimants are not discriminated against 
and unfairly denied protection due to a lack of understanding and training in respects of 
gender violence.  Arguably, as the last and quite possibly the only resort of victims seeking 
protection, it is essential that the RDP and those involved within it improve their responses 
to victims of FGM and other gender-based forms of violence. These reforms will now be 
discussed in Chapter Five. 
                                                 
https://www.ulster.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0018/74070/Legacy-Gender-Integration-
Group_Workshops-Report_Developing-Gender-Principles-for-Dealing-with-the-Legacy-of-the-Past_18-
11-2015.pdf (last accessed 27/7/17). 
252 Ibid, at 1. The Legacy Gender Integration Group, is an informal network of individuals with gender 
expertise from civil society and academia. The Legacy Gender Integration Group came together in April 









This thesis had an explicit aim to redress the inconsistent and inadequate treatment of 
gender-based claims for refugee status by decision-makers, focusing exclusively on the 
controversial cultural practice of FGM. It has revealed that a double standard exists in 
these cases. One the one hand States unselfcritically1 term FGM as ‘barbaric’, and yet on 
the other, fail to accord protection to those individuals challenging that norm and seeking 
protection. FGM, which epitomizes gender inequality, has been the subject of 
considerable critical attention since the 1970s.2 The extensive condemnation of the 
practice, like the traditional approach to domestic violence stands in stark contrast to its 
widespread prevalence today.3 FGM is increasingly entering the legal arena in the case-
studies and other States as an alleged persecutory practice grounding a claim for refugee 
status. Judicial attitudes have been characterized by overall inconsistency; some decision-
makers, mindful of the immigration risks in opening a floodgate to a large group of would 
be refugees, have refused refugee status, on occasion defending this gate-keeping 
approach in the language of cultural relativism despite the applicants’ explicit rejection of 
the custom.4 In other cases an affirmation of universal human rights norms has been 
coupled with an arrogant, even racist willingness to critique the practice and justify 
international normative reference.5  
     As the caselaw has revealed, the task of defining a just, humanitarian standard for a 
grant of refugee status in FGM cases is complex. Coupled with procedural and evidential 
barriers, in an era where States have tightened border controls, FGM claimants face great 
challenges in obtaining refugee status. The findings in the thesis have deepened the 
                                                 
1 See, Smith A, Scott A & Nash K, “New Critical Writings in Political Sociology: Globalisation and 
Contemporary Challenges to the Nation-State”, Routledge: London, (2017), Chapter 14.  
2Ibid (noting that human rights advocates and health professionals have stressed the undisputable and 
treacherous health consequences of FGM, its short and long-term painfulness as well as its place within a 






contention that the current refugee ‘lottery system’ is badly failing to meet the challenging 
claims brought by women, and that claimants are let down, both, by an extremely poor 
standard of decision-making and by a non-gendered RDP. In fact, the FGM jurisprudence 
and evidence within each of the case-studies, reveals that women are too often refused 
refugee status on grounds that are arbitrary, subjective, and demonstrate limited awareness 
of legal obligations under the Refugee Convention.6  Furthermore they reveal that existing 
gender-guidelines are either inconsistently observed or completely ignored. Ultimately, 
whilst the gender-guidelines implemented by the case-studies may have led to an 
awareness of gender issues, alone they are not enough to ensure equality in FGM refugee 
determinations. The need for a comprehensive gender policy aimed at refugee processes 
goes beyond making the guidelines binding or adding gender to existing definitions of 
persecution, or changing asylum laws. The case studies have recognised gender 
persecution but have chosen not to amend legislation, but rather to provide non-binding 
guidelines on how gender may be incorporated into the refugee grounds of persecution. 
Ultimately, by including the category of gender within its legislation and giving it legally 
binding status, States would show a real commitment towards the recognition of women’s 
rights and gender equality.7 However, in 2017 in an era of mass refugee migration, 
associated with terrorism related atrocities committed by purported refugees,8 it is 
unlikely that this status will be accomplished.  
     The central hypothesis of this thesis was that, if FGM was subject to the same 
protective processes implemented within specialised domestic violence courts, the RDP 
                                                 
6 Muggeridge H & Maman C, “Unsustainable: The Quality of Initial Decision-Making in Women’s Asylum 
Claims”, (2011), at 5. This UK report produced by Asylum Aid can be accessed via the Asylum Aid website 
at http://www.asylumaid.org.uk/data/files/unsustainableweb.pdf (last accessed 23/7/17). See also, Schrag 
P, et al, “Rejecting Refugees: Homeland Security’s Administration of the One-Year Bar to Asylum”, 52 
William and Mary Law Review 651, (2010).  
7 Valji N & De La Hunt L, “Gender Guidelines for Asylum Determination”, University of Cape Town Legal 
Aid Clinic: Rosebank, (1994), at 4. This report is available online at 
http://ccrweb.ca/sites/ccrweb.ca/files/static-files/safr.PDF (last accessed 24/7/17). 
8See, Crisp J, “Refugees: the Trojan horse of terrorism?”, (2017). This report is available online via the 
Open Democracy Website at https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/jeff-crisp/refugees-
trojan-horse-of-terrorism (last accessed 23/7/17); Scarborough R, “Islamic State Finds Success Infiltrating 
its Terrorists into Refugee Flows to West”, (2017). This article is available online via The Washington 
Times Website at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/jan/29/isis-finds-success-infiltrating-
terrorists-into-re/ (last accessed 24/7/17. See also, Mogire E, “Victims as Security Threats: Refugee Impact 




would be more inclusive and accommodating of the needs of claimants. The purpose of 
this chapter, therefore, is to offer several recommendations to potentially engender the 
RDP and make it more accommodating for FGM claimants and in tandem other victims 
of gender-based violence. These reforms could arguably play a central role in redressing 
the inconsistent and inadequate treatment of such claims by decision-makers, and ensure 
that claimants have access to a fair and accommodating decision-making process, one 
well-removed from the current ‘lottery’ system. In section I, I explain how this conclusion 
has been reached and highlight some of the best practices emanating from the domestic 
violence courts. Sections II through to VII propose several recommendations to improve 
the treatment of FGM within the RPD. To conclude, I will end with some general 
comments in respects of the need for accountability and a gendered partnership approach 
within the RDP in respects of gender-based claims for refugee status. 
 
I. A Gender-Sensitive Court or Process 
 
The RDP can be a daunting experience for anyone.9  FGM claimants face additional 
hurdles, including language and cultural barriers. Reducing trauma and making the 
process accommodating is recommended to increase the quality of testimony so that a fair 
determination can be made. Since the 1990s, specialised domestic violence courts have 
emerged. Like the innovative UK pilot programmes to address domestic violence, these 
courts typically exhibit some, or all, of the following: specialised procedures, specialised 
personnel, emphasis on specialised support services, special arrangements for victim 
safety, and problem solving or therapeutic approaches. Whilst the creation of a single 
specialised court to deal with gender-based refugee claims would help to potentially 
rectify many of the problems discussed throughout the thesis, it is impractical due to the 
asylum/immigration necessities of States. Like the complexity of domestic violence, FGM 
                                                 
9 Victims/claimants in any legal process are often unaware of what happens in court, what is expected of 
them, who participates in the process, who to talk to, where to go, when to go, why they are needed, why 
their role is an important and necessary one, how the court/hearing process operates, and how they should 
prepare. Furthermore, other factors, such as lengthy delays before and during the case, a lack of legal 
knowledge or representation, the environment of the courtroom, facing strangers, and being questioned, 




requires a gendered partnership approach within the RDP. Decision-makers, legal 
representatives and other interested parties, need to work together to determine refugee 
status in a robust system of services which is gender-sensitive, promotes the sharing of 
information and supports claimants. This approach would firstly, promote a gender 
inclusive and gender sensitive review process. Secondly, ensure that decision-makers and 
interested parties recognise the social and cultural difficulties FGM applicants face when 
making and presenting gender-related claims. Thirdly, due to the subjective nature of 
refugee determination, it is hoped that such an approach will hold decision-makers 
accountable for their determinations. The following sections, beginning with an 
examination of the decision-making panel, will highlight the best practices emanating 
from the domestic violence courts which may be transposed within the RDP to achieve 
the above objectives.10 
 
A. Constitution of the Determination Panel & Conducting the Review 
 
At the earliest opportunity the panel should be informed of any factors relating to the 
claim that would make it appropriate for a decision-maker(s) of a particular gender, 
preferably female, to conduct the review. Early identification would enable the panel to 
consider such a request at the time the matter is allocated to a decision-maker to conduct 
the review. Likewise, if an interpreter of a particular gender is requested, due 
consideration should also be given. It is essential that claimants are given information 
about the RDP, access to it, as well as legal advice, in a manner and language that she 
understands. FGM claimants face difficulty in making and presenting their claims. The 
difficulties, as is evident from the case-law, include but are not limited to: an assumption 
that female applicants’ claims are derivative of male relatives claims; a claimant may have 
difficulty in discussing her experiences of persecution because of shame or trauma; 
                                                 
10 It should be noted that most of the recommendations proffered in this chapter require resources, both 
human and financial. Unfortunately, due to word constraints and the complexity of this issue alone, it is not 
possible to examine this issue in detail. I will, however, proposed in light of my recommendations that, if a 
partnership approach is adopted, States, non-governmental organisations and other interested parties can 
create possibilities for operationalizing research and knowledge into concrete action and financial 
agreements to engender the RDP. 
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cultural differences or experience of trauma affecting a claimants ability to give testimony 
or her demeanour; the compounding effect on a claimants trauma that immigration 
detention may have; difficulties establishing the credibility of a claim; and a fear of 
rejection and/or reprisals from her family and/or community. Having detailed the 





In preparation for a hearing in a case where an FGM claim has been raised 
decision-makers should familiarise themselves with the applicable gender-guidelines and 
relevant COI that considers women’s experiences in that country. The type of information 
usually relied on may not be available in relation to gender-related claims. Consequently, 
decision-makers may need to consult alternative sources including the testimonies of 
other women similarly situated in written reports or oral testimony, of nongovernmental 
or international organisations or other independent research.11 Thorough preparation for 
a hearing will assist the decision-maker to develop a relationship of confidence and trust 
with the claimant, ask appropriate questions and deal with any issues that may arise during 
the hearing.12 Similarly, where applicable or at the request of a claimants’ representative, 
postponement of scheduled hearings should be allowed for receipt of particular 
information, including medical reports which may be relevant to the assessment of such 
a  gender-related claim. 
 
2. At the Hearing: Communication & Interpreters  
 
In all hearings, like the approach in the domestic violence courts, decision-makers should 
seek to create an informal setting, which creates an open and reassuring environment to 
                                                 
11See, UNHCR 7 May 2002, Guidelines on International Protection: Gender-Related Persecution within the 
context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, 
paragraph 37. Hereafter referred to as the UNHCR Gender Guidelines. 
12Ibid, para 36. 
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establish trust and encourage the disclosure of personal information. Claimants should 
also be made aware of the RDP process, objectives, role of those involved, and be assured 
that any disclosed information will be treated in confidence. At the hearing, claimants 
should be questioned in a culturally sensitive and respective manner which allows claims 
to be presented with minimal interruption and breaks as appropriate. Evidence should be 
given in the absence of family members and children. Applicants are routinely 
interviewed with children present, as they do not have or cannot afford childcare.13 Having 
children and other family members present at an asylum hearing is undoubtedly difficult 
and distracting and makes it difficult or impossible for women to discuss FGM and 
associated issues. Additionally, being present at the interview may traumatise the 
children. Childcare facilities need to be implemented. 
      Because of the sense of shame involved, women generally find it easier to disclose 
their experiences to other women.14 Practice by the police and victim support, through the 
domestic violence courts examined, is generally to provide female interviewers/advocates 
to victims.15 As noted above, due to the complexity of FGM and to ensure that claimants 
have access to a fair and accommodating process, appropriately trained female 
interpreters should be made available upon request.16The right to an interpreter is a key 
issue for FGM claimants and whilst the RDPs of the case-studies permit the use of 
                                                 
13 Asylum Aid, “Random Acts: Fact Sheet”, (2017), available online via the Asylum Aid Website at 
http://www.asylumaid.org.uk/random-acts-fact-sheet/ (last accessed 20/7/17). 
14Ibid. 
15Ibid. 
16 The CIRB Gender-Guidelines do not address the issue of whether or not gender-based claims should be 
conducted with all-female personnel (including interpreters), but they do state that, “In some cases it will 
be appropriate to consider whether claimants should be allowed to have the option of providing their 
testimony outside the hearing room by affidavit or by videotape, or in front of members and refugee claims 
officers specifically trained in dealing with violence against women”. See, Women Refugee Claimants 
Fearing Gender-Related Persecution - Guidelines issued by the Chairperson pursuant to section 65(3) of 
the Immigration Act, Immigration and Refugee Board, Ottawa, Canada, 9 Mar. 1993, section 5.31. 
Hereafter referred to as the CIRB Gender-Guidelines. The Guidelines are available online via the 
Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Homepage at 
http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/Eng/BoaCom/references/pol/GuiDir/Pages/GuideDir04.aspx (last accessed 
8/3/17). See also, Asylum Gender Guidelines, Immigration Appellate Authority, UK, Nov. 2000, section 
5.31 (hereafter referred to as the UK Gender Guidelines) and Considerations for Asylum Officers 
Adjudicating Asylum Claims From Women, 26 May 1995, Phyllis Coven, Office of International Affairs, 
Immigration and Naturalization Service, USA, at 5 (noting that victims may be inhibited about disclosing 
details of a sexual nature to men or male interpreters. Hereafter referred to as the INS Gender Guidelines. 
See also, Asylum Policy Instruction: Gender Issues in the Asylum Claim, Home Office, 2010, at 12 
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interpreters,17 there is a concern that services are inadequate. There is no specialised 
interpreter service for victims of gender-based violence and interpreters do not receive 
any specialised training on gender-based violence. Consequently, it is submitted that in 
order to fully represent what a victim of FGM is trying to communicate to the decision-
maker(s) and to avoid undermining her efforts to obtain protection, it is vital that an 
interpreter should understand the dynamics of FGM as well as key legal terminology. The 
gender-guidelines examined in the thesis make no reference to the training of interpreters. 
Specialised gender awareness training is required. 
    Some of the examined specialised domestic violence courts have provided training for 
potential court interpreters on the topic of domestic violence, presented by domestic 
violence advocates.18 Similar, mandated training for interpreters working with victims of 
FGM should also be provided. While the interpreter is not an advocate and should never 
attempt to play this role, training in respects of the gender-guidelines and issues pertaining 
to gender-based violence will contribute to the interpreter’s ability to communicate with 
the claimant. Such training is essential because, like decision-makers, interpreters may be 
so shocked by the words which they are asked to interpret in FGM hearings that they may 
be unable to continue. Training in advance of these hearings would help interpreters 
                                                 
17 The Canadian IRB recognizes the right for everyone to a fair hearing. Therefore, the IRB provides 
interpretation for any party who does not understand or speak any of the two official languages used in IRB 
proceedings. See, IRB, “Interpreter Handbook”, (2012), available online via the IRB website at 
http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/Eng/BoaCom/pubs/Pages/Interpret.aspx#Toc342656893(last accessed 24/7/17). 
In the UK, the Home Office will provide an interpreter at public expense whenever necessary. Interpreters 
must conduct themselves in a professional and impartial manner, and respect confidentiality at all times. 
Interviewers are responsible for the overall conduct of the interview. They must ensure that the interpreter 
behaves in accordance with, and not ask any interpreter to act outside the professional standards set out in 
the Interpreters Code of Conduct. See, Home Office, “Asylum Policy Instruction: Asylum Interviews”, Home 
Office: UK, (2015), at 25. This document is available online at  
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/410098/Asylum_Interview
s_AI.pdf (last accessed 24/7/17). In the US system, a claimant has the right to have an interpreter present 
for any interview or court hearing so that the applicant can understand what is going on and assist in his or 
her application. During an asylum interview, a claimant must supply his or her own interpreter.  This does 
not need to be a professional interpreter; a friend or family member who speaks English fluently will do.  An 
asylum attorney typically will have the ability to find an interpreter that suits claimants needs. During any 
court hearing, the government will provide an interpreter for the asylum claimant upon request. This 
interpreter is typically not an employee of the government but a contractor hired solely for interpreting. See, 
New York Human Rights Committee, “Interpreter”, (2013). This information was taken from the Political 
Asylum Website at http://www.politicalasylumusa.com/asylum-process/interpreter/ (last accessed 24/7/17). 
18 Lemon N, “Access to Justice: Can Domestic Violence Courts Better Address the Need of Non-English 
Speaking Victims of Domestic Violence”, 21 Berkeley Journal of Gender Law & Justice 38 (2006), at 54 
(discussing the Alaska Court System). 
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determine whether they will be able to cope with such highly sensitive and complex 
matters in cases they are translating, of if they should decline a case.19Developing a panel 
of refugee interpreters prepared to work within the specialised gender would entail 
training them on issues pertaining to the gender-guidelines, their substantive provisions, 
the dynamics of FGM and gender-based violence, applicable legal terminology, and a 
short outline of the jurisdictions refugee laws and processes. Training should also include 
educating interpreters about the fact that refugee claimants may be expecting a very 
different court system from the one used within my respective case-studies. Such training 
can also be instrumental in preparing claimants for their hearings. For instance, if 
claimants are not aware that their oral testimony will be considered, (which many may 
assume as the authorities within their countries of origin would not listen to them) they 
may assume that there is no point in appearing at a determination hearing, or speaking. In 
describing the RDP to FGM claimants, interpreters may be able to explain the process in 
a manner which they can understand, and in turn explain that while authority figures in 
their countries of origin where unwilling to listen to their claims, decision-makers in their 
‘refuge states’ will listen to her tell her story and consider this as evidence. Such points 
of clarifications according to Lemon, “go toward the goal of allowing victims meaningful 
access to the court and should not be seen as interpreters interjecting their own opinions 




 Like the approach adopted with the specialised domestic violence courts, claimants 
should be assured that their hearing is private and that they are safe. Refugee 
determination should at all stages respect the confidentiality of a refugee claim, including 
the fact that an application has been made. Information provided by the claimant to the 
authorities during the RDP is confidential and can only be used by the authorities for the 
purpose for which it was solicited, that is, to determine eligibility for international 
                                                 




protection. As a rule, no information should be shared with the authorities of the 
applicant’s COI, nor should it be released to any third party without the express consent 
of the individual concerned. The applicant’s consent must be freely offered and not 
obtained under duress.21 Reassurances of confidentiality can provide claimants with the 
psychological protection which they need to feel safe and open up about their experiences, 
thus bolstering their credibility claims.22 One way of promoting privacy is to ask 
claimants, if possible, to provide separate contact details from other family members, so 
that decision-makers and other interested parties can contact or correspond with her 
directly. All staff, including decision-makers and volunteers should be required to sign a 
confidentiality agreement, and at the beginning of the interview it is essential that some 
time is spent explaining the meaning of the duty of confidentiality of the decision-maker 
and interpreter. Furthermore, in instances were female interpreters and decision-makers 
are unavailable, the use of special measures as will be discussed in due course is 
paramount. Adjournments where appropriate should be permitted to establish trust and to 
ensure that all relevant information has been obtained.23  
 
III.  Special Measures 
 
Following the approach of the criminal justice system, within the specialised courts, 
vulnerable and intimidated witnesses are entitled to special measures.24 These provisions 
                                                 
21 UNHCR, “Refugee Status Determination: Identifying Who is a Refugee”, (2005), at 118. This document 
is available online at http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/43141f5d4.pdf (last accessed 24/7/17). 
22See generally, Pennebaker J.W, “Opening Up: The Healing Power of Confiding in Others”, W. Morrow: 
New York, (1990). See also, Davis R & Brickman E, “Supportive and Unsupportive Responses of Others 
to Rape Victims: Effects in Concurrent Victim Adjustments”, 19 American Journal of Community 
Psychology 443, (1991). 
23 For instance, if during the hearing it is considered appropriate that a claimant be given the opportunity to 
be assessed by a medical practitioner or counsellor, decision-makers should adjourn the hearing to enable 
the medical report or assessment to be obtained or for further investigations or enquiries to be made. Such 
information may be vital for deciding on the claim. Furthermore, decision-makers and advocates should 
also encourage claimants to seek appropriate counselling or other support services after a hearing or suggest 
to the applicant’s representative that such services be sought. 
24 For further discussions on the use of special measures see, Hall M, “The Use and Abuse of Special 
Measures: Giving Victims the Choice?”, 8 Journal of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime 
Prevention 33, (2007), at 33-53; Bull R, “Research on Trying to Improve the Quality of Information Elicited 




help witnesses, including victims of domestic and sexual violence, give their best 
evidence in court and help to relieve some of the stress associated with giving evidence.25 
Whist UNHCR policies and guidelines are relatively silent on the use of such measures, 
save to the extent that interpreters and suitably trained decision-makers should be made 
available when required, the 2002 UNHCR Gender-Guidelines state that, “the interview 
room should be arranged in such a way as to encourage discussion, promote 
confidentiality and to lessen any possibility of perceived power imbalances”.26 
Accordingly, the UK and CIRB Gender-Guidelines explicitly state that it may be 
appropriate in certain circumstances to consider whether claimants should be allowed to 
have the option of providing their testimony outside the hearing room by affidavit or by 
videotape.27 Evidence of this practice is unclear and despite efforts to obtain such 
information my requests have repeatedly gone unanswered. Whilst this silence may 
indicate a reluctance to disclose that on account of the non-binding nature of the 
guidelines that such mechanisms are not readily utilised within the case-studies, their 
success within the domestic and international courts/tribunals have been widely 
documented,28 and that success can similarly be replicated within the specialised gender 
hearings.  
     Before examining some special measures below, which may help to minimize the 
ordeal and trauma experienced by FGM claimants when giving their evidence, it is 
important to note that claimants should be made aware of the fact that such measures are 
available to them and can be accessed. However, these provisions, it is argued should only 
                                                 
25 Crown Prosecution Service, “Special Measures”, (2017), available online via the Crown Prosecution 
Website at http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/s_to_u/special_measures/ (last accessed 21/7/17). 
26UNHCR Gender Guidelines, supra note 11, para 36 (iv). 
27 CIRB Gender-Guidelines, supra note 16, Section D.3. (“In some cases it will be appropriate to consider 
whether claimants should be allowed to have the option of providing their testimony outside the hearing 
room by affidavit or by videotape, or in front of members and refugee claims officers specifically trained 
in dealing with violence against women”); UK Gender-Guidelines, supra note 16, section 5.6 (noting that 
evidence regarding sexual assaults may be given in writing or through video-link). 
28 Hamlyn B, et al, “Are Special Measures Working? Evidence of Surveys of Vulnerable and Intimidated 
Witnesses”, (2004). This report is available online at  
http://www.popcenter.org/problems/witness_intimidation/PDFs/Hamlyn_etal_2004.pdf (last accessed 
21/7/17); Roberts et al, “Monitoring Success, Accounting for Failure: The Outcome of Prosecutors' 
Applications for Special Measures Directions under the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999”, 9 
International Journal of Evidence and Proof 269, (2005). See also, Doak J, “The Victim and the Criminal 
Trial: A survey of Recent Trends in Regional and International Tribunals”, 23 Legal Studies 1, (2003), at 
1-32 & Ni Aolain F, “Radical Rules: The Effects of Evidential and Procedural Rules on the Regulation of 
Sexual Violence in War", 60 Albany Law Review 883, (1997). 
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be utilised in instances where either or both female interpreters or decision-makers are 
unavailable and should be automatic where a claimant does not want to be interviewed by 




The use of screens ensures that victims and witnesses can give their evidence without 
been seen by the defendant.29 Within the RDP screens may be used as a means of 
preventing FGM claimants of having to give face-to-face evidence in front of either or 
both male interpreters and decision-makers. The only person who should be able to see 
the claimant in such an instance is her legal representative or any other female appointed 
to assist her. The use of screens may also be instrumental in overcoming the use of 
demeanour assessments as a means of determining whether a claimant is telling the truth, 
as discussed in Chapter Three. Thus, the inability to visually see a claimant, ensures that 
their appearance, attitude and manner will no longer be deciding factors in determining 
credibility. Attention and focus will be directed towards any objective, hard-core evidence 




Victims and witnesses can also give evidence from outside the courtroom through a live 
stream. This could be another room or a suitable location outside the court. Giving 
evidence in this way may make FGM claimants feel less intimidated as fewer people will 
be present whilst testimony is given and the ability to discuss such claims in a none face-
to-face manner will potentially increase the quality of evidence provided by decreasing 
the anxiety of the claimant.  
 
                                                 
29 In the context of the criminal justice system, screens must not prevent the witness from seeing, and being 
seen by the judge, jury, the legal representatives acting in the proceedings, and any interpreter or other 
person appointed to assist the witness. 
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C. Evidence in Private 
 
Evidence in private involves clearing the courtroom of member of the public.30 Applying 
this measure in the RDP, would ensure that FGM claimants could be interviewed 
separately, without the presence of male family members, to ensure that they can present 
their case. Such victims, as discussed in Chapter Two may not feel comfortable recounting 
their experiences in front of relatives, who may not know, and especially their own 
children who, frequently, will not have been told about allegations. As such, family 
members should be excluded from the hearing, and child-care facilities should be put into 
place so that claimants can make their claims in private and without the fear of 
dishonouring her family and community and the resulting alienation which may 
accompany such claims. This approach has been advocated for by the UNHCR31 and is 
discussed within each of the domestic gender-guidelines examined.32 However, some 
women may not want to be interviewed separately, and in some instances, it could be 
argued that mothers and fathers opposed to FGM united by the desire to protect their 
daughter(s) may prefer to be interviewed together. Thus, by categorising this provision as 
                                                 
30 This measure provides for the exclusion from court, during the giving of the witness’s evidence, of 
persons of any description specified in the direction other than the accused, legal representatives acting in 
the case, or any interpreter or other person appointed to assist the witness. However, such a direction may 
only be given where the proceedings relate to a sexual offence or it appears to the court that there are 
reasonable grounds for believing that any person other than the accused has sought, or will seek, to 
intimidate the witness in connection with testifying in the proceedings. 
31 UNHCR Gender Guidelines, supra note 11, at 9 (nothing that, “Women asylum-seekers should be 
interviewed separately, without the presence of male family members, in order to ensure that they have an 
opportunity to present their case. It should be explained to them that they may have a valid claim in their 
own right”). 
32See, Macklin A, “Cross-Border Shopping for Ideas: A Critical Review of United States, Canadian and 
Australian Approaches to Gender-Related Asylum Claims” 13 Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 25, 
(1999) at 37. Within some societies, family members may alienate victims of sexual violence, viewing such 
violence as the woman’s fault for failing to preserve her virginity or marital dignity. See also, Saso D, “The 
Development of Gender-Based Asylum Law: A Critique of the 1995 INS Guidelines” 8 Hastings Women’s 
Law Journal 263, (1997), at 274; INS Gender Guidelines, supra note 16, at 5-6; UK Gender Guidelines, 
supra note 16, Section 5.26 – 5.28. The Home Office Asylum Policy Instruction, also notes that, “Victims 
of sexual abuse may not feel comfortable recounting their experiences in front of relatives, who may not 
know, and especially their own children who, frequently, will not have been told about allegations. 
Applicants should be interviewed by themselves, especially in cases where a claim of sexual abuse has been 
made or it is considered to be a possibility. All applicants are advised in their letter of invitation not to bring 
their children to the interview but to make alternative arrangements. If their children do attend the interview, 
they will have to accompany the applicant in the interview room (assuming that no other adult relative is 
present). See, Asylum Policy Instruction: Gender Issues in the Asylum Claim, supra note 16, at 12. 
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a special measure, claimants are made aware of the fact that provisions are available for 
having their claim heard in private, and in tandem reinforces the ethos and procedural 
provisions enshrined within the examined gender-guidelines.  
 
D. Video Recorded Evidence 
 
This measure allows evidence to be submitted to the court in advance.33 Within the 
proposed gender hearings, the use of video-recorded evidence would be paramount as it 
would enable the hearings, conducted by trained staff to occur in a relatively informal 
setting, thus making the process more accommodating for women. Furthermore, such 
video evidence would be accepted as her evidence- in-chief so that she does not have to 
repeat her story, and she would then be cross-examined if required via a video link rather 
than appearing in person. Thus, by easing the anxiety of the claimant, such evidence 
enables the decision-maker to see and hear a claimant, particularly a child claimant being 
interviewed at the time of her application for protection, and such evidence may provide 
more compelling and coherent evidence than that given in subsequent hearings. Such 
objective evidence will also be instrumental in identifying further training needs 
pertaining to good interviewing skills and how to treat claimants in a gender-sensitive 
manner.  
 
E. Use of an Intermediary 
 
This measure provides that an intermediary can be appointed by the court to assist a 
witness in giving evidence. The intermediary can explain questions or answers to be 
understood by the witness or the questioner but without changing the substantive 
evidence. Within the specialised refugee process, in addition to the use of interpreters, 
intermediaries should when requested be made available to provide assistance to FGM 
claimants, especially children and those claimants suffering from PTSD. Ideally 
                                                 
33 The majority of young victims and witnesses within the criminal justice context will give their evidence 
through video recorded interview. See, Crown Prosecution Service, “Special Measures”, supra note 25. 
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intermediaries, will also speak the language of the claimant, however, this may not always 
be possible and in such instances allocated interpreters may also be employed to act as an 
interpreter between the claimant and the intermediary. This will be especially beneficial 
where intermediaries, such as psychologists, doctors or other expert personnel are used in 
this capacity. Intermediaries should ideally be individuals with a shown interest or 
expertise in issues pertaining to women, FGM, or gender-based violence in general. They 
should also be appointed based on the needs of the claimant where possible. 
     Procedural justice literature34, has revealed that individuals given choice rather than 
coerced into situations respond better with greater satisfaction and with more motivation 
and effective performance.35 Current special measures, namely the gender-guidelines, are 
not satisfactory or on a par with those facilities available in the specialised domestic 
violence courts. The examined case-studies need to consider better meeting the needs of 
FGM claimants where decision-makers consider that they need special measures to 
disclose traumatic or sensitive aspects of their claims. Not only will this empower 
claimants, it will also ensure that such necessary safeguards are employed which ensure 
that the law is balanced, proceedings are fair and that determinations, including credibility 




As discussed in Chapter Three, emotion displayed during the recounting of experiences 
should not affect a woman’s credibility. Decision-makers should understand that cultural 
and trauma play an important and complex role in determining behaviour.36 The 
reluctance to disclose information, coupled with a lack of COI and physical evidence 
makes it easier for FGM claims to be discredited on credibility grounds. This is 
                                                 
34See generally, Edwards I, “An Ambiguous Participant: The Crime Victim and Criminal Justice Decision-
Making”, 44 The British Journal of Criminology 967, (2004); Laxminarayan M, “Procedural Justice and 
Psychological Effects of Criminal Proceedings: The Moderating Effect of Offense Type”, 25 Social Justice 
Research 390, (2012) & Jackson JD, “Justice for All: Putting Victims at the Heart of Criminal Justice?”, 
30 Journal of Law and Society 309, (2003). 
35 Wincik B, “Civil Commitment: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Model”, Carolina Academic Press: Durham, 
NC, (2005). 
36 UNHCR Gender Guidelines, supra note 11, at 10. 
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compounded in instances where, decision-makers use late disclosure against claimants37 
and misuse available COI to undermine the credibility of claimants.38  
       It is difficult to find any uniform approach to credibility assessments because it is so 
subjective and interview tactics vary from decision-maker to decision-maker.39 Such 
variability in interview tactics is likely to produce inconsistency in results40 and has 
contributed to the currently asylum lottery. In a gender sensitive FGM hearing open 
questions need to be asked. Without open questions, a claimant would be unlikely to take 
the initiative in describing the events that she believes are most important. The claimant 
would instead need to be able to provide specifically requested information, and the 
efficacy of the interview would become dependent on the accuracy of the interviewer’s 
assumptions about what information is important.41 Arguably, the RDP needs a more 
systematic approach to determining which questions are relevant in FGM cases. As 
Herlihy argues,42decision-makers need yardsticks by which to assess different approaches 
to credibility assessment, as well as a greater awareness of the logical steps that 
adjudicators take on their way to reaching credibility decisions. Through the use of special 
measures and consistent enforcement of the gender and credibility guidance discussed in 
chapter three, FGM claimants would have access to a fairer system and the inconsistency 
in similar cases may be reduced. Additionally, to be successful, there also exists a need 
for specific training (in gender and credibility issues) among decision-makers and their 
selection to panels based on their experience and expertise, including legal knowledge, 
psychological abilities, and experience in the field. Such expertise and training will 
effectively eliminate the risk of vicarious traumatization and make decision-makers more 
                                                 
37 Decision-makers use late disclosure against an applicant’s credibility, regularly disbelieving claimants 
who make such allegations, sometimes stating that they believe the applicant has made up the allegation to 
help their asylum claim. This is despite the UK Gender Guidelines for instance stating that, “If an applicant 
does not immediately describe information relating to her claim, this should not automatically count against 
her”. See, UK Gender Guidelines, supra note 16.  
38See, Amnesty International, “A Question of Credibility? Who So Many Initial Asylum Decisions are 
Overturned on Appeal in the UK”, Still Human Still Here: UK, (2013). 
39 Kagan M, “Refugee Credibility Assessment and the “Religious Imposter” Problem: A Case Study of 
Eritrean Pentecostal Claims in Egypt”, 43 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1179, (2010), at 1230. 
40Ibid. 
41Ibid, at 1231. 
42Herlihy J et al, “Discrepancies in Autobiographical Memories—Implications for the Assessment of Asylum 
Seekers: Repeated Interviews Study”, 324 British Medical Journal 324, (2002), at 324. 
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aware of how cultural differences may be a particularly compelling problem in FGM-
related cases. 
 
V. COI  
 
COI is required within the RDP as it provides ‘objective evidence’ indicating the 
plausibility of a claimant’s testimony, to help substantiate, assess and determine claims. 
43 Particular difficulties arise in substantiating women’s cases due to a lack of research in 
the field, and consequently a lack of awareness of issues affecting women and a lack of 
reference to women’s issues in COI materials. COI needs to have relevance to women’s 
claims, 44 otherwise, vital information is missing which results in inadequate and 
inconsistent decision-making. This thesis and the examined FGM jurisprudence has 
revealed that there is a deliberate use of inadequate COI to justify credibility denials, 45 
and that there is insufficient usage of COI by decision-makers generally. 46 
    In addition to the use of COI to discredit credibility, other issues which result in 
decision-makers relying upon inferior quality COI include: limited analysis due to time 
constraints; funding restrictions as a barrier to undertaking COI research; restricted 
internet access; and the inconsistent use of COI throughout every stage of the RDP.47 Only 
by removing these barriers and employing good COI practice can decision-making 
                                                 
43 Collier B, “Country of Origin Information and Women: Researching Gender and Persecution in the 
Context of Asylum and Human Rights Claims”, Asylum Aid: London, (2007), at 4. 
44 This would include: the position of women before the law; the political social and economic rights of 
women; the cultural and social mores of the country; consequences for non- adherence; the prevalence of 
harmful traditional practices including FGM; the incidence and forms of reported violence against women; 
and the protection available to them and any penalties imposed on those who perpetrate the violence. 
45See, Immigration Advisory Service, “The Refugee Roulette: The Role of Country Information in Refugee 
Status Determination”, (2010), available online via the UNHCR Ref World website at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4b62a6182.html, (last accessed 24/7/17) (hereafter referred to as the 
COI Report). An Executive Summary of the COI Report is also available online at 
http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/90_1264501167_ias-refugee-roulette-2010-executive-summary.pdf (last 
accessed 24/7/17) (hereafter referred to as the COI Executive Summary). 
46 Persistent problems as identified in the case-law and reaffirmed in the COI Report concerned selective 
quoting, speculative argument and reliance on outdated sources. See, COI Executive Summary, supra note 
45, at Methods of Use of COI within the Determination Process. 
47Ibid, at Barriers and Facilitators to Using COI. Such constraints, which can be time consuming, also 
inadvertency can dissuade both decision-makers and legal representatives from undertaking any in-depth 
research investigations, or conducting any further research or analysis. 
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improve. This can be achieved firstly by utilising superior quality COI information48 
within an independent documentation centre and secondly by using advanced Information 
Technology (IT). Whilst the case-studies have their own dedicated COI services,49 in the 
current economic climate, coupled with human and financial restraints, claimants and 
legal representatives may lack time and resources to research the political, legal, human 
rights and humanitarian situations that force people to flee their homes and seek 
protection. In addition to been made aware of the different COI experts offering objective 
evidence on individual claims for refugee status,50 the thesis posits that a specialist team 
within the dedicated COI services dealing with gender issues solely be established. Such 
an initiative, in a similar fashion to the role of the resource co-ordinator within the New 
York Domestic Violence court, would be responsible for collecting information, 
compiling reports, conducting field work research and producing the highest quality COI. 
Co-ordinated by a resource co-ordinator, staff would be trained in the use and provisions 
of the gender-guidelines and through conducting in depth analysis and completing case 
specific research requests, decision-makers and legal representatives will observe a far 
superior, systematic and individualized use of COI.  
       Another innovation from the specialised domestic violence courts which could be 
replicated to a degree within these centres is the use of advanced IT. Advanced IT 
applications, such as the Domestic Violence Court Technology Application Resource 
Link, discussed in Chapter Four, facilitates the transfer of critical information between 
the domestic violence court and a variety of other agencies involved in the case. A similar 
software application could be used to facilitate the transfer and accessing of additional 
                                                 
48 In establishing a framework of quality criteria which constitutes acceptable COI, the following factors 
should be taken into account: up to date information; information which is as factual as possible within its 
proper historical context; referenced and retrievable information; balanced, reliable and objective 
information; information written by an organisation or expert; and finally, succinct academic pieces of 
research should also be used. But recognising the value of country research and what constitutes ‘quality 
information’ is just one element; undertaking it is another. Although the advent of the internet has made it 
easier to access such information, the challenge for many involved in the determination process lies in 
knowing what to look for to begin with and how to pick and choose from among the plethora of potential 
sources which currently exist. 
49 For further information on the Canadian IRB Documentation Centre, the Country Information and Policy 
Unit of the Home Office, and the US Resource Information Centre, please refer to their respective websites.  
50See, Rights in Exile Programme, “Country of Origin Information Experts”, (2017). This report is available 
online via the Rights in Exile Programme website at 
http://www.refugeelegalaidinformation.org/country-origin-information-experts (last accessed 23/7/17). 
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COI gender-based information from other documentation centres. This would ensure 
heightened communication and the provision of all the necessary information prior to 
FGM determinations and would undoubtedly encourage better decision-making. As 
reliable information on women is difficult to obtain, there remains the possibility that 
information on specific countries may not include information on FGM. Consequently, 
decision-makers may assume that FGM is not an issue and denied refugee status. A co-
ordinated software application implemented by several determination centres can provide 
information on a specific country of region which another cannot find. Collaboration 
among the case-studies in respects of accessing information may be a particularly useful 
tool in respects of ensuring that comprehensive and reliable information on FGM is 
obtained and presented in a gender-sensitive manner. This development would give 
credibility to the gender-guidelines, contribute to a process which accommodates the 
specific needs of women and encourage collaboration among different countries to ensure 
that the claims of FGM claimants are fully investigated. Arguably, the use of such a 
system will further help in appeal cases as the research history of decision-makers, legal 
representatives and other interested parties could be scrutinised.51 The ability to identify 
limited usage and analysis of COI, is instrumental firstly in rooting out bias and holding 
individuals accountable for failing to implement the gender-guidelines; and secondly in 
identifying the training needs of individuals in researching, accessing and analysing COI 
information. 52  
 
VI. Training and Education 
 
As discussed throughout the thesis, decision-makers often do not understand either the 
psychological dynamics of relationships involving domestic violence or the obstacles 
facing women seeking protection.53 To remedy this discrepancy, such individuals need to 
                                                 
51 This is assuming that such specialised software would be accessible only to interested parties via a 
subscription which would be both username and password protected. 
52 Such training should consist of the following: Research Skills; Internet Skills; Source Assessment Skills; 
Analysis Skills; Thematic Research Skills and information, in particular on FGM issues; Country specific 
research information; Instructing Experts; Presenting data clearly; and General COI Courses.  
53 In addition to failing to understand the complexities of leaving abusive and discriminatory relationships, 
untrained court personnel and judges can and do misinterpret victim behaviour that is symptomatic of the 
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receive the education and training necessary to adequately perform their jobs.54 Education 
can be a highly effective tool for reclaiming judicial neutrality.55 As discussed in Chapter 
Four, victims need to understand what has happened and the impact it has had on them. 
They need sympathy and understanding, not blame. The specialised domestic violence 
courts ensure that all individuals with whom a victim will come into contact with will 
receive training to sensitize them to these needs and how to meet them. Some of the best 
practices emanating from these courts will now be examined. It is envisaged that these 
innovations can be easily transposed into the RDPs of the case-studies so that FGM claims 
can similarly be treated in a gender-sensitive and accommodating manner. 
    All participants in the judicial/quasi-judicial process, including the RDP need to 
understand the distinct types of psychological damage that being victimized by crime can 
produce. All need to learn how to act in ways designed to facilitate their amelioration 
rather than their exacerbation. The training they currently receive includes sessions 
conducted by psychologists or social workers designed to increase their sensitivity to 
these issues and to the dos and don’ts of victim interaction. This includes theoretical 
understanding, but also skills training including modelling and role-play exercises. 
Training also covers the more esoteric psychological reactions that crime victimization 
may produce. Individuals are encouraged to understand that those victimized by crime 
can experience a feeling of loss of control in their lives that can produce serious 
psychological consequences, which does not necessary indicate a lack of credibility as 
some FGM decision-makers have wrongly determined. 
                                                 
psychological trauma induced by extended abused. Thus, refugee decision-makers are equally guilty, as 
highlighted in the case-law, of failing to recognise that victims of FGM and other violence may actually be 
suffering from PTSD, whereby many victims may be suffering from symptoms such as: hyperarousal (being 
in a constant state of alertness for and expectation of danger); intrusion (relieving the violence experience 
as if it were constantly occurring in the present, through flashbacks and nightmares); and dissociation (a 
numbing response that includes repressing memories of violent incidents).  These symptoms can affect how 
a victim acts and how they are perceived by decision-makers. In fact, as discussed in chapter three the 
effects of PTSD may be perceived by decision-makers as signs of dishonesty and some FGM claimants are 
therefore denied refugee status because decision-makers find them to lack credibility. 
54 Virtually every study of court response to domestic violence reference in this thesis has recommended 
judicial training as a necessary remedy to existing systemic problems. See for example, Kinports K & 
Fischer K, “Orders of Protection in Domestic Violence Cases: An Empirical Assessment of the Impact of 
The Reform Statutes”, 2 Texas Journal of Women & Law 163, (1993), at 210-12. 
55 Epstein D, “Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases: Rethinking the Role of Prosecutors, 
Judges, and the Court System”, 11 Yale Journal of Law & Feminism 3, (1999), at 44.  
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     To the extent that victims suffer from a form of PTSD, decision-makers and those 
involved in the legal proceedings should encourage them to “open up” about their 
experiences and how they feel about them.56 According to Winick, this could be 
accomplished by designing intake and other processing forms to enable victims to write 
out a description of what occurred to them and what feelings they experienced.57 Whilst 
some victims will have language or literacy deficits that will make writing difficult, 
others, because of their cultural background, will be reluctant to put their statements in 
writing. This will always be an issue within the RDP as the majority of FGM claimants 
will not speak or write in the language of their host country. For these and perhaps other 
victims who might find a writing requirement objectionable, a court official should be 
appointed to explain the process and help them fill in such forms.58 
      When interviewing domestic violence victims, the police, and court officials are 
encouraged to be understanding and to make victims aware that sometimes even testifying 
in court about their story may have a healing effect.59 Domestic violence victims can be 
reluctant to proceed based on fear of having to confront their perpetrator. Indeed, such a 
confrontation may provoke high stress, anxiety, and fear, causing the victim to relive the 
emotional trauma of the crime. To relieve the victim’s apprehension, and to reduce the 
psychological pain and distress it might produce, police and prosecutors can suggest that 
alternative approaches, including the use of special measures, might be possible and may 
not violate the defendant’s right to confront the witnesses against him. Similarly, whilst 
FGM victims do not have the fear of facing their perpetrators, they are nevertheless 
subject to fear and re-traumatization by having to recount their experiences to decision-
makers, especially male decision-makers. Arguably, in applying the gender-guidelines if 
female decision-makers are unavailable, to reduce the psychological pain and distress of 
being interviewed by males, similar alternative approaches should be implemented. 
      Victims of domestic violence often experience the criminal justice process as 
coercive. According to the procedural justice literature, individuals given choice rather 
                                                 
56See, Pennebaker, supra note 22. 
57 Winick B, “Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Victims of Crime”, (2008), at 5. This paper is available online 
at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1102350 (last accessed 24/7/17).  
58Ibid. 
59 Mills, L. G., “Killing her softly: Intimate abuse and the violence of state intervention”, 113 Harvard Law 
Review 550, (1999), at 575. 
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than made to feel coerced, respond better, with greater satisfaction and with more 
motivation and effective performance.60 Experiencing choice and a sense of self-
determination is often vital to an individual's sense of her own locus of control and may 
be essential to emotional well-being.61 Arguably, by promoting safeguards which 
empower victims, this can help to ameliorate their psychological stress and restore their 
emotional equilibrium. Victims of FGM similarly, coupled with a foreign legal process, 
and additional social, cultural and linguistic barriers, also need to feel that they are being 
respected and have some control over the process which they find themselves in. By 
empowering claimants and making them aware of what is occurring and what they need 
to do to ensure that their refugee claims succeed, like domestic violence victims they too 
may respond better, with greater satisfaction and with more motivation and effective 
performance throughout their hearings. Consequently, decision-makers and court 
personnel also need training in how to be good listeners and to convey sympathy, 
empathy, and understanding. This will increase victims’ trust and confidence in these 
officials. 
      Much of the distress experienced by domestic violence victims in the criminal justice 
process relates to their failure to understand how the process works and why. They may 
not understand the various stages of the process, and the inevitable delays that will occur. 
This lack of understanding can further contribute to their anxiety, fear, and depression. 
The remedy, as invoked within the domestic violence courts is for all criminal justice 
personnel to provide victims with increased information about the process and to express 
a willingness to answer their questions. This is described in the social cognition literature 
as “information control”.62 Understanding the process will reduce victims’ stress, fear, 
and anxiety, and help them to manage their expectations concerning what will occur. Such 
information can be provided orally, through written materials, or through offering the 
                                                 
60See, Wincikk, supra note 35. 
61 Winck B, “Therapeutic Jurisprudence Applied: Essays on Mental Health Law”, Carolina Academic 
Press: Durham, NC, (1997), at 68-83; Winck B, “On Autonomy: Legal and Psychological Perspectives”, 
37 Villanova Law Review 1705, (1992), at 1755-68. 
62 Fiske, S. T. et al, “Social Cognition”, Addison-Wesley Publishing Company: Reading, MA, (1984), at 
122; Sydeman S et al, “Procedural Justice in the Context of Civil Commitment: A Critique of Tyler’s 
Analysis”, 3 Psychology, Public Policy & Law, (1997), at 211. 
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victim the opportunity to view a videotape orientation to the criminal process. Such a 
reform could easily be transposed into the RDP. 
     Like the domestic violence courts, all personnel within the RDP need to be trained in 
gender issues and procedures. In this way, one would hope that there would be cross-
pollination between the various cogs in the wheel so that the process can smoothly run in 
a gender-sensitive manner. Attitudes may not change as a result; however, by instituting 
gender-sensitive training for all aspects of the procedure the roots by which the old biases 
could negatively impact decisions should be effectively curtailed.  
    In respects of expertise, decision-makers should be selected according to their abilities 
and expertise, particularly in relation to the applicable law and gender issues. This 
expertise should cover the following areas: (1) legal knowledge – refugee law, 
immigration law, human rights law, conduct of judicial hearings, how to access evidence, 
how to write decisions, and how to interact with claimants and counsel; (2) experience in 
the field – work in countries torn by war or internal strife, work with refugees and 
displaced persons, sensitivity to the dynamics involved in working with individuals from 
other cultures; and (3) psychological abilities – capacity to bear the suffering of all 
individuals, including themselves, and experience in dealing with traumatised individuals. 
Naturally, it is unrealistic to expect decision-makers to be exceptional in all areas, but it 
would be important for them to show skills and experience in all three, with some degree 
of excellence in one or two. Only then, “would they be confident enough and command 
enough respect to use the position of authority that they hold in order to impose standards 
of quality on the behaviour of all other actors”.63 These skills are the basic skills which 
need to be possessed by decision-makers. They also need to be supplemented by 
specialised gender-training to ensure that FGM and other gender-based claims are 
assessed fairly and in a gender-sensitive manner. 
     Judicial education coupled with increased exposure to the issue through extended 
assignments to a domestic violence court, has been utilised within the specialised 
domestic violence courts.  Training has rooted out biases, helped to change attitudes and 
                                                 
63 Rousseau C et al, “The Complexity of Determining Refugeehood: A Multidisciplinary Analysis of the 
Decision-making Process of the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board” 15 Journal of Refugee Studies 
43, (2002), at 66-7. 
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victim protection is prioritised. The RDP can learn from these innovations. Gender-based 
training within the RDP, needs to deal with the application and interpretation of the 
respective gender-guidelines and to ensure that the guidelines are applied and interpreted 
in a gender-sensitive manner. Training must also be targeted towards the eradication of 
existing anti-victim, anti-women, anti-racial and anti-gender biases within a larger 
framework of promoting procedural and gender justice. To give credence to the gender-
guidelines and to ensure that FGM victims obtain the safeguards to which they are 
entitled, extensive reforms to match those in respect of domestic violence must now be 
implemented within the RDPs of the case-studies. Such reforms will ensure that FGM is 
recognised as a criminal as opposed to a cultural practice and assist in the remedying of 
disparities in the protection afforded to female refugee claimants. 
 
VII. Victim Support and Guidance 
 
Evidence from the specialised domestic violence courts have revealed that the use of 
independent domestic violence advocates64 are invaluable in the work of the court and as 
part of the co-ordinated community response to domestic violence. The review, and is 
evident from the examination of the courts, found that witnesses and victims are more 
likely to attend court if they are supported by an IDVA.65 Advocates can contribute to 
increased victim safety and satisfaction and maintain victim engagement with the court.66 
As with the specialised courts, it is strongly recommended that a gender violence advocate 
service should be implemented within the RDP. Advocates within these services should 
have passed an accredited course that equips them to deal with FGM and other forms of 
gender-based violence. They should work with claimants from the initial point of contact. 
Like the IDVAs, they can assess risk and tailor their services to respond to the risks and 
needs of the claimant, including language, medical, social and basis needs. IDVAs work 
                                                 
64 Hereafter referred to as IDVAs. See also, Specialist Domestic Violence Courts Review 2007-8, Section 
6 as cited in Valji & De La Hunt, supra note 7, at 31. 
65Ibid. 
66See, Robinson A, “The Cardiff Women’s Safety Unit: A Multi-Agency Approach to Domestic Violence”, 
Cardiff University, (2003). This report is also available online at  
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/251416613_The_Cardiff_Women%27s_Safety_Unit_A_Multi-
Agency_Approach_to_Domestic_Violence (last accessed 23/7/17). 
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within a multi-agency setting and involve other agencies when required. They are trained 
to understand the value and legal requirement of information-sharing and, as such, are 
integral to the specialised courts. A gender violence advocate service, like the IDVAs 
should be independent of other agencies’ agenda so that they can focus on the needs of 
the claimant and offer impartial advice.  
      From a victim’s perspective, the IDVA offers a main contact point through the many 
different agencies and processes they may need to access. The IDVA identifies sources of 
help and safety, explains the processes and supports the client to get the help they need 
both through their work with the client and through their relationships with other agencies. 
These relationships are best embodied in protocols for referrals and information-sharing. 
Such an approach could be easily transposed within the RDP. According to Valji and De 
La Hunt the best specialised domestic violence courts recognised that the IDVAs’ support 
of witnesses coming to court was essential to the success of the court.67They found that 
specialised courts that has IDVAs with a focus on court work had more successful 
prosecutions than those where IDVAs did not focus on court work.68 Advocates within a 
gender violence advocate service, like the IDVAs can be a key point of contact for FGM 
claimants throughout the entire RDP. Due to the independent nature of their role, advocate 
can work with claimants from their initial application, through the RDP and after if 
needed. Working with other agencies, they can help find interpreters and help to co-
ordinate objective evidence in support of claims, including liaising with dedicated COI 
services, human rights groups and legal representatives. They can also help with removing 
language barriers, childcare issues and medical support services if deemed necessary. 
      IDVAs have also played a role in improving the court system and successful domestic 
violence courts felt that IDVAs should be involved in training, planning, operation and 
performance reviews to ensure that victim safety was not compromised by the systems 
put in place.69Such an approach within the RDP would help to ensure that FGM claimants 
have their cases heard within a gender-sensitive process with support and confidence.  
 
                                                 
67 Valji & De La Hunt, supra note 7, at 32. 
68Ibid. 





For a system to be fair and open, it needs to be supported by physical and human resources 
that are well established within a system based on cultural integrity.70 The combination 
of these elements is the basis of a fair and open process for FGM claimants. This needs to 
be supported through the publication of rules and guidelines, standardized and clear 
written information, free access to legal advice and representation, access to COI, and an 
impartial body to decide appeals. A fair procedure should be followed by all interested 
parties to protect claimants' basic human rights, such as life, liberty, equal treatment, and 
equity. This is exactly, what the recommendation in this thesis hope to achieve.71 
Increased accountability within this co-ordinated response to gender-based violence and 
an on-going expansion of already existing standards (including the use of gender-
guidelines) must also complement any approach to FGM to address the needs of claimants 
and offer viable protection. Specialised gendered courts/hearings can achieve this. This 
approach would firstly give further credibility to the domestic court’s hard-nosed 
approach to domestic violence. Secondly, it reinforces the recognition of FGM as a form 
of persecution. Thirdly, it would encourage the use of gender-guidelines and demand 
training and specialisation among decision-makers and other relevant personnel. Finally, 
such courts/hearings based on the domestic violence models examined will address the 
needs of claimants and potentially redress inadequate quality decision-making and 
inconsistency of FGM asylum decision.  In conclusion, the evidence examined throughout 
the thesis suggests that victims of FGM are not being treated in a gender-sensitive manner. 
To effectively implement the reforms proposed in this chapter, a coordinated gendered 
system is needed. Like the approach adopted by the domestic violence courts and 
initiatives such as the Legacy Gender Integration Group mentioned in Chapter Four, the 
implementation of new laws, policies and processes when paired with the development of 
a coordinated strategy, ensures all interested parties respond in a consistent way to 
violence against women and can be held accountable. By dedicating part of the RDP to 
                                                 
70 Pacífico A, “A Network Society Communicative Model for Optimizing the Refugee Status Determination 
(RSD) Procedures”, 56(1) Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional 22, (2013), at 30.  
71 Ibid. See also, Alexander M, “Refugee status determination conducted by UNHCR”, 11 International 
Journal of Refugee Law 251, (1999), at 286-7. 
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gender-based violence, it sends a message to the world that violence against women will 
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pertaining to FGM as 
a basis for refugee 
status and on the US 
asylum system, I was 
contacted by the 
managing attorney 




They provided me an 
in-depth analysis of 
the US Court and 
Asylum system. 
Furthermore, I was 
furnished with a 
number of relevant 
cases to examine and 
provided with 
information on the 
construction and 
application of the 
PSG in gender-cases. 
The information 
provided was of the 
uttermost importance 
and formed the basis for 
many of the discussions 
in the thesis. 
 
Specifically, it revealed 
that disparate outcomes 
are evident in gender-




In the US, the PSG 
category is applied very 
narrowly these days, 
whether gender is the 
issue or not. PSG cases 
have become 
increasingly difficult to 
win. Gender-based 
cases have been 





She also revealed that 
it difficult to find 
claimants to speak 
about their 
experiences of FGM 
and their experiences 
within the RDP. 
 
Lisa further 
confirmed that in her 
experience gender 
guidelines are not 
routinely used and 
that immigration 
judges are not trained 
in their use and 
content. 
The reluctance of 
claimants to speak 
about the violence they 
suffered and their 
experiences within the 
RDP further reinforced 
the need to look for 







6/11/08 Initially received 
positive response to 
email requests for 
information on the 
practice of FGM. 
 
However, promised 
reports were never 
received. 
Information on their 
website, proved 
influential in helping 
me understand the 
practice of FGM, its 
prevalence, health 
consequences and some 




7/2/07 Communication was 
made with the Centre 
in the hope of 
speaking to some 
Influential in enhancing 
my understanding of the 
aims and objectives of 
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victims of domestic 
violence who had 
experience of the 
specialised domestic 
violence courts.  
 
Unfortunately, this 
was not a possibility 
as some women were 
unwilling and others 
due to childcare etc 
were unable to meet 
me. 
 
I was however 
provided with a 
wealth of information 




Courts and the role of 
victim advocates. 
the specialised domestic 
violence courts. 
 
Specifically, I came to 
recognise FGM as a 
specific form of 
domestic violence.  
 
I determined that the 
protective mechanisms 
implemented within the 
specialised courts could 
be transposed into the 
RDP to help victims of 










Various requests were 
made over several 
years to obtain 
information on the 
issue of FGM as the 
basis for refugee 
status within Canada. 
 
Information and updates 
on cases was influential 
in helping to understand 
what areas of reform 
were need within the 




I have been met with 
numerous no 
responses and on the 
two occasions that 
information was 
provided it was very 
general. I was merely 
told to refer to the 
IRB website, as well 
as CanLII and RefLex 
for relevant cases.  
I was informed that it 
is difficult to get 
information on 
specific FGM and 
other gender-based 
cases that have not 
been made public 
because of privacy 
concerns. 
More specifically, this 
organisation confirmed 
for me that many 
gender-based cases and 
statists are not made 
public in order to 
protect the sovereignty 
of the State so as not to 
open the floodgates to 
others in a similar 
position as those 
already granted refugee 
status. 
 
From the cases which I 
was able to examine, 
they helped to clarify 
my belief that there is a 
need for better training, 
access and 
accountability of legal 
advocates. 
 
The fact that many 
decisions are 
unavailable due to 
privacy concerns also 
prevented me from 
being able to adequately 
see how the gender 
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guidelines were used (if 
at all) in such cases. 
UNICEF 
Ireland 
18/11/07 Following an 
information request 
for information on the 
subject of FGM as a 
basis for refugee 
status, I was provided 
with a number of 
links which provided 
me with some 
background 
information on the 
subject. 
The information 
provided was limited to 
background information 
on the practice of FGM 
generally. 
 
I was surprised at how 
little information there 
was on the subject of 
gender-based violence 
and the implications of 
seeking refugee status. 
Irish Refugee 
Council 
Oct 07 – Aug 
09 
Over this period of 
time, Emma Carey a 
legal assistance within 
the organisations 
provided me with 
information on FGM 
and country of origin 
information 
pertaining to Nigeria. 
She also provided me 
with a number of 
relevance cases and 
other information 
relating to my 
research which she 
through was 
beneficial. 
Information and updates 
on cases was influential 
in helping to understand 
what areas of reform 
were need within the 
RDP.   
 
More specifically, this 
organisation confirmed 
for me that many 
refugee cases, including 
domestic violence cases 
and statists are not made 
public in order to 
protect the sovereignty 
of the State so as not to 
open the floodgates to 
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others in a similar 
position as those 
already granted refugee 
status. 
 
To aid in my 
understanding of how 
victims of gender-based 
violence are treated 
within the RDP, the 
Council encouraged me 
to contact AkiDwa. 
AkiDwa 19/11/08 I made contact with 
this organisation 
which had been 
established in 2001 by 
a group of African 
women to address, 
isolation, racism and 
Gender. 
 
I was advised that due 
to the sensitive nature 
of FGM, it would not 
be possible to speak 
with victims. I was 
however, directed to 
information on their 




provided, reinforced to 
me the need for 
sensitivity when dealing 
with victims of gender-
based violence. It made 
me aware of the need 
for a gender-sensitive 





enlightened me to 
understand that 
reforming the refugee 
definition was not the 




violence, and the 
treatment of victims 
within the RDP. 
RDP itself was more 









2/12/2008 In the midst of my 
research looking for 
current FGM/refugee 
claims I came across 
this legal firm in the 
US. 
They were dealing 
with an Ethiopian 
asylum case in which 
(1) FGM (2) potential 
firm resettlement in 
South Africa and 
Botswana were key 
issues.  Unfortunately, 
despite several 
requests for 
information on the 
case, I received no 
correspondence. 
Whilst, I received no 
correspondence to my 
information requests, 
the fact that the lawyer 
in the case was actively 
looking for contacts for 
experts on FGM or 
country experts for 
Ethiopia, South Africa 
or Botswana, helped to 
inform my 
understanding of what 
is needed of advocates 
in terms of research, 
evidential requirements 
and the need for country 
of origin information. 





1/5/09 Sought information 





Was informed that 
only legal 
The fact these decisions 
are not available to all 
researchers reinforced 
my floodgates 
argument. It further 
revealed the need for 




their researchers can 
access these 
decisions. 




 Sought information 





Was informed that 
only legal 
representatives and 
their researchers can 
access these 
decisions. 
Whilst, some decisions 
were available online, 
the fact that so many are 
not accessible to the 
public again reinforced 
my floodgates 
argument. It further 
revealed the need for 
better training, access 
and accountability of 
legal advocates. 
 
The lack of information 
also prevented me from 
being able to adequately 
see how the gender 








84 Clarton Pl 
Glasgow 
G5 9TD 
4/5/09 Through her work as 
a solicitor in the field, 
Nicole had come 
across the subject of 
FGM as a basis for 
refugee status. She 
wrote and published 
work on the subject. 
 
The information 
provided reinforced my 
opinion that the reasons 
given by the 
Immigration and 
Asylum Tribunal in the 
UK for continually 
dismissing asylum 
appeals based on FGM 
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She spoke with me 
briefly on her own 
understanding of the 
subject and send me a 
copy of work which 
she had written on the 
subject. She too felt 
that decisions were 
inconsistent and not 
in line with other 
jurisdictions.  
were inconsistent and 
out-of-step with other 
jurisdictions. 
 
She also clarified that it 
is difficult to obtain 
gender-related statistics 
and that most decisions 
are not widely available. 
Again, this raised 
questions over training, 
use of the guidelines 
and issues of cultural 






7/5/09  Following an 
information request 
for information on the 
subject of FGM as a 
basis for refugee 
status, I was provided 
with a number of 
links which provided 
me with some 
background 
information on the 
subject. 
 
Further requests for 
additional information 
The information 
provided was limited to 
background information 
on the practice of FGM 
generally. 
 
It nevertheless provided 
me with information 
which I used in the 
thesis to help me 
understand the 
complexity of defining 
gender-based violence 
and the relevance of 
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were met with an 
automated reply 
informing me that 
someone would 
respond to my request 
in due course. No 
further information 
was received. 



























Appendix B:  
 
FGM as a Recognised Human Rights Violation 
 
Several treaties, General Comments/Recommendations of treaty monitoring bodies, and 
consensus documents explicitly condemn FGM as a human rights violation. Other core 
human rights treaties of the United Nations and African Union provide general protections 
for the human rights of women and girls, which have been interpreted to prohibit FGM. 
Many of the sources of international law that are most frequently referenced to end FGM 
are listed in Appendix B, though this list is not exhaustive. 
 
A. International Law Source Documents 
 
Two regional human rights treaties explicitly condemn FGM as a human rights violation. 
 
• Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of 
Women in Africa. Adopted 11 July 2003; Entered into Force 25 November 2005. 
 
• Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against 
women and domestic violence. Adopted 11 May 2011; Entered into Force 1 
August 2014. 
 
Several United Nations human rights treaty monitoring bodies have explicitly condemned 
FGM as a human rights violation. 
 
• Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. 
General Recommendation No. 14 on Female circumcision under the Convention 




• Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women. General 
Recommendation No. 19 on Violence against women under the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. 1992. 
 
• Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. 
General Recommendation No. 24 on Article 12 (Women and health) of the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. 
1999. 
 
• Committee on the Rights of the Child. General Comment No. 4 on Adolescent 
health and development under the Convention on the Rights of the Child. 19 May-
6 June 2003. 
 
• Human Rights Committee. General Comment No. 28 on Article 3 (Equality of 
rights between men and women) of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. 29 March 2000. 
 
• Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. General Comment No. 14 
on Article 12 (The right to the highest attainable standard of health) of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 25 April-12 May 
2000. 
 
Several United Nations consensus documents have explicitly condemned FGM as a 
human rights violation. 
 
• Transforming our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. 
General Assembly Resolution A/RES/70/1. 25 September 2015. 
 
• General Assembly Resolution 67/146, Intensifying global efforts for the 




• General Assembly Resolution 48/104, Declaration on the Elimination of Violence 
against Women. 20 December 1993 
 
• Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action of the Fourth World Conference on 
Women. 4-15 September 1995. 
 
• Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and 
Development. 5-13 September 1994. 
 
• Commission on the Status of Women Resolution 51/2 on Ending of Female 
Genital Mutilation. 26 February-9 March 2007. 
 
B. Other Human Rights Instruments 
 
Several other core international and human rights treaties generally protect women’s and 
girls’ human rights, including protection from FGM. 
 
• Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. 
Adopted 18 December 1979; Entered into force 3 September 1981. 
 
• Convention on the Rights of the Child. Adopted 20 November 1989; Entered into 
force 2 September 1990. 
 
• International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Adopted 16 December 1966; 
Entered into force 23 March 1976. 
 
• International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. Adopted 16 




• Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment. Adopted 10 December 1984; Entered into force 26 June 1987. 
 
• African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. Adopted 27 June 1981; Entered 
into force 21 October 1986. 
 
• African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. Adopted 1 July 1990; 
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